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In South Africa, local government touches the lives of everybody, every day. Local 
government is regarded as the closest sphere of government to communities and 
represents all of government at this level. A functional and developmental local 
government is a necessary requirement for an effective developmental state. 
However, more than 20 years post the implementation of various local government 
legislative policy reforms and the rollout of special targeted programmes to 
municipalities, most continue to struggle to render basic services adequately to 
citizens and, as a consequence, have not even started giving effect to their 
developmental role as envisaged in the Constitution of South Africa. 
Notwithstanding the progress and advancements made since the dawn of democracy, 
it is becoming progressively challenging for government to accelerate development 
because of the difficulties and complications associated with institutionalising good 
governance in municipalities to address issues such as corruption, mismanagement 
and maladministration, particularly within the local government sphere. Municipalities 
in South Africa are swamped with many challenges impacting and threatening the 
sustainability of local government performance, and many are struggling to fulfil their 
obligations as set out in Section 152 of Constitution. The municipal performance 
outcomes over the last two decades paint a very gloomy picture of some leadership, 
governance, financial management, financial health and accountability fault lines, 
which have hampered municipalities from delivering municipal services on a 
sustainable basis. 
This dissertation aims to respond to the question of why municipalities are unable to 
deliver on their core service delivery mandate and give effect to the local government 
developmental objectives as envisaged in the Constitution and the myriad of local 
government statutes. The research also explores what should be put in place to 
ensure that municipalities or local government gives effect to the local government 
developmental agenda in a sustainable manner. 
In this regard, the dissertation proposes an integrated municipal conceptual diagnostic 
governance framework that identifies the main good governance and performance 
elements that will ensure and lay the basis for sustainable municipal performance. The 
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proposed municipal good governance and performance model identifies the good 
governance dimensions, key composite indicators and serves as a diagnostic model 
and early detection or warning system for municipalities and oversight institutions to 
proactively respond to looming governance, performance and delivery challenges. 
In constructing the municipal good governance and performance model, this 
dissertation responds to three main questions, namely: (1) what are the inherent 
requirements for municipal performance in South Africa; (2) what role does good 
governance play in municipal performance; and (3) what is the nexus between good 
governance and municipal performance. 
Given the reliance on the researcher’s own experience in relation to understanding the 
local government landscape, the researcher applied a qualitative research paradigm 
in developing the good governance and performance model, using an insider or emic 
perspective. The model validation process is complemented by the use of a highly 
specialised focus group supplemented by case studies at four selected municipalities 
in the Western Cape. 
The concept of organisational performance is very common in the academic literature, 
yet it remains elusive and very difficult to define because of its many meanings. To 
fully grasp the concept requires a multidimensional lens, particularly within the public 
sector where organisational performance is primarily expressed in terms of economy, 
effectiveness, efficiency, appropriateness and impact of service delivery and being 
more responsive to citizen needs. In Chapter 3, the researcher analyses 12 
organisational performance models and theoretical frameworks, each providing a 
different approach to the concept, yet as a collective these provide the researcher with 
some key points and indicators that inform the local government governance and 
performance model.  
Chapter 2 of this dissertation provides a range of definitions sourced from many 
authors and literature for the concept of ‘governance’, with some authors suggesting 
that, given the wide usage of the concept, it can be imprecise, although it has strong 
intuitive appeal, particularly in the public sector as it relates to achieving policy and 
organisational objectives. Within the public sector, government refers to the structures 
and functions of public institutions, whilst governance refers to the way government 
gets its job done most efficiently and effectively. Good governance is about doing the 
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right things right, focusing on the organisation’s purpose, vision and on outcomes for 
citizens and service users based on the principles of building public trust, citizen and 
stakeholder participation and engagement, mainstreaming and institutionalising 
transparency and accountability, following the rule of law, being responsive, 
consensus oriented and striving for achieving equity, efficiency and effectiveness in 
service delivery. These good governance principles inform the municipal good 
governance and performance model set out in Chapter 6 of this dissertation. 
The primary legal and regulatory basis within the municipal environment that informs 
the municipal good governance and performance model is provided in chapters 4 and 
5 of this dissertation and are underpinned by an analysis of the main definitions and 
legal concepts, the history of local government in South Africa, and an analysis of the 
intergovernmental relations system of local government as provided in the Constitution 
and many local government statutes, most notably, the 1998 White Paper on Local 
Government, the Structures Act, the Systems Act and the MFMA. 
There have been mixed views on whether or not there is a causal relationship or link 
between good governance and municipal performance, with some researchers 
arguing that there is a strong nexus that leads to better development outcomes, whilst 
others find the relationship to be insignificant and good governance to be no guarantee 
of superior performance and maybe even irrelevant. However, many researchers 
agree that good governance matters, that effective governance in the public sector 
can encourage the efficient use of resources, strengthen accountability for the 
stewardship of those resources, improve management and service delivery thereby 
contributing to the improvement of peoples’ lives and that effective governance is 
essential for building confidence in public sector entities. Furthermore, effective 
governance can improve management, leading to more effective implementation of 
the chosen interventions, and better service delivery; it is characterised by robust 
scrutiny, which provides important pressure for improving public sector performance 
and tackling corruption. 
There is no conclusive evidence on the nexus or relationship between good 
governance and organisational performance, except to make the point that ‘bad 
governance’ will over time progressively lead to poor organisational performance and 





generally perceived, leads to better organisational performance is not questioned and 
therefore it can be concluded that good governance is a necessary means and can be 
highly influential on municipal performance. However, good governance is necessary, 
but on its own is an insufficient condition for municipal performance, given the various 
other factors influencing this performance. 
Given the current state of local government juxtaposed against the intended long-term 
vision set by the NDP, particularly Outcome 9, the proposed municipal good 
governance and performance model or framework, as espoused in Chapter 6 of this 
dissertation, will have both current and future value in addressing many municipal 
governance and performance challenges in local government. If applied correctly, the 
model or framework can contribute to enhanced financial and non-financial 
performance by municipalities, resulting in improved audit outcomes, responsive, 
accountable and transparent local government, as well as positively contribute to 







In Suid-Afrika word almal se lewens daagliks deur plaaslike regering aangeraak, word 
dit beskou as die naaste sfeer van regering aan gemeenskappe en dit verteenwoordig 
die regering in geheel op plaaslike vlak. ’n Funksionele en ontwikkelende plaaslike 
regering is ’n noodsaaklike vereiste vir ’n effektiewe ontwikkelingstaat. Nietemin, meer 
as 20 jaar na die implementering van verskillende wetgewende beleidshervormings in 
die plaaslike regering en die implementering van spesiale geteikende programme by 
munisipaliteite, sukkel die meeste munisipaliteite steeds om die basiese dienste 
toereikend aan die burgers te lewer, en het gevolglik nog nie eens begin om effek te 
gee aan hul ontwikkelingsrol soos beoog in die Grondwet van Suid-Afrika nie. 
Nieteenstaande die vordering en vooruitgang wat sedert die aanbreek van demokrasie 
gemaak is, raak dit geleidelik uitdagender vir die regering om die ontwikkeling te 
bespoedig weens die probleme en komplikasies wat verband hou met die 
institusionalisering van goeie regeringsbestuur in munisipaliteite om probleme soos 
korrupsie, wanbestuur en wanadministrasie, veral binne die plaaslike regeringsfeer, 
aan te spreek. Munisipaliteite in Suid-Afrika word oorweldig deur vele uitdagings wat 
die volhoubaarheid van plaaslike regeringsprestasies beïnvloed en bedreig, en baie 
sukkel om hul verpligtinge ingevolge artikel 152 van die Grondwet na te kom. Die 
munisipale prestasie-uitkomste oor die afgelope twee dekades is 'n baie sombere 
prentjie van sommige van die leierskap, regeringsbestuur, finansiële bestuur, 
finansiële gesondheid en rekenpligtigheid wat munisipaliteite belemmer om 
munisipale dienste op 'n volhoubare basis te lewer. 
Hierdie proefskrif het ten doel om te antwoord op die vraag waarom munisipaliteite nie 
in staat is om te presteer op hulle kern diensleweringsmandaat nie, en om uitvoering 
te gee aan die ontwikkelingsdoelwitte van die plaaslike regering, soos ingevolge die 
Grondwet en die magdom plaaslike regeringsverordenings. Die navorsing ondersoek 
ook wat ingestel moet word om te verseker dat munisipaliteite of plaaslike regering op 
'n volhoubare manier uitvoering gee aan die ontwikkelingsagenda van die plaaslike 
regering. 
In hierdie verband stel hierdie proefskrif 'n geïntegreerde raamwerk vir munisipale 





bestuur en prestasie identifiseer wat die basis vir volhoubare munisipale prestasie sal 
verseker en sal daarstel. Die voorgestelde munisipale goeie regeringsbestuur- en 
prestasiemodel identifiseer die omvang van goeie regeringsbestuur, sleutel-
saamgestelde aanwysers en dien as 'n diagnostiese model en vroeë opsporing- of 
waarskuwingstelsel vir munisipaliteite en toesighoudende instellings om proaktief te 
reageer op dreigende regeringsbestuurs-, prestasie- en leweringsuitdagings. 
Met die ontwikkeling van die munisipale model vir goeie regeringsbestuur en prestasie 
reageer hierdie proefskrif op drie hoofvrae, naamlik (1) wat die inherente vereistes vir 
munisipale prestasie in Suid-Afrika is; (2) watter rol goeie bestuur in munisipale 
prestasies speel en (3) wat die verband is tussen goeie regeringsbestuur en 
munisipale prestasie. 
Gegewe die vertroue op die eie ervaring van die navorser met betrekking tot die begrip 
van die plaaslike regeringsomgewing, pas die navorser 'n kwalitatiewe 
navorsingsparadigma toe met behulp van 'n insider- of emiese perspektief. Die 
bekragtigingsproses van die model is aangevul deur die gebruik van 'n hoogs 
gespesialiseerde fokusgroep aangevul deur gevallestudies in vier geselekteerde 
munisipaliteite in die Wes-Kaap. 
Die konsep van organisatoriese prestasie kom baie algemeen voor in die akademiese 
literatuur, maar dit bly steeds ontwykend en baie moeilik om te definieer vanweë die 
vele betekenisse daarvan. Dit verg 'n multidimensionele lens om die konsep ten volle 
te begryp, veral binne die openbare sektor waar organisatoriese prestasie hoofsaaklik 
uitgedruk word in terme van ekonomie, effektiwiteit, doeltreffendheid, toepaslikheid en 
impak van die dienslewering en om beter te reageer op die behoeftes van die burger. 
In hoofstuk 3 ontleed die navorser 12 organisatoriese prestasiemodelle en teoretiese 
raamwerke, wat elkeen 'n ander benadering tot die konsep bied, maar gesamentlik 
gesien het dit die navorser van 'n paar sleutelpunte en aanwysers voorsien wat die 
bestuur en prestasiemodel van die plaaslike owerheid ingelig het. 
Hoofstuk 2 van hierdie proefskrif bied 'n verskeidenheid definisies wat van baie 
skrywers en literatuur verkry word vir die begrip 'regeringsbestuur', met sommige 
skrywers wat voorstel dat, gegewe die wye gebruik van die begrip, dit onakkuraat kan 
wees, hoewel dit 'n sterk intuïtiewe aantrekkingskrag het, veral in die openbare sektor 





Binne die openbare sektor verwys die regering na die strukture en funksies van 
openbare instellings, terwyl regeringsbestuur verwys na die manier waarop die 
regering sy werk op die mees doeltreffende en effektiewe manier verrig. Goeie 
regeringsbestuur gaan daaroor om die regte dinge reg te doen, met die fokus op die 
doel van die organisasie, sy visie en op uitkomste vir burgers en diensgebruikers, 
gebaseer op die beginsels van die opbou van openbare vertroue, deelname en 
betrokkenheid van die burger en belanghebbendes, in die hoofstroom plaas en 
institusionalisering van deursigtigheid en aanspreeklikheid, na aanleiding van die 
regstaat, om te reageer, konsensusgerig te wees en te strewe na billikheid, 
doeltreffendheid en effektiewe dienslewering. Hierdie beginsels vir goeie 
regeringsbestuur het die munisipale goeie bestuur en prestasiemodel wat in 
Hoofstuk 6 van hierdie proefskrif uiteengesit is, ingelig. 
Die primêre wetlike en regulatoriese basis binne die munisipale omgewing wat die 
munisipale goeie bestuur en prestasiemodel ingelig het, is in hoofstukke 4 en 5 van 
hierdie proefskrif aangebied en word ondersteun deur 'n ontleding van die belangrikste 
definisies en regskonsepte. 
Daar was gemengde sienings oor of daar 'n oorsaaklike of ander verband bestaan 
tussen goeie regeringsbestuur en munisipale prestasie, met sommige navorsers wat 
argumenteer dat daar ’n sterk verband is en dat dit lei tot beter ontwikkelingsuitkomste, 
terwyl ander die verhouding onbeduidend vind en verder dat goeie regeringsbestuur 
geen waarborg is vir uitmuntende prestasie nie en dat dit selfs irrelevant kan wees. 
Baie van die navorsers is dit egter eens dat goeie regeringsbestuur van belang is, dat 
effektiewe regeringsbestuur in die openbare sektor die doeltreffende gebruik van 
hulpbronne kan aanmoedig, die aanspreeklikheid vir die bestuur van daardie 
hulpbronne kan versterk, bestuur en dienslewering kan verbeter en sodoende bydra 
tot die verbetering van die lewens van mense en dat effektiewe bestuur noodsaaklik 
is om vertroue in die openbare sektor te bou. Verder kan effektiewe regeringsbestuur 
bestuur verbeter, wat lei tot meer effektiewe implementering van die gekose 
intervensies, en beter dienslewering; dit word gekenmerk deur sterk ondersoek wat 
belangrike druk bied om prestasies in die openbare sektor te verbeter en korrupsie 





Daar is geen afdoende bewyse oor die nexus of die verband tussen goeie 
regeringsbestuur en organisatoriese prestasie nie, behalwe om die punt te maak dat 
'slegte regeringsbestuur' mettertyd geleidelik tot swak organisatoriese prestasie en 
swak openbare waardeskepping sal lei.  
Die onderliggende beginsel dat goeie bestuur, soos algemeen waargeneem, tot beter 
organisatoriese prestasie lei, word nie bevraagteken nie, en derhalwe kan die 
gevolgtrekking gemaak word dat goeie regeringsbestuur 'n noodsaaklike middel is en 
baie invloedryk op munisipale prestasie kan wees. Goeie bestuur op sy eie is egter 'n 
onvoldoende voorwaarde vir munisipale prestasie, gegewe die verskillende faktore 
wat hierdie prestasie beïnvloed. 
Gegewe die huidige stand van plaaslike regering, saamgestel teen die voorgenome 
langtermynvisie wat deur die Nationale Ontwikkelingsplan  opgestel is, veral Uitkoms 
9, sal die voorgestelde munisipale goeie bestuur en prestasiemodel of raamwerk, soos 
uiteengesit in Hoofstuk 6 van hierdie dissertasie, beide huidige en toekomstige waarde 
hê in die hantering van baie munisipale bestuur en prestasie-uitdagings in die plaaslike 
regering. As dit korrek toegepas word, kan die model of raamwerk bydra tot die 
verbeterde finansiële en nie-finansiële prestasie deur munisipaliteite, wat lei tot 
verbeterde oudituitkomste, responsiewe, verantwoordbare en deursigtige plaaslike 
regering, sowel as 'n positiewe bydrae tot die opbou van vertroue tussen die 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION, RATIONALE, DESIGN AND 
METHODOLOGY 
 
1.1 INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND 
Local government in South Africa generally operates within a very complex legislative 
and service delivery environment. Notwithstanding some pockets of excellence, local 
government is being criticised for its performance over the last 20 years or so, which 
is viewed as far from optimal. This is despite the many financial and non-financial 
support initiatives provided by both provincial and national governments aimed at 
improving the overall delivery and performance of municipalities. 
There is broad agreement on the fragility of local government in South Africa, albeit 
somewhat dissimilar diagnoses for this situation (Mbeleni, 2011; Holborn & Maloi, 
2012; Brand, 2016; SoLGR, 2009). Brand (2015:1) highlights that “the annual reports 
from the AGSA, regular newspaper reports and political debates in different 
legislatures confirms the bad state of affairs in many municipalities”, and that “the 
consequences of various problems, particularly relating to the finances of 
municipalities, are often quite visible since it translates into bad or no service delivery”. 
Mbeleni (2011:8) argues that this situation enables wholesale corruption and some 
corrupt politicians, service providers and municipal officials have exploited the lack, 
and in many cases, gaps and loopholes in good governance practices. He makes the 
point that these corrupt individuals have “descended on municipalities like vultures in 
looting state resources, nepotism, venality, mendacity and all these had adverse 
effects on service delivery and perpetuated underdevelopment” (Mbeleni, 2011). 
Holborn and Maloi (2012), make a similar argument, pointing out that many of the 278 
municipalities in the country do not function optimally, that performance between them 
varies and that “poor governance practices, a clear lack in administrative proficiency 
and ability, political cadre deployment, skills shortage, low quality of politicians in many 
cases leading to poor political oversight, corruption, and a lack of accountability have 
all been blamed for poor local government performance”. Plaatjies (2019), in a recent 





increasing collapse of leadership, governance and management at municipalities, and 
that these contribute to “overwhelming levels of fraud and corruption at municipalities”. 
The SoLGR (2009:4) identifies many stubborn governance and service delivery 
challenges in municipalities that have emerged over the last 20 or more years. These 
challenges, which remain at the pinnacle of government’s strategic priorities and 
plans, include: 
• Backlogs and challenges in the delivery of basic services, such as 
electricity, provision of clean and safe water for human consumption, 
adequate sanitation and a shortage of integrated human settlements; 
• An increasing number of service delivery protests, with many being violent 
and resulting in loss of life and the destruction of public infrastructure. In 
many cases, these are fuelled by inter- and cross-party political issues 
negatively affecting governance and service delivery; 
• The proliferation of corrupt and fraudulent practices by politicians and 
municipal employees resulting in the loss of much-needed financial 
resources, business confidence and public trust and accountability; 
• Lack of community relationships and consultation, poor public participation 
practices and public and private sector accountability, and weak civil 
society establishments and relationships; and 
• Poor internal governance and insufficient internal municipal capacity and 
skills, in many cases resulting in poor service delivery and weak financial 
management practices leading to negative and poor audit outcomes. 
 
These municipal governance and service delivery problems have, according to 
Mbeleni (2011), meant that “many municipalities continue to sink deeper into financial 
and administrative mayhem with no indication of a radical rescue plan on the horizon”. 
Similar to the State of Local Government Report (SoLGR, 2009), the National Treasury 
(NT, 2011) found that “all is not well in the local government sphere”. For the National 
Treasury (NT, 2011) the following problems underpin the poor state of municipality 
and local government service delivery in South Africa: lack of leadership; political 





poor performance management; conformance and compliance challenges; a lack of 
economic growth; demographic pressures arising from urbanisation; infrastructure 
challenges and poor governance. The Auditor-General of South Africa (AGSA) has 
confirmed most of these issues as reflecting in the audit outcomes of municipalities 
since 2008/09 to 2017/18, as reflected in Annexure 1A (2009/10-2017/18) and 
Annexure 1B (2008/09-2017/18). The above analysis summarises the distressed state 
of affairs within the system of local government governance and illustrates that it has 
become intensely entrenched within the system of municipal governance. 
According to Cashdan (2002:1), although South Africa is a middle-income country, 
more than 50% of its citizens lack acceptable levels of education, clean and safe water 
for human consumption, nutrition, electricity and energy provision, proper housing and 
shelter, and general healthcare. In 1996, previous deputy president Thabo Mbeki 
made a speech in parliament on the adoption of the Constitution during which he 
lamented the “dismal shame of poverty”, and expressed that concerted efforts are 
required by the local authorities in the area of basic needs to enable service delivery 
as a basis for economic and social advancement and development of communities. 
Mbeki called for the establishment of ‘developmental local government’, as envisaged 
in the 1998 White Paper on Local Government to deal with the myriad of challenges 
municipalities face, such as service delivery backlogs, lack of financial means and 
resourcing, institutional weaknesses and segregation. Sheoraj (2015:235), borrowing 
from Mbeki’s speech, stresses that in order to overcome these challenges it is 
imperative that municipalities “work together with local communities to find sustainable 
ways to meet their needs and improve the quality of their lives”. 
The Local Government Turnaround Strategy (LGTAS), formulated in 2009 by the late 
Mr. Sicelo Shiceka, the erstwhile Minister for the Department of Cooperative 
Governance and Traditional Affairs (DCoGTA), intended to discover the origin and 
main causes of the current state of affairs and service delivery distress in many 
municipalities in the country. The State of Local Government Report (SoLGR, 2009) 
highlights both the countless challenges affecting the performance of municipalities 
that have emerged to varying degrees in different municipalities, as well as 
improvements made by many municipalities since 2001, particularly in rolling out and 





In 2014, with the launch of the Back to Basics strategy for local government on its 
official website (B2B, 2014), the South African government acknowledged that, 
notwithstanding some delivery achievements and remaining challenges, particularly in 
delivering basic services (such as electricity, housing or shelter, water, refuse removal 
and sanitation), much more needs to be done and with much more urgency, “to 
support, educate and where needed, enforce implementation of local government’s 
mandate for delivery” (B2B, 2014). The National Development Plan (NDP, 2012) sets 
the following as key requirements for meeting the transformation or revolutionary 
agenda of government: capable machinery at local government level; functional 
municipalities that can create economically sustainable human settlements; and safe 
and healthy living areas where citizens, communities and people can live, work, play 
and socialise. 
Now, more than two decades into the new system of local government, and about ten 
years after the release of the 2009 SoLGR, many diverse challenges remain that dent 
the advancement and accomplishments achieved thus far. Some of the major 
challenges include the lack of leadership and governance deficiencies, such as weak 
or limited accountability, transparency and responsiveness to the needs of 
communities, corruption, as well as high levels of financial and administrative 
mismanagement practices, particularly those not aimed for developmental purposes. 
From an institutional governance perspective, municipalities have insufficient, and at 
times inappropriate, human resource capital to ensure proficient organisations. In 
many cases, good relations, as a key requirement for organisational performance, 
particularly between councils, management and labour, is limited or non-existent. The 
absence or failure of municipalities to ensure the dynamic participation and active 
involvement of citizens and broader communities in key local government processes, 
or only doing so to fulfil legal requirements, is another contributor to the sad state of 
affairs in local government.  
Inappropriate approaches to community participation, which is a process whereby 
citizens’ priorities are supposed to be determined by government and shared with 
communities, and the lack of constructive citizen involvement in local government, 
which is a process of co-creation and co-production of public services, both contribute 





(2010:3) as main reasons for continuous service delivery shortfalls and challenges 
contributing to the many protest actions visible throughout the country. 
According to Brandsen, Steen and Verschuere (2018), co-creation and co-production 
occurs when citizens, as the receivers of public goods and services, actively 
participate in the design and delivery of services. It provides an opportunity for 
innovation, and creates joint or co-ownership and accountability between the public 
and government. 
Given the contemporary New Public Management approaches, citizen participation 
has generally soared and increasingly come onto the agenda of policymakers. 
However, Mathoho (2010:23) makes the point that “many people lost confidence in 
participating in local government processes”, mainly as a result of the observation “that 
their participation is not recognized” or that communities are used merely “as a rubber 
stamp” to enable municipalities to conform with the legislative requirements for public 
and community participation in key municipal processes.  
The New Public Management (NPM) approach to organisational performance is 
extensively discussed in Section 3.3.1 of this dissertation. NPM is founded on the 
principle that a successful government draws from the entrepreneurial spirit to 
revitalise itself given the focus on a better performing government, reduction of the 
bureaucratic and hierarchical organisational structure, excellence, improved 
productivity, cost savings, quality and competitiveness. However, the NPM approach 
has not been with critique, most notably contending that the model could distort the 
links between policymaking and providing services and bring about politicisation of the 
public service when managers are contracted under the pay-for-performance method. 
Further, it is criticised for downplaying the role of citizens in service delivery; for the 
model being inward looking to public institutions, and for inadequate transparency that 
contributes to poor service delivery. 
Community expectations are high and, as a probable solution to the public sector’s 
decreased legitimacy and declining resources, applying the principles of co-production 
and co-creation as a mechanism for accessing more of society’s capacities and 
constructive community involvement, is regarded as a method of improving local 
government sustainability. Co-creation and co-production, which are also further 





more general drive to reinvigorate voluntary participation and strengthen social 
cohesion in an increasingly fragmented and individualized society” (Brandsen, Steen 
& Verschuere, 2018). 
Through co-production and co-creation, the citizen is recognised and acknowledged 
as an important actor with responsibility for the design and implementation of public 
policies and public services. By applying the principles of co-creation and co-
production, local governments embrace citizen engagement as a valuable way to 
overcome some real or perceived challenges with which they are confronted, like the 
need to make public service delivery more efficient, effective and democratic, and to 
restore trust in and satisfaction with government and politics. Beresford, et al. 
(1997:78, cited by Mathoho, 2010:23) makes the point that “user involvement is not 
an end in itself” but argues that it is a means or a process of achieving change in both 
the actions and behaviour of public sector (municipal) staff to ensure the maximum 
outcome in service delivery. 
According to Kimemia (2010:1), “instead of waiting for the tensions to degenerate into 
runaway violence leading to unfortunate loss of lives and destruction of both private 
and public property, the responsible thing for the state to do is to be responsive to 
people’s grievances and respectfully give effect to the service delivery requirements 
of communities without undue delays” He makes the point that following a ‘putting the 
citizen first’ approach, i.e. “when there is greater openness and people are enjoined, 
genuinely, in decision-making processes, they tend to be more understanding and less 
susceptible to political manipulation regarding unfounded claims of mal-
administration”. 
In this regard, citizens will internalise a more truthful attitude and could become very 
valuable associates and partners in development rather than “perpetually disgruntled 
consumers of services”. It is the researcher’s view that municipal service delivery and 
performance sustainability goes far beyond the mere delivery of constitutionally 
determined basic services. Rather, local government performance includes the ability 
of a municipality to be responsive and to interface with various stakeholders in both 
internal and external environments. This includes communities, other municipalities, 
commerce and business, government entities, and key partners who give effect to the 





dissertation elaborate on the requirements and benefits of community and citizen 
involvement (‘public voice’) in ensuring sustainable municipal performance. 
Atkinson (2007:53) notes that many towns in South Africa have recently experienced 
mass community protest actions marked by civil society demonstrations, marches and 
petitions, with many turning into violent confrontations reminiscent of the rolling mass 
action and demonstrations prevalent in the late 1980s and early 1990s in the run up 
to the end of the apartheid era. These service delivery protests have continued, 
particularly during pre-municipal and provincial government elections in 2009, 2011 
and 2016. The recent spate of destructive service delivery protest action across South 
Africa is a further example. According to The Times (2016:4), municipalities report the 
most frequently cited reasons for protests as inadequate access to services, lack of 
employment opportunities, poor quality of services and poorly maintained roads and 
other municipal infrastructure. 
According to Mathoho (2010:23), the increased number of service delivery marches, 
protests and civil society demonstrations (by many poor and some rich), some 
peaceful and others violent, has in the main been as a result of underperforming 
municipalities and a lack of efficient and effective service delivery to communities. He 
makes the point that in the early stages of civil society unrest and community protests 
many municipal officials and politicians used to reject real concerns voiced by local 
people and in many cases did not react to them until provincial and national 
government intervened to salvage the situation. Mathoho (2010:24) ascribes the 
dismal performance to, amongst others, corruption and maladministration, lack of skills 
and managerial ability and proficiency, weak political and administrative interface, lack 
of political will, interference by politicians in public administration, intergovernmental 
relations challenges, institutional weaknesses, political power struggles and weak 
basic administrative systems. These are all ‘good governance’ challenges. 
Whilst acknowledging the major developmental role that municipalities have played in 
providing and extending constitutionally mandated basic services like electricity, 
water, refuse removal, sewage, and safe and clean streets to the vast majority of 
previously disadvantaged people that did not have access to these services, 
particularly during the apartheid years, Scheepers (2015:3) makes the point that “after 





efficiency, effectiveness and sustainability of local government”, and particularly its 
ability to deliver services in a sustainable manner. 
These diverse challenges, which mainly point to governance failures, are highlighted 
in the recent 2016/17 SoLG Report and in the annual AGSA reports since 2013/2014 
up until 2017/2018. Other role-players that highlight these challenges include the 
National Treasury, the DCoGTA, the AGSA and the DPME, all of which have 
confirmed these major reasons for the generally negative views and perception of the 
overall performance of, and service by, municipalities in the country. 
This research identifies some key inherent municipal governance and performance 
requirements that will enable the achievement of a functional state and, within the 
context of local government, a functional municipality. It touches on the major causes 
for governance and performance failures and makes recommendations on measures 
required to address the many challenges and fault-lines in the local government 
governance system. 
The goal of this dissertation is to develop a conceptual municipal good governance 
and performance model that will highlight key municipal performance areas and 
governance requirements aimed at guiding municipalities on critical inherent good 
governance requirements that should be institutionalised to assist municipalities to 
achieve their stated objectives and execute their developmental role as espoused in 
the Constitution, the 1998 White Paper on Local Government and the National 
Development Plan 2030. A key component of this dissertation is also to determine the 
nexus between good governance and municipal performance. 
 
1.2 RATIONALE AND RELEVANCE FOR THIS STUDY 
The 1996 Constitution of South Africa, the 1998 White Paper on Local Government 
and an array of local government legislation and policy documents, moulded local 
government as the epicentre of the delivery systems of the three spheres of 
government. Mogale (2003, cited by Koma, 2010:111) places local government “at the 
heart of poverty eradication initiatives”. Local government in South Africa plays a 
crucial role in driving the developmental local government agenda aimed at 





whilst concurrently ensuring the deepening and strengthening of the democratic 
philosophy and principles enshrined in the Constitution. In this regard, it is key for local 
government to be functional, responsive to the needs of the citizen and accountable 
to the public at large. Local government, being the closest to the people and in many 
cases the first point of contact between communities and a public sector institution, is 
generally referred to as being at the coalface of delivery of public services. This 
government sphere – responsible for ensuring a minimum level of constitutionally 
determined service delivery standards to ensure a decent living standard for all 
citizens – can be regarded as ‘everyone’s business’. 
The National Development Plan (NDP), in particular its Outcome 9 in which municipal 
performance sustainability is addressed, builds on the policy objectives as set out in 
the Constitution and the 1998 White Paper on Local Government, arguing that local 
government should: 
• Be “at the forefront of participatory democracy, involving citizens in 
meaningful deliberations regarding governance and development”; 
• Be “responsive to citizens’ priorities”; 
• Enjoy “high levels of trust and credibility amongst the public”; 
• Have employees that “are skilled, competent and committed to delivering 
quality services”; 
• Be “able to cost-effectively increase the quantity and quality of services; 
and” 
• Operate “within a supportive and empowering intergovernmental system”. 
 
However, the current reality within local government is starkly different to the policy 
aims and objectives of the 1998 White Paper. As indicated earlier, the local 
government environment is fraught with challenges and these negatively impact on 
service delivery sustainability and municipal performance in key areas, particularly 
those highlighted in Outcome 9 of the NDP; the objectives reflected as (a) to (f) in the 
1998 White Paper; and the aims of section 152 of the Constitution. It is the view of the 
writer that, although there are some small ‘pockets of excellence’, on aggregate very 





of, local government objectives, key policy proposals set out in the 1996 Constitution, 
various pieces of local government statues and the respective local government policy 
documents. A detailed discussion and analysis of key concepts underpinning 
developmental local government and the local government objectives are discussed 
from a legislative and policy perspective in Chapter 4, sections 4.2.2.1 and 4.3. 
This dissertation sets out the legislative, policy, governance and performance 
arrangements, which are underpinned by an extensive literature review that will 
support municipalities to: (a) be at the centre of implementing the principles of 
participatory democracy, involving citizens in partnering arrangements to co-create 
solutions and encourage insightful discussions and deliberations regarding 
governance, performance and development; (b) be responsive and citizen-focussed, 
considering citizens’ priorities and the areas that must be prioritised; (c) understand 
the key requirements to establish and enjoy high levels of credibility and public trust; 
(d) instil a culture of fairness by employing staff that that are committed, capacitated, 
competent, skilled and responsive to delivering quality services and who improve 
management and operational capabilities of the institution; (e) to progressively 
(considering cost and impact) increase and expand the quality and quantum of 
services and benefits from shared economic growth initiatives; and (f) to improve co-
operative governance, partnerships within and outside of government and operate and 
achieve maximum benefits from the structured and empowering intergovernmental 
relations system within and across the three spheres of government, the public and 
broader community. All initiatives and proposals flowing from this dissertation are 
aimed at instilling good governance practices as a means to progressively improve the 
performance of municipalities and give effect to the ‘developmental local government’ 
agenda by improving and extending services to communities and stakeholders. 
The key challenges at local government level since around 2004 have been 
adequately described by numerous pieces of literature, such as the 1998 Local 
Government White Paper (a founding key policy document), the 2009 State of Local 
Government reports, the 10, 15 and 20 year reviews of South Africa, the annual 
publications from the National Treasury and the DCoGTA on the state of financial 
management, the annual municipal audit outcomes from the AGSA, and various other 
publications. Most of these challenges and performance issues are as a result of 





resulting in poor audit outcomes, widespread corruption and political interference, high 
levels of distrust by communities in the system of local government, weak 
accountability arrangements, limited community and stakeholder involvement in the 
business of local government, employees and management that are incompetent and 
not committed to front line service delivery, poor infrastructure requiring urgent 
upgrades, poor governance and oversight arrangements and poor to non-existent 
intergovernmental interfaces. Brand (2016), in his presentation on financial 
governance reforms in South Africa, confirms most of these governance challenges 
and their associated impact on local government performance and service delivery. 
Chapter 2 of this dissertation is entirely devoted to understanding the concept of 
‘governance’, its various dimensions, forms and models, and particularly the elements 
of good governance in the public sector. The chapter demonstrates how this lays the 
basis for responsive, transparent and accountable local government. 
If local government wishes to achieve the objective and aspiration of a transformed, 
progressive, developmental and effective local government system, it requires strong 
political and administrative leadership underpinned by a visionary long-term strategy 
that is clear, consistent with that of a developmental state and well understood by all 
role-players in the local government space. However, the NDP (2012:1) cautions that 
“such a developmental state cannot materialise by decree, nor can it be legislated or 
waved into existence by declarations”. A developmental state must be progressively, 
consciously, yet intentionally built and with urgency, but in a sustainable manner. 
Therefore, with relevance to the performance of municipalities, the fundamental 
question remains: over more than 20 years of democracy, has South Africa really 
made progress as a nation to alleviate inequality and poverty, chiefly as it relates to 
the role and functions of local government? Chapter 3 responds to this fundamental 
question and includes an honest assessment of the country’s progress and 
performance over the last two decades of democracy, particularly on how far South 
Africa has come as a nation to implement and give effect to section 152 of the 
Constitution, which sets out the primary objects of local government, in the main, to 
alleviate poverty and inequality; improving access to basic services; building an 





accountable local government; and fostering community and stakeholder involvement 
in local government affairs, enabling a sustainable local government system. 
Section 152 of the Constitution, which sets out the objectives of local government, is 
the basis against which local government performance is assessed and evaluated in 
this study. Chapter 3, in sections 3.2.4 and 3.5, expands on organisational 
performance and the public sector, whilst Chapter 5, section 5.4, explains how these 
local government objectives feed into the proposed municipal good governance and 
performance model. Of importance, and covered in Chapter 3, is to identify what 
should be done differently in the local government arena to ensure that services (not 
just basic services) are rendered in a developmental and sustainable basis. 
This dissertation is particularly relevant and applicable, as municipalities seem 
increasingly unable to sustainably deliver on their service delivery obligations and key 
outcomes, particularly to give effect to the developmental long-term aims and 
objectives of local government. These long-term developmental goals and objectives 
are set out in section 152 of the Constitution and further espoused in the 1998 White 
Paper on Local Government, as well as many other pieces of legislation and policy 
documents designed to sustainably expand the service delivery performance of 
municipalities and the practical application of the local government system. These 
legislation and documents are all aimed at progressively improving the lives of citizens. 
As indicated earlier, on many fronts the evidence is clear that municipalities in South 
Africa are not delivering on what is required by the citizenship and are not meeting the 
service delivery requirements and expectations of the communities that they serve, in 
the main due to governance failures, some of which were highlighted earlier. 
Given the less than optimal local government performance over the last 20 years, with 
mostly the same problems plaguing the local government system, the situation 
requires a renewed approach to ensure that essential governance arrangements are 
in place that will ensure, or as a minimum provide, a solid base for municipal 
performance This dissertation contributes towards achieving the main objectives set 
out earlier in this chapter and will assist in shaping local government that 
institutionalises good governance practices by being responsive, transparent, 
accountable, following the rule of law and having respect for human rights, all of which 





objectives of local government. This has the further aim of progressively and 
sustainably improving the institutional performance of municipalities and the living 
conditions of the citizen. The proposed municipal good governance and performance 
model, set out in Chapter 5 of this dissertation, provides the basis for municipal 
performance and demonstrates the theoretical link between good governance and 
municipal performance. 
 
1.3 RESEARCH PROBLEM 
According to Madumo (2015, cited by Tirivangasi, et al., 2017:17), since 1994, “the 
South African government has taken great strides in ensuring development and the 
promotion of economic growth through legislation targeted at improving the general 
wellbeing of its citizens”, particularly impoverished communities, the vulnerable and 
indigents (the poor). The recent release by Stats SA of the non-financial census of 
municipalities in 2017, generally points to improved service delivery between 2011 
and 2016, with an increased proportion of citizens getting frontline basic services from 
municipalities. SALGA (2018) is of the view that this release by Stats SA provides 
“empirical evidence that municipalities are delivering services and continuously 
working to improve the quality of life in the communities they serve”. 
However, according to Madumo (2015:154), notwithstanding the progress and 
advancements made since the dawn of democracy, it is becoming progressively 
“challenging for government to accelerate development” because of the difficulties and 
complications associated with institutionalising good governance in municipalities to 
address issues such as corruption, mismanagement and maladministration, 
particularly within the local government sphere. Municipalities in South Africa are 
swamped with many challenges impacting on their performance, and many are 
struggling to fulfil their obligations as set out in section 152 of Constitution, section 4 
of the Municipal Systems Act, and the development objectives advocated in the 1998 
White Paper on Local Government. The most recent 2016/17 report by the AGSA on 
municipal outcomes paints a very gloomy picture of some of the leadership, 
governance, financial management, financial health and accountability fault-lines, 
which have hampered municipalities from delivering municipal services on a 





National and provincial governments and other role-players have already committed 
substantial amounts of financial resources, effort and capacity building initiatives to 
improve local government capacity and performance and to enable municipalities to 
deliver on the developmental local government agenda and the execution of key 
frontline municipal services on a progressive and sustainable basis. Notwithstanding 
this effort to comprehensively turn around local government, key challenges remain 
that threaten the sustainability of local government performance. These challenges, 
described earlier in the chapter, prevent municipalities from giving effect to and 
delivering on the local government developmental agenda as envisaged in the 
Constitution, the 1998 White Paper on Local Government, the Municipal Structures 
Act, the Municipal Systems Act and the Municipal Finance Management Act. 
Given the new mandate of local government, municipalities or local government are 
also required to serve as agents of development and are therefore no longer limited 
to only rendering the basic basket of municipal services. However, more than 20 years 
after the implementation of various local government legislative policy reforms and the 
rollout of special targeted programmes at municipalities, most municipalities continue 
to struggle to render basic services adequately to citizens and, as a consequence, 
have not even started giving effect to their developmental role in ensuring performance 
sustainability of local government. 
The proposed municipal good governance and performance model as set out in 
Chapter 5 has full relevance, particularly for municipalities that currently have 
performance sustainability issues, but can also serve as a guiding framework that can 
be adopted by municipalities experiencing early signs of distress. The model can be 
used and adapted to address risks, including for municipalities already facing 
governance and performance sustainability challenges that require urgent attention. 
The key question that arises is: why are municipalities unable to deliver on their core 
service delivery mandate and give effect to the local government developmental role 
and objectives of local government as envisaged in the Constitution, the White Paper 
on Local Government, the National Development Plan, and various local government 
legislative and policy documents? An outflow from this questions is: what should be 
put in place to ensure that municipalities or local government gives effect to the 





Therefore, the research problem that informs this study is the absence of a holistic, 
yet integrated, municipal good governance and performance model/framework or tool 
that identifies key good governance and performance elements that will ensure and 
lay the basis for municipal performance that is sustainable. The proposed municipal 
good governance and performance model should identify the good governance 
dimensions, key composite indicators and should also serve as a diagnostic model 
and early detection or warning system for municipalities facing possible governance 
and performance failures. 
The proposed municipal good governance and performance model should find 
application in any type of municipality, notwithstanding demographics, location or size, 
and should be able to be used by various role-players within the entire municipal 
governance system, such as the municipality itself (council and management), 
communities, key national and provincial government departments, external 
stakeholders, oversight and public accountability institutions, national and provincial 
treasuries (trigger support and intervention) and the DCoGTA. 
The absence of a valid, reliable and relevant municipal good governance and 
performance model or framework makes it very difficult for a municipality and some 
key oversight institutions to provide proactive, yet targeted responses to performance 
delivery challenges in individual municipalities. This diminishes the ability of municipal 
councils, and the other two spheres of government, i.e. provincial and national 
government, to perform their constitutionally obligated oversight, or monitoring and 
support functions over local government, including bespoke municipal intervention 
where required. 
Given the current state of local government juxtaposed against the intended long-term 
vision set by the NDP, particularly Outcome 9, the proposed municipal good 
governance and performance model or framework will have both current and future 
value in addressing many municipal governance and performance challenges in local 
government. The proposed good governance and performance model will also 
contribute to enhanced financial and non-financial performance by municipalities, 
resulting in improved audit outcomes, responsiveness, accountability and 
transparency, as well as positively contribute to building trust between the municipality, 





1.4 GOAL OF THE DISSERTATION AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
Given the above problem statement, and as set out in section 1.3 of this Chapter, this 
dissertation discusses municipal performance and the role of good governance as an 
enabler for municipal performance. In the view of the researcher, municipal 
performance refers to “the ability of a municipality to give effect to and execute the 
objectives of local government as envisaged and framed in section 152 of the 
Constitution, within the administrative and financial means of the municipality whilst 
applying good governance practices in delivering on its key obligations in an efficient, 
effective, economic and impactful manner. 
In this regard, and in search of the stated goal of the dissertation, namely the 
development of a municipal good governance and performance model that will 
address the key local government governance challenges and its associated impact 
on local government performance, the researcher has developed two main research 
questions, and one ancillary research question aimed at complementing the two main 
research questions. Each of the two main research questions has three sub-questions. 
These sub-questions make up the goal of each of the chapters in this dissertation, with 
the objectives of each chapter forming the basis for its sub-division. 
Research Question 1: 
• What are the inherent requirements for municipal performance in South 
Africa? 
The sub-questions, making up the goal of the chapter, are as follows: 
• What is the all-embracing definition of ‘performance’? 
• What are the main strands, elements and constituent parts of 
organisational performance in the municipalities? 
• What are the main legislative and policy arrangements governing local 
government performance? 
Research question 1 and the sub-questions are responded to in chapters 3 and 5 of 
this dissertation. 





• What role does good governance play in municipal performance? 
The sub-questions, making up the goal of the chapter, are as follows: 
• What is the all-embracing definition of ‘governance’ and ‘good 
governance’? 
• What are the main strands, elements and constituent parts of good 
governance in the public sector? 
• What are the main legislative and policy arrangements governing local 
government? 
Research question 2 and the sub-questions are responded to in chapters 2 and 5 of 
this dissertation. 
Ancillary Research Question: 
The ancillary research question is associated with, and interrelated to, the two main 
research questions and is aimed at bringing these two questions together. The 
ancillary question is as follows: 
• What is the nexus between good governance and municipal performance? 
In developing a response to the ancillary research question, the response 
presupposes a proper understanding by all role-players of the two main concepts that 
are addressed in this dissertation, namely governance and performance, which are 
outlined in chapters 2 and 3 respectively. It also presumes an in-depth understanding 
of the municipal or local government legislative and policy environment and the context 
relating to the two main concepts. This is addressed in Chapter 4 of the dissertation. 
 
1.5 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
1.5.1 Research Design 
According to Creswell (2014), “a research design is the set of methods and procedures 
used in collecting and analysing measures of the variables specified in the research 
problem research”. He makes the point that study type is demarcated by the design of 





experimental, experimental, review, meta-analytic” and further divided into sub-types, 
such as “descriptive-longitudinal case study, research problem, hypotheses, 
independent and dependent variables, experimental design, and, if applicable, data 
collection methods and a statistical analysis plan”. The research process and 
framework developed to find answers to the research questions can, in a more 
simplistic manner, be described as the research design. 
In Mouton (2001:55), the research design is described as “a plan or blueprint” that sets 
out the process that a researcher intends following in conducting the research. Mouton 
(2001) further argues that “the research design concentrates on the fundamental 
question of what kind of study will be undertaken in order to furnish acceptable 
answers to the research problem”. According to Yin (1989:29), “research design refers 
to the structure of an enquiry, it is a logical matter”, it deals with “a logical problem and 
not a logistical problem”. 
In the words of Bogdan and Biklen (2007:49), research design refers to “the 
researcher’s plan of how to proceed”. According to New York University (2018), when 
designing research, the key question that must be asked is: “given this research 
question (or theory), what type of evidence is needed to answer the question (or test 
the theory) in a convincing way? Obtaining relevant evidence entails specifying the 
type of evidence needed to answer the research question, to test a theory, to evaluate 
a programme or to accurately describe some phenomenon”. 
Creswell (2014) explains that the “function of research design is to ensure that the 
evidence obtained enables you to effectively address the research problem logically 
and as unambiguously answer the initial research question”. Therefore, “the central 
role of research design is to minimize the chance of drawing incorrect causal 
inferences from data” (Creswell, 2014). According to Ansari (2017), “social surveys 
and experiments are frequently viewed as prime examples of quantitative research 
and are evaluated against the strengths and weaknesses of statistical, quantitative 
research methods and analysis”. 
Research designs are frequently identified as using quantitative and qualitative 
research methods. This study is qualitative in nature and, as a method of data 
collection, the researcher will use a case study approach as part of the validation 





According to Bell (1999:19), “a case study approach is particularly appropriate for 
individual researchers because it gives an opportunity for one aspect of a problem to 
be studied in some depth within a limited time scale”. 
Ansari (2017) makes the point that case studies “are often seen as prime examples of 
qualitative research”. Further, Ansari (2017) argues that case studies provide an 
opportunity to adopt “an interpretive approach to data [that] studies ‘things’ within their 
context”. Case study research provides and “considers the subjective meanings that 
people bring to their situation” (Ansari, 2017). Therefore, this study is situated in the 
interpretivist paradigm. According to a UNISA (2018) article, citing Henning, van 
Rensburg et al. and Smit (2004), some important words underpinning or referring to 
the interpretivist methodology include “participation, collaboration and engagement”. 
According to Carr and Kemmis (1986:88), in applying or following the interpretive 
approach methodology the researcher “is a participant observer”, i.e. an observer that 
also participates and is involved in activities, one who “discerns the meanings of 
actions as they are expressed” within the context of the activities. The researcher is 
therefore not independent or distanced from the research process, but instead is 
intimately and actively involved in the research process. 
The case study approach includes, where practical, the use of interviews (i.e. 
structured and un- or loosely structured), unobtrusive methods to collect the data, 
analysis of documents and observations. A number of qualitative research designs, 
often also referred to as strategies of inquiry, are recognised and these include, 
amongst others, phenomenological, ethnographic, grounded theory, historical, case 
study, and action research. Denzin and Lincoln (2000) describe qualitative research 
design (strategies of inquiry) as “comprising the skills, assumptions, enactments and 
material practices one uses when moving from a paradigm and a research design to 
collect and analyse data about your research subject”. 
The main aim of this research is to develop a conceptual municipal good governance 
and performance model or framework that will identify the critical inherent 
requirements for municipal governance and performance sustainability in South Africa. 
It is envisaged that this municipal good governance and performance model will guide 
municipalities on the key requirements and conditions or minimum standards that 





sustainability in the country. It therefore remains important to use designs and 
methodologies that meet the requirements of reliability, usability and validity in order 
to enhance the credibility of the scientific research and standards. 
Given the reliance on his own experience in relation to understanding the local 
government environment, the researcher has relied on a qualitative research 
paradigm, which according to Babbie and Mouton (2001:53) and Webb and 
Auriacombe (2006:592), “makes use of an insider perspective, also termed the emic 
perspective, as the point of departure”. Given the use of the insider perspective, the 
ontological assumptions and the ontological questions must be considered as, 
according to Stahl (2007), it can be the foundation “of many epistemological and 
methodological differences” in views, given the question of whether reality is 
independent of the observer or not. 
Heidegger (1993, in Stahl, 2007:3-4) describes the concept of “ontology, which 
etymologically means speaking of being”, as “the philosophical discipline that asks 
‘what is?’ and ‘what does it mean to be’. It researches the fundamental questions of 
being, and thus, in everyday parlance, one could say that it studies the nature of 
reality”. Stahl (2007:4, citing Klein, Hirschheim & Nissen, 1991), makes the point that 
ontological assumptions are of essential importance to any research in any discipline 
as they form the “most important building blocks of our worldview” – they are so 
significant that we rarely question them. 
In this regard, the ontology of positivism or non-positivism must be considered. 
According to Stahl (2007:4-5), positivism is a research approach that is based on the 
“ontological doctrine that reality is independent of the observer”, whilst non-positivism 
“does not depend on a reality independent of the observer since the observer plays a 
part in the constitution of reality and is usually believed to do this”. Therefore, this 
research dissertation can be regarded as a qualitative, descriptive, non-positivist 
study, making use of the insider perspective theory. 
The researcher has been employed in various senior and executive positions of 
leadership, authority and management in the public sector, i.e. in a public entity 
(mainly policy role), provincial and national government in oversight, advisory and 
execution roles and in local government in South Africa (mainly oversight). He has 





some key local government legislation and policy documentation, especially local 
government policy proposals dealing with financial management, accountability 
provisions, oversight and municipal intervention mechanisms. The researcher has 
extensive knowledge of the public finance domain, particularly the latest developments 
in the municipal or local government environment and is familiar with the factors 
affecting the performance of municipalities across South Africa. The researcher can 
therefore be considered an insider in relation to this study in respect of his 
understanding of the local government environment in South Africa. 
Due to the experimental nature of this dissertation and the associated research work, 
particular emphasis has been placed on the conceptualisation of the research 
problem, the nature of the study, the identification of the unit of analysis and 
operationalisation of the outcomes (Mouton, 2001:49). 
The study has been separated into two phases, which can be further broken down as 
follows: 
Phase 1: Conceptualisation 
• Research design 
• Comprehensive literature reviews on: 
• Legislative requirements (Constitution, legislation and key policy papers) 
relevant to the performance and governance of local government; 
• History and transformation of South African local government, pre- and 
post-1994, and how this relates to good governance and municipal 
performance; 
• Context and challenges in local government, particularly focusing on 
municipal governance and performance challenges and sustainability 
issues; and 
• Various governance and performance frameworks in the private and public 
sectors. 
• Design, internally validate, test, review and amend, where required, the 






Phase 2: Validation and testing of the municipal good governance and performance 
model 
• Isolate the main and sub-elements that have a bearing on the governance 
of local government and municipal performance sustainability; 
• Isolate the elements in both the external and internal environment that 
impact on the governance of local government and performance 
sustainability; 
• Present the municipal good governance and performance model or 
framework to a focus group of experts and obtain input on the respective 
constituent good governance and performance main and sub-elements; 
and 
• External validation through case studies of selected municipalities in the 
province of the Western Cape, interviews with key stakeholders. Testing, 
reviewing and amending where appropriate. 
 
The comprehensive literature review in chapters 2, 3, 4 and 5 of this dissertation will 
provide the conceptual basis from which the municipal good governance and 
performance model or framework will be constructed. Theoretical models are useful 
frameworks as they describe the study in a clear, succinct and visual way and provide 
a holistic picture of what this research is trying to achieve. The proposed municipal 
good governance and performance model links the theory, as set out in chapters 2, 3 
and 4, and the constructs that the researcher has identified. 
In examining existing literature and models relevant to the subject, secondary sources 
such as statutes, internet articles, journal articles, books and e-theses were explored. 
In addition, capacity-building agencies knowledgeable on the subject matter were 
consulted and reading materials were obtained from international organisations. All of 
these were critically analysed as they inform the construction of the governance and 
performance elements of the municipal governance and performance model. These 
sources have, where relevant, been subject to an in-depth analysis and assessment 





according to the researcher, they passed academic muster and, from a theoretical 
perspective, contribute to the construction of this dissertation. 
According to Abend (2008, cited by the USC Libraries, 2018), “theories are formulated 
to explain, predict, and understand phenomena”. In numerous cases, theories are 
used to “challenge and extend existing knowledge within the limits of critical bounding 
assumptions”. The “theoretical framework introduces and describes theory that 
explains why the research problem under study exists, and is the structure that can 
hold or support a theory of a research study”. 
The USC Libraries (2018) provides the six strategies and steps for developing an 
effective theoretical model or framework. These steps have been used as a basis to 
develop the proposed municipal good governance and performance framework or 
model. 
1. Examine your dissertation title and research problem. This 
dissertation title and design is formulated based on the research problem. 
It anchors, or holds together, the entire dissertation. It also forms the basis 
from which the theoretical framework is constructed. 
2. Brainstorm about what you consider to be the key variables in your 
research. This dissertation answers this step in chapters 2, 3 and 5. 
Pursuant to considering the many variables informing this dissertation, 
particularly on ‘good governance’ and ‘municipal or organisational 
performance’, it appropriately responds to the factors that contribute to the 
presumed conclusion. 
3. Review related literature. Chapters 2 and 3 are the main literature 
review chapters, with Chapter 4 anchoring the study from a legislative and 
policy perspective. The literature review (chapters 2 and 3) addresses the 
research problem as set out in Chapter 1. It includes the assumptions 
from which various authors have addressed the research problem. 
4. List constructs and variables that might be relevant to your study. 
Following this step, the variables must be grouped into two categories, i.e. 
dependent and independent variables. The various elements influencing 
good governance and performance are mainly captured in chapters 2, 3 





5. Review key social science theories, is done in chapters 2 and 3, with 
Chapter 6 providing a response to the ancillary question of testing the 
relationships or nexus between good governance and performance. 
6. Discuss the assumptions or propositions of this theory and point out their 
relevance. This is captured in chapters 5 and 6 of this dissertation. 
(USC Libraries, 2018). 
 
Two additional steps have been added by the researcher, namely (a) to develop a 
draft good governance and performance sustainability model or framework; and (b) to 
verify and test the key assumptions of a municipal good governance and performance 
sustainability model or framework in a municipal environment in the four identified 
municipalities, mainly as part of the case study analysis and interviews with local 
government subject experts. 
The proposed municipal good governance and performance sustainability model has 
been validated through the application of internal and external validation processes. 
The internal validation process has been considered using a process of triangulation 
and the adjustment of the municipal good governance and performance sustainability 
model, with (1) the connections between the different eras of local government 
development in the country; (2) the developmental role and mandate of local 
government as set out in the Constitution and Local Government White Paper; (3) the 
legal, constitutional, legislative and respective policy mandates of local government in 
South Africa; (4) the current state of local government performance in the country; and 
(5) discourse on the local governance measurement. 
External validation consists of using a focus or reference group in the form of a panel 
of local government experts, having recognised both local and international 
experience in the public and private sector and academia. The reference group, as an 
external party, had to consider whether or not: the proposed municipal good 
governance and performance sustainability model provides predictive and structural 
validity; its intended use and applicability in local government is value adding; whether 
or not it is implementable in municipalities; and whether its components and the 
application of the good governance principles and performance elements will result in 





sustainability. An adapted version of the Delphi method was used to guide the format, 
programme and outcome objectives of the focus group discussion. Further external 
validation was also performed, which is deemed integral to the case study analysis. 
The study is a methodological study. Mouton (2001:173) describes methodological 
studies as “studies aimed at developing new methods (such as questionnaires, scales 
and tests) of data collection and sometimes also validating a newly developed 
instrument through a pilot study”. A focus, expert interviews and document analysis of 
various reports have been used as the primary methods of data collection and 
analyses for this dissertation. 
The unit of analysis or the subject of the study that is being investigated is municipal 
performance, particularly the development governance framework or tool measuring 
performance sustainability in municipalities, and therefore the focus of the research 
will be on municipalities. Mouton and Marais (1990:43) describe three methods that 
can be utilised to conduct exploratory research. These include: 
1. Conducting a “review of related social science and other pertinent 
literature” as part of the anchoring the research theory that underpins the 
dissertation; 
2. Conducting a “survey of people who have had practical experience of the 
problem to be studied”. This is part of testing some of the key findings and 
analysis based on the review of key literature; and 
3. Formulating an “analysis of insight”. During this process, outcomes and 
analysis from various surveys are used to provide stimulating examples. 
 








Figure 1.1: The research methodology model 
Source: Adapted from Lobe (2005:61). 
 
1.5.2 Study Population, Sampling Frame, Data Collection and Data Analysis 
The study population, sample frame and data-collection methods are comprehensively 
set out in Chapter 6, sections 6.5.4 of the dissertation. By applying a sampling criteria, 
as set out in Chapter 6, a sample of four municipalities are chosen from the 30 
municipalities in the province of the Western Cape. 
Given the sampling methodology applied in determining the municipalities to be 
included, as described in Chapter 6, and by utilising the criteria of the municipal good 
governance and performance model, the sample municipalities are as follows: 
• Swartland Municipality: a municipality that has demonstrated 
consistently good organisational performance. 
• Kannaland Municipality: a municipality that has demonstrated 
consistently poor or sub-optimal organisational performance. 
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• Oudtshoorn Municipality: a municipality that has demonstrated poor 
performance initially, but has been able to progressively improve 
(improved/getting on the right path). 
• City of Cape Town Metropolitan Municipality: a municipality that has 
consistently demonstrated good performance, but has recently shown 
some signs of regression. 
Sections 6.5.4 and 6.5.5 of the dissertation provides the methodology for choosing the 
specific municipalities included in the sample and utilised in the case studies, the data 
analysis process, the key observations and findings from the desktop analysis, the 
four municipal case studies and the interview process of municipalities included in the 
sample. 
1.6 PROPOSED CHAPTER OUTLINE 
Chapter 1: The chapter introduces the topic, lays the basis and provides the 
underlying reasons and motivations for engaging in this research. It contextualises the 
relevance of the study, provides the research problem, goals and objectives, the 
research questions and the methodological approach in the research design and 
research methods. 
Chapter 2: The two main concepts underlying this dissertation are ‘governance’ and 
‘performance’. Chapter 2 provides the theoretical framework and literature review on 
the first concept of ‘governance’. It provides an in-depth analysis on ‘governance’ as 
a concept: how it has developed over time, its application in theory and practice, the 
respective dimensions of good governance and the various forms of governance and 
models, with a specific focus and application in the public sector. Good governance 
as a form of governance, its characteristics and underlying elements, with application 
in the public sector, forms the basis of Chapter 2. 
Chapter 3 provides the theoretical framework and literature review of the second main 
concept underlying this dissertation, namely ‘performance’. The chapter provides an 
in-depth analysis of the concept of ‘performance’, with a focus on the public sector. 
The chapter includes a detailed analysis of the various organisational performance 
models and theories and provides an analysis of various factors that have an impact 





sector, which is not driven by profits, but by creating public value and customer 
satisfaction, the research recognises the various role-players, both internal and 
external to the municipal environment. The chapter also touches on the characteristics 
of high-performance organisations and concludes by highlighting some of the critical 
success factors for municipal and organisational performance. 
Chapter 4 explores the complex legislative, regulatory and policy arrangements of the 
local government functional system and framework within the context of the overall 
intergovernmental relations system of South Africa and covers the history and origin 
of the local government system in South Africa, its evolution (pre- and post-1994), as 
well as an analysis of the many legislative and policy documents applicable to the local 
government environment, with the key legislative statutes being the Constitution, the 
1998 White Paper on Local Government, the Structures Act, the Systems Act, the 
MFMA and various regulations and policy papers. Furthermore, Chapter 4 is informed 
by a range of key concepts and definitions relevant to understanding the local 
government environment and elaborates on the powers and functions of local 
government and touches on the fiscal arrangements to gauge the extent to which it 
has been possible (or not) to align the local governmental fiscal and functional (service 
delivery) frameworks.  
Chapter 5 unpacks the legislative, regulatory and policy framework with respect to 
municipal organisational performance and governance in South African local 
government. The chapter also includes an analysis of the legislative and policy 
framework as it relates to financial governance and oversight, particularly by municipal 
councils, external and internal assurance providers, the main oversight institutions and 
by key stakeholders. The chapter also sets out the legislative and regulatory 
requirements as they relate to the intervention and supervision mechanisms available 
to the provincial and national executive in the event of performance failures in 
municipalities. Chapter 5 connects, and should be read in conjunction with, Chapters 
3 and 4. 
Chapter 6 introduces the proposed municipal good governance and performance 
model, constructed by taking into account the key research findings as reflected in 
chapters 2, 3 and 4. The proposed municipal good governance and performance 





main concepts of governance and performance and particularly the dependencies and 
linkages between the two main concepts underpinning this dissertation. The proposed 
municipal governance and performance model also outlines the various key elements 
from a governance and legislative perspective that must be considered in measuring 
municipal performance. The chapter provides an extensive analysis of the various 
institutions that have oversight responsibilities, inclusive of their respective 
measurement instruments and analysis of municipal performance. In addition, the 
model validation process, internally and externally, and analysis of the findings from 
the case studies and focus group discussions, are also provided in Chapter 6. 
Chapter 7 provides conclusions, summary and recommendations flowing from the 
research. It also provides the necessary linkages and connectors between the various 
chapters and aims to answer the initial research questions and sub-questions, as well 
as highlight opportunities for further research possibilities that will enhance the findings 
of this research. The chapter reflects and responds to the ancillary research question 
on the nexus between good governance and organisational performance, particularly 
in the public sector. The proposals and recommendations are clustered in accordance 
with the proposed municipal good governance and performance model as presented 
in Chapter 6, focusing on the dimensions and elements of good governance and how 










The main aim and purpose of this chapter is to conduct a literature review to 
conceptualise and contextualise governance, especially given its multiplicity of 
definitions. According to Lee (2003:2), “the term governance is actually a very old one”. 
He makes the point that this concept has been recently revived, particularly within the 
social science domain, and has possibly become one of the most attractive areas of 
research. Consequently, over the years many different definitions have emerged to 
explain the concept of governance. Due to this attractiveness, numerous definitions 
and widespread usage there exists a bountiful treasure trove of literature on the topic, 
but also a corresponding difficulty of summarising this literature. 
The literature review in this dissertation includes key concepts and definitions relevant 
to the study. It includes the history and background of governance, theories, various 
uses, types and key thoughts, as well as perceptions and impressions underpinning 
and supporting a foundation for the study of governance. The study has a particular 
reference to, and focus on, the public sector, both internationally and locally in South 
Africa. The analysis and literature review include the elements of good governance as 
they are understood and observed through the lens of various authors, subject 
experts, institutions and researchers on this subject. In order to improve the 
conceptual understanding of the subject matter, this chapter also touches on issues 
such as the dimensions and elements of governance, namely political, technical and 
institutional; and the relevance and applicability of governance in local government. 
An in-depth analysis of the key concepts of good or fair governance, government, 
governmentality and what constitutes bad or poor governance, anchors the chapter as 
the researcher explores the identification of good or fair governance indicators, as 
provided by various subject specialists, authors, policy makers and institutions. These 
indicators will be used as a basis for testing (application) during the various case 
studies, particularly the when examining the link between these governance indicators 





rule of law, accountability, responsiveness, transparency, predictability, public 
involvement and participation, will be analysed and explained with the aim of 
developing sub-indicators in later chapters to be utilised as a base during the case 
study analysis. The identification of these good governance indicators will hold 
relevance in later chapters, particularly when observing their application in the case 
study approach to selected municipalities in the province of the Western Cape. 
The analysis of the various concepts includes both an international and local flavour, 
particularly when examining their relevance to public sector institutions, as well as 
when reflecting on the lessons learnt from the private sector in inculcating good 
governance practices. Finally, the chapter explores the impact of, and the linkages 
and connectors between, good governance and organisational performance, which 
lays the basis for the next chapters. 
 
2.2 GOVERNANCE: DEFINING KEY CONCEPTS 
This section sets the context of the study by exploring key concepts and definitions 
relevant to the research theory of governance and organisational performance in local 
government. Key definitions include government, governance and governmentality to 
provide context for the next sections of the chapter, wherein the researcher will expand 
on these definitions, particularly as they relate to the broader concept of governance 
and how these interrelate, connect and are applicable to the study of organisational 
performance, with an emphasis on the public sector (local government). 
 
2.2.1 Government 
According to the Encyclopaedia Britannica (2018), the word ‘government’ means to 
steer with gubernacula (wheels or rudders) and is attested, in a metaphorical sense, 
to Plato's ‘Ship of State’. The word originally derives from the Greek verb κυβερνάω 
[kubernáo]. 
The word ‘government’, which is fundamentally different from the term ‘governance’ 
but sometimes loosely (wrongly) used as having the same meaning, refers to a form 





main purpose or objective of providing public services to a community. ‘Government’, 
is also broadly regarded as the institution or territorially based body that makes 
authoritative decisions and applies enforceable laws and regulations for which it has 
constitutional or legislative authority for and in a society. In other words, decisions of 
a government must be binding of, and enforceable on, citizens, residents and 
businesses within its borders. 
The Columbia Encyclopaedia (2000), and the Business Dictionary (2018) explain 
‘government’ as referring to a group of people that control or rule a community or unit 
and that this social control is a system that is vested in a specific group in the social 
hierarchy. This societal group has been given the right by the community to make 
laws, including the right to enforce these laws. Finer (1970:3-4) explains the concept 
‘government’ as “the activity or process of governing or governance, a condition of 
ordered rule, those people charged with the duty of governing or governors; and the 
manner, method or system by which a particular society is governed”. 
Schwella, et al. (2015:13-14) makes the point, affirming Heywood (2007:6) that, whilst 
all types of institutions should have proper governance arrangements in place, the 
concept of ‘governance’ is more comprehensive than ‘government’, and that 
governments “govern within the jurisdiction of the states over which they hold 
authoritative and sovereign powers as government”. Heywood (2007:26) defines 
‘government’, in the broader sense, as “to rule or control others” and this includes any 
mechanism or instrument through which rule and order is maintained. Stoker 
(1998:34) makes the point that in the modern state ‘government’ refers to the “formal 
institutional structure and location of authoritative decision-making” and that “a 
government is only able to function effectively if it has the adequate authority, public 
support and stability to maintain law and order”. 
The fundamental features of a government, according to Heywood (2007:26) and 
Ranney (1971:26), are the ability to, as a collective, make decisions mainly through 
laws and regulations, and having appropriate public institutions and capacity to 
interpret and enforce those laws and regulations, flowing from decisions by the 
broader community, for and on the community and to provide public goods and 
services that these laws prescribe. The Oxford English Dictionary (2010) defines ‘a 





characteristically divided into various groupings and responsibilities, which include the 
executive, the legislative and judicial authorities, each functioning under its own 
exclusive or sovereign powers determined through laws within a nation, customs and 
institutions. Although there is a difference in the relationship between the various 
groupings as institutional structures of government, as a collective they all intend to 
promote and advance the overall well-being of the public they serve. However, in order 
to maximise performance (output) and citizen impact, the various institutional 
structures of government must collaborate and partner with each other in an attempt 
to prevent duplication and optimally coordinate the activities that need to be rendered 
to various societal groups. 
According to Wikiblog Cultuland (2018), in the Commonwealth of Nations, the more 
narrow interpretation of the word ‘government’ refers to “a collective group of people 
that exercises executive authority in a state” or the ministry as a collective of the 
executive arm or “metonymically, to the governing Cabinet as part of the Executive”. 
This view of the Commonwealth is confirmed by the IFAC (2001:6), in that in most 
governments, integral to the accountability process, there is the clear separation or 
differentiation of power and functions between the executive (for example, ministers 
as members of cabinet, members of executive councils in provinces, entities, 
government business enterprises and municipal councils) and the legislature 
(parliament and councils). In this regard, there is a governance relationship to govern, 
in that the legislature provides the authority and power through legislation to the 
executive to acquire and use financial resources. As part of the accountability 
responsibility, the legislature is also responsible for having oversight of the executive 
and the administration of financial resources. The management and application of the 
resources, including that of financial management, are generally the responsibility of 
the executive (cabinet/executive councils). 
State or public policies are determined, administered and enforced by a government, 
and these are in many cases underpinned by a constitution or founding statement that 
generally sets out the aspirations, governing principles and political philosophy. The 
chosen political philosophy of a government requires a fair amount of careful balance 
between the principles of individual citizen freedom (e.g. of choice, speech and 





Many different types of systems of government exist and these different types are 
founded by clear principles or philosophy. The nature of any governmental system is 
defined by the way in which governmental power and authority is distributed. Some 
government types include those based and founded on the principles of democracy 
(‘power of many’), oligarchy (‘power of a few’), aristocracy, dictatorship or autocracy 
(‘power of one’), monarchy and republic. The chief characteristic of any philosophy of 
government is underpinned by the system underlying how political power to govern is 
obtained. The two main forms or systems to obtain political power are through electoral 
contest or by hereditary or inherited (genetic) succession. Governments worldwide 
consist of many political systems based on ideologies, which include socio-economic, 
socio-political and geo-cultural. These ideologies are entrenched in the system of 
government and shape how governments engage with communities and voters. 
John Healey and Mark Robinson in the Governance Barometer (2018) define ‘good 
government’ as being without any presupposed value judgement of society, and 
implying “a high level of organisational effectiveness in relation to policy-formulation 
and the policies actually pursued, especially in the conduct of economic policy and its 
contribution to growth, stability and popular welfare”. Good government, deemed as a 
precondition for political legitimacy, also implies an adherence to and inclusion of the 
principles of good governance, which include public accountability, responsiveness, 
and transparency in delivering government services, adhering to the rule of law, citizen 
participation and openness. 
The concept and broader definition of ‘government’ cannot be divorced from an 
understanding of the connections between the concept of ‘government’ and 
‘governance’. One can deduce that, although the two concepts should not be confused 
as being the same, there is a relationship between the two and state or government 
institutions must apply governance in the way they govern or run a government to 
ensure organisational performance and sustainable development of the communities 
that they serve. Naidoo (2015:16) makes the point that “governance is, however, 
possible only as long as governments manage to implement policy”. The definition of, 






Although incorrect in the view of the researcher and based on the literature review of 
the various concepts, the term or concept of ‘government’ is sometimes used 
interchangeably with ‘governance’. This is despite ‘governance’ having fundamentally 
different meanings or application for different people. The two concepts, i.e. 
‘governance’ and ‘government’, should not be confused or treated as one and the 
same. According to Rhodes (2002:208-2027) and Rhodes (2000:5), ‘governance’ 
suggests a fundamental change in the meaning of government, recommending new 
processes or methods of governing or an innovative method by which society is 
governed and ruled or a changed condition of well-organised and ordered rule. 
In short, ‘governance’ is about the process of governing and how choices and 
decisions are made that impact the intended outcomes and affect social, economic 
and environmental change. According to Broadway and Shah (2009: 242) governance 
is about “the formulation and execution of collective action at the specific government 
level”. Naidoo (2015, citing Kaela, 1998:134), states that governance is measured by 
the extent to which public goods and services are actually delivered to the 
improvement of citizens’ lives and agreed laws successfully implemented. 
Van Rensburg et al. (2016:2) makes the point that there is a requirement to make a 
“shift from ‘government’ to ‘governance’”. This signifies a change or a shift from a 
public service operating as a standardised central government in the provision of 
public services to an inactive or passive public, “towards one where the state is but 
one part of a mixed economy of funding and provision”. Flynn (2002:59, citing van 
Rensburg et al., 2016), explains that this shift from ‘government’ to ‘governance’ 
requires improved management oversight and control over expert professionals and 
staff, the inclusion of active public participation by the citizens and consumers. The 
next section focuses on a definition of ‘governance’, as its regarded as a much 
“broader term than ‘government’, as it involves more societal actors than government, 
and aims to impact across all the conventional areas covered by the traditional 








Scholars define governance in different ways, which requires further research. Some 
might be more comprehensive than others. However, what is important is for the 
definition to be generic enough so that it can be effectively utilised to develop statistical 
criteria and be applied in any sector. A lack of clarity and distinction in definitions will 
lead to ambiguous meanings and biased results, especially when scope and coverage 
is inadequate. 
Over the years, many different definitions have emerged to explain the concept of 
governance. According to Heinrich and Lynn, Jr. (2000:2), “governance refers to a 
means of achieving direction, control, and co-ordination of wholly or partially 
autonomous individuals or organisations on behalf of interests to which they jointly 
contribute”. Governance can be regarded and unpacked as the institutionalisation of 
processes and systems to enable the institution to perform and achieve set 
organisational goals and objectives. Governance processes and systems provide 
organisational strategy and direction as a way of doing things and conducting one’s 
business as it provides for “a control environment with the assistance of individuals 
within an organisation”. 
Given the limited scope and size of public sector budgets and the extent and growing 
demand for public services, particularly as these relate to municipalities, there is a 
growing need in the public sector to inculcate the application of good governance 
standards and procedures to be of a high standard. In the CIPFA (2014:v), the 
Independent Commission for Good Governance for Public Services emphasises that 
good governance lays the basis and is the foundation for good organisational 
performance and outcomes, respectable and trusted management, upright and 
accountable stewardship of public funds and resources, good public involvement and 
engagement in the prioritisation and execution processes (co-creation), resulting in 
building high levels of citizen trust. 
The following are some key definitions of the term ‘governance’: 
• The Business Dictionary (2018) defines ‘governance’ as “the 
establishment of policies and continuous monitoring of their proper 





promotes accountability from members in executing their main duty of 
enabling and improving the success and long term feasibility of the 
organisation and therefore “includes the mechanisms required to balance 
the powers of the members” in pursuit of clean and proper governance. 
 
Ramachandran and Ang (2003) summarise these definitions (all of which are 
government centric) and cite them as follows, from respective sources: 
• The World Bank (1992) defines governance “as the exercise of authority, 
control, management, power of government”. Holistically, governance 
refers to “the manner in which power is exercised in the management of a 
country’s economic and social resources for development”. This definition 
emphasises power. 
• Osborne and Gaebler (1992) describe and define governance following a 
more expansive or spread-out approach, as “the process by which we 
collectively solve our problems and meet our society’s needs”. 
Governance goes beyond government’s ordinarily and institutionalised 
approach in conducting its business, and incorporates “how well 
government has encouraged, facilitated and shaped the participation of 
civil society and private sector not only in service delivery but also in the 
evaluation and monitoring of government performance itself.” This 
definition emphasises a focus on ‘the process’. 
• Landell-Mills and Serageldin (1992) define and describe governance as “a 
complex concept” consisting of and recognising government’s structural 
(organisational) configuration and established institutional capacity 
arrangements that enable implementation, and government’s 
policymaking, managerial and management decision-making processes, 
the association, connection and partnering relationship between 
government officials and the broader public and citizenry implementation 
capacity. This definition entails and emphasises ‘tri-sectoral’ participation. 
• Paderanga (1996) broadly defines governance as the process whereby 
authority is continuously exercised over the performance and citizen 





institution. This definition of the concept emphasises institutional 
arrangements, control, authority and environment. 
• Root (1995) offers a more lucid definition of governance, as the 
institutional capacity and creation of the conducive environment in which 
citizens engage and interact with the institution and each other to find an 
optimal solution to common citizen problems. This definition emphasises 
the importance of institutional arrangements, environment and citizen 
engagement and co-creation. 
 
Through the above, Ramachandran and Ang (2003:5) compiled a much more 
comprehensive definition of governance as a process of creating functional 
relationships between people1 and institutions by institutionalising “a system of laws, 
regulations, processes, procedures, norms, standards, roles, rights, responsibilities, 
rules, authority, power, empowerment and leadership”, all aimed at optimising the 
performance of the institution. 
Applebaugh (2010, cited by the National Defense University and ISAF, 2010) provides 
one of the most widely cited definition of governance and encompasses the principles 
of legitimacy, legality and participation. Applebaugh (2010) describes governance as 
“the rules of the political system to solve conflicts between actors” with the aim to adopt 
and make decisions (legality), “the proper functioning of institutions and their 
acceptance by the public (legitimacy)” and to “invoke the efficacy of government and 
the achievement of consensus by democratic means (participation)”. 
Practical or normative agendas can also be defined by governance practices. Public 
and private sector, political, voluntary and institutions not for gain are institutions where 
concepts of good or fair governance are commonly used. The idea and notion of good 
or fair governance and its elements are discussed separately and in more detail below. 
Lee (2003:3, citing Stoker, 1988) points out a risk relating to the concept of 
governance, in that it is “intuitively appealing but ambiguous” and some may 
                                            
1 The term ‘people’ refers to individuals or collection of individuals like family, community and society; while formal 
entities cover public agencies, private sector establishments and non-profit or non-governmental organisations that 





intentionally or instinctively use it “for rhetoric rather than substantive reasons”. 
Heinrich and Lynn (2000, cited by Lee, 2003:3) caution that when the term 
‘governance’ is mentioned in the process of administrative improvements, it may lack 
clarity on whether it refers to institutional configuration and structures, managerial 
ruling and judgement, organisational processes, systems of instructions, directives 
and incentives, organisational and institutional philosophies, or a mixture of these. 
After his work in 2002 on governance concepts and theories, Rhodes (2006) confirms 
“that the term ‘governance’ is popular but imprecise” and further makes the point that 
governance has at least six uses. Rhodes later added a seventh use in 2017, 
‘international interdependence’, which he expands on in much detail in his 2017 article 
on ‘Governance and Public Administration’. The various uses of governance comprise 
“the minimal state; corporate governance; the new public management (NPM); ‘good 
governance’; international interdependence, ‘socio-cybernetic’ systems; and self-
organising networks” (Rhodes, 2006). 
As part of this work, he argues “that governance refers to ‘self-organising, inter-
organisational networks’ and these networks complement markets and hierarchies as 
governing structures for authoritatively allocating resources and exercising control and 
co-ordination”. Rhodes (2006) defends this description of governance and argues that 
it reflects on changes at the time in British administration, particularly referring to the 
“hollowing out the state, the new public management, and intergovernmental 
management”. He concludes with the idea that self-organising networks are now a 
prevalent and inescapable universal feature of public service delivery in Britain. He 
continues that self-organising networks are a “challenge to governability because they 
become autonomous and resist central guidance”, that they are characterised and 
based on mutual trust and modification and further that they weaken institutional 
management reforms and improvements rooted in rivalry and competition. 
However, Van Rensburg et al. (2016:2) makes the further point that there is a further 
shift that is required, i.e. a shift from ‘government’ towards ‘governance’ and then a 
further shift from ‘governance’ to ‘governmentality’ or ‘governability’. The discussion in 







Bevir (2011) in his paper ‘Governance and Governmentality after Neoliberalism: Policy 
and politics’ highlights interactions and linkages between governance and 
governmentality, particularly on and after neoliberalism. Governance and 
governmentality neutralise excessive power and ruling. In his paper he provides 
academics and researchers in the field of governance with a fascinating interpretation 
of the many “changes in the state”, stating that “they might learn from governmentality 
to pay more attention to interpretation and discourses”. He also provides “insights into 
modern power”, suggesting “they learn from governance to pay more attention to 
agency and heterogeneity” (Bevir, 2011). Bevir (2011) contests that “scholars of 
governance might recognise the role of technologies of power in neoliberalism”, whilst 
“scholars of governmentality might grasp the way neoliberal marketisation has given 
way to networks and service integration”, which is key in the modern day. 
Governmentality is a theoretical approach introduced by Foucault in the 1970s that 
has re-oriented thinking about governance and power. According to Van Rensburg et 
al. (2016:7), “governmentality is inspired by Foucault’s (1991) later writings, and firmly 
embedded in second-stream notions of power”. Foucault (1991:04) highlights that the 
concept ‘governmentality’, generally refers to techniques, practices and procedures 
for guiding and pointing human behaviour and understanding. According to Stripple 
and Bulkeley (2013:32), ‘governmentality’ refers to the ways of thinking and acting by 
particular mentalities and how this way of thinking is used in the process of governing. 
In order to understand governmentality as a form of power, scholars must examine its 
empirical articulations through the investigation of governmental rationalities and 
programmes (Dean, 2009, cited by Astuti, 2006:39). Further to this, Foucault (1991, 
cited by Astuti, 2016:39) defines governmentality as “the conduct of conduct”. It 
operates through calculated means and rational activity “by educating desires and 
configuring habits, aspirations and beliefs” of individuals and groups (Li, 2007a:279). 
Aside from research and wide application of the concept of governmentality in the 
context of environmental governance (Astuti, 2016:19), the researcher finds it to be a 
fairly new idea or concept in the theory of municipal governance. Van Rensburg et al. 





governmentality deal with “the ways in which people are influenced to govern 
themselves, a notion of power that is dispersed throughout a population”. 
Janse van Rensburg, et al. (2016) highlight that governmentality tolerates and permits 
governing practices from a distance and it symbolises and advocates “discipline in 
individuals through the creation of docile agents to be used in modern political and 
economic institutions”. The authors conclude that once people and groups have 
entrenched norms and standards, they self-regulate their perceptions, actions and 
even values according to those norms that they have personified. Citing Astuti 
(2016:40), governmentality recognises that governmental interventions are 
undertaken not only by the state apparatuses but also by non-government institutions 
and non-state actors, such as non-governmental organisations (NGOs), scientists, 
researchers, bankers, and private sector practitioners – anyone who is involved in 
attempts to shape the conduct of the population (Li, 2007a; 2007b; Dean, 2009). The 
concept of governmentality provides insights into how assemblages of practices, 
agents, knowledge and techniques work to produce governable subjects (Hart, 2004). 
According to Bevir (2013:62), the “governmentality perspectives identify and analyse 
the complex of rules, norms, standards, and regulatory practices that extend state rule 
more deeply into civil society by regulating the ways in which civil society self-
regulates”. Fox and Ward (2008) emphasise that the governmentality approach calls 
for a shift in focus towards reflexivity, self-rule and self-organising that are entrenched 
in good governance practices that “influence individuals to behave in a certain way”. 
Governmentality calls for an alternative approach, more particularly, a shift away from 
the traditional bureaucratic form of state controlled and state-centred governance to a 
more network-type, indirect forms of governance relations and streamlined processes. 
Bevir (2013:62, citing Triantafillou, 2004 and Ferlie & McGivern, 2013) highlights that 
the governmentality viewpoint departs from the premise that “governance is made up 
of inter-dependent organisations that together form “semiautonomous and self-
governing networks”. 
Miller and Rose (2008) contest that the “notion of governmentality does not necessarily 
privilege the state as locus or origin of power, but takes self-governing practices as 
starting point”. They highlight that it “allows a mapping of multiple centres of calculation 





Miller and Rose (2008) are of the view that the “focus falls on power without a centre, 
or rather with multiple centres”, in other words, “power as relationally dispersed rather 
than focused in the state”. 
Rose and Miller (1992:174) emphasise that distinct individual freedom should not be 
construed as an opposing or opposite feature of power. Individual freedom is a 
prominent part of the functioning of governmentality; “power is not about constraining 
individuals, but rather about creating people who are capable of bearing a kind of 
regulated freedom” (Rose & Miller, 1992). Van Rensburg, et al. (2016:17) agree “that 
the dichotomies through which power has been traditionally characterised—such as 
state versus civil society, public versus private, and coercion and consent—and the 
main-stream concepts of power that underlie these dichotomies do not provide an 
adequate understanding of the ways in which power operates”. 
According to Foucault (1991:100), thinking through a governmentality lens allows us 
to see that governance’s main aim is to shape human conduct, and its target is to 
produce and enhance the general well-being of its citizens, the development and 
improvement of their socio-economic indicators and conditions (health, mortality, 
education, shelter and access to basic services), the growth in the wealth of its citizen 
and the reduction in the poverty and Gini coefficient. A governmental intervention 
employs a variation of methods, procedures and certain forms of knowledge to achieve 
its purpose and main objectives. Dean (2009:25) argues that governmentality is a 
representation of “collective mentalities” created through “the bodies of knowledge, 
belief and opinion” in which our individual minds and consciousness are immersed. 
In a broad sense, Foucault (1991:102) summarises “governmentality as the ensemble 
formed by the institutions, procedures, analyses, and reflections, the calculations and 
tactics that allow the exercise of this very specific albeit complex form of power”. 
Governmentality has the broader population as its target, apparatuses of security (or 
calculative technologies employed) as its essential mechanism and “political economy 
as its form of scientific knowledge” (Foucault (1991:16). Governmentality theory 
provides an innovative means of analysing both traditional government’s and non-
government actors’ attempts to influence, define and reshape policies and 





It is the researcher’s view that there is a need to critically examine and 
unsympathetically shift towards the indirect and subversive ways in which the delivery 
of key services to communities can be enhanced in order to give effect to the local 
government mandate and service delivery performance and stainability. It will require 
radical effort and urgency to move beyond traditional ways and methods of 
government service delivery and governance practices models and their inherent 
conceptions of delivery and power. Drawing from the analysis and definition of 
governmentality, this can be achieved by seeing governmentality as a governance 
instrument and as an art of government that works through the development of new 
calculated practices, strategies and organisations, aimed to promote and tolerate 
particular practices and discourse amongst local citizens and stakeholders in a 
municipality to shape human conduct and educate people to work as a collective to 
attain objectives that will benefit the entire system, and in that way improve municipal 
performance. In the view of the researcher, governmentality as a field in governance 
literature has not yet been widely explored, and this provides abundant opportunity for 
further research on the subject. 
 
2.3 GOVERNANCE: HISTORY AND BACKGROUND, THEORIES AND KEY 
CONCEPTS 
2.3.1 History and Background of Governance 
According to Lee (2003:2), the concept of “governance is actually a very old one”. The 
word and concept of governance, as a noun, according to the Business Dictionary 
(2018) originates from the late 14th century as an ‘act or manner of governing’, “from 
Old French ‘gouvernance’ government, rule, administration; (rule of) conduct from 
governor”. At the time, it referred to authority (with action), as well as the system of 
governing and government control. Similar to the word ‘government’, the concept of 
‘governance’ derives, from the Greek verb kubernaein [kubernáo], which, in the 
metaphorical sense, means ‘to steer’ and ‘to control or to give direction’. In English, it 
simply refers to ‘the specific activity of ruling a country’. This meaning and 
interpretation can be traced to early modern England, when the phrase ‘governance 
of the realm’ appeared in royal correspondence between James V of Scotland and 





‘Governance’, in its current broader interpretation and application, has only become 
prominent since the early 1990s as an attractive concept in social science and since 
then started to feature on the agenda of many public and private sector institutions. 
This is mainly due to wider use and re-introduction of the concept by academia, 
political scientists, economists in the public sector and private sector and the wide 
distribution of policy and discussion papers on the subject by prominent institutions 
such as the World Bank, United Nations (UN), and International Monetary Fund (IMF). 
Lee (2003:2) makes the point that the concept of governance “has been widely used 
as a new notion meaning ‘something new and reformed’ associated with government 
and public administration”. The application of governance practices, particularly in the 
public sector, will assist in replacing some the negative perceptions of the broader 
public on the general state of the public sector. 
Similarly, Ramachandran and Ang (2003:3) make the point that governance is not 
new. Indeed, it is “an age-old subject matter dating back to birth of great civilisations 
such as those in the Nile of Egypt, Euphrates and Tigris of Babylon, Mahenjodaro and 
Harappa of Indus River, Yellow River of China, Mayan of South America, Greek, 
Media-Persia and Roman Empire”. Furthermore, history records that the birth of great 
civilisations mark the beginning of organised societies and institutions. It tells how 
families, citizens, communities and societies, individuals, private sector bodies and 
institutions, non-government and supporting institutions are basically organised and 
governed in a systematic way. The governance structure and framework that a country 
or society has adopted or practiced is very much inclined to local needs and demands 
as per the social, economic and political fabrics. 
Charles (1991, cited by Ramachandran & Ang, 2003:3) points out that the system of 
governance was evolutionary. In particular, the system of governance currently being 
practiced is shaped by agricultural and industrial orders that began during the 
Renaissance period, which was when great change began in the organisation of work 
and production in the second half of the eighteenth century, particularly in England. 
Prior to this the contribution of ancient civilizations to the contemporary system of 
governance was significant, but incremental. 
In ancient times the impact and influence of one society’s way of life on another was 





different times in history and the learning and interactions amongst them were 
constrained by lack of systematic, efficient and effective ways for information cum 
knowledge flow and exchange. Today, the whole governance system within and 
across borders is at a crossroads embracing change, particularly in the wake of the 
information era and the many governance challenges faced by both public and private 
sector institutions (Ramachandran & Ang, 2003:3). 
The Institute of Governance (IoG) (2003:3) emphasises that governance is not about 
government, but “about how governments and other social organizations interact, how 
they relate to citizens, and how decisions are taken in a complex world”. Governance 
is a process of decision making by public and private sector organisations and 
societies at large and includes the decision of who will be involved in the decision-
making process, how the process will happen and how everyone that is involved in the 
decision-making process will be held accountability for their actions and decisions. All 
governance processes rest on, or are underpinned by, a governance system or 
framework and include the policies, rules, procedures, processes, resolutions and 
agreements that outline and prescribe “who gets power, how decisions are taken and 
how accountability is rendered”. According to the IoG (2003:3), the concept of 
governance finds useful application in global corporate governance, national 
governance, institutional governance and the broader local community/citizens’ 
governance context. 
According to the United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the 
Pacific (UNESCAP) (2018) the concept of ‘governance’ is not new. They define it 
similarly to the IoG, as “the process of decision-making and the process by which 
decisions are implemented (or not implemented)” (UNESCAP, 2018). 
Both the IoG and the UNESCAP believe that understanding and conceptualising 
governance at the various levels is easier if one reflects on the many different kinds of 
enterprises and bodies (the players or actors) that operate and are involved in the 
economic and social arena, as well as who has influence on what and about what, 
who makes decisions, and in what capacity do they make these decisions. Public 
sector institutions or government are but one player or actor in governance, with other 





government that is being discussed, be it national (provincial, local or rural), or the 
level of influence based on urban ‘class’ (elite, middle class or poor). 
The two figures below set out the relationship between the various players in the 
governance environment, as depicted by the IoG and the UNESCAP, where the size 
of each of the circles in relation to each other may vary, depending on each unique 
situation of the two institutions. 
 
 
Figure 2.1: Four sectors of society 







Figure 2.2: Urban actors 
Source: UNESCAP (amended) (2018). 
 
Governance captures more than just processes and procedures. It includes the more 
strategic and tactical aspects of steering and directing, as well as superior decisions 
about the strategic direction, actors or role-players that will be responsible for 
execution and ultimate accountability and measurement. Therefore, as mentioned 
above, ‘governance’ is not only about ‘setting the direction’ or ‘where to go’, but also 
includes ‘who should do what, when and where’; ‘who should be the key decision 
makers and be involved in deciding’, and ‘in what authority and capacity’. 
According to the Institute of Governance (2003:4), there are four zones or areas that 
are relevant in the study of governance: governance in the ‘global space’ (or global 
governance), governance in ‘national space’, organisational or institutional 





Given its relevance to the scope of local government, this research will primarily focus 
on governance in the national space; institutional, organisational and community 
governance; the characteristics and indicators of good governance; and to what extent 
the application of it will impact on organisational (municipal) performance. 
 
2.3.2 Theories and Uses of Governance 
2.3.2.1 Context 
Governance is not about government, but is a process whereby communities, citizens 
and organisations engage with each other and make key decisions that impact on the 
organisation or communities and include the who, what, where and when questions, 
particularly regarding delivery and accountability issues. Governance, according to the 
Institute of Governance (2003:3) is “about how governments and other social 
organizations interact, how they relate to citizens, and how decisions are taken in a 
complex world”. 
Schwella, et al. (2015:11) define governance theory and theories as ideas that inform 
governance and consider various governance models and “assists in the recognition 
and formation of new governance approaches”, it demonstrates “how theories and 
philosophies intended for other uses have been modified to accommodate new 
governance approaches”, it continue to challenge “known concepts of the state by, 
even, critically revisiting mainstream concepts” and it asks for bigger distribution “of 
authority-based analysis … rather than a mere focus on government”. 
Rhodes (2000), the author and editor of many books on governance and public 
administration, explains seven types or uses of governance, which are detailed below. 
These include: 
1. Corporate governance: ‘the system’ to direct, manage and control 
institutions and organisations; 
2. Good governance: the prescribed procedures for auditing and reviewing, 
guaranteeing transparency, and information disclosure of the public sector 





3. New Public Management introduces private sector management and 
oversight approaches and procedures aimed at improving the efficiency 
and effectiveness of the public sector; 
4. The minimal state or new political economy: this approach emphasises 
the transformed relationship and affiliation amongst and between 
government, civil society and the private sector market; 
5. International interdependence focusses on creating partnering (co-
producing) arrangements with international role-players and actors; 
6. Socio-cybernetic systems focus on the socio-cybernetic systems with 
and in-between the various role-players and actors within the governance 
system; and 
7. Network governance advocates the use and application of networks 
between government, NGOs, private sector and communities and denies 
the presence of mono-centric power. 
 
Schwella, et al. (2015:11) complements the above seven types or uses of governance 
by adding a further three: ‘market governance model’; the ‘public-value governance 
model’; and the ‘learning governance model’. 
The work done by Rhodes in 2000 updates his previous research in 1996. In Rhodes’ 
(1996) research article, he recognises six distinct uses of governance, one of which is 
the ‘New Governance: Governing without Government’ approach. In the 1996 article, 
Rhodes struggles to determine and clarify the importance, meaning and definitions of 
governance as a way to explain the tendencies, movement and arrangement of British 
government reform since the 1980s. In the article, Rhodes reviews, evaluates and 
critiques various definitions of governance and through this process finds many 
definitions insufficient and inadequate for clarifying the new governing structure that 
emerged in Britain by 1995. During this process, Rhodes began to identify and 
construct two new governing structures, which eventually became generally accepted 
and understood, namely hierarchies (which refer to government systems and 
bureaucracies), and markets (which refer to the united call in the 1980s for 





However, during further research and analysis, Rhodes (1996) found his two newly 
identified governance structures lacking in descriptive and instructive power and 
added a third, namely self-functioning international interdependences or networks. He 
reorganised this as a form of governance and as an alternative approach to the 
modern-day governing structure in Britain. In this process of defining governance as 
‘self-organising and self-functioning networks’, Rhodes (1996) conducts a 
comprehensive literature review and evaluated and assessed the different elements 
and components against various forms of governance. In order to arrive at an 
assessment of how governance may contribute to the current working of governments, 
the assessment includes a review and analyses of the extent to which network 
relationships have become progressively entrenched in public sector delivery. Given 
the main aim of improving the provision of adequate public services, the evaluation 
and assessment by Rhodes (1996) includes the assessment of government reforms 
and governance (Cornell University of Architecture, Art and Planning, 2018). 
Schwella, et al. (2015:12) makes the point that “governance ideas, concepts, theories, 
models” and ideologies aim to contribute “towards governing good and well”. The 
authors clarify that “good [governing] refers to the ethical dimensions of governance, 
whilst governing well refers to the effectiveness dimensions of governance”. 
 
2.3.2.2 Governance as corporate governance 
The first recognised and documented use of the word or concept of ‘corporate 
governance’ is by Richard Eells (1960:108), defining corporate governance as “the 
structure and functioning of the corporate polity”. Corporate government as a concept 
is older, has a different meaning and, according to Becht, Bolton and Röell (2004), 
“was already used in finance textbooks at the beginning of the 20th century”. 
Corporate governance, according to the Business Dictionary (2018), is defined as “a 
framework of rules and practices” with which a board of directors (as controllers) 
makes the decisions in an enterprise to promote fairness, transparency and, 
ultimately, accountability in a corporation’s association and relationship with all its 
investors and stakeholders, such as customers, employees, bankers, management, 





to, and finds application primarily yet not exclusively in, private sector institutions, 
although Rhodes (2002:7) disagrees and indicates that the philosophies of corporate 
governance find equal application in public and private sector organisations. The 
principles of good corporate governance “include openness or the disclosure of 
information; integrity or straightforward dealing and completeness; and accountability 
or holding individuals responsible for their actions” by clear allocation of 
responsibilities and defined roles. 
According to Dundas (2013), a corporate governance framework is made up of two 
main elements: (1) general corporate governance, which includes relevant legislation 
and case law, governance documents, such as the rules, company constitution, a trust 
deed, the rules of the association and articles of incorporation; and the statutory 
responsibilities and obligations of the company (business) directors and the 
relationships between owners, shareholders, investors and others; and (2) operational 
governance, which deals with compliance with a range of industry specific legislation 
and general statutes that impose obligations. 
The corporate governance framework can be described as a contract that regulates 
the relationship between a company and its stakeholders, particularly amongst the 
management of the corporation, board of directors, majority or controlling 
shareholders, minority shareholders, and all other role-players and stakeholders. It 
serves as ‘a system of checks-and-balances’ and sets clear duties, roles, privileges 
and responsibilities for all role-players and includes procedures for oversight, control 
and supervision and regulates information-flows and decision making. It provides 
procedures to mediate and reconcile at times incompatible and conflicting interests of 
stakeholders in executing their roles and responsibilities. In addition, the framework 
clarifies rights and rewards for all stakeholders impacted by this relationship. 
The International Finance Corporation (2018:3), defines corporate governance as 
“structures and processes for the direction and control of companies” and “concerns 
the relationships among the management, board of directors, controlling shareholders, 
minority shareholders, and other stakeholders”. The European Central Bank (2004) 
describes corporate governance as measures, processes and procedures determined 





Investopedia Academy (2018) highlights that the main benefit of having a high level of 
good corporate governance practices in place is it creates a transparent set of rules 
and controls, particularly in which all role-players have aligned incentives. Good 
corporate governance is not only about being profitable, but is also a tool to 
demonstrate wide-ranging good corporate governance practices underpinned by high 
levels of ethical behaviour, proper conduct and good corporate citizenship, particularly 
through environmental awareness. To maintain good community and investor 
relationships, it has become good practice in many institutions to communicate a firm’s 
corporate governance approach and principles. Such communication can include the 
company outlining its management control and corporate governance polices and 
structures. These include outlining the commitment to good corporate governance in 
all charters, with the tone being set by the board of directors and executive team sitting 
at the peak of the company. It can also be extended to include commitment to good 
governance in all governance documents, such as the firm’s committee charters, 
articles of incorporation and association, shareholding and ownership guidelines and 
in by-laws, where applicable. 
 
2.3.2.3 Governance as good governance 
Stemele (2009:4) highlights that the “concept of ‘good governance’ has only recently 
attracted attention in administration and management, and there are many definitions”. 
The term ‘good governance’ also relates to the concept of ‘fair or good enough 
governance’, which is often associated with a ‘standard of good governance’. The 
concept of good governance, according to Schwella, et al. (2015:25), “may have 
different meanings and prescriptive connotations ranging between a capitalist, a 
socialist, a liberal or a conservative perspective”. In addition, there may be differences 
in opinion between political leaders and citizens of what is perceived as good 
governance. 
In a business or non-profit organisation, ‘good governance’ refers to consistent and 
reliable management having high levels of ethics; a management team that can be 
relied on to guide and make good and proper decisions; an institution that has good 
consistent and integrated policies that encapsulate the principles of good governance; 





Good governance suggests that an institution functions in a way that permits the 
managers and directors as ‘agents’ to respect the interests and rights of all the 
stakeholders, who are the ‘principals’, with the main aim of making the institution 
successful and sustainable. 
The World Bank (1992) defines good governance as “epitomized by predictable, open 
and enlightened policy making; a bureaucracy imbued with a professional ethos; an 
executive arm of government accountable for its actions; and a strong civil society 
participating in public affairs; and all behaving under the rule of law”. Good 
governance, according to the World Bank (1992), is branded and underpinned by the 
rule of law; active citizen participation, co-production and inclusiveness; public 
accountability; responsiveness to the need of the citizen; effectiveness, efficiency and 
economy in public finances; harmony and consensus orientation; transparency in 
public administration; and management, equity, fairness and impartiality. The Institute 
of Governance (2003:1) “defines good governance as “the process whereby power is 
exercised, decisions are made, citizens or stakeholders are given voice and account 
is rendered on important issues”. 
It is clear, and many researchers in this field have agreed, that the conceptual 
understanding and definition of ‘good governance’ has evolved since its 
commencement and that the concept includes a more extensive range of matters and 
values than some definitions initially envisaged. Due to these developments, and as 
part of their development agenda role, the International Fund for Agricultural 
Development (IFAD) (1999:4-6) reviewed the various essential elements and 
descriptions of good governance. This review includes an assessment and evaluation 
of policies developed and established by multilateral development organisations. 
Given the importance and relevance of good governance as the anchor to this 
research project, section 2.5 of this research discusses it in much more detail. It 
includes the various elements and characteristics of good governance, which includes 








2.3.2.4 Governance as the minimal state 
According to US Legal (2013), “a minimal state refers to a state with the least possible 
amount of powers”. This concept is commonly used in the study of political philosophy 
and refers to a situation wherein the state’s responsibilities and obligations are so 
negligible or ‘minimal’ that if reduced any further there will be a risk that the state may 
become a form of anarchy. The state’s responsibilities and obligations, in a minimal 
state, are restricted to caring for and protecting people “from coercion, fraud and theft, 
to requiring reparation to victims, and to defending the country from foreign 
aggression”. Therefore, given the definition of a minimal state, the only government or 
state institutions that would be in place in this instance would be the police (caring and 
protecting people from crime), the judiciary (restitution to victims of crime) and the 
military (defending the country from foreign attacks). 
There is some critique against this argument by Clark and Powell (2017), who argue 
that this definition of a ‘minimal state’ mainly comes from classical liberal scholars who 
suggest that these primary (minimal) functions need not be completely provided by the 
government. However, the reality is completely different, as a “truly minimal state is 
much more minimal than scholars have traditionally envisioned” (Clark & Powell, 
2017). The private sector also adds to the provision of all three of these ‘minimal state’ 
functions. Therefore, one can conclude that a truly ‘minimal state’ will deliver these 
functions, but only on the margin and when private provision is inadequate to cover 
the cost of these ‘minimal state’ services. 
Lee (1989), is his article entitled ‘The Impossibility of a Desirable Minimal State’ argues 
that “a desirable minimal state is impossible because, if attainable, it is not desirable; 
if desirable, it would be unattainable”. However, Clark and Powell (2017) are not 
convinced of this argument, based on their own theory of a minimal state. Von Mises 
(2006:37), when arguing on the differences in viewpoints between classical and 
revolutionary libertarians and minimal statists, argue that the “government is best, 
which governs least”. 
However, Clark and Powell (2017) do not believe this to be a best and correct 
explanation of the functions and purposes of a good government. They argue that 
within a free market economy system the government’s main purpose is to act in the 





and established – it should protect and defend the persons within the country against 
violent and deceitful attacks, particularly by criminals and gangsters, and it should 
guard, protect and defend the country against distant and external enemies. 
The perspective of Clarke and Powell (2017) on a minimal state is “that the 
government that governs least, is more minimal than minimal, is best”. They argue 
that the state has uncritically been given too large a role and that there is scope for a 
much greater role for private sector markets and civil society in the delivery of public 
service (even under the conditions of a minimal state). This is particularly so if private 
sector markets and broader civil society are able to provide some policing, security, 
defence and, in the case of disagreements, some dispute resolution services. 
Therefore, a less than minimal state would “provide only the amount of these services 
that are both necessary and that markets and civil society fail to provide” (Clarke & 
Powell, 2017). 
 
2.3.2.5 Governance as New Public Management 
The New Public Management (NPM) approach was developed and introduced by 
academics during the 1980s, particularly in the United Kingdom, with the main aim of 
transforming the bureaucratic way in which public services are delivered to the public 
sector to one that is more ‘business-like’ or ‘entrepreneurial’ and whereby private 
sector management models are used to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of 
public services. NPM is synonymous with the concepts of efficiency and effectiveness, 
value for money and ‘triple bottom line’ goal setting and continuous monitoring and 
evaluation of performance, good governance and financial management practices, 
accountability and transparency, and a focus on customers or citizens and innovation. 
NPM focuses on maximising customer service delivery and impact on the citizen or 
the client, and on achieving this impact by delivering services in an efficient and 
effective manner. Rhodes (2002:7) highlights that NPM “introduces private sector 
management methods to the public sector such as hands-on professional 
management, explicit standards and measures of performance; managing by results; 





The NPM approach requires more governance (steering) and less government 
(rowing). In the context of governance, Rhodes (2000:8) makes the point that ‘steering’ 
is fundamental or essential to the scrutiny and unpacking of public management and 
can therefore be regarded as a substitute or replacement to governance. Osborne and 
Gaebler (1992:20, cited by Rhodes, 2002) differentiate between the steering role of 
government in making policy decisions and the rowing role of government when 
executing its service delivery mandate making the point “that bureaucracy is a 
bankrupt tool of rowing”. 
The key point from NPM governance is a belief that the public sector or government 
steers and directs action and approaches by shaping the market and in this way 
captures and takes control of the actual service delivery provision or the ‘rowing 
function’. One example or practice of applying the New Public Management approach 
arose under the direction of Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, who opted to play both 
the official role of prime minister in the United Kingdom and the functional role of ‘policy 
entrepreneur’ in that, through civil service reforms, she drove changes in public 
administration that are classically applied in the private sector, focusing on areas such 
as organisational improvement and optimisation methods, improving customer 
services and relations, domestic resource (revenue) mobilisation initiatives, improving 
financial management and procurement practices, strengthening accountability and 
oversight arrangements through enhanced audit and policy evaluations processes, 
and advancing partnership arrangements between government, civil society and the 
private sector. 
Some efficiency measures introduced by NPM reformers include applying the 
principles of subsidiarity in that services are decentralised with the main objective to 
improve the efficiency and the effectiveness of the state by giving local agencies or 
those closest to communities more choice and autonomy in how they deliver 
government services. Some of main efficiency initiatives include the delivery of shared 
services from a central site as a cost-reduction strategy; applying e-government 
strategies to improve the effectiveness and responsiveness to the citizen; using 
government business entities and enterprises, operating on business principles, as 
quasi-market structures to delivery public services but chiefly to act as a mechanisms 
for the public sector to compete with the private sector; and the participation of 





companies are utilised to deliver what were formerly public services. The performance 
of these initiatives, formulated under the NPM approach, is assessed using audits, 
benchmarks and performance evaluations. 
The NPM approach should not be confused or mistakenly compared with the New 
Public Administration (NPA) approach as the themes and characteristic of the two 
systems of governance are different. There are some mutual or common features 
between the NPM and NPA, but they differ on the following points: 
1. The NPM approach advocates being hands-on, practical and pro-active, 
unambiguous and having clear standards of delivery. The emphasis is on 
performance and output control, focusing on efficiency and will 
discontinue units that do not deliver. The approach acknowledges the 
importance, and encourages the participation, of private sector 
enterprises, improves the timing of delivery and focuses on greater use of 
and value for money.  
2. The NPA is based on hierarchy of rules, apolitical, non-partisan civil 
service, at times intentionally excluding the private sector. It is not open to 
partnering opportunities with the private sector, internal red-tape, 
inefficient and unnecessary rules and regulations. The NPA focuses on 
equity and equality and recognises the importance of the public sector, 
many times above that of the private sector, internal government stability 
and sustainability. 
 
The NPM theory and approach has not been without criticism. According to Barzelay 
(2001), criticism includes the view that “there are blurred lines between policymaking 
and providing services in the New Public Management system”. Main risks include the 
possible politicisation of the public service due to the fact that the most senior 
executives in the public service are hired on contract under a pay-for-performance 
system and further risks that these contracts are generally linked to the political term 
of office. This results in many appointments appearing to be linked to political parties, 
which may lead to the questioning of managers’ commitment and faithfulness. This 
may in turn result in public managers moving away from trying to meet citizens’ needs 





from being targeted and becoming the ‘political sacrificial lamb’. The NPM approach 
also brings to question integrity and compliance when dealing with incentives for public 
managers, resulting in public confidence being at risk which could undermine the trust 
in government. 
Rhodes (2002) highlights four ways in which the NPM approach, with applicability to 
inter-organisational networks, “fails to capture the characteristics of [the] 
contemporary government structure”: 
1. NPM focuses on institutions internally rather than externally, with the aim 
of having a deliberate focus on partnerships and collaborations, whilst 
ensuring the horizontal interface and “ties between individuals and 
agencies” (Dickinson 2016:43); 
2. NPM focuses on the main goals, strategy and objectives and not on the 
most important point of building and maintaining good relationships and 
fostering trust, internally and externally with the private sector; 
3. NPM is tasked with a focus on results, which are highlighted, whilst 
Rhodes’ (2006) model divulges a potential breakdown in public 
accountability and trust; and 
4. NPM emphasises the importance of rivalry and competition and this 
approach is not aligned with the essential requirements of ‘steering’, 
which has the characteristics of a network model. 
 
2.3.2.6 Governance as a socio-cybernetic system 
Rhodes (1996) defines the concept of ‘governance as a socio-cybernetic system’ as 
“the effects of the interactions among government, social, political and economic 
actors wherein no one actor has a monopoly over information or expertise”. In using 
this governance approach, the community may decide to set wide-ranging goals and 
objectives and through this process produce a governing framework. As actors or role-
players the community can engage within the established official environment in which 
they work and “reshape the network of relations to solve problems” (Rhodes, 1996). 
Kooiman, et al. (2005) defines ‘governance’ as including the public, as well as “private 





further add that it comprises the design and use of principles that will guide 
engagements and care for organisations that enable them. The key element of this 
definition is the concepts of ‘engagements’ or ‘interactions’, as this key element stands 
at the core of the proposed new interactive and collaborative governance viewpoint 
(Kooiman, et al., 2005). The authors view ‘interaction’ or ‘engagement’ as “a specific 
form of action, undertaken by actors in order to remove obstacles and tread new 
pathways”. This definition connects to another definition by Kooiman (1993a:258) “that 
governance can be seen as the pattern or structure that emerges in a socio-political 
system as ‘common’ result or outcome of the interacting intervention efforts of all 
involved actors”. The pattern or structure encompasses many actors and participants 
and therefore “cannot be reduced to one actor or group of actors in particular”. 
The authors point out that it is not only the national or central government that is 
responsible for determining policy objectives and outcomes. In this regard, national or 
central government may authorise or approve legislation, but in the implementation of 
those laws and regulations, the central or national government must engage and 
interact with, amongst others, local and provincial government, the NGO sector, 
private sector, certain public sector clusters and authorities (e.g. education or health 
authorities) and the broad citizenry that may be affected by such legislation. The reality 
is that this approach suggests that the various role-players and actors engage and 
interact with one another, and not just through one-way engagements or interactions. 
Kooiman, et al. (2005) differentiates between “governing (or goal-directed 
interventions) and governance which is the result (or the total effects) of social-
political-administrative interventions and interactions”. Although there is a particular 
process and procedure for policy formulation and determination, institutions should 
guard against it being determined and forced from high up onto citizens. Policy 
formulation and determination should emerge and be developed from negotiations and 
discussions between the several affected parties, and in that way recognise the many 
(inter) dependencies and that no single actor ‘knows it all’ in the policy formulation 
environment. The point that Kooiman (1993:4) makes is that all actors and role-players 
in a specific policy area need one another as each can contribute to the relevant 
knowledge and no single person has all the appropriate knowledge and skills to make 





Kooiman, et al. (2005:11) make the point that “no single actor, public or private, has 
the knowledge and information required to solve complex, dynamic, and diversified 
problems”, that “no actor has sufficient overview to make the needed instruments 
effective”; and further that “no single actor has sufficient action potential to dominate 
unilaterally in a particular governing model”. Therefore, what has been advanced is 
that interaction with and between the various role-players and actors is central to the 
socio-cybernetic governance approach. 
Rhodes (2000:12), citing the findings, speculation and recommendations of the work 
of Kooiman (1993) on ‘modern governance’, confirms that governing confronts new 
challenges in that “instead of relying on the state or the market, socio-political 
governance is directed at the creation of patterns of interaction in which political and 
traditional hierarchical governing and social self-organization are complementary” and 
the obligation and responsibility for interventions is distributed across private and 
public sector partners, which is aligned to the socio-cybernetic governance approach. 
Ismay (2008:47) summarises this governance approach of cybernetics systems very 
appropriately, as an approach whereby the “single sovereign authority is replaced by 
multiple actors specific to each policy area, interdependence between and amongst 
the socio-political-administrative actors, shared goals, blurred boundaries between 
public private and voluntary sectors and multiplying and new forms of action, 
intervention and control. Governance is the result of interactive social political forms 
of governing”. 
 
2.3.2.7 Governance as self-organising networks 
Networks is one of the governance styles and is integral to the broader public 
governance umbrella. It is seen as one of the broad ways of giving effect to service 
delivery obligations. These networks involve collaboration between government and 
community organisations to co-create and co-produce key priorities and policy 
objectives and includes initiatives by government (public sector) and the private sector 
to work together contractually by using public-private partnerships (PPP) to deliver a 





The various definitions of governance suggest that ‘networks’ are the “analytical heart 
of governance” (Rhodes, 2000) and the analysis of how networks operate 
demonstrates their impact to be much more than ‘what governments do to get their 
jobs done’. The researcher therefore offers proportionately more attention to this form 
of governance than others in this chapter. 
Springer (2018), citing many other authors, such as Kaufman, et al. (1986), Thorelli 
(1986), Peters (1998), Lowndes and Skelcher (1998), Thompson, et al. (1991), 
Thompson (2003), Powell (1990), Kooiman (2003), Considine and Lewis (2003), 
Kickert (2003), and Schout and Jordan (2005), makes the point that network 
governance is regarded as one of the “three ‘ideal-types’ of governance, that are 
considered to have played a role in Western administrations”, going back to the 1950s. 
According to Kooiman, et al. (2005), governance simply refers to “the relations 
between public-sector actors and societal actors when addressing public issues”. 
‘Network governance’ or ‘self-organising networks’ capture the relational aspect of 
governance. ‘New governance’ is often used as an alternative or synonym for network 
governance. According to Lee (2003:2), the principles underpinning ‘new governance’ 
are not based on hierarchy, but founded on the basis of societal determinants and 
coordination, given that governance is self-regulated and based on the logic of co-
steering, co-production, co-determination and networks. 
Kickert (1997:735) defines network governance as the process of managing and 
coordinating “complex networks, consisting of many different actors from the national, 
regional and local government, from political groups and from societal groups”. These 
include action-, pressure-, and interest groups; societal institutions; and private and 
business organisations. 
According to Ismay (2008:48), “self-organising networks involves several 
interdependent actors involved in delivering services”. He makes the point that 
“networks are made up of organisations” and that an organisation needs to achieve its 
objectives and therefore must engage in a process of exchanging resources in pursuit 
of maximising their influence and effect over outcomes and objectives in a bid to “avoid 





Various forms of network governance, which focus on the interactions between actors, 
have developed over time and include some of the following: 
Fischer (2012) explains that “participatory governance is a variant or subset of 
governance theory which puts emphasis on democratic engagement, in particular 
through deliberative practices and seeks to deepen citizen participation in the 
governmental process by examining the assumptions and practices of the traditional 
view that generally hinders the realization of a genuine participatory democracy”. 
Participatory governance can lead to: citizen empowerment and community capacity 
building; the development of a wide and transparent exchange of knowledge and 
information; a more equal distribution of political power; the establishment of 
collaborative partnerships; a fairer distribution of resources; the decentralisation of 
decision-making processes; an emphasis on inter-institutional dialogue; and greater 
accountability. 
Nodal governance is a controlled or organised form of participatory governance in 
which the public and private sectors agree to co-operate in the provision of much 
needed public services (Meuleman, 2008:36, citing Froestad & Shearing, 2004). It 
typically functions through networks and public-private partnerships (PPP) of 
governance ‘nodes’ that include many role-players and actors, such as government, 
various agencies, businesses, NGOs and communities. Both forms of governance, i.e. 
participatory and nodal governance, locate and place the state or the public sector as 
a significant actor and player in the activities of unravelling and resolving societal 
difficulties and needs. 
Culture governance is a new form of governance representing a top-down steering 
approach to governance and is not administratively bureaucratic, nor is it tiered or 
hierarchical (Springer, 2018). It represents a form of governance that is empowering 
and permits self-discipline. Although it gives the impression that some essential 
mismatches between hierarchies and networks are abandoned, this governance 
approach is considered a generally accepted appropriate style mixture. 
Community governance is a form of governance that promotes social cohesion, co-
creation, co-ownership and public or citizen accountability and whereby the state 





and look after, their own public requirements, needs and affairs. These can include 
public needs, such as community policing, security, safety and transport. 
According to Meuleman, (2008:36), citing Hajer, et al. (2003), deliberative 
governance “is ‘deliberately’ anti-statist and focuses on societal processes of 
deliberation as the crucial ‘modern’ problem-solving mechanism”. It is premised on the 
idealistic view of democracy, as illustrated and promoted by Klijn and Koppenjans 
(2000). 
Reflexive governance considers complexity and uncertainty as the main challenges 
for networks. According to Meuleman (2008:36, citing Beck, 1994), networks “require 
that governance approaches are reflexive, i.e. the governance approach and the 
‘governors’ itself are influenced, or should be open for influences by the governance 
environment”. In this form of governance, learning is a central issue. 
Adaptive governance, according to Meuleman (2008:37), “is a way of designing 
policies that can adapt to a range of anticipated and unanticipated conditions”. The 
adaptive governance approach “is collaborative, flexible and learning-based issue 
management” mainstreamed transversely across the different scales. Meuleman 
(2008:37), points out that adaptive management is “a form of reflexive governance” 
and that it is a bespoke designed learning process intended to manage and deal with 
uncertainty and ambiguity. 
According to Klijn and Koppenjan (2000:142), network governance can be separated 
into five characteristics, namely: 
• Joint or shared dependence of players and actors, which culminates in 
working relations between them that are supportive and sustainable, 
ultimately benefitting the citizen; 
• As a consequence of the many interactions and exchanges, rules and 
procedures are formed that regulate and control the behaviour of the 
various role-players and actors; 
• The diversity of players, actors, their own perceptions and the many 
strategies that can flow from the network governance approach, makes the 
already complex policy processes even less predictable, whilst 





• Public policy determination and application is the consequence of many 
difficult engagements and interactions between the various role-players 
and actors who contribute “in concrete games in a network”; and 
• Conflict management and risk reduction strategies must be developed and 
implemented to respond to the problems and needs that may arise as a 
result of implementing network co-operation and network engagements. 
 
In making networks within knowledge-intensive organisations more effective, Meyer 
(2004:37) identifies four key elements, i.e. (1) trust; (2) durability; (3) strategic 
dependency; and (4) institutionalisation, whilst Adler (2001:215) adds the key element 
of the will “and ability to understand the interests of other network partners and to act 
accordingly”. Thorelli (1986:38) adds the concept of ‘power’, indicating it to be a 
‘cousin’ of trust. The dominant and fundamental principle in networks remains the 
capability and capacity to influence, inspire and effect choices and decisions of others. 
According to Powell (1991:34), network governance can be regarded as “more a 
marriage than a one-night stand, but there is no marriage license, no common 
household, no pooling of assets”. The advantages of network governance, in 
comparison to hierarchies are “that networks are open, [the absence of which] can 
also be a threat to another key element, namely trust, because trust relates to team 
building in a network”. Network governance expands and takes democracy to the next 
level as it advances and promotes governance matters, such as accountability, 
responsiveness, fairness, equity and impartiality and democratic legitimacy. Further, 
it is deemed to provide opportunities for innovation, revolution and modernisation and 
for gaining knowledge in an ever-changing milieu. 
Springer (2018:34, citing Meyer & Baltes, 2000) indicates that network governance 
has some weaknesses, which include the following: 
• According to Sorensen (2006), the influence of political office bearers is 
limited. As a consequence, democracy is weakened; 
• Networks are not permanent structures and are therefore generally not 





formal structure or organisation, or the network collapses or entirely 
disintegrates; 
• In comparison to ‘market’ and ‘hierarchy’ governance, networks tend to be 
less effective and efficient, given that network governance involves and is 
underpinned by the involvement of people. People having more ‘links’ than 
others generally play a significant role in the network and tend to have a 
much ‘louder voice’ than the rest of the members within the network. On 
the positive side, strong networks, acting like a ‘hub’ (pivotal members or 
‘bosses’), ensure swift communication within the network. Within a 
network, hubs create some form of hierarchical structure. Like players 
having more ‘links’ than others, the actors who happens to be in an 
important position have an added advantage over their peers and as such 
this makes, “the selection of participants in network governance processes 
problematic” as there are also no generally recognised processes and 
procedures for such selection of these hubs or ‘bosses’, with the risk being 
“that privileged actors join in technocratic decision making, which may 
result in a decrease of citizen participation compared to the classical 
representative forms of democratic decision-making” (Springer, 2018:34). 
The disadvantage, according to Barabasi (2003, cited by Springer, 
2018:34) is that when these ‘bosses’ in the network are removed, 
networks generally tend to discontinue, break down into smaller pieces or 
totally collapse. 
 
Concluding on this important form of governance, the researcher reflects on the work 
by Rhodes (2000:17), who indicates that “networks are one institutional setting in 
which public and private actors interact”. Networks are informal establishments; that 
is, informally constructed and put together with “permanent, rule-governed 
relationships”. According to Rhodes (2000:17), these “agreed rules build trust, 
communication, reduce uncertainty and are the basis of non-hierarchic co-ordination.” 
Much research on this subject has been done that concludes that governance as 
‘networks’ is a universal and probably the most significant method and form of 





However, competing explanations exist about how networks affect government and its 
policies and the performance of the state. 
 
2.3.2.8 International interdependence 
In recent times, research on international interdependencies and relations, as well as 
international political economy as they relate to governance, have received increasing 
attention. Particularly relevant to ‘governance as international interdependence’ are 
the concepts and theory of ‘hollowing-out’, as well as ‘multi-level governance’. 
Rosenau (1992:3-6) makes the point that under the ‘hollowing-out’ theory, the 
authority of the state is eroded by international interdependencies. Under ‘hollowing-
out’ and ‘multi-level governance’, ‘government’ is distinguished from ‘governance’, 
with the former referring to the “activities that are backed by formal authority” and the 
latter to the “activities backed by shared goals” (Rosenau, 1992). Rosenau (1992:3-6) 
describes governance as “a more encompassing phenomenon” as it embraces not 
only public sector organisations “but also informal, non-governmental mechanisms”. 
Rosenau and Czempiel (1992:5) highlight that one can “get governance without 
government when there are regulatory mechanisms in a sphere of activity which 
function effectively even though they are not endowed with formal authority”. 
Authority (or power), under a global governance scenario, is disaggregated and 
scattered, adding to the displacement of the authority of the nation state by redirecting 
authority “upwards to the international level and downwards to sub-national agencies”. 
Held (1991:151-7) makes the point that the autonomy and authority of nation states 
are limited by the following four processes, namely: 
• The internationalisation of production and financial transactions; 
• international’ institutions and organizations;  
• international law; and 






These limiting processes have, according to Hirst and Thompson (1995:409), resulted 
in the weakening of the governance capacity of the nation state, although it is required 
to remain a pivotal institution. Hirst and Thompson (1995:435) indicate that “UNISA 
of public powers that regulate and guide action in a relatively consistent way, providing 
minimum standards of conduct and relief from harm”. 
Multi-level governance, as illustrated by the European Union (EU) Commission in 
relation to the emergence of trans-policy networks as a feature of national policy 
making, suggests a high degree of “dependence in the policy sector; policy making is 
depoliticised and routinized; supra-national agencies are dependent on other agencies 
to deliver a service; and there is a need to aggregate interests” and strengthen 
functional representations, which, according to Benington and Harvey (1998); Haas 
(1992) and Hooghe (1996), in Rhodes, R.A.W. (2000),  is a very good example of the 
benefits and influence of multi-level governance and international interdependencies 
on the public sector. 
 
2.4 DIMENSIONS OF GOOD GOVERNANCE 
The Governance Working Group (1996) defines ‘governance’ as “the structure of 
institutions and societal norms by which authority is exercised for everyone's benefit 
at all levels, from local to global” and highlights that it has three distinct dimensions, 
namely: 
1. The political dimension – processes by which those in authority are 
selected, elected, monitored and replaced; 
2. The economic dimension – processes by which public resources are 
effectively managed and sound policies implemented; and 
3. The institutional dimension – processes by which citizens and the state 
itself respect society’s/public institutions. 







2.4.1 Political Governance 
The World Bank (2018) believes political governance has two sub-components 
(dimensions)” (1) the “structure of government”; and (2) “the structure of accountability 
and contestability of political leaders”. The legislative and practical or real-world 
separation of powers between the executive (cabinet), legislative (parliament), and 
judicial (legal court system) underpins and indicates the structure of government. 
The first sub-dimension focusses on the role of the legislature in terms of oversight 
over the executive, the prerogatives of the legislature to determine public resource 
allocation, and the independence and effectiveness of the judiciary (judges, courts and 
magistrates) to prosecute and enforce judgments without fear or favour, and the 
effectiveness and independence of the accountability and parliamentary and 
governance committees’ oversight arrangements (e.g. parliamentary standing 
committees, SCOPA, audit authorities and ombudsmen). 
Leftwich (1993:606-611) views political, or as he calls it, democratic governance, as 
having three major components: systemic, political and administrative. The political 
perspective, which deals with “legitimacy and authority derived from a democratic 
mandate”, is similar to the views that were expressed by the World Bank under the 
first sub-dimension, as highlighted in the preceding paragraph. 
The second sub-dimension, according to the World Bank (2018), deals with the 
“structure of the accountability and contestability of political leaders”. One measure to 
test the quality of governance in the public sector is to do an assessment and analysis 
of the quality of public policies, which is designed by political leaders, as well as the 
implementation thereof. This should include whether or not politicians are fully 
committed to being accountable for the policy choices that they have made as political 
leaders. The World Bank (2018) makes the point that the quality of governance is 
further dependent on the extent of political rivalry and opposition in choosing leaders 
(both political office bearers and public servants), the integrity and credibility of political 
parties, respect for the rule of law, respect for democracy (which includes the neat 
handover of legitimate political power), openness and transparency in political party 
funding and donations, openness to asset disclosure, declaration of all interests, 
implementation of parliamentary rules relating to conflict-of-interest and an openness 





public trust, and to promote openness and transparency “of the political structure, 
including the opportunities for multi-faceted political expression and for non-elites, 
minorities, and disenfranchised to gain access to political power” (World Bank, 2018). 
Leftwich (1993:606) provides a political understanding and explanation of good 
governance. He indicates that such an interpretation focuses on “the way political and 
legal systems are organised, it emphasises rights and obligations of citizens, the 
presence of democratic rules and procedures, multi-party democracy, the key role of 
political parties in governance, the existence of pluralist press and the functioning of 
an active civil society”. In essence, according to Leftwich (1993:606), “political 
dimension is concerned with the form of political authority in a country, the system of 
politics, how it relates to public administration, laws and regulations, accountability 
mechanisms and its citizens”. 
According to Dlalisa (2009:2), this type of dimension is also termed or referred to as 
‘democratic governance’. The Centre for International Private Enterprise (CIPE) 
(2018) defines democratic governance as “giving citizens a say in how decisions are 
made”, which is vital to ensure “that democracy delivers for all of society”. The authors 
emphasise that good and solid democratic governance is branded and underpinned 
by responsiveness, transparency, openness and accountability in both the private 
sector and government. Governance processes that are open, transparent, inclusive 
and participatory, generally culminate in improved, just and impartial public sector 
policies informed by the citizens and based on good governance principles as these 
create the environment for responsive government or public service delivery to the 
communities and business in general (CIPE, 2018). 
Dlalisa (2009:21) highlights that “democratic governance embraces the requisites of 
Western Democratic Practice” as defined by Western scholars and includes the 
elements of a decentralised “governance system, the rule of law, human rights, 
freedom of expression and association, accountability, openness, citizen participation, 
civic and political rights” adding, according to the UNDP (1997), transparency, access 
to public information and the right to vote. 
Good democratic or political governance assistants improve the reliability, integrity and 
credibility of government and contribute to improving effectiveness and efficiency of 





in turn can support economic development and growth. Good political governance has 
an impact on the economy, particularly on addressing the socio-economic challenges 
of unemployment, skills and human development. Good political governance will 
produce and result in a more conducive environment for growth and development, as 
well as increase corporate and public sector investment supported by the creation of 
sustainable employment opportunities, particularly so in local government. The 
success is dependent on an appropriate interface between the political, administrative, 
community and private sector (economic development) structures. 
 
2.4.2 Institutional Governance 
Breaking up the definition of ‘good governance’ into six dimensions, the World Bank 
and Kaufmann (2010) suggest the term ‘institutional governance’ to refer to “the 
capacity of the government to effectively formulate and implement sound policies”. 
This includes assessing: 
• Government effectiveness2 – deals with measuring the value and 
qualitative aspects of public service delivery and the extent to which it is 
delivered from political interference and pressures, the quality of public 
sector policy design and formulation and the ability to essentially 
implement such policy, and the reliability, credibility and sustainability of 
government’s commitment and assurance that such policies will indeed be 
implemented. 
• Regulatory quality – captures observations of the capability and capacity 
of the state to articulate, formulate and implement credible and sustainable 
policies, strategies, plans and regulations that allow and encourage private 
sector growth and development. 
                                            
2 Includes the “extent to which the civil service recruitment and management is meritocratic, the extent to which 
government wages are adequate and transparently administered, the existence and respect of professional and 
ethical codes of conduct, the effectiveness of public resource management (e.g. comprehensive and published 
budgets, the absence of implicit subsidies, competitive procurement, timely and open financial reporting and 
independent external audits), probity and lack of corruption in tax and customs administration, the integrity and 
independence of regulatory agencies, and the quality of frontline service delivery (perhaps as measured through 






Boeninger (1992:268) makes the point that institutional governance, as one of the 
dimensions of good governance, “is concerned with the ability of governmental 
institutions to manage and get things done through institutional mechanisms”. He 
highlights that this form of governance captures government’s established institutional 
capacity and structural configuration, the process of making decisions and the 
collaboration, interface and relationship amongst public sector officials, public and 
private agencies and business in the local community. In essence, the concern is 
about the capacity of the state to deliver and enable the citizen. 
Institutional governance connects with the “administrative perspective of democratic 
governance” as it “emphasises efficiency and effectiveness, accountability and 
transparency in public administration and bureaucratic competence to manage” 
(Leftwich, 1993:606-612). The World Bank (2018), in its article on the main dimensions 
of governance, places ‘public sector management’ as a core component of institutional 
governance. According to the World Bank (2018), institutional governance addresses 
the effectiveness and quality in service delivery by public servants and external 
contractors (particularly where the delivery and execution of government services is 
contracted out) “in managing public resources, carrying out regulatory functions, and 
generally implementing public policy”. 
In the view of the researcher, this form of governance extends beyond only assessing 
the effectiveness of the state, and includes assessing the remaining two components 
of the three ‘e’s’, i.e. efficiency (input-output relationship) and the economy (public 
value and impact). Brautigam (1996:83, cited by Dlalisa, 2009:23), is of the view that 
“an efficient and effective public administration system stimulates development 
projects and improves policy making processes”. Eriksen (2002:12-13) supports this 
view, indicating that institutional and organisational capacity and competence is 
related and closely linked to aspects of sustainable economic development, public 
wellbeing, growth and job creation, efficiency, value for money, productivity and 
effectiveness in the delivery of much-needed public service, an effective and efficient 
administration or bureaucracy, competent and skilled employees, dedicated leaders 
and public servants, the capability and capacity to manage and the effective use of 





transport facilities among the requirements of an effective system at national, regional 
and local levels” (Wohlmuth, 1998:46). 
From an institutional perspective, the effective promotion of good governance is based 
on a public administrative system that is effective, efficient and responsive in its 
service delivery mandate; concerned about the impact of services and public value 
creation; transparent and accountable; competent in its leadership and staff to design 
and implement policies that are developmental; and has the competence to manage 
both the public and private sectors, whilst managing the interface with politicians 
(political governance). 
 
2.4.3 Technical Governance 
Dlalisa (2009:23, citing Boeninger, 1992:268), makes the point that the technical 
dimension of governance, which is a component of institutional governance, focuses 
“on resource constraints and the technical know-how on resource mobilisation and 
utilisation, quality service delivery and economic development”. 
A discussion paper by the World Bank (1991:8) highlights that when the institutional 
ability and capacity of government to manage or steer the economy in the right 
direction, and the capacity to provide much needed public services, are weak, the 
prospects for progress and development are meagre or poor. Particular areas of 
capacity challenges highlighted and prioritised by the World Bank as part of their public 
sector management reform programme include poor public finance management 
(such as revenue management and expenditure control), weak civil service and 
parastatal reform (such as cost containment measures, strengthening and improving 
personnel management practices and the effectiveness and efficiency of state-owned 
enterprises). The above finding is mainly as a result of the quality of public servants, 
which, in the main, is influenced by a general lack of proficiency, skill and know-how 
needed to execute and effectively implement technical decisions, poor levels of 
education resulting in low or poor skills levels and the inability to exercise appropriate 
power and authority in the management and application of scarce resources, 





Wohlmuth (1998:45) highlights that if ‘governance’ is defined as the “way a 
government manages a country’s affairs, then it requires a system of public 
administration to manage it appropriately, [and that] is skilled and adequately 
capacitated to deliver on its goals and objectives”. Brautigam (1996:83-85, cited by 
Wohlmuth, 1998:46, and Dlalisa, 2009:23) argues that “the state’s capacity, or ability 
of government agencies, structures and systems to design and accomplish its goals, 
is an important component of the institutional dimension”. Technical proficiency and 
ability (technical governance) is encapsulated in the principles of institutional 
governance. Wohlmuth (1998:45) highlights that it is not just resources that is required 
for the functioning of an effective state, but also the four dimensions of state capacity, 
i.e. the regulatory, administrative, technical and extractive (revenue) dimensions. 
According to Brautigam (1996:83, cited by Wohlmuth, 1998:47), the technical capacity 
or ability of the state “includes the expertise and knowledge required to make and 
implement technical decisions, whether in science, engineering or in 
macroeconomics”. The technical dimension of governance includes the respective 
policy and strategy tools and instruments necessary to give effect to the plan and to 
successfully implement the decisions and policy choices of government. According to 
Wohlmuth (1998:47), having the appropriate technical capacity and expertise 
necessitates mobilising the government administration system to improve the 
technical capacity by acquiring the necessary, yet “appropriate technical and health 
standards, getting engineering projects properly evaluated or solving the technical 
issues of functioning of the current systems”  
There is a high level of interconnection and interrelatedness between the three 
dimensions of state capacity. Wohlmuth (1998:47) highlights that the administrative 
capacity as a pre-condition, “requires technical capacity and regulatory capacity are 
enhanced” whilst the “technical capacity has to be organised around a functioning 
public administration system and under the umbrella of a sufficient regulatory capacity 
so that the technical standards really matter in the country”.  
Wohlmuth (1998:48) emphasises that it is the cumulative weaknesses, and not 
necessarily a single weakness, that make the function of a state effective or not, i.e. 
low technical skills and institutional ability and capacity (on institutional management, 





and contradictory statutes, laws and regulations) and inadequate revenue 
management (extractive) capacity will add to the administrative weakness (underpaid, 
unsatisfied, understaffed and badly organised administrative machinery). 
2.4.4 Other Schools of Thought on the Dimension of Governance 
The World Bank (2018), in their article on the main dimensions of governance, added 
two further varieties, namely the concepts of (a) competition, open opportunity and 
entry by the private sector; and (b) “dealing with civil society, voice and participation”. 
This first point is a measurement of the extent to which the system of governance has 
allowed, or stopped, a restricted business elite to combine or unite their collective 
financial or commercial influence and authority so that it converts into some form of 
(party) political power. This includes measuring to what extent officials and laws have 
been influenced unduly in ways that further unite, consolidate and protect such 
financial and commercial power. 
To guarantee or ensure competitive or fair market behaviour, the state should be 
attentive or on the look-out for signs of the concentration of financial and commercial 
power, the presence of dominant players or monopolies, the absence of statutes, laws 
and regulations and the lack of enforcement thereof. Other signs, according to the 
World Bank (2018), to be on the lookout for include the presence of “weak corporate 
governance requirements in the case of publicly traded companies, the existence of 
powerful business associations coupled to the political elite financially and otherwise”. 
The impact of such arrangements on the quality of governance itself and relationships 
between the political power structure and commercial or financial and economic elite 
will become increasingly important. 
The second point focusses on ‘civil society, voice and participation’ in the formal 
election and referendum process. According to the World Bank (2018), governments 
must “focus on the variety of other channels that help assure stronger voice and 
participation by society at large”. This focus should include the role and function of civil 
society institutions and players in the administration of government entities and the 
delivery of public services, the practice of broad citizen participation, public hearings 
and community consultations on any proposed laws and regulations impacting on 
communities, autonomy and the independence of the press and media and the 





action of autonomous independent regulatory institutions, such as the consumer 
protection and media watchdog agencies, independent academic institutions and think 
tanks (World Bank, 2018). 
In summary, good governance requires strong leadership (both politically and 
administratively). It requires that the institutional capacity of the state be strengthened 
through proper political governance practices premised on respect for the separation 
of powers (authority) between the parliament (legislature), the executive and the 
judiciary (courts). It requires initiatives to improve the efficiency and effectiveness 
(impact) of the state in the implementation of policy and establishing the rule of law. 
To ensure organisational performance, creating the required technical capacity to 
implement and give effect to the characteristics and requirements of a functional state 
is non-negotiable. Also non-negotiable is the institutionalisation of practices that 
encourage open opportunity and entry and fair competition by the private sector, and 
effective mechanisms to deal with communities, their voice and active public 
participation and engagement. 
 
2.5 GOOD GOVERNANCE 
2.5.1 Context and the Evolution of the Concept 
‘Good governance’, introduced by Rhodes (1996) and discussed earlier under section 
2.2.3 as a use of governance, was initially conceptualised in the 1980s by the World 
Bank. The World Bank made refinements to the definition, particularly in the 1990s, in 
a quest to appropriately shape its lending policy to third-world countries. ‘Good 
governance’ remains a contested concept. According to the IMF (2017:12), the 
contours of the concept remain unsettled – more generally and within the Bank, which 
never articulated a single unambiguous and clear-cut functioning description of the 
concept – both because of changes in insights and broader developments. 
The World Bank (1992, cited by Leftwich, 1993:610, and Leftwich, 1994), “defines 
governance as the exercise of political power to manage a nation’s affairs”, and ‘good 
governance’, which is more expansionary in definition than just mere political power in 
managing a nation’s affairs, as “an efficient public service, an independent judicial 





public funds; an independent public auditor, responsible to a representative 
legislature; respect for the law and human rights at all levels of government; a 
pluralistic institutional structure, and a free press” (World Bank, 1992). 
‘Good governance’, as defined by the World Bank (1992), covers the following three 
elements: 
1. The form of political regime;  
2. The process by which authority is exercised in the management of a 
country’s economic and social resources for development; and 
3. The capacity of governments to design, formulate and implement policies 
and discharge functions. 
 
The World Bank (1992) has over time stepped back from the term ‘good governance’, 
reverting to ‘governance’ or ‘fair governance’ instead, which implies good enough 
governance, or, ‘good governance which is qualified’. This is a shift from a normative 
to more functional organisational approach, which focuses on organisational 
arrangements, functions, and outcomes, both between state or government actors and 
“between state and non-state actors” (IMF, 2017:11). According to the Asian 
Development Bank (1995:7), given the governance climate, the focus of the World 
Bank has in recent years shifted away from “its own interventions to the overall country 
context within which those interventions take place”. 
According to the Divine Word College of Laoag (DWCL) (2018), ‘good governance’ 
can be regarded “as an indeterminate term used in the international development 
literature to describe how public institutions conduct public affairs and manage public 
resources”. Furthermore, they make the point that governance is “the process of 
decision-making and the process by which decisions are implemented (or not 
implemented)”. 
The IMF (2017:7), concerned with development of countries, embraces a definition 
that demonstrates developmental intentions: “the manner in which power is exercised 
in the management of a country’s economic and social resources for development.” 
Given this definition, governance is about managing the change and development 





incorporates the effective functioning, competence and ability of government, and 
includes the guidelines and instructions of those governance societies that produce 
the framework governing the conduct of both the public sector and private business, 
“including accountability for economic and financial performance, and regulatory 
frameworks relating to companies, corporations, and partnerships”. In broad terms, for 
the IMF, governance and, for that matter, good governance is about the institutional 
environment in which citizens interact among themselves and with government 
agencies/officials. 
Leftwich (1993:611) recognises three elements for good governance, namely 
“systemic, political and administrative”. The systemic use of governance is wide-
ranging and more comprehensive than government as it covers the “distribution of 
both internal and external political and economic power”. The political use of 
governance refers to “a state enjoying both legitimacy and authority, derived from a 
democratic mandate”. The administrative use refers to “an efficient, open accountable 
and audited public service which has the bureaucratic competence to help design and 
implement appropriate policies and manage whatever public sector there is”. 
According to Williams and Young (1994:87), in its search to realise optimal efficiencies 
and effectiveness in government through the delivery of public services, the World 
Bank seeks to encourage open and transparent competition and opportunity for 
market participation; privatisation of state or public enterprise and institutions to 
improve citizen impact and efficiency; reorganisation and modification of the public 
service; improve human resource management practices in government and reduce 
excess staffing to improve efficiency of the state; introduce fiscal and budgetary policy 
principles and apply strict fiscal discipline (no overspending) in the management of 
public finances; apply the economic principles of subsidiarity by decentralising public 
administration closer to communities and empower the administration to make 
decisions at the lowest level; and improve and expand on the utilisation of non-
governmental organisations and the private sector to deliver public goods and 
services. Rhodes (2000:9) defines good governance succinctly as: “good governance 








2.5.2 Characteristics of Good Governance: International, African and South 
African Perspective 
2.5.2.1 International context and perspective 
The World Bank, who is primarily responsible for the transformation of financial (fiscal), 
social and economic and resource management, highlights three characteristics of a 
society that affect the form and nature of a nation’s approach to governance: (a) the 
“type of political regime”; (b) the “process by which authority is exercised in the 
management of the economic and social resources, with a view to development”; and 
(c) the “capacity of the state to formulate policies and have them effectively 
implemented” (World Bank, 1992). As indicated earlier in the chapter, the concept of 
‘good governance’ was conceived by the World Bank as part of their own reform 
agenda, to strengthen the lending criteria of the Bank. As part of this reform and as 
part of the World Bank’s research program according to the World Bank & Kaufmann 
(2010), the Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) have been developed (using 
indicators for more than 200 countries) between 1996 and now. The WGI captures six 
key dimensions or criteria of good governance, which “include (1) voice and 
accountability; (2) political stability and lack of violence; (3) government effectiveness; 
(4) regulatory quality; (5) rule of law; and (6) control of corruption” (World Bank & 
Kaufmann, 2010). Therefore, the essence of good governance from the perspective 
of the World Bank, et al. (1994) is thorough “development management, and the key 
dimensions of governance are public sector management, accountability, the legal 
framework for development, and information and transparency”. 
The United Nations (UN), on the other hand, has also began to play an increasing role 
in promoting the application of ‘good governance’. The former UN Secretary-General, 
Kofi Annan, makes the point that “good governance is ensuring respect for human 
rights and the rule of law; strengthening democracy; promoting transparency and 
capacity in public administration”. The UNDP (1997) has developed nine 
characteristics for describing ‘good governance’. These include “(1) participation; (2) 
rule of law; (3) transparency; (4) responsiveness; (5) consensus; (6) equity; (7) 





The International Monetary Fund (IMF), created in 1996 at a United Nation’s 
conference in Bretton Woods, New Hampshire, made a declaration on “promoting 
good governance in all its aspects, including by ensuring the rule of law, improving the 
efficiency and accountability of the public sector, and tackling corruption”, to be 
indispensable components within “a framework within which economies can prosper" 
(IMF, 2009). The IMF expresses the view that dishonesty, corruption and bribery inside 
economies is mainly triggered “by the ineffective governance of the economy, either 
too much regulation or too little regulation” and therefore made it a prerequisite for 
borrowers to have the prescribed IMF good governance guidelines, policies and 
procedures in place before receiving any loans from the IMF (IMF, 2009). 
The approach of the Asian Development Bank (ADB) to governance is guided by their 
own assessment of development programs and projects in relation to their impact, 
efficacy and success with which development support is utilised, as well as assessing 
the absorptive ability of their borrowing nations. According to the ADB, governance is 
regarded as having one and the same meaning as proper or sound development 
management. As a result, the logical diagnostic framework for addressing governance 
matters draws a difference between the components of good governance and the 
exact areas of public sector management intervention in which they could be endorsed 
or their existence improved. The ADB builds on the approach by, and the analysis of, 
the World Bank and has recognised four components or elements of ‘good 
governance’, namely “accountability, participation, predictability, and transparency” 
(Asian Development Bank, 1995:vii). 
The UNESCAP (2018) identifies eight dimensions or characteristics of good 
governance, namely “participatory, consensus oriented, accountable, transparent, 
responsive, effective and efficient, equitable and inclusive and follows the rule of law”. 
The UNESCAP makes the point that the application of good governance practices 
guarantees that maladministration, fraud, corruption and dishonesty are minimised, 
the opinions of minority groupings are considered and valued and that the views and 
inputs of the poor and underprivileged in society, obtained in public consultation 
processes, are considered and included in decision-making processes. It also includes 







2.5.2.2 African and South African perspective and commitments to good 
governance 
2.5.2.2.1 African context and perspective 
Over the last two decades, the African continent has been facing serious governance 
challenges, particularly from a political and institutional perspective, with corruption, 
disregard for human rights and dictatorship topping the list. These challenges and the 
absence (lack) of good governance or the presence of bad governance practices in 
some African states have created a sense of panic amongst African leaders as the 
criteria for obtaining international funding support for development, particularly from 
organisations (for example the World Bank and the IMF) include a focus on evaluating 
good governance. This has resulted in African states formally and collectively 
committing themselves to the standards and elements of good governance at 
international (African) conventions, and taking up programs and policy documents of 
institutions, such as the “United Nations Programme of Action for African Economic 
Recovery and Development 1986-1990 (UN-PAAERD) and Africa’s Priority 
Programme for Economic Recovery 1986-1990 (APPER)” (Adedeji, 1998:1). 
Dlalisa (2009:35, citing UNECA, 1988) indicates that the main aim of the various 
charters developed at these conferences, which will be discussed below, is a clear 
and overwhelming “demand for change in the political system of African countries to 
allow for citizen participation in decision making at all political levels” including 
“manpower development and its utilisation in the long run and the ways and means to 
strengthen the role of non-governmental organizations”. 
The Khartoum Declaration is regarded as one of the first initiatives in Africa towards 
embracing the elementary elements and components of good governance. The 
Declaration was adopted in 1998 at the International Conference on the ‘Human 
dimension of Africa’s economic recovery and development’ in Sudan, as a 
consequence of the International Conference on Africa: The challenge of economic 
recovery and accelerated development, held in Nigeria in 1987. According to Africabib 
(1988), the analytical part of the Khartoum Declaration (reproduced in a condensed 





conditions of humans in Africa and, given the state of affairs, “criticizes many structural 
adjustment programmes for being incomplete, mechanistic and of too short a time 
perspective” and “concludes that the human dimension is the sine qua non of 
economic recovery”. Africabib (1998) concludes, recommending the human factor be 
incorporated in the recovery and structural adjustment processes; special attention be 
given to the social sector in general, including vulnerable and poor community groups; 
and advocates long-term sustainable human resource development and utilisation and 
enhancing the role of local, national and international role-players, non-governmental 
organisations and the private sector. Dlalisa (2009:34, citing the UNECA, 1998) 
indicates that the Khartoum Declaration emphasises the “urgent need to improve the 
African political environment, promote development, overcome political instability and 
intolerance, restore the freedom and human rights of individuals and groups and to 
abolish the over-centralization of power in African states”. 
The African Governance Architecture (AGA) has a main purpose to encourage and 
promote interactions and to build relations between stakeholders who are tasked with 
strengthening democracy and advancing good governance in Africa. Additionally, it is 
their responsibility to interpret and explain the objectives of the legal and policy 
declarations in the AU shared values. The AGA was initiated pursuant to the 
declaration at the 15th Summit of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of 
the African Union (Assembly/AU/Dec.304 (XV)), with the 16th conference theme being 
‘Shared Values of the African Union’. The African Union Commission (AUC) was 
mandated to establish a ‘Pan-African Architecture on Governance’ with the main aim 
of establishing the instruments and developing a procedure for improving public policy 
negotiation, “convergence, coherence, and harmonization amongst AU Organs, 
institutions and Member States as a way of speeding up the integration process on 
the continent”. 
The justification and motivation for the AGA is the absence of efficient and effective 
harmonisation, collaboration, interaction and coordination amongst the many 
governance organisations, instruments and frameworks at national, regional and sub-
regional levels. In many cases, these governance organisations work in silos, they do 
not share information or adequately coordinate their activities. As a consequence, they 
are not sufficiently integrated and do not benefit sufficiently from each other to enable 





governance arrangements and structure of the Africa continent and was set up to 
establish approaches to strengthen existing governance institutions and ensure 
effective harmonisation amongst these institutions, resulting in optimum organisational 
performance (AGA, 2018). The AGA complements the main duties of states and 
current institutions of the AU on governance and provides an opportunity to participate 
and develop the required institutional capacity and ability to adequately respond to 
Africa’s many governance challenges. The AGA (2018) makes the point that “a 
coordinated and integrated approach is no substitute for the primary responsibility of 
AU Member States in democracy, governance and human rights”. 
In search of embracing the philosophies of good governance, another key initiative by 
African states is taken up in the United Nations. Economic Commission for Africa: 
African Charter for Popular Participation in Development and Transformation. This 
Charter (UNECA, 1990:1), conceived at the conference in Tanzania in 1990 on 
Popular Participation, demands the development of a new dispensation in Africa, 
namely “an Africa in which democracy, accountability, economic justice and 
development for transformation are internalised and the empowerment of the people, 
initiative and enterprise and the democratisation of the development process are the 
order of the day in every country”. 
The African Charter for Popular Participation in Development and Transformation sets 
out a comprehensive and valuable practical understanding of the definition, meaning 
and application of good governance in the African context for the following reasons: 
• The United Nations, in its founding documents, enshrines the concept of 
citizen and community participation as integral to their own advancement 
and development. It includes consideration for communities’ own 
capabilities in shaping particular developmental initiatives. In this regard, 
the ENECA African Charter in UNECA (1990:6) not only commences with 
the words “we the people of the United Nations”, but also states and 
affirms that as the people they remain committed, yet resolute and 
determined, “to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity 
and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women ...” 






• The UNECA Charter (1990) likewise expresses and demands the state 
and broader public commence playing a different role within the political 
processes. The different role requires and is premised on partnering, co-
creation and co-decision making between the state and communities as 
essential elements “to promote freedom of expression and other basic 
human rights”. This promotes political, institutional and community 
accountability, as well as efficient and real decentralisation and 
widespread community and public participation that is sufficiently broad 
based at all levels of the community. 
• The requirements for the developmental processes consider the 
requirements from bi-lateral and multi-lateral institutions. Those that 
prioritise and stress the importance and focus on “more economic power 
to people, decentralisation, accountability and popular good governance 
principles”, are also enshrined in the Charter. 
• The development and inclusion of indicators, which, according to UNECA 
(1990:19), aim to monitor progress in relation to community and citizen 
participation and partnering. These indicators include matters like literacy 
rates, the “number and scope of grassroots institutions, representation of 
people in the parliament, the rule of law, freedom of association, press and 
media freedom and political accountability”. 
 
The principles of good governance, particularly in the African context, are also 
captured in documents from the African Development Bank (ADB). According to 
Ndegwa and Green (1994:54), and cited by Dlalisa (2009:37), the ADB is tasked with 
developing proposals for the “design of an African Development Strategy for the 1990s 
and the Imperative Political and Economic Agenda for Africa to 2000 and Beyond 
(IPEA)” (ADB, 1994:155-164). These development policies and proposals have to be 
community or people-centred to ensure that equality and equity issues are 
incorporated in economic transformation and change programmes and initiatives. The 
ADB (1994), according to Dlalisa (2009:37), also supports the views of the World Bank 





or elements of good governance that are regarded as fundamental for “the promotion 
of socio-economic development” and advancement. These elements include: 
1. A legal basis and “framework that guarantees the rule of law”; 
2. based on the construct of the political and social heterogeneity or 
diversity, community involvement, participation and co-creation that 
enable inclusion in decision-making processes by communities, at all 
levels of government;  
3. bureaucratic accountability and transparency to ensure the uniform 
application of the rules and to ensure the depersonalisation of decision-
making processes of public servants; 
4. a legitimate and rightful government based on popular determined 
sovereign rule and worldwide recognition that is supported by public 
administrative systems that is appropriately structured and organised;  
5. rationality of governmental organisational structures and incorporation of a 
public administration system that is highly structured with competent 
officials and; 
6. ‘freedom of association and expression to allow the formation of civil 
society organisations, and a critical evaluation of government decisions”. 
 
The Treaty of the Southern African Development Community (SADC, 1992) agrees to 
good governance principles that “include human rights, democracy and the rule of 
law”. These principles are captured in the 1997 Maputo Declaration, which 
encapsulates culture, peace and governance. The Maputo Declaration includes a 
conviction by the members to the promotion of peace, “a system of representative 
democracy and governance driven by democratic principles of justice, freedom and 
tolerance” in order to empower and involve people in development and decision 
making. Elements and principles of good governance, such as the promotion and 
advancement of democratic institutions, community and public participation, 
promoting human rights and adherence to the rule of law, are reflected in the goals of 
the African Union (AU). These principles are in addition to the promotion and 





rights, the rule of law and good governance” (Constitutive Act 2001:4, cited by Dlalisa 
2009:39). 
Another initiative in Africa adopted by African ministers responsible for finance and for 
planning and development is the African Alternative Framework (AAF) to Structural 
Adjustments Programmes for Socio-Economic Recovery and Transformation (AAF-
SAP). The AAF-SAP highlights aspects of good governance, and provides 
comprehensive approaches to advance structural adjustment programmes that are 
citizen inclusive, participatory in nature and that contain alternatives and substitutes 
that have been formulated, are owned and internalised by African states (UNECA, 
1989). Dlalisa (2009) makes the point that “the AFF calls for more authority to local 
communities, defining a new role for popular society organisations, promoting public 
private partnerships and supporting more community self-management and mass 
participation in decision making”. 
The Ibrahim Index of African Governance (IIAG) was launched in 2007 and is globally 
regarded as the most comprehensive mechanism and tool used to enable the 
collection of data on African governance and is utilised for monitoring and measuring 
governance progress across the Africa continent. The IIAG uses more than 100 
variables from more than 30 independent African and global institutions to construct 
their annual assessment of the quality of governance in African countries. The IIAG 
(2007) makes available “a framework for citizens, governments, institutions and the 
private sector to accurately assess the delivery of public goods and services, and 
policy outcomes”, across the Africa continent. This framework is regarded as a 
monitoring and measurement mechanism and tool to assist, debate and assess the 
performance of governments in Africa in performance and in that regard, it is “a 
decision-making instrument with which to govern” (IIAG, 2007). 
The IIAG (2007) explains “governance as the provision of the political, social and 
economic goods that a citizen has the right to expect from his or her state, and that a 
state has the responsibility to deliver to its citizens”. The IIAG monitors, measures and 
evaluates development using four main categories and by benchmarking governance 
performance transversely across a number of governance dimensions at the local, 
national, regional levels, and across the African continent. The four main categories 





Sustainable Economic Opportunity and Human Development”, and consist of data and 
information that cover a wide variety of governance elements “ranging from 
infrastructure to freedom of expression and sanitation to property rights” (IIAG, 2007). 
South Africa performs relatively well against other developing countries in terms of 
public financial management. This was confirmed in 2018 by the findings of the Mo 
Ibrahim Index of African Governance (IIAG), which ranked South Africa 4th out of the 
54 countries in Africa. Over the past five years, South Africa has been able to 
consistently improve its score by 0.9 annually and has moved up from its overall 
position of 5th in 2011. South Africa has remained consistently in the index’s top 10 
since 2000. Overall, Africa has also shown some improvement in level of governance, 
with 94% of Africans living in a country that is better governed in 2013 than in 2000. 
The 2017/2018 World Economic Forum’s Global Competitiveness Report ranked 
South Africa 61st, while it was ranked 47 out of 138 countries in 2016/17. The Report 
notes the strength of auditing and reporting standards in South Africa, where it was 
ranked first. However, it also highlights three problematic factors when doing business 
with South Africa: corruption, crime and theft, and government instability. 
The New Partnership for Africa Development (NEPAD) is seen as one of the most 
recent examples of Africa’s pledge to follow and adhere to the principles of good 
governance. Members, as part of the protocol agreement, have dedicated and devoted 
themselves “to the respect of global standards of democracy”, such as the promotion 
of diversity, heterogeneity, accountability, transparency and democratic and 
autonomous political, financial and economic governance in Africa (Constitutive Act, 
2001:24-26). The African peer review mechanism (APRM) is the process, as part of 
the accountability chain, through which each members’ adherence to the principles, 
values and philosophies of good governance is monitored and reported. 
The earlier examples, supported by subject matter experts and institutions such as the 
World Bank, IMF and the OECD, undoubtedly demonstrate Africa’s commitment to 
good governance and serve as a clear demonstration of the understanding by African 
leaders that good governance is clearly linked to the developmental potentials and 
challenges of democratisation in Africa, with the focus on ‘people’ as the centre holding 





2.5.2.2.2 South African context and perspective 
2.5.2.2.2.1 The King Committee reports 
In South Africa, the concept of good governance was introduced as late as 1994, when 
the King Report on Corporate Governance (King I) was made public. The King I Report 
was the first of its kind in the country, and was widely recognised as providing 
pioneering work in corporate governance literature. According to the King II (2002:2), 
the King I Report was aimed at encouraging and endorsing “the highest standards of 
corporate governance”. In addition to the economic, financial and regulatory features 
and characteristics of corporate governance, the King I “drew attention to the 
importance of a properly functioning board of directors as a key ingredient of good 
corporate governance” (King II, 2002:2). The King I advocated and promoted “many 
of the standards and principles encouraged in the plethora of national codes that were 
adopted … following the release of the Cadbury Report in the United Kingdom in 1992” 
(Armstrong, Segal & Davis, 2005). The King Report (1994) defines the concept of 
corporate governance as “a process to help directors discharge their responsibilities”. 
The King I advocates that a cohesive and integrated approach to good governance is 
required in order to ensure that ethical, social and environmental practices are applied 
to serve the best interest of a wide range of participants. The King I was generally 
regarded, at the time, as a revolutionary, innovative and pioneering piece of research 
work. However, given the many changes and developments in the international and 
local economic, financial, environment and legislative environment, particularly after 
1994, the King I Report had to be brought-up-to-date with the publication of a second 
report (King II) on Corporate Governance for South Africa (UNECA, 2013:12, citing 
Cliffe Dekker Attorneys, 2002). Although not intended as a replacement or substitute 
for the rule of law or to make up for the shortcomings in the legal regime governing 
corporations in South Africa, the King II was developed to expand on the practices and 
application of good corporate governance as defined by the law. 
The King I was famous for its focus on the advancement of a cohesive and integrated 
approach to good governance and incorporates both the international economic and 
financial environment and the legislative framework into a single framework. According 
to Cliffe Dekker Attorneys (2002:2), the King II Report signals an approach or a 





introduces the ‘triple bottom line’ approach, which promotes the “economic, 
environmental and social aspects of companies’ activities”. The King II is applicable 
“to all companies with securities listed on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange, banks, 
financial and insurance entities and certain public sector enterprises”, such as the 
national, provincial and local government departments, and emphasises that in order 
to be successful, from a governance perspective, the “21st century requires companies 
to adopt an inclusive and not exclusive approach” and also requires openness “to 
institutional activities and there must be greater emphasis on the sustainable or non-
financial aspects of its performance” UNECA (2013:12). In addition, it requires 
company boards to act responsibly in their operations, be transparent, responsive, 
responsible and accountable (to shareholders and communities), and in all respects 
apply the test of fairness. It requires a calculated balance between compliance to good 
governance principles and performance in a business driven or entrepreneurial market 
economy. 
The King II outlines specific governance standards, mainly focusing on the separation 
of roles and structures, commencing from the board of directors to the auditing and 
functions. The King II covers the following: 
1. Clearly sets out the functions, responsibilities and powers of the governing 
board; 
2. Differentiates between the distinctive powers, functions, roles and 
responsibilities of the board chairperson and the chief executive officer; 
3. Differentiates, clarifies and defines the respective powers, roles, functions 
and responsibilities between the executive and non-executive directors; 
4. Creates a requirement to outline and consider operational and institutional 
risk management, establishing an internal control mechanism and clearly 
demonstrating the measures introduced to alleviate, moderate and control 
or manage risks; 
5. Lays out explicit board requirements in relation to the function and 
operation of internal audits, defining it as “an independent, objective 
assurance and consulting activity to add value and improve an 
organisation’s operations by helping the organization to accomplish its 
objectives by bringing a systematic, disciplined approach to evaluate and 





processes”. In addition, it requires “commitment to integrity and 
accountability, internal auditing provides value to governing bodies and 
senior management as an objective source of independent advice” (Cliffe 
Dekker Attorneys, 2002:12, cited by UNECA, 2013:14); 
6. A focus on cohesive and integrated sustainability reporting, focusing on 
the ‘triple bottom line’, i.e. finding a balance between “integrated 
economic, social and environmental performance” and the connection 
between the company or organisation and the broader community in 
which it operates; and 
7. Accounting and auditing standards, specifically external auditing, to 
provide an objective external view of the state of affairs of the company or 
organisation. 
In acknowledging the changing conditions in which corporations operate, the King III 
Report provides the changes to corporate governance guidelines and is therefore 
regarded as a further enhancement of the King II. The King III was released in 
September 2009, mainly in response to anticipated changes to the 2018 South African 
Companies Act, as well as changes in global governance practices and learnings 
pursuant to the publication of the King II in 2002. In addition, citing the Times (2007:1), 
the enactment of legislation such as the Prevention of Corrupt Activities Act (POCA) 
in 2004 and the Auditing Professions Act in 2005 also contributed to the development 
and publication of King III. 
There is perfect alignment between the King II and King III in that many provisions in 
the two King reports are fundamentally the same. However, the main point that 
distinguishes the King III from its predecessor and makes it a more superior publication 
is that the King III advocates giving “more powers to non-executive directors and 
emphasises their independence”. The King III became effective in March 2010 and, 
according to UNECA (2013:16), it “applies to all entities regardless of their form and 
manner of incorporation”. UNECA (2013:16) explains that the King III consists of two 
distinct codes or documents, namely (a) “a code of governance (the Code), which is a 
set of principles”; and (b) a “Report that contains recommendations of best practice 
for each principle”. The hypo dissertation is that “adherence to the principles contained 






King III remains principles-based and is fundamentally premised on ‘apply or explain’ 
as opposed to the ‘comply or else’ approach of King II. This means that the main aim 
is for corporations to strive to comply with the Code and, if so, they are entitled or can 
issue a positive statement. If not compliant, corporations are bound to provide reasons 
and explain the reasons for non-compliance and non-adherence to the principles or 
recommendations of the Code to their stakeholders. 
The principle of sustainability is one of the main principles and themes underpinning 
the King III, making it a requirement that “all statutory financial information and 
sustainability information be incorporated in the company’s report” (UNECA, 2013:16). 
The Report, which integrates and reflects the ‘triple bottom line, namely the economic, 
social and environment, should contain the necessary information demonstrating to 
what extent the activities and actions of the business or corporation has either 
positively or negatively impacted on the environment, community governance matters 
and the economic and social life of the public. According to UNECA (2013:16) and the 
Institute of Directors Southern Africa (2009:13-14), the King III incorporates issues of 
“alternative dispute resolution, risk-based internal audits, shareholders and 
management remuneration and the necessity for evaluating the board and the 
performance of directors”. 
The King IV (2016), like its two predecessors, was issued in response to significant 
corporate governance and regulatory developments locally and internationally, and is 
seen as a significant enhancement since the release of the King III in 2009. According 
to the King Committee (2016), the King IV was published on 1 November 2016 and 
came into effect on 1 April 2017. It replaces or substitutes the King III in its entirety. 
Listed companies are generally applying King III, whilst King IV has been extended 
and made more applicable to include public sector institutions. 
The King IV was crafted as a response to challenges experienced by non-profit 
organisations (NGOs) and public-private companies and entities in the public sector 
in understanding, interpreting and adapting the King III code and its associated 
principles to their specific circumstances. The King Report on Corporate Governance 
(2018) and the guide on questions and answers on the King IV (2016) make the point 
that the enhancement to the code is chiefly aimed at making King IV more applicable 






2.5.2.2.2.2 ANC Freedom Charter 
Stemele (2009:11) is of the view that “the concept of good governance in South Africa 
was initially mooted by the African National Congress” (ANC), in its “Freedom Charter 
document, which was adopted by the Congress of the People in Kliptown in 1955”. He 
highlights the following key aspects of governance as a concept and not necessarily 
in the context of good governance, contained in the Freedom Charter: 
• The people shall govern. The Freedom Charter’s underlying philosophy 
is based on the principles of governance for the people by the people. This 
implies “governance is supposed to be implemented by allowing people to 
take part in the administration of the country” and in this way promotes 
participation of citizens and communities in matters that directly affect 
them; 
• People to have equal rights. This, according to Stemele (2009:16), “is 
the basis of the equality clause”, which is captured in section 9 of the 
South African Constitution; and  
• All shall be equal before the law. This principle addresses the good 
governance principle of ‘adherence to the rule of law’. “If there is no rule of 
law, people might be treated arbitrarily”. 
(ANC website 2007, as cited by Stemele, 2009). 
2.5.3 Characteristics and Principles of Good Governance 
Various authors and policy makers have written about the characteristics and 
principles of good governance with the aim of putting together a universal set of good 
governance principles and departure points that can be made equally applicable to 
public and private sector institutions. These principles are underpinned by values, as 
good governance on its own will not succeed in the absence of strong leaders (e.g. 
management, political leaders or directors of institutions) whose conduct is 
underpinned by a set of personal behavioural values. The principles of good 
governance (as obtained and syndissertationed from various research papers, such 
as the UN, CIPFA, World Bank, IFAC, IDA, Asian and Africa Development Banks, UK 





From the United Nations (2018): 
• “Participation: All men and women should have a voice in decision-
making … built on freedom of association and speech, as well as 
capacities to participate constructively; 
• Rule of law: Legal frameworks should be fair and enforced impartially, 
particularly the laws on human rights; 
• Transparency: Transparency is built on the free flow of information”; 
• Responsiveness: “Institutions and processes try to serve all 
stakeholders”; 
• Consensus orientation: Facilitation of “differing interests to reach a broad 
consensus on what is in the best interests of the group, and … on policies 
and procedures”; 
• “Equity: All men and women have opportunities to improve or maintain 
their well-being; 
• Effectiveness and efficiency: Processes and institutions produce results 
that meet needs while making the best use of resources; 
• Accountability: Decision-makers in government, the private sector and 
civil society organisations are accountable to the public, as well as to 
institutional stakeholders”; and 
• “Strategic vision: Leaders and the public have a broad and long-term 
perspective on good governance and human development, along with a 
sense of what is needed for such development”. 
 
2.5.4 Good Governance in the Public Sector 
2.5.4.1 International perspective 
To help everybody comprehend and apply the mutual principles and philosophies of 
good governance and to evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of current 
governance practices in the public sector3, the Chartered Institute for Public Finance 
                                            
3 Good governance in the public sector: the same principles apply mutatis mutandis to the international 





and Accounting (CIPFA) published a guide on Good Governance Standard for Public 
Services (CIPFA, 2004). The Standards are useful for those tasked with oversight and 
governance responsibilities, such as councillors, governors and directors of boards 
“who are striving to do a difficult job better, and to individuals and groups who have an 
interest in scrutinizing the effectiveness of governance” (CIPFA, 2004:1). The 
International Federation of Accountants (IFAC) (2001:11), in the Cadbury Report 
(1992), which is a study on governance activities and arrangements in the public 
sector, explains corporate governance as “the system by which organisations are 
directed and controlled” and provides the following as principles and philosophies of 
good corporate governance within the broader public sector: 
1. Openness: Together with transparency is a key requirement to ensure 
that participants and stakeholders, through consultation and having 
complete, precise and clear information, have assurance in the 
administrative, managerial and policy making processes and activities of 
government entities; 
2. Integrity: Comprises both straightforward dealings and completeness. “It 
is based upon honesty and objectivity, and high standards of propriety 
and probity in the stewardship of public funds and resources”, which 
includes the management of the affairs of public sector institutions; and 
3. Accountability: Is about stewardship (‘taking care of’) over public 
resources and all aspects of public sector organisation performance. It 
involves “the process whereby public sector entities, and the individuals 
within them, are responsible for their decisions and actions … and 
whereby they submit themselves to appropriate external scrutiny” and to 
respond to a responsibility conferred. Aucoin and Heintzman, (2000, cited 
by Peters, 2000:21), describes accountability as “(a) to control for the 
abuse and misuse of public authority; (b) to provide assurance in respect 
of the use of public resources; and (c) to promote learning in pursuit of 
continuous improvement in public management”. 
Although these three underlying principles, as defined in the Cadbury Report (1992), 
are comparable to both private sector and government entities, the context of the 
public sector nonetheless requires some form of adaptation to reflect key 





According to IFAC (2001:12), “public sector entities have to satisfy a more complex 
range of political, economic and social objectives, which subject them to a different set 
of external constraints and influences; and are subject to forms of accountability to 
their various stakeholders which are different to those that a company in the private 
sector owes to its shareholders”. CIPFA (2014:1) makes the point “that governance is 
dynamic: good governance encourages the public trust and participation that enables 
services to improve”. On the other end, they state that poor or “bad governance fosters 
low morale and adversarial relationships that lead to poor performance or even, 
ultimately, to dysfunctional” organisations (CIPFA, 2014). 
 
2.5.5 Principles of Governance in the Public Sector 
The principles of governance, as discussed earlier, include concepts such as 
openness, transparency, accountability and integrity and should be echoed and 
mirrored in each of the dimensions of governance within the broader public sector. 
According to IFAC (2001:12-13), these include the following:  
• “Standards of behaviour: How the management of the organisation 
exercises leadership in determining the values and standards of the 
organisation, which define the culture of the organisation and the 
behaviour of everyone within it; 
• Organisational structures and processes: How the top management 
within organisations is appointed and organised, how its responsibilities 
are defined and how it is held accountable; 
• Control: The network of various controls established by the top 
management of the organisation to support it in achieving the entity’s 
objectives, the effectiveness and efficiency of operations, the reliability of 
internal and external reporting, and compliance with applicable laws and 
regulations and internal policies; and 
• External reporting: How the top management of the organisation 
demonstrates financial accountability for the stewardship of public money 






The Good Governance Standard for Public Services, as set out in the 2014 CIPFA, 
advocates six core underlying philosophies and principles of good governance, with a 
particular focus on public sector institutions. The Standard builds on the work done 
and defined by the Committee of Standards in Public Life (1995:14), which is generally 
referred to as the Seven Principles of Public Life, and commonly known as the Nolan 
principles. The Nolan principles are: selflessness, integrity, objectivity, accountability, 
openness, honesty and leadership. These principles are applicable to everybody who 
works as a public office-bearer and includes those who are elected (voted in) or 
selected through recruitment to public office, as well as those in other sectors that 
deliver public services, notwithstanding the size or level of complexity of the public 
sector institution. According to the article, ‘The Good Governance Standards for Public 
Services’, it is rather for “organisations to demonstrate the spirit and ethos of good 
governance, which the Standard aims to capture and which cannot be achieved by 
rules and procedures alone” (OPM & CIPFA, 2004:2). 
The six core principles of good governance in the public sector, according to CIPFA 
(2004), are set out in Figure 2.3 below: 
 
Figure 2.3: Good governance standards 






The core principles of good governance, according to CIPFA (2004:5) include the 
following: 
1. “Good governance means focusing on the organisation’s purpose and on 
outcomes for citizens and service users”: It is about (a) “being clear about 
the organisation’s purpose and its intended outcomes for citizens and 
service users”; (b) “making sure that users receive a high quality service”; 
as well as (c) “making sure that taxpayers receive value for money”. 
2. “Good governance means performing effectively in clearly defined 
functions and roles”, through (a) “being clear about the functions of the 
governing body”; (b) “being clear about the responsibilities of non-
executives and the executive”; (c) “making sure that those responsibilities 
are carried out”; and (d) “being clear about relationships between 
governors and the public”. 
3. “Good governance means promoting values for the whole organisation 
and demonstrating the values of good governance through behaviour”, by 
(a) “putting organisational values into practice”; and (b) “individual 
governors behaving in ways that uphold and exemplify effective 
governance”. 
4. “Good governance means taking informed, transparent decisions and 
managing” risks, by (a) “being rigorous and transparent about how 
decisions are taken”; (b) “having and using good quality information, 
advice and support”; and (c) “making sure that an effective risk 
management system is in operation”. 
5. “Good governance means developing the capacity and capability of the 
governing body to be effective”, by (a) “making sure that appointed and 
elected councillors have the skills, knowledge and experience they need 
to perform well”; (b) “developing the capability of people with governance 
responsibilities and evaluating their performance, as individuals and as a 
group”; and (c) “striking a balance, in the membership of the governing 
body, between continuity and renewal”. 
6. “Good governance means engaging stakeholders and making 





accountability relationships”; (b) “taking an active and planned approach 
to dialogue with and accountability to the public”; (c) “taking an active and 
planned approach to responsibility to staff”; and (d) “engaging effectively 
with institutional stakeholders”. 
 
Although the Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) provide a useful indication or 
snapshot of some observations and insights of a states’ excellence in and quality of 
governance, it has not been without critique, particularly regarding the construction 
and usefulness of the indicators (characteristics) (Arndt & Oman, 2008; Thomas, 2009; 
and Langbein & Knack, 2010). The critique includes issues such as: 
• A lack of conceptual clarity of the theory of ‘good’ governance, what it 
really means, as well as the fact that it measures “a broad underlying 
concept of ‘effective governance’ … they appear to say the same thing, 
with different words … and the six indexes do not discriminate usefully 
among different aspects of governance”; 
• “Each of the indexes … merely reflects perceptions of the quality of 
governance more broadly” and does not reflect the specific reasons and 
consequences of the application of good governance. Given this, it limits 
the lessons learnt and the use of those lessons for those tasked with 
policymaking, implementation and the academia.” 
• The indicators are not reproducible and too complex; and accordingly they 
are not appropriately used in “measuring the impact of institutions as they 
really exist in a particular place on real outcomes”; and  
• The “absence of a normative concept or unifying single theory to 
distinguish between good or bad governance” or of an underlying theory of 
‘good’ governance. 
 
In conducting the case studies and focus group discussion, the researcher will use 
some of these good governance indicators supported by information gathered from 
focus groups, key staff, communities, private sector business and government (public 





in order to gauge to what extent the absence and presence of these indicators has 
contributed to organisational performance. The aim is to make concrete proposals on 
how to improve the state of governance for organisational performance. Chapter 5 of 
this dissertation provides more content on the definitions and application of these good 
governance indicators, particularly how they relate to organisational performance. 
 
2.5.6 Bad or Poor Governance 
The researcher could not obtain any normative concept or unifying single theory on 
‘bad governance’, other than some articles that endeavour to distinguish and 
differentiate between ‘good’ and/or ‘bad’ governance as a concept or theory. There 
are many references in, for example, speeches of politicians and institutions charged 
with governance responsibilities, with ‘bad or poor governance’ being the reason for 
most failures in processes and institutions. 
In essence, bad governance refers to “the inability of a public institution to manage 
public affairs and public resources”. According to MidjkAn (2014), the definition or 
concept of bad governance means the “failure of a government to meet the needs of 
society while making the best use of all resources at their disposal”. Poor governance 
can be regarded as a synonym for bad governance, and “is characterized by arbitrary 
policy making, unaccountable bureaucracies, unenforced or unjust legal systems, the 
abuse of executive power, a civil society unengaged in public life, and widespread 
corruption”. 
According to the World Bank (1992), poor or bad governance is defined in relation to, 
or juxtaposed against, ‘good governance’. One can argue that it is the other side of 
the same (governance) coin (good versus bad). The World Bank (1992) emphasises 
that “good governance is epitomized by predictable, open and enlightened policy-
making, a bureaucracy imbued with a professional ethos acting in furtherance of the 
public good, the rule of law, transparent processes, and a strong civil society 
participating in public affairs”. On the other hand, or the other side of the same coin, 
‘poor governance’ is branded and “characterized by arbitrary policy making, 
unaccountable bureaucracies, unenforced or unjust legal systems, the abuse of 





According to Kalbaq (2015), “bad governance is being increasingly regarded as one 
of the root causes of all evil and suffering within our societies, it is the complete 
opposite of good governance and involves abuse of human rights, corruption, lack of 
transparency, lack of responsiveness, and lack of accountability”. To the contrary, in 
their effort to reduce and eradicate bad governance, academia and experts opted to 
rather focus on ‘good governance’ than ‘poor or bad governance’, signalling a positive 
approach to the developmental and growth agendas. The UNSCAP (2018:1) simply 
states that “bad governance is being increasingly regarded as one of the root causes 
of all evil within our societies”. 
Kalbaq (2015:3) makes the point that “bad governance is characterized by corruption, 
crime, no freedom of expression in public organizations, abuse of human rights, high 
levels of centralization” with a very small number making decisions, the absence of 
transparency and accountability and, in the researcher’s view, the antonyms or 
opposites of the good governance indicators discussed in this chapter. 
According to Kalbaq (2015), “there is little openness in government business and most 
people regard the public service as not transparent and accountable. Conflicts, civil 
wars, inadequacy, no existence of political parties constitute bad governance”. 
Further, ‘bad governance’ is “coordinated by aggression that is violent, deception or 
cheating against the will of peaceful people” (Kalbaq, 2015). Albin-Lackey (2013) 
makes the point that “corruption creates instability and unpredictability in governance”. 
Dlalisa (2009:40) makes the point that bad governance or “undemocratic governance 
leads to ills, such as corruption, waste of much-needed resources, abuse of human 
rights and economic and social exclusion” and that “the absence of good governance 
principles is detrimental to the role of the government”. Government, in its aim to 
address poverty and inequality and in achieving the sustainable development goals, 
must subscribe to aims and objectives of a development state. In this regard, Dlalisa 
(2009:40) makes the point that “poverty alleviation measures and the decentralisation 
processes are likely to be undermined by the lack of public accountability and 
transparency, corruption and disregard human rights”. 
Although the indicators of good governance are not regarded as a set of complete 
measures of governance, given that it only measures a country’s comparative ranking 





or absence of good governance in an institution. As set out under the discussion in 
this chapter on the topic of ‘good governance’, the absence of ‘good governance’ is a 
direct result of ‘bad governance’ and this is therefore the reason that it can be used to 
effectively measure governance in and performance of an institution. 
According to Mead (2018), the impact of “bad governance results into huge loss in 
economic growth and it also affects the human resources, the human ingenuity and 
the personality of the citizens”. He makes the point that “bad governance and 
corruption deter investment, waste national resources and forebode allocation and 
increase insecurity” and that the poor and vulnerable are most negatively impacted, 
and hurt and suffer the most as a result of bad or poor governance practices such as 
maladministration, dishonesty, fraud, bribery and corruption (Mead, 2018). 
In the South Africa context, ‘bad governance’, according to Dlalisa (2009:1, citing 
Frimpong & Jacques, 1999), has resulted in a disaster that is coupled with a clear lack 
of confidence in the actions of government in addressing service delivery problems in 
local government. He indicates that because of bad or poor governance people will 
“no longer believe that their governments will make good and keep their promises to 
deliver services” Dlalisa (2009) cites Frimpong and Jacques (1999:122), making the 
point that “the majority of people are faced with inadequate health services, unclean 
water, poor educational services, badly maintained infrastructure, inadequate housing 
and starvation because state institutions have become so paralysed by corruption”, 
and that they are just unable to deliver on their stated promises. 
Schwella, et al. (2015:67) make the point that good governance must serve the 
interests of the public. If it does not, it is bad governance. Further, “[g]ood governance 
is supported by effective constitutions and constitutionalism, while bad governance 













Figure 2.4: Difference between good and bad governance 
Source: Kumar, K (2018)  – Presidential Address – 2018 CIGFARO Conference. 
 
It is the view of the researcher that it is highly unlikely, although there are examples to 
the contrary, that bad governance has the possibility to enable the provision of 
excellent clean service delivery to the people due to the absence of some of the key 
attributed that contributes to good governance. Simply put, ‘bad or poor governance’ 
is a function of the absence of ‘good governance’. 
Section 2.6 aims to explore and provide some evidence on the nexus or connection 
between governance and organisational or institutional performance and to what 








2.6 GOOD GOVERNANCE AND ORGANISATIONAL PERFORMANCE 
2.6.1 Governance for Performance 
In a World Bank working paper, Kaufman, et al. (1999) concludes that there “is new 
empirical evidence that governance matters, in the sense that there is a strong causal 
relationship from good governance to better development outcomes such as higher 
per capita incomes, lower infant mortality and higher literacy” (IFAC, 2013). 
This view from Kaufman, et al. (1999) highlights the key role of the public sector to 
affect societal change and the importance of applying good governance practices in 
public sector service delivery. In essence, according to IFAC (2001:1), “effective 
governance in the public sector can encourage the efficient use of resources, 
strengthen accountability for the stewardship of those resources, improve 
management and service delivery, and thereby contribute to improving peoples’ lives”. 
It is also critical for building both public confidence and trust in order to enable and 
ensure that government entities are effective in meeting their service delivery and 
developmental objectives. 
According to IFAC (2013:6), “effective governance is characterized by robust scrutiny, 
which provides important pressures for improving public sector performance and 
tackling corruption”. It “can improve management, leading to more effective 
implementation of the chosen interventions, better service delivery, and, ultimately, 
better outcomes” (IFAC, 2013). Improved delivery performance of local government 
against stated objectives leads to better sustainable outcomes and ultimately ensures 
that people have an improved or better quality of life that is aligned to the 
developmental objectives of local government. 
There are mixed views on whether or not there is empirical evidence that the 
application of good and effective governance results in better public sector 
organisational performance. Heracleous (2001:165) summarises this in his research 
outcomes on the relationship between good governance ‘best practices’ and 
organisational performance. Heracleous (2001:165) finds the relationship to be 
insignificant and provides four possible reasons for this. Firstly, the likelihood that 
these ostensible good governance ‘best practices’ are undeniably irrelevant to 





application and “operationalisation of theoretical concepts has low face validity”; 
thirdly, that research conducted on this subject matter that could provide concluding 
evidence is “generally too narrow”, targeted and aimed at connecting or relating the 
quality of governing boards or oversight institutions directly to organisational 
performance, whilst overlooking and potentially discounting other systemic influences; 
and, fourthly, the recognition that it is not a ‘one size fits all’ approach and “that different 
types of organisations require different practices in corporate governance”. 
Heracleous (2001) argues that the various ‘codes of good (governance) practice’ have 
been drawn up for companies with ineffective governance systems, inferring that good 
and effective governance will potentially result in improved yields for investors and 
shareholders and, by implication, bad or poor governance will give the opposite result. 
Heracleous (2001:166) makes the point that “research findings have generally failed 
to support the purported linkage” between the application of such good governance 
practices in the institution and organisational performance and that “good governance 
however is no guarantee of superior performance” and potentially even irrelevant. On 
the contrary, he makes the point that ‘bad governance’ practices may be more directly 
associated or linked to organisational underperformance, put differently, “good 
governance may be a qualifier rather than a differentiator”. 
Gillies and Morra (1997:77) opt to not question the underlying principle of whether or 
not good governance results in improved organisational performance purely due to the 
lack of hypothetical, academic or empirical evidence. They argue that “common sense 
tells us that there is a relationship between corporate governance and firm 
performance” and further make the point that “the fact that various empirical macro-
studies in corporate governance have been unable to identify it does not mean that 
this relationship does not exist”. 
Rambajan (2011:iii), in her study on the causal relationship between good corporate 
governance and organisational performance concludes that, notwithstanding the 
absence of appropriate measurement instruments for the relationship between good 
corporate governance and organisational performance, statistically, the total results of 
her study concludes “that the vast majority of board selected variables relating to 





Muhamad (2009:ii), when testing the association or connection between good 
government governance and organisation performance in a case study of the MARA 
Credit Control Department, used descriptive, correlation, and regression analyses to 
test the relationship between public sector good governance practices (as 
independent variables), such as “leadership, stakeholder relationship, risk 
management, accountability, planning and performance monitoring, information and 
decision support and review and evaluation” and public sector or government 
performance (as dependent variable), expressed or characterised “by the efficiency 
and effectiveness, productivity and cost and customer satisfaction” (Muhamad, 2009). 
The results of the study by Muhamad (2009:ii) support and confirm all the hypotheses 
suggested for the research, with the results of correlation analyses concluding that 
“good public sector governance and its dimensions are associated positively with the 
department performance”. In addition, Muhamad (2009:ii) summarises that the net 
outcome from the regression analyses concludes “that good public sector governance 
as a whole has a significant effect on the public sector performance”. 
Laurence, E. Lynne Jr., et al. (2000:257), attempted a similar exercise in their work 
using qualitative data to test the association, connection or relationship between good 
and effective governance and performance, particularly so in the public sector. They 
acknowledge the important role of qualitative data in governance research, but 
conclude that the challenge is to clarify and describe government results, ultimate high 
level outcomes and the intended impact or government performance in ways that (1) 
the intuitional configuration, political system and the administration is recognised and 
appreciated; and (2) allow the recognition of distinct identification of governance 
configurations and arrangements of public administration and management on 
intended outcomes, whilst simultaneously directing the other factors that affect the 
ultimate outcomes and impact. It is about appreciating and taking into account the 
context of the wider government or public sector system and considering the potential 
influences of other levels or components on the public sector system. In this research 
work they developed a ‘logic of governance’ model to demonstrate the variables that 
impact on performance, but more importantly how variables and sub-components 
relate and inter-relate with each other, each scenario having the statistical potential of 





There is therefore no conclusive evidence on whether or not a positive relationship or 
nexus exists between good governance and organisational performance, except to 
make the point that ‘bad’ or ‘poor’ governance will over time progressively lead to poor 
organisational performance, poor or no delivery and poor public value creation. The 
next chapter explores the concept of organisational performance and connects it to 
the concept of good and effective governance highlighting the indicators and elements 
of organisational performance. It will also explore some organisational performance 
models with the aim of making the necessary linkages to good governance indicators 
as discussed in this chapter. 
 
2.7 CONCLUSION AND SUMMARY 
Governance as a concept is not new. It is very complex, highly contested, and has in 
recent years gained some impetus and a much wider meaning than initially intended. 
Governance is a useful instrument of public sector management and serves as a 
measurement of political development and maturity and has become a powerful tool 
to boost or improve the lawfulness and validity of the state. In addition, governance 
has also developed into a logical diagnostic framework or approach to comparative 
politics, across and within nations. 
Governance does not have the same meaning as government. Kettl (2002) defines 
government as “the structure and function of public institutions”, and governance as 
“the way government gets its job done”. Therefore, governance is concerned with “the 
process of decision-making and the process by which decisions are implemented or 
not implemented”. Governance is the manner in which a government exercises 
political power and control; it is associated with the institutions and structures that are 
used for exercising power; it advocates that public decision-making processes have 
to be considered; it infers that the implementation capacity for public sector delivery in 
a country is of importance; it includes the relation between the government and the 
public; and it is a multi-faceted concept where the levels and process for various 
stakeholders can be determined and assessed. 
This chapter described the three key dimensions of governance and various contexts 





dimension, which is the procedure by which persons in power or authority are elected, 
selected to serve, monitored, evaluated and held accountable and replaced; (2) the 
economic dimension, which refers to the activities and processes, including sound 
policies implementation, by which public sector funds and other resources are 
efficiently, effectively and economically managed and applied in the execution and 
delivery of public services; and (3) the institutional dimension, which is the process 
and procedure by which people, communities, citizens and government institutions 
itself respect the social order and other public institutions. 
The chapter also covered the various contexts within which governance can be used, 
including “as international governance, corporate governance, national governance 
and local governance”. In addition, the chapter discussed seven uses of the term 
governance, i.e. governance as the minimal state; as corporate governance; new 
public management; as ‘good governance’; as a socio-cybernetic system; as self- 
organizing networks; international networks and international interdependences. The 
concept of governance is central to community and people development and to the 
performance of the state as the intuitional mechanism that gives effect to 
developmental local government. It therefore cannot be ignored by local government. 
The focus of the chapter, however. is on unpacking the concept of ‘good governance’ 
as a system of governance and the role of various stakeholders (such as government, 
communities, non-government organisations and citizens) in enhancing good 
governance practices with the aim of enhancing service delivery and impact. Given 
the various nuances and definitions highlighted in this chapter, the one description that 
is all encompassing is by the ADB (1994:177). The ADB (1994:177) uses six elements 
to describe ‘good governance’ as a normative concept of governance as: 
1. “Legitimacy of the government (based on popular sovereignty and 
international recognition); 
2. An appropriate legal framework (to guarantee the rule of law); 
3. Popular participation (to allow decision-making by the people at all levels 
of the state, and on the basis of political and social pluralism); 
4. Freedom of association and expression (to allow the formation of civil 





5. Bureaucratic accountability and transparency (so that impersonality in 
decision-making, and a uniform application of rules, by officials can be 
guaranteed); and 
6. Rationality of the governmental organisational structures (incorporating a 
public administration system that is highly structured and characterised by 
impersonality and a predictable behaviour of officials)”. 
 
Good governance is underpinned by principles or characteristics that include sincere 
and comprehensive public involvement and participation that is inclusive of all people 
(citizens), accountability, ethical leadership and conduct, responsiveness, 
transparency, democracy, access to information and applying the rule of law (without 
fear or favour). As highlighted by Schwella, et al. (2015:27), the fundamental 
characteristics of good governance are that they are interrelated, interconnected and 
equally reinforcing. Schwella, et al. (2015) emphasises that they, i.e. each of the 
characteristics, cannot stand on their own. 
According to Mandal and Gupta (2015), good governance implies that those in power 
or authority should work to broadly achieve the main or chief purpose, i.e. for the good 
and benefit of the people being governed. In their work, they connect to the work done 
by various other authors on the subject and in the process identify eight major 
characteristics of good governance, namely that good governance is “participatory, 
consensus oriented, accountable, transparent, responsive, effective and efficient, 
equitable and inclusive and follows the rule of law” (Mandal and Gupta, 2015). 
Mandal and Gupta (2015) make the point that governance “ensures that corruption is 
minimized and takes cognizance of the societal views of minorities and the most 
vulnerable in decision-making to ensure peace, security and prosperity of the people” 
and that the institution remains “responsive to the present and future needs of society”. 
Good governance necessitates full protection of all human rights, unbiased 
implementation of laws, a fair and impartial independent legal system and judiciary 
and an independent, objective and honourable incorruptible police protection service. 
The community, citizen and people contribution, involvement and participation that is 
organised and informed by both men and women, is a significant building block of 





authentic transitional organisations or elected public office bearers (councillors). 
Mandal and Gupta (2015) emphasises that good governance promotes “freedom of 
association and expression on the one hand and an organized civil society on the 
other hand”. 
Transparency implies that decisions are made by consensual agreement and within 
the limits of recognised and accepted legal and structural frameworks and that 
information is easily available and directly reachable to those who need it. 
Accessibility, as a good governance principle, requires that institutions and processes 
try to serve all stakeholders within a reasonable time framework. 
There are no absolutes and these principles are inter-related – they often overlap and 
may be conflicting at times, depending on how they are implemented in practice in 
accordance with the social context. However, they do help to improve the 
understanding of good governance. 
In order to be successful, local government will have to embrace these principles in all 
activities, particularly by allowing for open and transparent, democratic and 
accountable management of public administration underpinned by the rule of law. The 
absence of this will inevitably result in ‘bad or poor governance’, making the 
environment fertile for corruption and other unethical conduct that will pose a threat to 
service delivery and to the achievement of the development objectives of local 
government. According to Prinsloo (2013:3), “power and authority abuse, dishonesty, 
fraud and violation of the legal systems are factors causing good governments to fail”. 
The study of governance opens up a new intellectual space and opens one’s mind to 
the possibilities provided by this concept, particularly the role of local government in 
coping with public issues and recognising the much stronger role and contribution of 
other role-players, societal groups, communities and the voluntary NGO sector in 
responsibly exercising their respective and legitimate ‘power’ in addressing and finding 
joint solutions for the many developmental challenges and problems in communities. 
What is clear is that applying the principles of good governance is an ideal – it is a 
‘means’ and not an ‘end’ in itself. It is acknowledged that it is very difficult to achieve 
good governance in totality, whether as a country, society or government. However, 





performance, strong actions must be taken to steadily work towards the ultimate and 
desired ideal, with the main aim of making the desired levels of human development 
and service delivery a reality. 
In conclusion, this researcher agrees with Rosenau (1992) and Lynn, et al. (2001) that 
all “types of governance share one important common feature, they are all based on 
the ‘rule of law’, which defines rights and responsibilities of members facing common 
problems”, not centralised order or control, but voluntary compliance by all. Good and 
effective governance necessitates that governance provide a framework for effective 
and ethical execution of service delivery requirements and therefore “governments 





CHAPTER 3: ORGANISATIONAL PERFORMANCE- KEY 
CONCEPTS, THEORETICAL FRAMEWORKS AND MODELS 
 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
The aim of this chapter is to define organisational performance, its dimensions, some 
of the key concepts relevant to the subject, as well as various organisational 
performance models and theoretical frameworks, performance measures and 
measurement instruments, with a particular focus on the public sector. The chapter 
explores the context, reasons and root causes for organisational performance failures, 
particularly from the viewpoints of key external institutions reporting and monitoring 
performance of the local government sector. The chapter concludes with an 
exploration of the characteristics of highly successful organisations (including 
municipalities). This will inform the approach of the researcher when compiling a 
municipal performance and governance framework, which will be addressed in 
subsequent chapters. The chapter includes some key points to address performance 
failures in local government, including some indicators that will provide reliable and 
valid results to enable proper decision making, corrective actions and resource 
mobilisation and (re-)allocation, where required to allow municipalities to perform their 
service delivery obligations and objectives. 
The chapter asserts that organisations can over time strategically or better use 
performance management to provide feedback on their performance and to assess 
how well they are doing in relation to others. This chapter explores organisational 
performance at a conceptual and operational level, which includes key indicators that 
enable success or trigger possible failure. , The relevance of organisational 
performance, as a concept, to the management of performance of individuals and 
performance management systems and theories is an integral part of overall 
organisational performance. 
On the literature reviewed by the researcher, some contradictions and approaches to 
the subject were found, particularly in defining key concepts and measures. Hamman, 
et al. (2013) make the same point, indicating that every time “existing literature on the 





difficult to compare results across the various studies given the contradictions between 
them “mostly caused by different concepts and measurement approaches of 
organisational performance”. In some cases, this contradiction is also true for local 
government, particularly as it relates to performance measurement. 
This chapter endeavours to clarify some of these concepts and misunderstandings, 
and will attempt to show how performance management relates to assessing local 
government performance (public sector). The development of verifiable and validated 
indicators to assess performance and appropriate corrective action is considered vital 
for assessing the success or failure of organisations. It therefore, as in the case of 
local government, requires understanding what the organisation aims to achieve 
(outcome), what needs to be done or delivered (outputs) to achieve the aims and what 
will be required (inputs from an institutional perspective). Differently put, a clear 
understanding is required on the service delivery drivers for local government. 
This chapter considers a set of appropriate indicators that measure the successful 
achievement of key activities or actions, or those realistically influenced in pursuit of 
local government outcomes and objectives over time. These indicators, gleaned from 
the Constitution and various local government legislative and policy directions, will be 
used to construct the local government performance and governance model for local 
government sustainability, which is presented in Chapter 6 of this dissertation. 
 
3.2 DEFINING ORGANISATIONAL PERFORMANCE: KEY CONCEPTS AND 
DEFINITIONS 
Clarifying the concept of ‘organisational performance’ requires an understanding of 
how the various sub-components of the concept are defined. The concepts of (1) 
‘organisation’ and (2) ‘performance’, can be further broken down into individual 
(employee) performance or that by a collection of people (team or organisation). 
Defining performance is important because failure to do so can lead to the absence of 
performance planning and measurement, and in turn prevent individual or 
organisational improvement. Equally important is to understand the various levels and 
components of performance, particularly those affiliated with the culture of being a 







When considering several leading texts on organisational theory, particularly on 
determining a definition of the term or concept of ‘organisation’, it becomes clear that 
there is a general lack of consensus by various authors over the meaning of the word. 
Many authors approach the conceptualisation of the concept from different angles and, 
in doing so, they provide important insight into its different components and application 
possibilities. Jaffee (2001) makes the point that “it would be nonsensical to simply 
ignore the efforts or try to develop definitions as if they never existed” as one would 
find “hundreds, maybe thousands, of these definitions in books on organisation and 
management theory”. Jaffee (2001) further acknowledges the work that has gone into 
defining and conceptualising ‘organisation’, making the point that “no single or concise 
definition can hope to encapsulate all of the different analytical angles” from which one 
can define the concept because of the complex nature of the object of study and the 
multiple perspectives that inform organisational analysis. The various definitions and 
approaches set out below by various authors demonstrate a general lack of consensus 
on a universal definition of the concept. 
Social structure is identified by W. Richard Scott, in Jaffee (2001), as one of the key 
elements in defining the concept of organisation. He contends that social structure 
consists of both formal structures (e.g. documents, job descriptions and charts) and 
informal structures (created by individuals within organisations); “participants are the 
humans” or “people the organisation”; goals “are the conceptions of desired ends”; 
technology is used to transform the raw materials and “environment refers to all things 
outside” the boundaries that either shape or influence the organisation (Jaffee, 2001). 
In defining an ‘organisation’, Hall (1999:30, cited by Jaffee, 2001) provides this 
comprehensive definition: “an organisation is a collectivity with relatively identifiable 
boundary, a normative order (rules), ranks of authority (hierarchy), communications 
system and membership coordinating systems (procedures); this collectively exists on 
a relatively continuous basis in an environment and engages in activities that are 
usually related to a set of goals; the activities have outcomes for organisational 





This definition by Hall (1999:30, cited by Jaffee, 2001) accommodates three interlinked 
concepts. The first relates to structure and includes elements that have hierarchy, 
coordination, norms and standards communication and the scope or boundaries. The 
second component encompasses processes aimed at reaching organisational goals; 
while the third may be the result of the members, structure of the organisation and 
greater society (Jaffee, 2001). 
Lawley, J (2001), makes the point that Morgan, G (1997), in his contribution to 
organisation theory, uses metaphors, images and mental models to define, 
understand and conceptualise organisations (shape and feature). Some of the most 
common metaphors view organisations as machines (tools or instruments), organisms 
(akin to living things), brains, culture, a political system, psychic prisons or instruments 
of domination. The following definitions, taken from Jaffee (2001), embody this 
metaphoric approach. For example, Jones (1997:4) makes the point that “an 
organisation is a tool used by people to coordinate their actions to obtain something 
they desire”, whereas Bedeian (1984:2) indicates that “there does appear to be some 
agreement about the fact that organisations generally develop as instruments for 
attaining specific goals”. Pfeffer and Salancik (1978:2) state that “the key to 
organisational survival is the ability to acquire and maintain resources”, while Cyert 
and March (1992) succinctly explain that “organisations make decisions ... in the same 
sense individuals do”. 
Leavitt and March (1962) asserts that an organisation consists of individuals or groups 
performing specific and often differentiated activities with a particular technique or 
method. Katz, et al. (1978) define systems, which may comprise of sub-systems to 
include continuity through time, and goal-oriented individuals or groups with 
differentiated activities and purposes. The Business Dictionary (2018) defines an 
organisation as a managed social unit, established to meet common objectives in 
which there is a relationship amongst members; and clear rank with demarcated 
responsibilities. 
Lansburgh and Spriegel (1947, in Dwivedi, 1995:5) agree with the above, asserting 
that the relationship and clarity of the contribution of individuals to the purpose of the 
organisation for which they have been brought together is often less clearly defined, 





Allen (1958:52) defines ‘organisation’ as “the process of identifying and grouping work 
to be performed, defining and delegating responsibility and authority and establishing 
relationships for enabling people to work most effectively together in accomplishing 
objectives”. According to Business Management Ideas (BMI) (2018), Koontz and 
O’Donnell, in their work on ‘Principles of Management’, see it as the “establishment of 
authority relationships with provision for co-ordination between them, both vertically 
and horizontally in the enterprise structure”. These authors ascribe that organisations 
have a role in coordinating individual contributions to achieve organisational goals and 
these activities are based on clearly demarcated authority and work to be performed. 
BMI (2018) acknowledges Terry’s (1960) note that for organisations to efficiently 
coordinate activities, perform operations and achieve objectives, requires an authority 
relationship amongst the work to be performed, the relationship between the 
individuals performing them and the organisations that they represent. Sheldon (1923, 
cited by BMI, 2018) highlights that the most efficient and effective ways of achieving 
organisational objectives are to link the efforts of the work that needs to be performed 
to individuals and workgroups doing it; appropriate work processes; and the facilities 
used. Organisations can contribute to efficient resource use (factors of production) 
through a systems approach and the segregation of work processes and duties 
amongst individuals and groups in the organisation. 
Management has a role to play to aggregate a number of business activities in pursuit 
of achieving business objectives. According to Venkatesh (2018), “organisation as a 
structure in the words of Professor Wheeler ... is the structural framework of duties 
and responsibilities required of personal in performing various functions within the 
company. It is the blue-prints, a mechanism”. It can be achieved through the utilisation 
of the internal construct. It requires organisations to apply a structural framework or 
framework of delegations to an organisation. This framework assigns particular 
functions to individuals and groups within an organisation. BMI (2018) highlights that 
in “Wheeler’s view organisation as a process of fixing duties and responsibilities of 
persons in an enterprise so that business goals are achieved”. In line with this, Terry 
(1960, according to BMI, 2018) defines ‘organising’ (as a verb) to mean the 
“establishing of effective authority relationships among selected work, persons, and 





In defining the term organisation, two concepts emerge: static and dynamic. The first 
highlights the relationship between: the structure of the entity, work to be performed, 
as well as individuals or groups and their positions within the organisation at a given 
time. The emphasis in the static concept is on the organisation. 
The second concept considers the organisation as an adaptive (or dynamic) open 
system, focusing on the process of determining, arranging, scheduling and assigning 
tasks to be performed in the interest of achieving the organisation’s objectives. 
Renkatesh (2018) submits that this “dynamic concept lays emphasis on individuals 
and considers organisation as a continuous process”. 
Conrad and Poole (2002:24) highlight that organisations could be defined as 
individuals and groups that are required to interpret complex interpersonal and work-
related messages from within and across the environment within which they operate 
to achieve multiple goals. They further contend that the environment in which 
organisations function will affect their systems, outcomes and outputs so as to achieve 
the norms of the bigger system in which they function (Conrad and Poole, 2002). 
The researcher supports the statement that municipalities fall within the definition of 
an organisation, and therefore can be considered together with all role-players, such 
as communities, politicians, legislature, academia, business partners and service 
providers. 
A system is defined as a set of interrelated parts that have been brought together to 
achieve a desired outcome. According to Harvey and Brown (1996:36, cited in 
Henkins, 2002:22), a system has the following attributes: 
• “A system must be designed to accomplish an objective; 
• The elements of a system must have well established arrangements; 
• Interrelationships must exist amongst the individual elements of a system; 
• The basic ingredients of a process (the flows of information, energy and 
materials) are more important than the basic elements of the system; and 
• The objectives of the organisation are more important than the objectives 






The input-output model suggested by Henkins (2002:22) shows the relationship 
between inputs and outputs. It explains that inputs are the basic building blocks and, 
if applied through processes, activity functions can result in outputs and services 
produced by an organisation. This links to the business model of municipalities. 
Henkins (2002) explains the concept using a simple input-output systems diagram, as 
set out in Figure 3.1 below. 
 
Figure 3.1: A Simple Organisation Systems Diagram 
Source: Henkins (2002:22). 
Henkins (2002) makes the point that “the flow of inputs and outputs is a basic starting 
point in the description of an organisation as a system”, and understanding the 
configuration and workings of the system. Henkins (2002) also asserts: 
• “Inputs are the resources that are applied to the processing function. 
• Processes are the activities and functions that are performed to produce 
goods and services. 
• Outputs are the products and services produced by the organisation”. 
 
Harvey, et al. (1996:37, in Henkins, 2002:23) argue that organisations are socio-
technical systems that function in harmony with other elements in an ever-changing 





they operate. They also highlight that there is a relationship between the work that 
needs to be done and those doing it in organisations so as to produce outputs for the 
larger environment from resources acquired from the outside environment (Harvey, et 
al., 1996:37, in Henkins, 2002:23). 
 
3.2.2 Performance 
‘Performance’, as noun in the context of this study similarly performs a task or function 
that relates to achievement or satisfaction of completion. According to Elger (2018:11), 
to perform (as a verb) is to take a complex series of actions “that integrate skills and 
knowledge to produce a valuable result” (performer as an individual or organisation). 
The Business Dictionary (2018) offers the following definition of performance: “the 
accomplishment of a given task measured against preset known standards of 
accuracy, completeness, cost, and speed. In a contract, performance is deemed to be 
the fulfilment of an obligation, in a manner that releases the performer from all liabilities 
under the contract, or in short, the completion of a task with application of knowledge, 
skills and abilities”. 
Laitinen (2002) considers performance to be the capability of an entity “to produce 
results in a dimension determined a priori”, in comparison to a goal. For performance 
to exist, the following three dimensions are required, namely “an object whose 
performance is to be considered; second a dimension in which one is interested; and, 
third a set target for the result”. Orelli, et al. (2010:458) cite Bovaird’s (1996) 
description of performance as a compendium of data and information that describes 
achievement and variable relevance to different role players. They also highlight that 
performance can be classified according to inputs, processes, outputs and outcomes. 
Bates and Holton (in Armstrong, et al., 2000:15 and Armstrong, 2000:3) agree that 
“performance is not a one-dimensional construct, but performance is a multi-
dimensional construct concerning both outcomes and behaviour”, the “measurement 
of which varies depending on a variety of factors”. Armstrong (2000) however cautions 
“that it is important to determine whether measurement objectives” are targeted at 





work has been done but also as to how the results have been obtained, which finds 
direct application in local government (Armstrong, 2000). 
This approach by Armstrong resonates with that of Robbins (1990:51), who asserts 
that process (work) and outcomes (results) are both considerations in determining the 
performance of an organisation. Rothwell (1994:26), however, disagrees and 
emphasises that performance means an achievement of “outcomes rather than 
behaviours” and further that “performance means something performed, an 
accomplishment ... is synonymous with outcomes, results, or accomplishments” and 
should therefore “not be confused with behaviours, work activities, duties, 
responsibilities, or competencies”. 
The authors Lebans and Euske (2006:71, in Gavrea, Ilieş & Stegerean, 2011:287) 
define a number of related definitions in support of organisational performance. Key is 
that it provides a set of both financial and non-financial indicators that provide 
information on the achievements of objectives and results (Lebans and Euske, 2006, 
Kaplan and Norton, 1992). They further assert that understanding performance and 
how it relates to each area of responsibility requires the quantification of results to be 
achieved in a changing environment; performance affects change and could be used 
as a mechanism to describe how current actions or activities may affect future 
performance. They highlight that understanding performance of an organisation is 
variable and open to subjectivity on who is judging the performance (either from within 
or outside) of the organisation (Lebans and Euske, 2006). 
Langdon (2000:12) defines ‘performance’ as a dynamic concept of doing, changing 
inputs into outputs, managing the environment in which these are done and reporting 
on the results thereof. He proposes a model in which this can be achieved. In his 
model he defines the outputs as the products, service or knowledge at organisational 
or individual levels. These outputs contribute to consequences for future outputs, 
which may include, for example, increased work satisfaction or reduction in the 
number of performance output measurements (for example the reduction in the 
number of fires for a fire services function). The two elements mentioned earlier are 
as a result of the application of inputs, which are transformed though processes into 
outputs, noting that outputs precede the consequence element of the proposed model. 





transformed into outputs and shaped by the organisation, its competitors, customers, 
regulators and the like. The model also proposes a set of process elements to 
transform inputs into outputs and a feedback loop to assess and report on whether the 




Figure 3.2: The Langdon Performance Model 
Source: Langdon (2000:12). 
 
The Langdon model (Langdon, 2000) represents a systems approach to performance 
management and will be further explored in subsequent sections on organisational 
effectiveness, performance measurement and management. Orelli, et al. (2010:459) 
highlight that performance in the public sector as an organisation includes political and 
individual employee levels. 
This research has its focus on the performance of the public sector and considers the 
performance of a municipality as an organisation within the local government sphere. 





3.2.3 Employee (Individual) Performance 
Organisational achievements are linked to how well individual employees perform the 
tasks assigned to them at an organisation. According to the Business Dictionary 
(2018), this assessment of how well individuals within an organisation have performed 
their tasks is defined as employee performance. 
Organisations often review employee performance periodically (quarterly, bi-annually 
or annually) and use results to recalibrate and implement improvement measures. 
These individual performance reviews often include aspects of leadership, 
prioritisation, as well as the successful completion of tasks according to specifications 
and deadlines. 
Newstrom and Davis (1993:17, in Schierschmidt, 2002:23) highlights that an 
individual’s “performance is a function of both ability and motivation”. They further 
argue that that the potential human performance determined in an organisation is 
dependent on the resources at their disposal and the opportunity to obtain the 
organisational achievements. 
Schierschmidt (2002:23) adapts an equation from Newstrom and Davis (1997:17), 
which highlights that potential human performance in an organisation represents an 
interaction and is dependent on the knowledge and skill of the individual employee, as 
well as their motivation or attitude within a given situation. The equation considers 
potential human performance, resources and opportunity, as inputs to achieve 
organisational results. The approach taken to include individual employee attitudes as 
a contributor to organisational performance dismisses the views expressed by 
Rothwell (1994) that “Performance should thus not be confused with behaviours, work 
activities, duties, responsibilities, or competencies”. 
Vroom (1964, in Shoraj & Shyqyri, 2015) highlights in their expectance theory that 
performance is the mathematical “result of multiplying skills with motivation” as per the 
linear “equation: Performance = Skills × Motivation”. Vroom’s equation is expanded by 
Campbell and Pritchard (1976) as follows: 
“Performance = f (Skill capability x Skill level x understanding the duty x selection to 
make the effort x selection to continue x mitigating and aggravating conditions beyond 





To satisfy the above equation requires that individuals have at least four variables, 
which include: knowledge to understand the expectations; skills to do what is 
expected; requisite motivation to do what is required; and work environment in which 
their actions can be translated into behaviours. 
Schierschmidt (2002:23) adapted the work of Newstrom and Davis (1993:17) and 
developed a different equation that measures organisational performance as follows: 
“Knowledge x Skill = Ability; Attitude x Situation = Motivation; Ability x Motivation = 
Potential Human Performance; Potential Performance x Resources x Opportunity = 
Organisational results [or organisational performance”. 
This mathematical construct/equation illustrates that the motivation of individual 
employees within the public sector could be a key driver of organisational performance 
within the public sector. Therefore, individual performance measures both behaviours 
and results (outcomes). Armstrong (2000:3) highlights that “behaviours emanate from 
the performer and transform performance from abstraction to action. Not just the 
instruments for results, behaviours are also outcomes in their own right – the product 
of mental and physical effort applied to tasks – and can be judged apart from results”. 
Performance management of individuals and/or teams in an organisation therefore 
require an assessment of “both inputs (behaviour) and outputs (results)”. 
Schierschmidt (2002:24) terms such an approach as a “mixed model of performance 
management”, and includes employee’s “competence or capability levels”, results 
measurement and monitoring, target setting and review. 
 
3.2.4 Organisational Performance 
This research has its focus on the performance of an organisation and considers the 
actual achievements of results (goals and objectives) against the targets that an 
organisation has set for itself. The Business Dictionary (2018) defines “organisational 
performance as an analysis of a company’s performance as compared to goals and 
objectives”. Corporate organisations analyse three primary outcomes as a 
measurement for organisational performance, namely “financial performance, market 





Richard, et al. (2009) align with this definition, adding minor nuancing to suggest that 
the performance of an organisation includes “(1) financial performance (profits, return 
on assets, return on investment, etc.); (2) product market performance (sales, market 
share, etc.); and (3) shareholder return (total shareholder return, economic value 
added, etc.)”. The applicability of these definitions for organisational performance is 
chiefly geared towards defining private sector organisational performance. Despite 
countless academic literature and documentation on the concept of organisational 
performance, universal agreement on the construct of this concept remains evasive. 
Gavrea, et al. (2011:287) explain that Georgopoulos and Tannenbaum (1957:535) 
believed that organisational performance should be interpreted as how well 
organisations performed as social systems. They further highlight that organisational 
performance in the 1950s focused on organisational structure, work and people. 
In subsequent decades (the 1960s and 1970s), Yuchtman and Seashore (1967:379) 
explored new ways of measuring organisational performance to include the ability of 
organisations to compete for limited resources and exploit their operational 
environments. The 1980’s debate on organisational performance noted that 
organisational performance is more complex than whether an organisation has 
achieved its stated goals and objectives. Lusthaus and Adrien (1998, citing Campbell, 
1970, in Gavrea, et al., 2011:287) define organisational performance as including 
meeting stated goals and objectives (effectiveness) within the constraints of limited 
resources (efficiency). Within this context, profit became a key indicator of 
organisational performance. 
Within the public sector, Cloete (2003:10) argues that many public sector reforms 
introduced in South Africa post-1994 focus on making the shift “from being input- and 
resource-focused administration to output- and result-based public service”. This 
paradigm shift includes emphasis on outcomes or impact of the service delivery. 
Public sector performance, as expressed by Pauw, et al. (2009:202), includes terms 
such as economy, effectiveness, efficiency and appropriateness. In his theory, Pauw 
defines economy to include the “relationship between quantity, quality of resource 
inputs and its related costs” (Pauw, et al., 2009). He also defines efficiency to include 





measured by the extent to which planned outputs”, and the outcomes have the desired 
impact on communities (Pauw, et al., 2009). 
Public service delivery in the ‘new public service era’ is characterised by a re-
organisation of the public sector; governments that are more responsive to citizen 
needs and where criteria for performance or service delivery effectiveness and 
efficiency of government programmes exist and are measured. This paradigm, 
according to Hazlett and Hill (2003:446) and Cordella and Bonina (2012:512), and 
cited by Ndlovu (2015:2), includes a transformational management approach aimed 
at the achievement of results, policy development, integrated coordination and 
services across partners. 
According to Lips (1998:329), for any “organisation to collect appropriate information 
that is useful to account to its stakeholders and improve its performance, it is essential 
to set the right performance objectives, indicators and targets”, which underpin the 
new public management (NPM) approach. Combs, Crook and Shook (2005:261, cited 
by Hamann, et al. 2013:7) highlight that when considering organisational performance, 
care should be taken not to confuse operational with organisational performance. 
Operational performance, according to their framework, includes “all non-financial 
outcomes” of an organisation, whilst the “conceptual domain of organisational 
performance” is only concerned with the economic results. This view excludes the 
“impact of the environment on the economic” or non-financial performance on an 
organisation (Hamann, et al., 2013). They further motivate that many assessments of 
organisational performances, basing their research on performance against economic 
indicators, are the same as measuring and reporting against corporate financial or 
economic performance (Murphy, et al., 1996; Richard, et al., 2009, Fryxell & Barton, 
1990, cited by Hamann, et al., 2013). 
Given the above definition by Hamann, et al. (2013), the researcher is of the view that 
the definition is limited as it only considers economic outcomes, and should thus be 
broadened. In arriving at a holistic definition, consideration should also be given to 
behavioural outcomes, as organisations include people, strategies, processes and 
often physical infrastructure. In support of the inclusion of additional elements to 
adequately define organisational performance, attention is drawn to anecdotes where 





the character of its staff. This may also be due to changing management models; the 
way in which people and organisations do their work; and the expectation of 
stakeholders. Given the aforementioned analysis, it is clear that a multidimensional 
lens is required to grasp the concept ‘organisational performance’, particularly within 
the public sector. 
In defining organisational performance in the industrial age, Fontannaz and 
Oosthuizen (2007:11) suggest that this simply implies meeting the performance 
expectations of the dominant stakeholder or shareholder. Kotter and Heskett (1992, in 
Kirby, 2005:30-39 and cited by Fontannaz & Oosthuizen, 2007) define organisational 
performance as including annual net income growth; average return on capital 
investment; and appreciation or increase in the stock price. Zook (2001, in Kirby, 
2005:30-39) focuses on a similar combination and include this in their assessment of 
organisational performance: those organisations that have shown revenue and profit 
growth to shareholders and achieved shareholder returns in excess to the cost of capital 
In the industrial economy, the key driver for organisational performance was the ability 
to gain access to financial capital. This criterion is no longer sufficient for the current 
networked economy, which may include the satisfaction of a range of stakeholder 
requirements (Kolk, van der Veen, Pinkse & Fortanier, 2005, cited by Fontannaz & 
Oosthuizen 2007:11). The triple bottom line (economic, social and environmental) 
assessment of an organisation’s performance has been a further attempt to measure 
an organisation’s performance beyond performance based merely on financial 
indicators. Performance across the three dimensions of the triple bottom line is subject 
to measurement, reporting and auditing (Fontannaz & Oosthuizen (2007:11, citing 
Neely & Adams, 2007). 
Kirby (2005:30-39, in Fontannaz & Oosthuizen, 2007:11) acknowledges that 
organisational performance or approximations of organisational performance from a 
multi-stakeholder perspective is often challenged if organisational performance 
frameworks that include intuitive measures are not supported by profitability of 
financial indicators of performance. 
The operational performance (non-financial indicators) of a municipality mainly deal 
with the input-output relationship (inputs being financial or human resources, amongst 





outcome relationship, which runs over a longer period. Research, analysis and various 
reports indicate that municipal performance failures are not exclusively based on 
financial performance. Municipal performance failures show underperformance on 
pre-determined objectives (non-financial outputs), as well as financial indicators. This 
is attributed to factors or weaknesses within the organisation, as well as from its 
external environment. 
An in-depth understanding of municipal performance requires careful consideration of 
the legislative and policy environments; quantitative and qualitative nature of the 
services and resources available; quality and standard of services to be provided; the 
relevant department within the municipality tasked to perform the activities; and the 
external environment impacting the municipality. 
Van der Merwe, (1992:113) sums up municipal performance appropriately as follows: 
“Governmental institutions face a complicated web of relationships; they have a large 
number of different client groups; there are many influences to take into account in 
decision-making; they are subject to all sorts of policies, procedures, rules and 
regulations in the areas of financial management and personnel management and 
administration; the bottom line of profit does not exist; financial performance and the 
impact of service on the general welfare of the people … difficult to assess; policy 
objectives are generally vague and shift with changes in the political environment.” 
In summary, in pursuit of an organisation’s vision, mission and values, consideration 
needs to be given to applying an integrated and systematic approach to delivery of 
public services. This approach is referred to as ‘performance management’ and 
‘performance measurement’, which will be discussed in Sections 3.2.6 and 3.4 
respectively. 
 
3.2.5 Organisational Effectiveness 
A myriad of theories on organisational performance recognise the relationship 
between organisational effectiveness and organisational performance (Martins & 
Coetzee, 2009:145-144, citing Baruch & Ramalho, 2006; Lee & Brower, 2006). 





many of the theories, according to Henkins (2002:20), have combined elements such 
as the goal, competing values and systems approaches. 
A critique of the value of the goal approach lies with the targeted information it provides 
in relation to a specific indicator and organisation that has achieved it. This limits a 
comparison of the effectiveness and performance across functional units or 
organisations (Spangenberg & Theron, 2004:20). 
The systems approach provides for the separation, division and integration of units 
and processes across different sub-systems within an organisation, mainly aimed at 
improvising accountability, transparency and results. This approach focuses on the 
processes that convert inputs into outputs within the confines of a business unit, as 
well as on the maintenance of systems (Seashore, 1983, cited in Spangenberg & 
Theron, 2004:20). 
Quinn and Rohrbaugh (1983), in their systems model on organisational effectiveness, 
highlight that a system should be defined with all of its attributes as these may impact 
on the way organisations maintain, adapt and transform processes within the 
organisation and its environment. Denison (1990) notes that the key outcomes of the 
systems model relate to stability, maintenance, growth and/or decline. Eccles (1991, 
in Spangenberg & Theron, 2004:20) makes the point that the systemic, integrated and 
adaptive approaches to organisational effectiveness require a diverse set of financial 
and non-financial indicators or performance measures. 
According to Gibson, et al. (1991, in Spangenberg & Theron, 2004:21), time is 
considered a key element in the systems approach on organisational effectiveness as 
the organisation is part of the broader environment from which it takes and eventually 
returns resources. Sustainability is considered a key element of the environment within 
which businesses operate and succeed. The time-dimension model takes account of 
the effectiveness of the financial and non-financial measures criteria, which are 
defined over the short and long term. 
French and Bell (1999) highlight that organisational performance includes 
effectiveness and efficiency measures that track whether organisations are able to 
achieve their objectives with “minimum expenditure of energy, time, money, human 





Dictionary (2018) and Pedraza (2014), organisational performance is not an exact 
science because most of the models that have been developed to measure 
organisational performance vary in constituency components and relative priorities, 
which makes comparatives difficult. To obtain a relatively accurate picture of an 
organisation’s performance requires a ‘big picture’ view of the organisational 
effectiveness and efficiencies and a clear set of criteria that are to be used to measure 
financial and non-financial performance. 
However, it is agreed that measuring organisational effectiveness is important as it 
provides a mechanism to track organisational well-being and make recommendations 
for actions to improve internal processes, achieve the organisation’s vision and 
provide confidence to shareholders and respond to the environment within which the 
organisation operates. 
Henkin (2002:20), citing ‘In Search of Excellence’ by Tom Peters and Robert 
Waterman (1982), highlights the following “eight features of effective and excellent 
companies: 
• A bias for action and achieving goals; 
• Remaining close to customers to better understand their needs; 
• Granting employees a high degree of autonomy and fostering an 
entrepreneurial spirit; 
• Increasing productivity through employee participation; 
• Ensuring that employees know what the company stands for and 
managers are involved in problem solving at all levels; 
• Remaining with the business they know and understand; 
• Organisational structures that are simple and contain a minimum number 
of support staff; and 
• Mixing tight centralised controls for protecting the company’s core values 
with loose controls elsewhere to encourage risk taking and innovation”. 
 
Critique of Peters and Waterman (1982) support what was mentioned earlier: that 
there is no universal method of measuring organisational performance nor an exact 





al., 1985:29). Henkins (2002:20) highlights that organisational performance is 
dependent on a number of activities that require assessment. 
The SixSigma (2018) approach to organisational effectiveness considers the 
ingredients for effective organisations to include as leadership, delivery, performance, 
measurement, accountability and communication. This approach requires leadership 
to set the vision and strategy to achieve the goals and objectives for organisations, 
and to communicate. To deliver on the purpose of the organisation, the recruitment of 
adequately qualified staff with appropriate knowledge and skill is required. Staff within 
the organisation is required to deliver on the vision and produce goods and services 
to customers or clients. Understanding and streamlining processes, as well as 
simplifying and reducing errors to derive customer satisfaction is important. 
Communication of the organisation’s aspirations and goals, as well as processes and 
progress towards achieving them, is important. 
Robbins (1990:51) highlights that assessing organisational effectiveness should be 
part of organisational strategy; is dependent on a well-executed diagnostic, which 
takes into account multiple criteria; and is focussed on organisational processes (as a 
means) and achievements (as ends). Martins and Coetzee (2009:144, citing 
Cummings & Worley, 2005; French & Bell, 1999) note that a broad organisation 
management strategy must include an assessment of organisational performance 
supported by a well-planned and executed diagnostic of processes and outcomes to 
recommend improvements to the overall system management. Measuring 
organisational performance will be explored later in this chapter. 
 
3.2.6 Performance Management 
Addams and Embley (1998, in Spangenberg, 1994:1) link individual staff performance 
appraisal to strategic planning of an organisation, whilst Bowman and Jarrett (1996:2) 
note that the management of an organisation should ensure that resources (facilities, 
equipment, funds and time) are optimally used and that employee potential and 
performance are maximised. 
Management is about planning, leading, control and execution. According to Curtis 





harnesses the endeavours of individual managers and workers to an organisation’s 
strategic goal”. Performance management is viewed more broadly as a pattern of 
thinking in changing economic, social, technological and political, environment and 
that performance management in such environments can also be a toolbox of 
techniques to deal with managing these. 
According to Rogers (1999:2, in Schiersmidt, 2002:27), in the more comprehensive 
context and approach, “performance management is not just a process for ensuring 
those public service organisations and their employees are well placed to produce the 
performance that society requires of them. It is also part of the process by which 
performance itself is defined, by which criteria of performance are established and by 
which societal, political and managerial judgements are made of those who are 
performing. Performance management does not only create the performance required 
of local authorities – it also ensures that local authorities are well enough managed to 
produce the required performance”. 
Performance management, according to Rogers (1999:3), includes the management 
of objectives, accountability, numbers and appraisals (reward or punishment). 
Spangenberg (1994:1, citing Bevan & Thompson, 1991) points out that performance 
management includes a shared vision, how the organisation will achieve its mission, 
and communication of this to all staff. They also highlight performance management 
targets and the contribution of the unit, and overall organisation, to these. 
The review of performance includes progress towards achieving targets and the 
identification of corrective action, be it staff training, development or rewards and clear 
communication on future expectations and performance standards. The contextual 
circumstances of an organisation, as is the case of municipalities, are important 
considerations when organisational performance is considered. 
Performance management is often erroneously or misguidedly confused with 
performance appraisal. Notwithstanding this confusion, ‘performance management’ 
includes various mechanisms, processes and programmes to manage the 
performance of organisations, departments, business units and individuals, whilst the 
term ‘performance appraisal’ refers to the act of judging or evaluating how an individual 





within an organisation. Performance appraisal therefore constitutes only a component 
of performance management. 
Performance management is used to communicate to employees how they have 
progressed in meeting agreed objectives and to institute corrective action in cases 
where there may be a variance between what has been set and achieved. The activity 
of performance management is executed by the supervisors of staff over a pre-
determined performance period within organisations. The consequences of these 
performance management exercises are used to chart interventions and capacity-
building programmes to address shortcomings within the individual staff member to 
achieve the set objectives; award bonuses and salary increases based on evidence; 
conclude on performance rewards for excellent work performance; or to provide a 
basis upward mobility or promotional transfers within an organisation. 
Van der Merwe (1992) makes the point that in the public sector there are many internal 
and external environmental influences that impact on organisational performance. 
However, these influences impede the use of simplistic formulae and techniques to 
assess good management or performance. 
This view is supported by Schierschmidt (2002:28), who believes “that any general 
assessment or review of the performance of an individual government department is 
an extremely complex matter which requires careful and balanced quantitative and 
qualitative judgements, based on detailed information about the resources at its 
disposal in relation to all the services delivered by the department concerned, as well 
as all its activities in the policy and legislative fields”. It can therefore be concluded, 
that for any assessment of organisational appraisal or staff definitions need to be 
expanded to include the impact of the internal and external environments within which 









Figure 3.3 below (the van der Merwe model) demonstrates the various relationships 
between external and internal environments. 
 
 
Figure 3.3: Van der Merwe Model 
Source: Van der Merwe (1992:123, cited by Schierschmidt, 2002:26). 
 
Several studies have considered various factors that influence organisational 
performance. The model illustrated in Figure 3.1 draws from Gavrea, Ilieş and 
Stegerean (2011:288), which was developed and aimed at comparing the 
performance of the various Romanian manufacturing firms with each other. The model 
notes, amongst others, the influence of the internal and external environments, as well 





proposed variables, in determining organisational performance are included in the 
model and are not exhaustive. 
The Gavrea, et al. model (2011) focuses on structural elements that include the reason 
for existence, size and age of the company. It also focuses on internal environment, 
which includes elements such as leadership, strategy, quality, performance 
management, innovation and governance, while the external environment focusses 
on markets, customers, competitors and presumably the legislative environment. 
Rogers (1999:11) presents an alternative simplified approach (Rogers’ model) to 
organisational performance management as “to think of the fundamental 
organisational conditions that need to be achieved if a local authority is to successfully 
manage all the key aspects of its performance”. The Rodgers’ model, as depicted in 
Figure 3.4 below, “uses two axes: one focuses on what is happening either inside or 
outside the organisation, the other represents the need for both control and flexibility. 
The four quadrants produced represent the four main conditions for managing 
organisational performance in local government” (Schierschmidt, 2002). 
The Schierschmidt (2002:30) model, which was adapted from Rogers (1999:11-12), is 
represented in Figure 3.4 and notes the interaction between the internal and external 
environments on organisational performance. It highlights the need for leadership to 
set clear goals and objectives, develop key systems and processes to ensure the 
delivery of quality products and services and to have staff, or develop and capacitate 
staff that are adaptive and innovative to manage the expectations of their clients in a 
politically responsive manner. 
In the model, the bottom-left quadrant interfaces with the internal environment and 
highlights control over resources, communication and information and documentation. 
This is indicative of well-regulated and stable bureaucracies, and provides for 
significant order and methods of conducting the processes within an organisation. The 
bottom-right quadrant considers the external environment, including effective delivery 
of products and services; quality assurance; implementation of organisational 






The top-left quadrant focuses on the internal environment and is tasked with ensuring 
that there is a focus on communication, staff involvement, capacity building; clarity of 
focus, improving staff morale, attitudes and motivation. The top-right quadrant has an 
external focus on communication, branding, marketing and feedback to customers. It 
also focusses on accountability and political sensitivities. 
 
 
Figure 3.4: The Rogers/Schierschmidt Model 
Source: Rogers (1999:12) in Schierschmidt (2002:31). 
 
Schierschmidt (2002:30) highlights that the elements in the four quadrants in the 
Rogers’ model are subject to pull and push factors, noting that there should be an 





organisation. He also notes that management must have a balanced focus, be 
constantly aware of the elements in all four quadrants and regularly review and adjust 
the impact of the tensions amongst these. 
 
3.3 ORGANISATIONAL PERFORMANCE: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORKS AND 
MODELS 
Jessa (2012:31, citing Mouton & Marais, 1994) submits that models are considered to 
be conceptual frameworks or constructs that aim to simplify and systemise the 
outcomes of research given particular assumptions about the structure, causative and 
functional nature of the modellandum. Models are also considered useful in soliciting 
a range of questions in support of policy formulation (Pollitt, et al., 2002:25). Many 
models or theoretical frameworks on organisational performance have been 
developed. However, those reviewed in this chapter are primarily confined to 
outcomes-driven performance.   
Jessa (2012: 31, citing Osborne, et al. in Van der Waldt, 2007:117) makes the point 
that the key drivers of achievement of outcomes, increased outputs and successful 
performance management, include factors such as accountability, learning and 
incentives. Mintzberg (1996:76-77) highlights that a need exists to develop a balance 
between private and public organisational performance models. As in the case of 
municipalities, options exist to either use both models, or adopt a hybrid of the two, 
whichever is appropriate to their circumstances. 
The remainder of this section considers a number of organisational performance 
approaches and models that could be equally applicable for utilisation in local 
government (municipalities).  
 
3.3.1 The New Public Management Approach to Organisational Performance 
Hood and Jackson (1980) were the first to introduce the term ‘new public management’ 
(NPM) in an attempt to transform the public service to a business-like operation, to 
ensure efficiency and introduce market-oriented management and to ensure that 





according to Farazmand (2016), moved from the assumption that government 
programmes could be better delivered if the government sector could be relieved from 
rigid hierarchical bureaucracies. 
Several features with regards to the new public management approach in Turner 
(2002, cited by Naidoo, 2005:73-74) have been identified. These include leadership, 
communication, goal setting, private sector management techniques, performance 
management and individual learner appraisal, effectiveness and efficiency, greater 
competition and the various participation of stakeholders in service delivery. 
This approach puts focus on the citizen, the recipient of the service to be delivered; is 
results-driven and, in some cases, is delivered through external providers or private 
enterprises. Fryer, et al. (2009:479, in Jessa, 2012:32) makes the point that the NPM 
approach also “focusses on the effectiveness and efficiency of resource” use, 
empowerment and the services that have been delivered to communities by using 
public procurement processes. 
Schwella, et al. (2015:48, citing Kamarck, 2002) states that NPM is founded on the 
principle that a successful government draws from the entrepreneurial spirit to 
revitalise itself and, in doing so, takes on concepts that were previously been the sole 
province of the private sector. NPM has at its focus a better performing government, 
reduction of the bureaucratic and hierarchical organisational structure, excellence, 
improved productivity, cost savings, quality and competitiveness. 
This approach also aims to improve the greater welfare of society, increase 
participation in civic life, reduce wastage, eradicate corruption, improve 
competitiveness and quality, not forsake governance, and to promote impartiality and 
equality. In their book ‘Re-inventing Government’, Osborne and Gaebler (1992) focus 
on entrepreneurial government. 
Hood (1995:93) notes that the new public management approach, uses public 
administration as tool for development, promoting moral values and civic trends in 
support of social change. It also promotes a decentralised approach to the control of 
resources to achieve improved results, competition and improved quality and timely 





The three ‘M’s’ (markets, management and measurement) concept, introduced by 
Ferlie, Ashburner, Fitzgerald and Pettigrew (1996:3), is described by these authors as 
“NPM in action”. Minogue (1998:18-27, in Jessa, 2012:32) notes that NPM was 
introduced to bring about cost savings through reduction in bureaucratic organisations, 
to achieve cost effectiveness, performance auditing and measurement. According to 
Ahmed (2016), new public management requires that government is responsive and 
proactive in dealing with challenges; has the requisite flexibility and innovation to 
communication and staff and citizen empowerment; be accountable for delivering 
against goals and objectives; and can adapt to the use of technology, partnerships 
and processes. 
Ahmed (2016) makes the point that the NPM approach focuses on the following five 
‘A’ ideas: 
• “Alertness-Government: should anticipate problems and changes before 
they emerge, then deal effectively with them”. 
• “Agility-Government: should be entrepreneurial, open, and communicative. 
It should empower citizens and public employees alike”.  
• “Adaptability-Government: should continuously improve the quality of its 
programs and services, and it should do so by assessing its performance 
with measurable results. It should alter with changing circumstances and 
take advantage of new opportunities”. 
• “Alignment-Government: should saturate itself with knowledge by 
effectively managing its information technology. Governments should 
collaborate with other governments and the nonprofit and private sectors 
to achieve social goals”. 
• “Accountability-Government: should have a clear and compelling mission 
that focuses on the needs of people. Government should improve its 
accountability to the public interest, which should be understood in terms 
of law, community, and shared values”. 
 
The Management Study Guide (MSG) (2018) highlights some foundational themes of 





for money and a strong focus on financial control. It further notes a master-servant 
relationship mode of functioning, with senior management holding disproportionate 
levels of power. The introduction of accountability with regards to financial and non-
financial audits, uses transparent means to review performances, setting benchmarks, 
using protocols to ameliorate professional behavior. The NPM focuses on government 
in the interest of citizens achieving value for money, giving managers more discretion 
but holding managers accountable for delivery. This new approach also allows for 
audits on achievements, good governance, reflection and transparency to relevant 
stakeholders and citizens. 
Refinements to the NPM have taken into account networks of collaboration and 
strategic alliances. The NPM model also propagates a quasi-market approach to 
mimic market forces, create a more fragmented or loosely controlled public service or 
contracted management, offering a differentiated service to government. 
The NPM model evolved over time to include additional aspects or components. The 
new NPM is often referred to by scholars as the NPM (2) as it projects, according to 
the MSG (2018), a much stronger focus on “making use of private sector principles to 
increase efficiency” in public sector organisations. The critical aspects of this new 
model, as set out in Figure 3.5 below, include the: 
• “Introduction of a more elaborate and evolved quasi-market system.  
• Creation of more fragmented or loosely contracted public sector 
organizations at the local level setting in a change from management of 
hierarchy to management of contract.  
• Distinguishing between the small strategic core and the large 
organizational periphery, market testing and contracting out the non-
strategic functions. 
• Delayering and downsizing.  
• Introduction of new managerial concepts like Management by Influence, 
creating network for of organizations, creating strategic alliances between 
the organizations.  








Figure 3.5: Administrative System Concept under New Public Management 
Source: New Public Management Soshiro Osumi (1999). 
 
Barzelay (2001) raises some criticism of the NPM approach, contending that the model 
could distort the links between policymaking and providing services and bring about a 
politicisation of the public service when managers are contracted under the pay-for 
performance method. This method suggests that managers could walk away from 
trying to meet citizens’ needs; and by implication suggests that managers will sacrifice, 
compliance, loyalty and integrity.  
Bovaird and Löffler (in Rabie & Ackron, 2010:18, cited in Jessa, 2012:32) highlight a 





role of citizens more; that the model was inward looking to public institutions; and that 
inadequate transparency contributed to poor service delivery. 
 
3.3.2 Nicholson and Brenner Model 
Spangenberg and Theron (2004:19) developed a generic performance measurement 
model for work units, called the Performance Index (PI) that could equally be applied 
to non-profit, public and private organisations. 
In their research literature, Nicholson and Brenner (1994), in considering the 
dimensions of perceived organisational performance, identify to two psychometric 
measures. These measures are considered in the “systems model and the Unit 
Performance Questionnaire (citing Cockerill, Schroder & Hunt, 1993; Spangenberg, 
Schroder, Duvenage & Theron, 1999)”. 
According to Spangenberg and Theron (2004), the Nicholson and Brenner model, 
derived from the work of Nicholson and Brenner (1994), comprises four elements 
measuring the effectiveness of an organisation. These include wealth, markets, 
adaptability and climate. The identification of these four elements underpins the 
statements made earlier that organisational performance and effectiveness are multi-
dimensional. 
Lewin and Minton (1986) and Quinn and Rohrbaugh (1983), in their experimentation 
with the Miles and Snow (1978) model, cite Cameron and Whetton (1983), who note 
the need for performing organisations to differentiate between their flexibility to deal 
with perceptions and integration of work across employees in the interest of 
sustainability, given the perceived risk of global climate change; internal strength 
(wealth); and their capability (markets). 
 
3.3.3 Unit Performance Questionnaire 
Spangenberg and Theron (2004:19) adopted Nicholson and Brenner’s (1994) 
performance model to develop a 360° performance management instrument called the 





sector institutions. The questionnaire comprises four categories: inputs (resources), 
climate, adaptability and outputs. 
Comparing the two models demonstrates clear overlap, highlighting seven specific 
dimensions of sustainable organisational performance, which include: 
• Leadership is considered a fundamental requirement for setting direction 
and holding all other requirements together to increase efficiency and 
increase or improve production and organisational effectiveness. It is 
foreseen that this is possible though improved business processes and 
people management, communication, learning circles, organisational 
interaction and synergistic production methods, as well as conflict 
resolutions. 
• Business/work team unit’s climate includes team cohesion, buy-in to the 
organisation’s vision, psychological, attitude and staff motivation and key 
drivers of individual and organisational performance. 
• Self-actualisation and employee job satisfaction, respect and trust in the 
integrity of the leader, career pathing and empowerment. Capacity or the 
wealth of the organisation includes the internal strength of its human 
capital as expressed through quality of diversity of staff and resources 
(equipment, financial and profits). 
• Branding of an organisation, value-add, competitiveness, customer 
satisfaction of products and services, while maintaining reputation. 
• The ability of an organisation and its leadership, management, systems 
and processes to appropriately adapt and react to changes in their 
environment. 
• Predicting future trends, future performance, staff levels and expansion 
serving as a complete and inclusive index of anticipated future growth of 
an organisation. 
 
3.3.4 The Logic Model 
The introduction of logic models or log frames, as explained by Logic Models (2018), 





relationship between resource inputs (what you put in), processes (what you do) used 
to transform them into outputs (what you get out or produce), which may result in 
outcomes (results from all activities). These are done with clarity of what it is expected 
to be achieved.  
Logic models generally: 
• Include a problem statement, goal, assumptions and rationale; 
• Are a simplistic mechanism to communicate a product or service within a 
community; chart organisational direction from problems, and set 
measurable goals and objectives, rationale, inputs, activities, outputs and 
outcomes; 
• Support data collection; 
• Fail to provide evidence of achievement on what has been planned; 
• Do not question the relevance of an intervention or project;  
• provide intention, assumptions and rationale behind a project or a 
programme; and  
• Can be used interchangeably, though contentiously, with the theory of 
change. 
 
Bullen (2018) notes that “at the simplest level, a ‘Theory of Change’ shows the big, 
messy ‘real world’ picture, with all the possible pathways leading to change, and why 
you think they need to change (do you have evidence, or is it an assumption?)” and 
submits that [a] “logical framework is like zooming in on the specific pathway that 
program deals with and creating a neat, orderly structure for it”. 
A typical logic model, as set out in Figure 3.6, considers both internal and external 
factors. Internal factors (assumptions, what you know or what you can control), are 
considered under the inputs, activities and outputs, whilst the external factors (what 
you cannot control) are considered as part of the outcome process. 
Logic models hold both advantages and limitations. Some advantages of a logic model 
are that they are “easy to use – simple format, logical and sequential; builds a common 





share ideas, identify assumptions, build your team and communicate; helps you 
design your service and improve and identify issues that are critical to achieve results 
and to identify what is no longer relevant to your goal; can explain the relevance of a 
service in the organisation or community; and measures and evaluates the important 
bits, so it supports data collection”(What Works, 2018). 
Some of the limitations of the logic model include the following: “services and 
programmes are not linear; a range of factors influence results; a logic model focuses 
on the expected results, rather than the unintended or unexpected; a logic model 
doesn’t address the questions: are we doing the right thing? Should we do this 
programme?” (What Works, 2018). 
A logic model development guide was published by the W.K. Kellogg Foundation 
(2006) and provides useful analytical tools and resources to understand, develop and 
implement a logic framework within an organisation. The use of such analytical tools 
could contribute to improved planning and the implementation of programmes with a 
view of demonstrating the effectiveness of the various program activities by initiating 
and completing outcome-oriented evaluation. 
 
Figure 3.6: Typical Logic Model 






The E2 Model, developed by O’Donnell and Duffy (2002:1217-1218), provides an 
attempt to measures the efficiency and effectiveness of organisational performance 
and can be regarded as a good example of unpacking the typical logic model. 
According to Jessa (2012:36), congruency and interrelatedness between activities and 
what they aim to achieve are used to design the key performance indicators (KPIs). 
O’Donnell and Duffy (2002), in their ‘E2 Model’, provide three elements, also termed 
axioms, that are considered key in determining performance. These axioms note that 
performance could be encapsulated in effectiveness and efficiency indicators and that 
the action and execution thereof are intrinsically linked. 
The E2 model applies four knowledge factors, termed the GIRO knowledge factors. 
These factors contribute to the measurement of, and could be used to make inferences 
on, product efficiency and effectiveness and could form the basis for making: 
‘Knowledge Goals’ (G) to steer the activities; Knowledge Inputs (I); Knowledge 
resources (R); and Knowledge Outputs (O). 
 
3.3.5 The Systems Model 
There are a lot of similarities between the logic model and the systems model. The 
systems model includes the vision, mission and goals. Jessa (2014:34, citing Grobler, 
et al. (2006:288), promulgates “that managers should be the raters trained in person 
and system factors” emanating from different business units within the organisation 
working together to achieve the objectives. 
Jessa (2012:34, citing Straub, Koopman and Van Mossel, 2010:325), highlights that 
the systems model provides a systemic analysis of inputs, processes (workflow, 
communications and coordination), outputs to assess operational effectiveness and 
efficiencies of an organisation. The systems model provides for stakeholder 
involvement, management and empowered staff in problem solving and the effective 
and efficient operations, and recommendations for improvement of municipal services 
and products. Organisational performance management has as its foundations inputs, 





Spangenberg (1994:3) submits that “process, outputs and linkages form part of the 
ongoing process that comprises the core of organisational performance management” 
and, therefore, in his article ‘Performance Management – Problems and Possible 
Solutions’, places the ‘ongoing processes’ part (see Figure 3.7 below) separately in a 
dark frame to distance it slightly from inputs, as well as planning and design. Figure 
3.7 further demonstrates the ongoing, cyclical nature of performance management, 
allowing for an annual clarification or conformation of the vision and mission of the 
various units and the organisation. It also allows for major changes in inputs, such as 
strategic shifts which will have a strong influence on the organisation and in that way 
highlight the relative distant position vis-à-vis a corporate head office. 
Spangenberg (1994:3) highlights that the systems model notes that a reciprocal 
relationship exists between organisational systems and performance management. 
The systems model of performance management, as set out in Figure 3.7, provides a 
holistic view on organisational performance and includes ongoing management 
awareness of areas that need to be monitored and corrected. 
 
Figure 3.7: Systems Model of Performance Management 





3.3.6 Public Services Sector Quality Model 
Despite strong growth in the services sector, Parasuraman, et al. (1995:41) highlight 
that little progress has been made to provide an accurate definition of “organisational 
performance in the public sector” and to link it to the measurement of service quality. 
Included in the definition of organisational performance, and aligning it to the 
measurement of service quality, is the research work conducted by Gronroos and 
Lehtinen (1982); Lewis and Booms (1983) and Sasser, Ohlsen and Wyckoff (1978), 
as cited in Parasuraman, et al. (1995:42). 
A municipality is in the business of delivering services and is structured and mandated 
to offer services to citizens and can therefore be regarded as forming part of the 
broader classification of the service sector. As a result, they must focus all efforts to 
measure the quality of service delivery by means of citizen satisfaction surveys. These 
surveys measure whether municipalities have met, exceeded or failed to meet their 
customers’ expectations. The value of satisfaction is seen as the difference between 
citizen expectations and what they have experienced. 
The municipality provides a public service and organises its delivery. It expresses 
customer satisfaction as the outcome of a process in which citizen expectations are 
met, exceeded or not met to versus the experience the citizen receives. 
In a public service, which is normally monopolistic, measuring customer satisfaction is 
one of the key informants to assess performance. Whilst private companies have other 
tools, such as profit, measuring customer satisfaction helps public services providers, 
such as a municipality, to choose priorities of intervention. It also helps to improve 
service quality, reputation of the provider (municipality) and satisfaction by the client 
(community), which adds value to the product or brand. 
Parasuraman, et al. (1995:41-42) highlight the prevailing Japanese philosophy of 
‘Khaizan’, meaning continuous improvement in service quality with “zero defects- 
doing it right the first time”. They cite Crosby (1979) who explains service quality as 
“conformance to the requirements”. Garvin (1983) “measures quality by counting the 
incidence of ‘internal’ failures (those observed before a product leaves the factory) and 





Parasuraman, Zeithaml and Berry (1995:43) note that to comprehensively understand 
service quality, consideration needs to be given to characteristics such as intangibility, 
heterogeneity and inseparability. These include a need to focus on organisational 
performance, consistency of behaviour of staff and standardised product quality and 
the interaction between client and service providers. 
What emerges is that: 
• Given the intangibility, perceptions and subjectivity of services, measuring 
quality proves to be more difficult than that of a physical product. 
• Measuring quality involves comparing performance against expectation. 
As they relate to service delivery, customer expectation and comparison 
across services or products are important. In defining quality of services, 
customer satisfaction on should be met on a consistent basis (Lewis & 
Booms, 1983). 
• Material, facilities and personnel have been identified by Sasser, Ohlsen, 
and Wyckoff (1978, cited in Parasuraman, et al., 1995:42-43) as 
determinants of organisational performance. They highlight that the 
outcomes should be measured on what (physical, cooperative and 
interactive) and how (technical or functional) things have been delivered. 
 
Given all the role-players in the service sector, there could be differences, 
discrepancies or gaps in the perceptions or experience in the service quality between 
the views from the municipality (politicians, management and staff) and that of the 
broader community (consumers including businesses). Customer expectations or 
perceptions and service providers highlight seven quality gaps or discrepancies in 
measuring the delivery of quality of services and products. The service quality model, 
as set out in Figure 3.8, uses customer satisfaction assessment methodology, namely 
the SERVQUAL model, to measure incongruence between customer expectations 
and experience. The SERVQUAL model measures the seven quality gaps or 
discrepancies between the perceptions of consumers and service marketers and takes 
account of elements such as empathy, responsiveness, access, competence, 





The (Public) Service Quality Model uses quality assurance methodologies on outputs 
and customer satisfaction to continuously improve organisational performance (Jessa, 
2012:34). This model, as depicted in Figure 3.8, also addresses challenges as it 
relates to areas not serviced and those requiring additional focus. 
 
 
Figure 3.8: Services Sector Quality Gap Model (2018) 








3.3.7 Outcome-Based Performance Management Model 
According to Ackoff (1986), Coda (2010) and Sorci (2007), in Bianchi (2016:51), 
organisational growth can be viewed from both qualitative and quantitative 
perspectives. They consider enhancing synergies with stakeholders and learning 
process improvement over time as part of the qualitative perspectives, while 
quantitative processes can be grouped under structural or operational. The literature 
provides three perspectives on sustainable organisational development and 
performance, focusing on balanced growth, namely internal profile, external profile and 
time. 
The outcomes-based performance management approach includes achieving 
consistency in and between internal organisational sub-systems, processes and 
sectors; while the external profile includes, balanced growth with the organisational 
finances, competitors and social (Coda, 2010). Given the expansion of citizen needs 
amidst retreating resources, “there is a need to improve public sector performance”, 
in line with continuous improvement processes and the measurement of outputs and 
outcomes (Bianchi & Rivenbark, 2012; Bianchi & Xavier, 2014). In support of 
sustainable organisational performance, there is a need for dynamism and interaction 
or interlinkages in and between institutions on the achievement of outcomes-based 
performance management and as it relates to the public sector. 
Targeting outcomes performance-based management to the public sector is a bit more 
complex as the outcomes of different institutions are often related or interrelated and 
can have a knock-on effect, making it difficult from both theoretical and practical 
perspectives (Rainey & Han Chu, 2005). This complexity also plays out in decision 
making as it is impacted by legislation and time delays in observing feedback and 
impact due to the interrelatedness of institutions (Bianchi, 2016:58). 
It is expected that the public sector be held to higher levels of capability and 
accountability as it provides services to the private sector and communities, which has 
implications for higher socio-economic value and economic growth. Sustainable 
growth in a local area through value creation and outcome performance management 
has been the key feature of the Bianchi Systematic Framework/Model, as 
demonstrated in Figure 3.9. This systematic model can easily be applied to public and 









Figure 3.9: Bianchi Systematic Framework (Model) 
Source: Bianchi (2016:60). 
The model highlights the need for an outcomes-based approach to organisational 
performance that may require cooperation and good governance of a number of 
institutions (public and private) to derive good public policy outcomes, achieve 
individual and public value, and have regular evaluation and feedback to address 
stubborn problems (Bovaird & Löffler, 2003:316). 
Bovaird (2007) highlights that good service delivery and rules on behalf of government 
can generate new value to public and private sector; improve community participation; 
and, through good governance, improve social capital, as well as citizen trust and 





Good governance is also seen to improve the attractiveness of a region (socially and 
economically) and thus generate further public value. This value, according to Bianchi 
(2016:64) may be comprised of improved and sustainable “taxation and citizen 
satisfaction and participation to public governance” creating a “virtuous sustainable 
development circle”. 
Bovaird and Löffler (2003, in Bianchi, 2016:61) highlight that since the 1980s and 
1990s the Bianchi Systematic Framework/Model has inspired many international 
public sector reforms, targeted at achieving an acclaimed “excellent public service 
delivery as a means to generate value for a community”. Noting the stubbornness of 
some of these challenges, the pursuit of sustainable socio and economic development 
objectives on its own may not be enough. 
Compounding the issue on these ‘wicked problems’ and stubborn challenges is that 
they are often characterised by being social problems that affect a multitude of 
stakeholders at various hierarchical levels, each with their cultures that affect policy 
planning, design, support, decision-making, implementation, measurement and 
accountability (Bianchi, 2016, citing Bovaird & Löffler, 2007; Rittel & Webber, 
1973:160). 
Over the last ten years, several countries have developed various new approaches to 
improve interinstitutional collaboration to address the stubbornly stuck societal 
challenges. Amongst these approaches, submitted by Bianchi (2016:61-62, citing a 
number of references), is following joined-up government4 (Christensen & Laegreid, 
2007b, 2013; Christensen, et al., 2014), whole-of-government (OECD, 2005), 
integrated governance, outcome steering (Hood, 2005), holistic governance, 
horizontal management (Peters, 2015), and new public governance (Osborne, 2010). 
To manage such processes, Borgonovi (1996:105) highlights three levers: “(1) 
institutional reforms, (2) organization structures and performance management 
systems, and (3) cultural/social systems”. Other good examples of outcomes-based 
                                            
4 According to Pollitt (2003:35), “Joined-up government is a phrase that denotes the aspiration to achieve 
horizontally and vertically coordinated thinking and action” to realise a number of benefits such as “different policies 
that undermine each other can be eliminated” through improve utilisation of scarce resources … “synergies may 
be created through the bringing together of different key stakeholders in a particular policy field or network” and 





(results-oriented) performance measurement models, according to Jessa (2012:36), 
include the ‘Burke and Castello Performance Model’ and the “New Zealand service 
performance measurement model”. These models highlight four strategic domains in 
which organisational performance is managed and measured. These frames include 
the structure; human resources; political and symbolic, and address the strategy; 
relationship within and outside of the organisation; the achievement of stated goals 
and the staff capacity; and training and collaboration required to deliver on 
organisational performance. They also address the political and executive interfaces, 
leadership and power relations within an organisational culture of wanting to deliver. 
Breitbarth, Mitchell and Lawson (2010, in Jessa, 2012:36) highlight that the New 
Zealand model “is driven by the ratepayers’ involvement and demands and is 
integrated with the Medium Term Municipal Assessment (MTMA) and the Long-Term 
Council Community Plan (LTCCP)”. The LTCCP is involved in planning the regulatory 
frameworks and involves a range of role players, including “all employees, the auditing 
authority, consultancies and politicians in the operation of the model. A ‘service 
performance index’ (SPI), is used to rate what is of high and low priority in respect of 
performance objectives. In this manner, important municipal functions are rated in 
terms of importance and past performance ratings”. 
 
3.3.8 The ISO 9000 Service Excellence Model 
The ISO Service Excellence Model involves, while meeting customer and other 
stakeholder expectations, compliance with legislative and concomitant regulations, 
provided for in the seven quality management principles (QMP). These QMPs are 
leadership in directing the organisational purpose; delivering on meeting customer 
expectations; building on people empowerment; evidence-based decision-making; 
efficient resource management; and relationship management and value creation. 
Gaster, et al. (2003, cited in Jessa, 2012:35) makes the point that the ISO 9000 model 
could be used in local government to measure progress towards achieving outputs 
and outcomes at municipalities. The use of this model is recommended, despite 
difficulty in no consensus on the exact definition of performance and quality. Gaster, 





objectives, identify service standards, communicate with communities, and have buy-
in from national government and top management to improve service delivery. 
The setting of service standards, according to Jessa (2012:35, citing Gaster, et al., 
2003:88-89), asserts that quality improvement happens when quality and quantity 
norms have been established. However, Grobler, et al. (2006:269) suggests that an 
improvement in quality occurs once the quantity or a quality has been established in 
terms of the good or service produced, noting that this quality or quantity is a result of 
community participation and that the service or good is produced in a sustainable 
manner at the place where it is needed. He makes the point that managers in 
municipalities “are expected to be responsive to specified mandatory standards, by 
way of being compliant with service standards or policies” and further that setting 
standards “has a direct bearing on efficiency, accountability and equity, without which, 
clear measures for performance will not be obtained”. Jessa (2012:36, citing Pollitt 
2003; Shah, (2009) and Zeegan (in Fryer, et al., 2009) highlight a risk of a potential 
“decline in motivation and innovation” amongst sector managers should these norms 
be imposed on them. 
 
3.3.9 The Balanced Scorecard 
Kaplan and Norton (1992:71) developed the Balanced Scorecard (BSC) framework 
which is regarded as one of the most popular approaches used by many institutions 
in measuring organisational performance. The BSC, moving away from the traditional 
way of measuring performance during the industrial era focusing primarily on financial 
output, also considers non-financial indicators as proxy for organisational 
performance. Although initially developed for application in private sector institutions, 
the utilisation of the balance scorecard framework has in recent times extended to 
both the private and public sector, with many municipalities adopting the framework 
as a model for both individual and organisational performance measurement. 
Organisations, according to the BSC Institute (BSCI) (2018), use the BSC as “a 
strategic planning and management system to align” the daily operations to the 
strategy the organisation is embarking on; decide on its priorities, communicate the 





The BSC, as depicted in Figure 3.10, is able to link the strategy as per the vision (what 
we aspire for), mission (our purpose), values (what we believe in), strategic goals and 
objectives (themes, results and/or goals) to the operational aspect of organisations. 
The BSCI (2018) makes the point that the system operationally strives to achieve 
continuous improvement in activities by connecting “the dots between big picture 
strategy elements such as mission, vision, core values, strategic focus areas and the 
more operational elements such as objectives, measures (or key performance 
indicators, or KPIs, which track strategic performance), targets (our desired level of 
performance), and initiatives (projects that help you reach your targets)”. 
 
 
Figure 3.10: The Balance Scorecard – Connecting the Dots 
Source: BSCI (2018). 
 
Kaplan and Norton (1992:72) note that the BSC Framework measures organisational 
performance based on four components: customer innovation and learning, internal 





recommend that managers set key performance indicators and targets against each 
of the four components to assist in monitoring and evaluating performance. Kaplan 
and Norton (2001) highlight the following advantages of using the BSC in measuring 
organisational performance  
“… gives top managers a fast but comprehensive view of the business. … includes 
financial measures that tell the results of actions already taken…it complements the 
financial measures with operational measures on customer satisfaction, internal 
processes, and the organisation's innovation and improvement activities - operational 
measures that are the drivers of future financial performance”. 
According to Rouse and Putterill (2003:793), “the balanced scorecard is stakeholder 
oriented”. The stakeholder component considers organisational performance from the 
view point of the customer or stakeholder that the organisation was designed to serve, 
while the “organisational capacity (originally called learning and growth)” considers 
“organisational performance, human capital, infrastructure, technology, culture and 
other capacities” Rouse and Putterill (2003:793). 
Kaplan and Norton (1992:74) highlights that organisations create public value through 
response to customer expectations and how customers view the services provided by 
organisations. To respond, organisations must adjust their internal processes to 
provide for improved efficiency and performance in the way they manage and use their 
financial resources and improving profits and the bottom-line. 
The simplicity and minimalistic approach to information, allows managers to focus 
their attention on a few critical measures to effectively manage the performance 
of organisations. The four perspectives of Kaplan and Norton’s balance scorecard 







Figure 3.10: Kaplan and Norton’s Balance Scorecard 
Source: Sim and Koh (2001). 
 
The BSC has recently also been expanded to centrally incorporate a fifth perspective, 
namely ‘vision and strategy alignment’ in order to support an execution culture. The 
addition of this element enables and improves linkages between the organisations 
vision, strategy and what work is performed by individuals in the organisation. 
Armstrong, et al. (2000:8) highlights that by adding the fifth component, the BSC is 
able to bring about vertical and functional alignment though the integration of 
organisational objectives and strategies with the work performed by individuals in the 
organisation. Fontannaz and Oosthuizen (2007:11) note that “whilst this approach 
provides a valid strategy execution and measurement framework for ensuring stability, 
the underlying assumptions of rational decision making by the multi-stakeholder 
perspective is in determining a common unit of analysis for measuring stakeholder sat 





Noting the popularity and advantages of the BSC methodology, critique has been that 
the BSC framework, according to Rouse and Putterill (2003:793) citing Kennerley and 
Neeely (2000), omits a competitive dimension; it fails to recognise aspect of human 
resource capacity and performance of suppliers; and fails to identify which dimensions 
of performance determines performance. According to Linard, et al. (2002), the BSC 
is unable to transform organisational strategy into a coherent set of objectives and 
measures, nor is it able to select metrics and their relationships to determine 
organisational performance. 
Sloper, et al. (1999) submit that the BSC is a static approach, as the framework ignores 
feedback. Linard and Dvorsky (2001, in Bianchi, 2016:67) makes the point that “Norton 
and Kaplan stress the importance of feedback relationships between BSC variables 
for describing the trajectory of a given strategy, [however] the cause-and-effect chain 
is always conceived as a bottom-up causality, which totally ignores feedbacks, thereby 
confining attention only on the effect of variables in the lower perspectives”. The BSC 
is unable to provide an understanding of how: policy levers influence strategic 
resource usage, depletion and accumulation; “performance drivers affect end-results 
(both output and outcome measures)”; and “end-results will affect strategic resource 
accumulation and depletion processes” Bianchi, (2016:67). 
The view from Broadbent and Laughlin (2009:283) is that the BSC framework of 
Kaplan and Norton has “a narrow definition of a performance management system”, 
whilst “Marchand and Raymond (2008:663) suggest that the impact of the balanced 
scorecard on organisational performance is still a debatable question”. 
Despite the critique of the BSC method, its use is popular amongst managers for the 
sake of simplicity and not having information overload; it provides a useful guide on 
identifying unique organisational and individual objectives. The BSC can link the 
organisational objectives with that of the individuals within an organisation. This 
methodology compels individuals in an organisation to identify their most important 
objectives and values, to develop metrics and measure performance. Henkins 
(2002:5), highlights that the BSC provides “a systems approach as it is based on cause 






3.3.10 The McKinsey 7-S Framework 
The McKinsey 7‐S model, also known as Peters’ and Waterman’s ‘seven excellence 
attributes’ was developed in 1982. This model is but one of many other leading 
excellence frameworks and models developed over the last 25 plus years (Peters & 
Waterman, 1982). According to Dahlgaard‐Park and Dahlgaard (2007), some other 
models developed over the last two decades include “Peter's and Austin’s simplified 
excellence model (1985), lists of best practices (1998), Xerox excellence models 
(1990, 2002), the European excellence model (1992), Dahlgaard‐Park and 
Dahlgaard’s 4P model (1999, 2004) and Toyota’s 4P model”. For the purpose of this 
study, the focus will be on Peter and Waterman’s (the McKinsey) 7-S Framework given 
its strong linkages to the balance scorecard. 
According to Kaplan (2005), the BSC and McKinsey 7‐S models complement each 
other when their features and functions are compared. Even though the two are not 
fully aligned, the BSC model is viewed as the contemporary manifestation of the 7‐S 
model. It also helps to explain why the BSC model is considered a popular, practical 
and effective tool to align organisational strategy, processes and execution. 
Excellence models often ignore human and the soft dimension when models to 
improve organisational performance are implemented. In considering well-known 
excellence models, Dahlgaard‐Park and Dahlgaard (2007) found that they are often 
inspired by Japanese practices and that they include the soft dimensions of 
organisational realities. 
The McKinsey 7S Framework is a management framework or diagnostic model 
conceived and developed in the late 1970’s at consulting firm McKinsey & Coby well-
known business consultants Robert H. Waterman, Jr. and Tom Peters, aimed at 
addressing the critical role of coordination, rather than structure. The McKinsey 7S 
Model, according to Kenton (2019), can be regarded as “a framework for 
organizational effectiveness that postulates that there are seven internal factors of an 
organization that need to be aligned and reinforced in order for it to be successful” and 
that “it specifies seven factors that are classified as ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ organisational 
variables or elements”. These elements or reinforcing variables are linked and aligned 
and are considered by every organisation that aspires to succeed. Different to past 





ones. Kenton (2019) makes the point that the [h]ard “elements are easily identified 
and influenced by management, while soft elements are fuzzier, more intangible and 
influenced by corporate culture”. The ‘hard elements’ are strategy, structure and 
systems, whilst soft elements are shared values, skills, style and staff. The McKinsey 
7-S model is used to monitor and assess changes in internal organisational situations 
and to recommend adjustments that will assist them to perform better and or maintain 
performance. 
According to Malbašić and Brčić (2012:100), Peters and Waterman (1982) “were 
among the first to recognize the importance of organisational values as a key 
organisational variable in their model known as the McKinsey 7-S Framework”. In their 
research, they identified ‘shared values’ as a central element amongst all the 
variables, which can be “defined as the connective tissue of contemporary 
organisations and the key to individual and organisational” behaviour (Sikavica, et al., 
2008, cited by Malbašić & Brčić, 2012). The McKinsey 7-S Framework is depicted in 
Figure 3.12 below. 
 
Figure 3.11: The McKinsey 7S Framework 






The departure of the seven interdependent elements (three hard and four soft) as set 
out in the model is that there are seven internal aspects of an organisation that need 
to be aligned and reinforced and given equal importance if it is to be successful and 
to achieve the best results (Peters & Waterman, 1982). 
The hard elements, according to Ravanfar (2015:8), include the following: 
• Strategy – a plan that clearly sets out the main aims of the business and 
initiatives on how it will go about improving its competitive advantage and 
successfully participate in the market on a sustainable basis. A 
comprehensive “strategy is the one that is clearly articulated, is long-term, 
helps to achieve competitive advantage and is reinforced by strong vision, 
mission and values”, structure and systems and is well-aligned with the 
other six elements of the 7s model. 
• Structure – refers to the organisational chart of an institution and includes 
the separation of activities, integration and coordination mechanisms and 
institutional accountability arrangements and is regarded as “one of the 
most visible and easy to change elements of the framework”. Important to 
note, is that ‘structure’ follows ‘strategy’ and not the other way around. 
• Systems – refers to the official processes and procedures for 
measurement, reward and resource allocation and includes the 
institutions’ everyday operations and how business is conducted and 
decisions are taken and is regarded by Jurevicius (2013) as “the main 
focus for managers during organisational change”. 
 
The soft elements, according to Ravanfar (2015:9), include the following: 
• Shared values – refers to “the norms and standards that guide employee 
behavior and company actions”, it is the foundation or the “core of 
McKinsey 7s model” that holds everything together and also connects to 





• Skills – refers to the organisation’s core proficiencies, competencies and 
distinctive capabilities that enable the employees of the institution to 
perform very well. The specific skills of an institution underpin and 
strengthen the strategy and structure. 
• Staff – refers to an institution’s human resources, demographic, 
educational and attitudinal characteristics and includes human resource 
management processes, such as recruitment, training, motivation and 
reward. 
• Style – refers to “the way the company is managed”. Alternatively put, the 
“management style of the company’s leaders” and includes the behaviour 
patterns of top-level managers and professional, “how they interact, what 
actions do they take and their symbolic value” (Jurevicius, 2013). 
 
Woodcock and Francis (1989, in Malbašić & Brčić, 2012:100), submit that values have 
a fundamental role to play in an organisation’s success and liken “an organisation 
without values as a house built on weak foundations that will eventually fall”. It is 
important to establish clear guidelines for the formation of a values-based 
organisation, one key ingredient being “a well-chosen way of communicating 
organisational values to employees and customers as well as to other stakeholders” 
(Malbašić & Brčić, 2012:100). 
Some criticism of the 7-S Framework (as an integrative approaches) came from 
D’Aveni and Gunther (1994:236), who make the point “that environmental turbulence 
erodes competitive advantage and that the frameworks limit an organisation’s ability 
to deal with change” and, given this contention, they proposed the “new 7-S 
framework, which comprises a vision for disruption [and] general capabilities for 
executing disruption and product/market tactics to deliver disruption”. In essence, 
determining and supporting the organisational strategy makes the organisation 








3.3.11 The Burke-Litwin Performance and Change Model 
The Burke-Litwin model (Burke & Litwin, 1992) is broadly regarded as a well-
researched diagnostic model/framework for “assessing the factors affecting 
organisational effectiveness in a cross-cultural research setting, environmental impact 
and organisational performance, as well as on change and effectiveness”. The Burke-
Litwin model is based on an efficient, yet practical “cause-and-effect framework that 
explains linkages how organisational performance and overall effectiveness” is 
affected and influenced. The Burke-Litwin model of organisational performance and 
change (according to Burke & Litwin, 1992; Chawane, van Vuuren & Roodt, 2003), 
provides a taxonomy or nomenclature of key organisational dimensions “and is 
reported to clearly show cause-and-effect relationships between the organisation’s 
internal and external environments, aimed at explaining their link to organisational 
effectiveness”. 
Furnham and Gunter (1993) submit that “the Burke-Litwin model is the best-known 
and most influential model for looking at the role of organisational climate in business 
performance”, echoing the views of Kraut (1996) who describes the model as 
comprehensive, as well as one that “enhances the efficacy of an organisational 
diagnosis and serving as a guide to actions resulting from the diagnosis” and who view 
it “as based on sound theory and research”. French and Bell (1999) view “the model 
as playing a significant role in thinking about planned change”. Burke and Litwin, 
(1992) highlight that the model forecasts “behaviour and performance consequences, 
it deals with cause (organisational conditions) and effect (resultant performance), 
serving as a guide not only for diagnosis, but also for planned managed organisational 
change”. The authors “describe the model as a mechanism that portrays … the 
primary variables that need to be considered in any attempt to predict and explain the 
total behaviour output of an organisation, the most important interactions between 
these variables, and how they affect change” (Burke & Litwin, 1992). 
The Burke-Litwin model, as depicted in Figure 3.13, is constructed demonstrating “that 
there are four groups of elements within an organisation”, namely “the external 
environment, transformational factors, transactional factors and performance” (Accipio 
2018), with each of the groups comprising and reflecting various elements of the 





group, how each of the elements “interact with each other and the overall hierarchy of 
an organisation” (Accipio, 2018). 
Martins and Coetzee (2009:145-146) make the point that, according to Burke and 
Litwin (1992), “the Burke-Litwin model highlights two distinct sets of dynamics” in an 
organisation, namely that “one set is primarily associated with the transactional level” 
of human behaviour creating the organisational climate; and “the second set of 
dynamics is concerned with processes of human transformation, amounting to sudden 
‘leaps’ in behaviour”. French and Bell (1999) and Jones and Brazzel (2006, in Martins 
& Coetzee, 2009), submit that “such transformational processes are required for 
genuine change to take place in the culture of an organisation”. 
Within the model, Burke and Litwin (1992) distinguish between transformational 
factors, reflected in the purple boxes, and transactional factors, represented in the pink 
boxes. The orange boxes represent “the input to the organisation” and reflect “the 
beginning and end of the process” within a completed, integrated and connected 
feedback loop. It also connects “the external environment, and the organisation’s 
output, individual and organisational performance” with the “external environment 
represents any forces or conditions outside of the organisation that will affect its 
processes”, such as consumer/community “behaviour or marketplace conditions”, 
whilst the individual and organisational performance refers to the overall output or 








Figure 3.13: The Causal Burke-Litwin Performance and Change Model (1992) 
Source: Burke and Litwin (1992b). 
 
According to the SA Journal of Human Resource Management (SAJHRM) (2018, 
citing Burke & Litwin, 1992), the transformational factors, namely the institution’s 
“mission and strategy, leadership and culture” is affected by and influences the 
external environment. On the other hand, transformational factors, such as “the 
organisational structure, systems, management practices and climate”, affect the 
transactional factors. Martins and Coetzee (2009:146), cites Chawane, et al. (2003) 
who make the point that “both types of factors reciprocate, and eventually impact on, 
individual and organisational performance and overall effectiveness”, creating “a 






Martins and Coetzee (2009:146) explain both the transformational and “transactional 
factors affecting organisational performance and effectiveness”. The “transformational 
factors affecting organisational performance and effectiveness” include: 
• External environment: consists of external conditions or situations that 
impact and influence the performance of the institution and includes 
factors such as “marketplaces, world financial conditions, 
political/governmental circumstances, competition and customers”. 
• Vision, mission and strategy: reflects the beliefs of staff on “the central 
purpose of the organisation and how the organisation intends to achieve 
its purpose over an extended period of time”. 
• Leadership: reflects conduct, particularly from management, “that 
encourages others to take necessary actions, including perceptions of 
leadership style, practices and values”. 
• Organisational culture: is, simply put, “the way we do things around here” 
and includes a “collection of overt and covert rules, values and principles 
that guide organisational behaviour and that have been strongly influenced 
by the organisation’s history, custom and practice”. Results can be 
transformed by changing believes and behaviours in an organisation, 
which is underscored by the quote from the management guru, consultant 
and writer Peter Drucker, saying that “Culture eats strategy for breakfast”. 
In saying this, Drucker (2016) does not mean that strategy is unimportant, 
but rather “that a powerful and empowering culture was a surer route to 
organisational success”. 
• Individual and organisational performance: reflects “the measurable 
outcomes or results, with their relevant indicators of effort and 
achievement” and includes indicators such as “productivity, customer or 
staff satisfaction, profit and service quality, salary and benefits, and 
recognition”. 






The “transactional factors affecting organisational performance and effectiveness” 
includes: 
• Structure: is put in place to ensure the implementation of an institution’s 
mission and strategy and includes the configuration of staff in accordance 
with the different “areas and levels of responsibility, decision-making 
authority and relationships”. 
• Management practices: how management deploys and uses human and 
material resources “to carry out the organisation’s strategy”, and includes 
“managerial behaviour, work etiquette, professionalism, planning, 
communication and control”. 
• Systems (policies and procedures): institutionalised standard operating 
policies and procedures and mechanisms that facilitate work and are 
manifested in the institution’s performance management, reward and 
control systems. 
• Departmental/work unit climate: includes the institution’s shared 
“impressions, expectations and feelings of the employees in their 
respective departments”, which affects the relationships between staff and 
management and other units. “A positive work climate might serve to 
enhance retention rates, whereas a negative work climate might lead to a 
high employee turnover rate”. 
• Task requirements and individual skills/abilities: includes the conduct and 
behaviour, “skills and knowledge required for task effectiveness”, that 
enables staff to achieve and deliver on “the work assigned for which they 
feel directly responsible”. This requires proper ‘job-person’ match or ‘fit-for-
purpose’, which “entails elements of recruitment, selection, appointment 
and promotion”. 
• Individual needs and values: includes “the specific psychological factors 
that validate individual actions or thoughts relating to stress, well-being, 
recreational activities and living conditions”. 
• Motivation: includes the behaviour “to move toward goals, take needed 
action and persist until satisfaction is attained form the net resultant 





achievement, power, affection, discovery and other important human 
motives”. 
(Martins & Coetzee, 2009) 
 
Martins and Coetzee (2009:146) added ‘equipment’ and ‘working environment’ to the 
list of transformational and transactional factors that directly affect and impact 
organisational performance. The ‘equipment’ includes the “tools to do the job and the 
quality of available technology” whilst the ‘working environment’, comprises the 
“facilities such as the buildings, offices, staff cafeteria and recreational facilities for 
staff” (Martins & Coetzee, 2009). Martins and Coetzee (2009:146) cite Burke and 
Litwin (1992) who propose “that interventions directed at leadership, mission and 
strategy, and organisational culture produce transformational or fundamental change 
in the organisation’s culture”, whilst [i]nterventions “directed at management practices, 
structure and systems produce transactional change”. 
 
3.3.12 The ESP Performance Framework 
Fontannaz and Oosthuizen (2007) developed a conceptual framework to guide and 
provide a systemic view as an alternative approach to sustainable organisational 
performance and to integrate the various divergent approaches (between 
management and academia) to organisational performance, particularly within the 
context of the network economy which is characterised by the challenges of 
complexity, connectivity and change. 
The fundamental changes in the business eco-system and subsequent challenges 
to traditional management practice, according to Fontannaz and Oosthuizen 
(2007:13) “raises questions about the relevance of the existing organisational 
performance approaches in addressing the challenge of complexity, particularly 
with regard to the validity and reliability of the established performance 
management frameworks”. These changes have sparked the exploration of an 
alternative approach to sustainable organisational performance in order to deal with 





representing the ‘ESP’ of organisational performance” model developed by Fontannaz 
and Oosthuizen (2007). 
Whilst the traditional, strategic approach remains relevant and essential in 
addressing the challenge of complexity, this perspective, according to Fontannaz 
and Oosthuizen (2007:16) is “insufficient in balancing the challenges of connectivity 
and change”. To ensure organisational performance, the prescriptive, strategy 
approach needs to be integrated with the more “composite, people approach to 
address the challenges presented by increased connectivity and the repositioning 
of the knowledge worker as a key driver of organisational performance” (Fontannaz 
& Oosthuizen, 2007:16). 
The Performance ESP framework provides a structured approach to informing 
organisational development to ensure sustainable performance. Whilst financial 
measures are indicative of current performance, sustainability requires a more 
composite measure of organisational performance. The Performance ESP framework 
balances the conflicting demands of profitability and growth by providing a counter 
measure to the established financial metrics. It also provides a framework for 
conversational processes to develop organisational performance in emergent enquiry. 
The ESP5 Framework, according to Fontannaz and Oosthuizen (2007:13) is aimed at 
addressing the fragmented views of organisational performance by “integrating the 
alternative process based perspective of execution with the systemic perspectives of 
strategy and people”. The execution perspective presumes an empowered workforce, 
it provides a process based perspective, which focuses on the process of relating as 
the unit of measurement, it “addresses the reality that the majority of executive 
decision making occurs in the ad hoc, daily processes that exist in an organisation” 
and that the “decisions are not limited to a formal, strategy process, following a linear 
sequence” (Fontannaz & Oosthuizen, 2007:12). Hrebiniak (2005:11) defines 
execution as a dynamic and adaptive process, which compensates for unanticipated 
events. He posits that execution is a key determinant of competitive advantage, as 
“organisations with a sound execution foundation have a sustainable competitive 
advantage which is difficult to imitate”. The execution perspective or approach 
                                            





contends that it is not possible “to act on an entire system, as the system is made up 
of individuals, who respond in different ways”, which implies “that change cannot be 
determined on a rational basis” (Fontannaz & Oosthuizen, 2007:12). 
The strategy perspective, process or approach “is an everyday occurrence, which is 
impacted on by everyone within an organisation”. According to Mintzberg, Ahlstrand 
and Lampel, (1998, cited in Fontannaz & Oosthuizen, 2007:12) this approach refers 
to the rational, prescriptive approach to building competitive advantage, which 
determines organisational performance and that “focuses on the formal, rational 
process of formulation, implementation and evaluation” and “includes the design, 
planning and positioning schools”. This approach is prescriptive in advocating what 
must be done by the organisation and is reliant on the underlying assumption of 
determinism and is found to be effective in conditions of relative stability. However, 
this approach requires a more composite, people approach to address the challenge 
of change and transformation. 
Bossidy, Charan and Burck (2002:22, cited by Fontannaz & Oosthuizen, 2007:12) 
“support Hrebiniak’s view and identify that the heart of execution lies at the intersection 
of the three core processes: people, strategy and operations. Execution is the missing 
link or nexus between strategy and people”. Fontannaz and Oosthuizen, 2007:11, 
citing Bossidy, et al., 2002) make the point that “a leader’s job is to integrate strategy, 
people and execution to ensure organisational performance”. 
The descriptive, people perspective “to organisational performance”, according to 
Mintzberg, et al., 1998, in Fontannaz & Oosthuizen, 2007:12), “includes all elements 
which influence change within an organisation, particularly leadership, culture and 
values. The people approach includes the entrepreneurial, cognitive, learning, power, 
cultural and environmental schools of strategic management”. According to Swart 
(2000:220), the “focus is on change leadership, which refers to influencing others to 
enact change that will lead to the achievement of a desired future state”. 
Fontannaz and Oosthuizen (2007:13) acknowledge that, notwithstanding there being 
divergent approaches to organisational performance, it does not appear that the 
approaches are mutually exclusive. There is the potential for integrating the 
approaches by developing a cohesive, integrative framework guide that will ensure 





The Performance ESP framework, illustrated in Figure 3.14 below, consists of four 
core elements aimed at addressing the question of which organisational approach is 
relevant for a particular contextual (environmental stability/turbulence and internal 
agreement/conflict) dimension, making it possible to identify which organisational 
approach is relevant for a particular context to ensure organisational performance. 
 
 
Figure 3.12: The Performance ‘ESP’ Conceptual Framework 
Source: Fontannaz and Oosthuizen (2007:15) 
 
The prescriptive, rational hard ‘strategy’ approach to organisational performance 
remains relevant in a traditional environment. In conditions of environmental stability 
and internal agreement, the prescriptive approach represents the most efficient 





customer centric and employs a variety of strategic management analysis tools, to 
provide a collaborative, “systemic view of organisational performance” (Fontannaz & 
Oosthuizen, 2007:15). 
The integration or the descriptive, social ‘people’ approach, with the prescriptive 
strategy approach is more relevant as the context experiences greater instability, as it 
is no longer possible to direct organisational behaviour on a rational basis. The role of 
leadership is particularly relevant in this context, as it is the leader’s role to contain 
anxiety within the group and provide confidence in the new way of acting. Without 
strong leadership, the organisation will become bureaucratic, which will undermine 
sustainable performance. 
In addressing the challenge of complexity, identified as hyper-change, an emergent 
strategy approach to organisational performance becomes relevant. This approach 
does not assume determinism (a fundamentally flawed assumption in conditions of 
hyper-change). However, this approach can only be implemented in organisations 
where individuals are empowered and exhibit a strategic mind-set to organisational 
performance (Fontannaz & Oosthuizen, 2007:15). 
The ESP Framework is consistent with the three ‘performance dimensions’ model as 
provided in Sole (2009:3-5). According to Jessa (2012:37), Sole (2009:3-5) offers “a 
performance management model that serves to measure municipal performance in 
three performance dimensions”: firstly, the strategic dimension; secondly, the 
operational dimension; and, thirdly, the team and individual dimension. The strategic 
dimension “involves the public and politicians in the monitoring and measurement of 
the effectiveness of the municipalities’ strategic initiatives” primarily for utilisation later 
in the decision making process. The operational dimension “focus on municipal 
efficiencies and quality of services and products” with the potential of assessing 
institutional performance on a daily, weekly or monthly basis. The ‘team and individual 
level’ dimension focusses on “feed-back to employees, attention to internal 
accountability and human resources”. It is only when all three elements of the 
performance dimensions of the Sole (2009) ‘performance dimensions’ model interact 






These dimensions will be utilised in developing the key indicators informing the local 
government governance and performance framework (model) to be utilised/applied 
during the local government case studies, focus group discussions and individual 
interviews, which will be captured as part of Chapter 6. 
 
3.4 PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENT 
3.4.1 Performance Measurement in the Private Sector 
According to the Business Dictionary (2018), defining organisational performance from 
a private sector perspective “refers to the analysis of a company’s performance as 
compared to goals and objectives”. In this regard, private sector or corporate 
organisations measures three primary outcomes, namely financial performance (using 
mainly financial performance data), market performance, i.e. to maximise shareholder 
wealth through allocative, productive and dynamic efficiency (using mainly stock 
market performance) and shareholder value performance (using mainly AFS 
information, such as dividend yield). 
According to the Market Business News (MBN) (2018), in the private sector, “financial 
performance refers to measuring a company’s operations and policies in monetary 
terms” to assess “how good a firm’s financial performance is by looking at its return on 
assets and return on investment” and by gauging “its financial performance by 
measuring value added”. On the other hand, the MBN (2018) submits that “market 
performance measures how well a company or product performs in the marketplace” 
specifically referring to the performance of a “product rather than the whole company”. 
The assessment of “how much a company enriches its shareholders” is expressed in 
the concept, ‘shareholder value maximization performance assesses’ and is deemed 
by many as “the ultimate organisational performance measure” and considered the 
top priority of senior management at private sector institutions. Given that the focus of 
the study is in the public sector, performance measurement in the public sector will 







3.4.2 Performance Measurement in the Public Sector 
In measuring and understanding performance measurement in the public sector, it is 
important to understand the ‘set of common terminology’ often used in public sector 
literature that informs the concept of performance measurement in this sector. The 
literature review is chiefly informed by policy documents formulated from institutions 
(national and provincial) responsible for this sector, such as the Department of 
Provincial and Local Government (DPLG), National Treasury, the Auditor-General 
South Africa (AGSA) and the Department of Performance Monitoring and Evaluation 
(DPME) in the Presidency. It is important to understand the context, as all of the 
commonly used terms represent measures of performance, but each term/concept 
measures different aspects of performance. 
It is common practice in public sector performance management literature to talk about 
concepts such as effectiveness, efficiency, outcomes, outputs, productivity, quality, 
inputs and economy as these concepts are all underpinned by public sector legislative 
provisions. In the public sector, these definitions remain key to understanding 
organisational performance and measurement and lay the theoretical basis for 
understanding organisational performance and measurement in the context of the 
chapter. These concepts are explained as follows. 
Economy: refers to “procurement and delivery of inputs; human, physical and financial 
resources; quantity and quality; cost element, timeliness; operational level” efficiency 
(UNDP, 1997:3). 
Efficiency: “optimal transformation (activities) of inputs into outputs, utilization of 
means to achieve results and objectives, rational use of resources, least costs 
maximum results/return, activities in perspective of results, work planning and 
timelines, tactical levels” (UNDP, 1997:3). 
Effectiveness: the “extent to which a program or project achieves its immediate 
objectives or produces its desired outcome, achievements of results, objectives, goals, 
focus on target groups, beneficiaries, clients, medium and long-term perspective, 






Schierschmidt (2002:9), adopted a range of commonly used definitions from Parker 
(1993:3) and the DPLG (2001:22), with some key definitions including the following: 
• “Inputs are defined as the resources that an agency uses to produce 
services, including human, financial, facilities or material resources”; 
• “Outcomes are the quantified results, or impacts, of government action. 
Comparing outcomes to objectives through the use of measures assesses 
progress”; 
• “Outcome measures are tools, or indicators, to assess the actual impact 
of an agency’s actions. An outcome measure is a means for quantified 
comparison between the actual result and the intended result”; 
• “Outputs are the goods and services produced” by the organisation; 
• “Output measures are tools, or indicators, to count the services and 
goods produced” by the institution; 
• “Efficiency measures are indicators that measure the cost, unit cost or 
productivity associated with a given outcome or output”; 
• “Performance indicators are essentially statements that describe the 
dimensions of performance, which are considered key performance 
indicators when assessments and reviews are undertaken”; 
• “Input indicators refer to economy and efficiency measurements”; 
• “Output indicators … measure whether a set of activities or processes 
yields the desired tangible results” and “are effectiveness indicators”; 
• “Outcome indicators … measure the quality or the impact of the outputs 
on the achievement of the overall objective” and “are impact indicators”. 
 
Impact refers to the change in the standard of living of the target group or (municipal) 
area given the intervention of the organisation, such as better quality of life and 
improved or less dependence on the state to move to self-sufficiency and self-reliance. 
Measurement or measuring performance is about instilling a culture of accountability 
– a very important principle of good governance, particularly in the public sector (local 
government). Denhardt and Aristigueta (2008:107) and Marr (2009:137) make the 





stakeholders and improve the performance of an organisation”. highlights that 
Accountability is very important in the South African context of local government 
performance because accountability is the essence of South Africa’s democratic form 
of government. Accountability involves an obligation to explain or justify actions. The 
objective of accountability is not to assign blame but to discover why something went 
wrong, how it can be rectified and how its recurrence can be prevented” (RSA, 
2000:24, cited by Schierschmidt, 2002:27). 
According to Ndlovu (2015:19, citing Marr, 2009:7), performance “measurement helps 
public organisations to make better informed decisions and to be more accountable to 
citizens” and further cites Marr (2009:137) that “organisations use performance 
measurement as an accountability tool for external reporting and compliance with 
regulations”. Rocheleau (2006:335, in Ndlovu, 2015:19) submits that “it provides an 
indication of whether an organisation is responsive to the values of its stakeholders”.  
According to Schierschmidt (2002:28), “[p]erformance management is first and 
foremost a function that serves accountability. It can be one of the most cost-effective 
means of promoting transparency and openness in the way governing bodies operate 
and improves their performance. Public reporting on government effectiveness and 
efficiency is fundamental to good governance”. 
According to Laitinen (2002), in order to ensure the successful implementation of 
organisational strategy, measuring and “improving performance is key to ensuring the 
successful implementation of organisation strategy and when financial and non- 
financial measures are included in the same performance model, managers can 
survey performance in several areas simultaneously in order to facilitate efficient 
strategic decision making”. According to Alkhaldi and Wraikat (2015:5, citing the IT 
Governance Institute, 2003), a performance “governance model should provide the 
structure and practices for organisations to do the following”: 
• “Goals, objectives and expectations are determined (plan and organise); 
• Methods that can be used to reach those objectives through enterprise 
activities and utilization of the enterprise’s resources are determined 
(acquire, implement, deliver, and support); 
• “Construct a method for monitoring and reporting performance (monitor 





• “Build an efficient structure and sufficient accountabilities for effective 
governance”. 
(Alkhaldi & Wraikat, 2015:5) 
According to the IT Governance Institute (2003, cited by Alkhaldi & Wraikat, 2015:5), 
performance can be measured by applying the following methods: 
• “Defining and monitoring measures with management to ensure that 
objectives are accomplished and to measure performance in order to get 
rid of surprises”. 
• “Leveraging a system of balanced business scorecards maintained by 
management.” 
These methods can be equally applicable to any form of governance model as these 
models, instituted to measure performance in any area of the organisation, should be 
concerned with how the particular area within an organisation will have an immense 
impact on whether the entity will attain its vision, mission or strategic goals. 
Ndoluvo (2015:19, citing Kettl & Kelman, 2007:40-41, and Marr, 2009:137) indicates 
that “governments have limited themselves to measuring and reporting on 
performance for compliance purposes, and only a few go beyond performance 
measurement for compliance with performance management” and that, performance 
measurement, “as an accountability tool, has a punitive connotation, whereas as a 
performance management tool it can improve performance instead of just complying 
with accountability”. Further, Ndoluvo (2015:19) makes the point that “measuring 
performance has the potential of improving the results of government programmes 
and it can also create an information-driven language to break down the silos that 
often separate different unit managing government programmes”. 
Radnor (2008:96, cited by Ndolovu, 2015:19) suggests “that performance 
measurement should not be limited to tracking quantitative achievements but it should 
be about performance culture that is concerned with strengthening organisational 
performance, application of information to learn and improve”. It therefore remains 
crucial “to set the right performance objectives, indicators and targets” to gauge 





3.5 ORGANISATIONAL PERFORMANCE IN THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT 
SECTOR 
Mellahi and Wilkinson (2004:3-4, citing Cameron, Sutton & Whetten, 1988; Weitzel & 
Johnson, 1989), note that there is there are no clear decisive definition as to what 
constitutes organisational failure and the consequences thereof. Noting the 
consequences thereof may result in downsizing bankruptcy, decline, organisational 
mortality and retrenchments. The understanding is that, despite the lack of a precise 
definition of failure, there is an understanding at a general level that failure constitutes 
a deterioration of an organisation to respond to its respective niche and levels of 
resources available to an organisation (Cameron, Sutton & Whetten, 1988:9). 
In the private sector, performance is determined by the financial bottom line, while in 
the public sector it relates to the ability or inability of municipalities to provide basic 
services or functions provided as per the schedules contained in the Constitution of 
South Africa (Act 108 of 1996). 
The lack of consensus and specific criteria and measurement of the exact definition of 
performance are also often at the centre of organisational failure. An example of 
resource inadequacy, suggests that despite operational efficiency, an organisation 
can also be failing. In modern times, according to Cannon and Edmonson (2005), 
“organisational failures, as indicated by particular measures are nonetheless thought 
of as opportunities for learning”. 
 
3.5.1 Performance Failures in South African Local Government 
The 1998 White Paper on Local Government and the numerous pieces of statutes and 
policies, most notably the Constitution and the NDP 2030, pronounce that the key 
responsibility of local government as to improve the lives of citizens. The impact of 
failure in this regard, often results in consideration that failures exist at the 
organisational or operational level. 
These failures at municipal level have been topical issues for policy development, 
debates, conferences and academia. Failures include resource and capacity 





interfaces; intergovernmental cooperation; as well as vision, goals and target setting 
(Mnguni, 2016). 
According to the University of Cape Town’s Professor Tom Koelble, in Mnguni (2016), 
a lack of staffing, competence and technical capacity to manage departments and 
divisions within municipalities have been cited amongst the reasons for municipal 
failures. The National Treasury (2014:20) makes the point that although municipal 
failures can be attributed “to a lack of capacity, whether it’s individual, organisational 
or environmental capacity”, this is by far not exclusively the reason. Municipal 
performance failings are also due to absolute evidence of personal and professional 
incompetence, mismanagement, laziness and political interference. 
It is contended that the recognition and focus on capacity-only perpetuates current 
practices to focus remedial actions to address ‘technical incapacities’, while not 
addressing the ‘softer’ issues, such bad behaviour and performance failures and 
aligning these to longer-term perspectives, such as incentives and sound 
administration. Some of the ostensible reasons for performance failures will be 
discussed under a separate heading (3.5.2) in this chapter. 
A number of Section 9 constitutional institutions, the National Treasury (NT), 
Departments of Performance Monitoring and Evaluation (DPME), the Department of 
Cooperative Government and Traditional Affairs (DCoGTA), the South African Local 
Government Association (SALGA), the Auditor-General of South Africa (AGSA), the 
Financial and Fiscal Commission (FFC) and other public and private research 
institutions have done policy analysis and research on performance failures in the local 
government sphere. 
These have noted under-performance and failure, have done extensive research 
thereon, and have embarked on strategies to reduce municipal underperformance. It 
is also cautiously noted that the theoretical constructs of organisational failures or non-
performances have been limited and is expected to contribute to the body of 
knowledge on organisational failures. 
Most of these policy analyses and readings have not been approached, cemented or 
underpinned by a theoretical framework, yet provide a very good understanding of the 





founded reasons, when overlaid on the theoretical frameworks of organisational 
performance discussed earlier in the chapter, can easily be matched to some of the 
discussed organisational performance theoretical frameworks. What follows is a 
summary, using a policy approach/perspective, of some of the key research findings 
on municipal performance (failures) by the various key institutions highlighted above. 
 
3.5.1.1 Department of Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs 
(DCoGTA) 
Oversight of the system of cooperative government (Chapter 3) and local government 
(Chapter 7) as enshrined in the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa (Act No. 
108 of 1996) is the responsibility of the DCoGTA. This oversight is broadened through 
the vision of the National Development Plan for South Africa as taken up in its Chapter 
13, ‘Building a capable and developmental state’. 
Achieving the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and universal household 
access to basic services has been the vision of the South African government, post-
election in 2009. This vision was supported by, amongst others: “Government 
Programme of Action committed to build a developmental state, improve public 
services and strengthen democratic institutions” and includes the priority of 
intervening, stabilising and supporting local government to fulfil its core mandates. 
These objectives follow the many failings of local government in delivering basic 
services to households, in the main throughout urban and rural communities. 
To address the many local government failures, a Local Government Turn-Around 
Strategy (LGTAS) was introduced in 2009. This strategy calls for intergovernmental 
collaboration to improve local government performance and service delivery. 
The State of Local Government Report (SoLGR, 2009:4) serves as a basis for such a 
turnaround strategy and notes that governance challenges and service delivery 
challenges remain consistently the main reason for local government 
underperformance. This Report highlights stubbornly high service delivery backlogs; 
a disconnect with civil society often because of poor communication, which results in 
violent community protests; lack of adequate and human resource capacity; and poor 





To address these challenges, DCoGTA developed twenty-five indicators as a proxy of 
municipal performance. Their latest report on the state of local government in South 
Africa was released in June 2017. It focusses on issues of service delivery, 
governance, legislative compliance, implementation challenges, as well as support 
initiatives and their impact. 
Key findings of the Report highlight that, although access to basic services has 
increased over the last ten years, both the population and the number of households 
have increased. In addition, access to basic services such as energy, water and 
sanitation have increased; however, a general deterioration and collapse in basic 
infrastructure delivery is visible, inadequate human resource capacity and poor 
revenue collection performance coupled with generally bad financial management 
practices in many municipalities are crippling human advancement and the delivery of 
basic service. 
Almost a decade later, notwithstanding the effort and intervention by various 
stakeholders, between the 2009 and 2016 State of Local Government Reports most 
of the challenges remain and some new ones have emerged. Subsequent 
interventions implemented by DCoGTA, such as the Back-to-Basics (B2B) strategy to 
improve municipal performance, resonate with interventions such as Project 
Consolidate; Operation Clean Audit (OPCA); Siyenze Manje6, the Development Bank 
of Southern Africa and the Financial Management Improvement Programme. 
Acknowledgement should be given to the fact that the quantum of basic and social 
services, together with participatory inclusion had been extended to communities. 
Despite these, notable tasks remain to improve service delivery and permanence of 
local government to achieve the Developmental Local Government objectives. 
The Back-to-Basics approach is premised on five key areas that aim to ensure that 
people or communities and their needs are centre stage; that financial management 
                                            
6 DBSA (2017). The ‘Siyenza Manje’, translated as ‘we are doing it now’, initiative was launched in 2006. It was 
managed by the Development Bank of Southern Africa’s (DBSA) Development Fund, aimed at building capacity at 
municipal level and “complementing the government’s Project Consolidate, which identified underperforming 
municipalities to provide them with assistance”, particularly through the deployment of “experts to municipalities to 
assist with the implementation of infrastructure projects, planning and financial capacity building”. “Siyenza Manje 
is a partnership between the DBSA, National Treasury, the Department of Provincial and Local Government, and 





and governance and their predictability are ensured; and that adequate and 
appropriately capacitated human resources are employed to perform their functions 
and deliver the services. In its baseline assessment of the performance of 
municipalities, they note areas such as community satisfaction, financial management 
and governance, as well as political interface, as some of the main reasons for the 
generally sub-optimal performance of municipalities in the country. DCoGTA 
concludes that at most one third of municipalities is dysfunctional; one third is 
functional and have identified areas for further support; whilst the others are at most 
getting the basics right. 
Presidency Zuma, in his speech at the Twenty Year Review7 (2014), highlights that 
service delivery challenges remain and that the provision of basic services includes 
“improving services such as water infrastructure, solid waste management or the 
provision of electricity”. He further notes that “services such as refuse removal, the 
cleaning of the streets, the provision of parks and recreational facilities remain critical 
to make citizen’s experience of local government a pleasant one”. 
One of the key factors impacting the B2B Strategy (2014:9), as noted by the DCoGTA 
(2018), is that sometimes little recognition is given for positive achievements. It 
appears that many of the performance systems are fixated on under-performance. 
The DCoGTA developed key indictors to more effectively monitor and decide on under 
and over performance, as well as hold poor performers accountable. These indicators 
are included in the regulations to ensure that reporting is legislated and that monthly 
reports are prepared in line with the five pillars of the Back-to-Basics approach. Some 
of these indicators will be further explored as part of Chapter 6 and when conducting 
the various municipal case studies to gauge and measure organisational performance. 
3.5.1.2 The National Treasury 
The overall objective of good financial management practise in municipalities is to 
improve the sustainability of municipal services. The role of the National Treasury (NT) 
in this regard relates to improving financial management and the achievement of 
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unqualified audit opinions. It is argued that choosing financial management or 
unqualified audit opinions is but one indicator of municipal performance. 
The NT fulfils its oversight requirements in terms sections 5(2)(a) and (b) of the 
Municipal Finance Management Act (No. 56 of 2003) (MFMA) by monitoring budgets 
and promoting fiscal discipline across all 278 municipalities. The application of sound 
financial management practices across the entire financial management accountability 
cycle (policy formulation, integrated development planning, multi-year budgeting, in-
year performance monitoring and compilation of accountability reporting) will improve 
audit outcomes. 
The National Treasury (2014) makes the point that to develop sound strategies to 
address municipal performance failures, it is necessary to describe what constitutes a 
functional, well-performing local municipality in order to have a benchmark against 
which to measure. In this regard they consider two important dimensions for assessing 
municipal performance. Firstly, whether the municipality is performing its functions and 
delivering on the desired outcomes as set in the Constitution (Section 152) and, 
secondly, whether the political leadership and organisational capacity of the 
municipality is of such a nature that it will be able to do so on a sustainable basis. 
The National Treasury highlights two dimensions in assessing the performance of 
municipalities. The first relates to the internal institutional factors, while the second 
element is a range of external factors that impact on the environment within which 
municipalities work, i.e. to deliver on the constitutional objectives of local government. 
It is also noted that challenges in the external environment often impact on issues 
within the municipality and a framework has thus been developed to understand the 
root causes of municipal performance. 
The State of Local Government Finances and Financial Management Report 
(SLGFFMR) (2009) attempts to measure the municipal financial performance of 
municipalities. The Report highlights that very little service delivery progress has been 
made to improve the financial enabling environment and better accountability and 
application of the selected performance measures. The National Treasury (2018) 





2017, shows that 128 (95 in the previous year) out of 278 municipalities are in financial 
distress8. The increase is mainly attributed to the 2016 local government elections. 
It is therefore important to note that the performance of municipalities includes financial 
indicators. This is supported by the findings of the Auditor-General on financial 
performance and provides a good indication of the state of financial management in 
municipalities. The disadvantage of this assurance is that it speaks to the history of a 
municipality and does not indicate whether it is financially viable, heading for financial 
difficulty or is already ploughed into a state of financial distress. 
Initiatives to encourage citizen oversight of provincial and municipal finances include 
the creation of websites such as Municipal Money (www.municipalmoney.gov.za), 
launched in partnership with Code4SA and the National Treasury; and Vulekamali 
(www.vulekamali.gov.za), launched in partnership with IMALI YETHU to provide 
complementary information on provincial budgets and to find improved alignment in 
planning and implementation spending. These initiatives will be expanded to 
metropolitan councils (in partnership with the International Budget Partnership: 
https://www.internationalbudget.org) to be included the Open Budget Index, an 
international instrument that assesses transparency and accountability for public 
funding and spending. 
According to SA News (2018), South Africa’s efforts to deepen transparency in public 
financial management processes have been extensively recognised internationally: 
• “In the 2017 Open Budget Index (OBI) survey, out of 115 countries, South 
Africa has been ranked first – a position shared with New Zealand. South 
Africa has consistently rated in the top three since it held the first position 
in the 2010 Open Budget Index”. The OBI survey assesses the availability 
and comprehensiveness of eight key budget documents and “examines 
the extent of effective oversight provided by legislatures, independent 
fiscal institutions and the supreme audit authorities, and the opportunities 
available to the public to participate in national budget processes”. 
                                            
8 The National Treasury (2016/2017) uses the “term ‘financial distress’ very deliberately instead of the 
words ‘financial crisis’ (which appear in Section 139 of the Constitution and Section 139 of the MFMA 
because this report is only intended to provide an initial indication of which municipalities may be 





• The 2017 Mo Ibrahim Index of African Governance (IIAG) ranked South 
Africa sixth overall in Africa from fourth in 2015, fourth in Sustainable 
Economic Opportunity and first in the category of Public Management. The 
IIAG (2018) “is a tool that measures and monitors governance 
performance in African countries”, measured across four key components: 
safety, “rule of law, participation and human rights, sustainable economic 
opportunity, and human development”. 
• The World Economic Forum’s Global Competitiveness Report 2016 - 2017 
ranked South Africa 47th out of 138 countries. It noted areas of excellence 
in local government as the strength of auditing and reporting standards 
(1st) and quality of roads (29th). However, the World Economic Forum’s 
report highlighted areas of poorer performance, including wastefulness of 
government expenditure (88th), public trust in politicians (109th), perceived 
favouritism in decisions of government officials (115th), quality of electricity 
supply (112th) and the burden of government regulation (106th). 
 
3.5.1.3 The Auditor-General of South Africa (AGSA) 
The functions of the AGSA are enshrined in Chapter 9 (sections 181 and 188) of the 
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa (1996). The AGSA is also regulated by the 
Public Audit Act (No. 25 of 2004). 
The AGSA (2017) is considered the authority on the audit of financial (for improvement 
or regression to key controls, risks, management quality and leadership, key 
vacancies, skills, business processes, and so forth) and non-financial reports 
(primarily measures, according to AGSA (2017-18) (2019:6) “actual service delivery 
against the performance indicators and targets set for each predetermined 
performance objectives as defined in IDPs and/or annual SDBIPs, and to report on 
this in their APRs”) in the public sector and public institutions in the country. 
Setting the correct objectives that are outcome-oriented and linked to the constitutional 
mandate, as set out in Section 152 remains key if municipalities wish to make an 
impact by addressing the many service delivery and developmental challenges faced 





Report (audit outcomes) for municipalities, emphasised that accountability for the 
management of municipal affairs; appropriate planning focused on citizen needs; 
implementing relevant internal controls, supervision in support of sound financial and 
performance management are key to turnaround of the current negative state of 
financial governance and institutional performance in municipalities. In his Report, Mr. 
Makwetu highlighted that many challenges that manifest can be attributed to poor 
leadership and failure to instil a culture of ethics and integrity; inability to comply with 
legislation and the establishment of internal control measures; and the recruitment of 
appropriate human resource capacity within the municipal space. In his concluding 
remarks, Mr. Makwetu noted that there is a need for greater relationship management 
and cooperation amongst stakeholders to address the challenges highlighted above 
(AGSA Report, 2017:131). 
According to Mr. Makwetu, treasuries and governance departments (Department of 
the Premiers; Local Government and DCoGTA) have an oversight role to play in 
municipal coordination and enforcement of good practices in implementing and 
capacitating the performance management and budgeting systems. These are 
believed to improve planning, budgeting, monitoring and the reporting of service 
delivery objective achievements. The introduction and recent approval of the Public 
Audit amendments aim to bring about greater accountability and consequence 
management (Public Audit Act, No. 25 of 2004). 
 
3.5.2 Root Causes and Factors Leading to Organisational Performance Failures 
Organisational performance is a factor of complex and diverse sources, internal or 
external to municipalities, according to the National Treasury, the DCoGTA, the AGSA 
and Jessa (2012:29). They highlight that, despite improvement in methodologies and 
tools to measure municipal performance, “resources or capacity may be inadequate 
and the instruments (tools) employed to measure performance might be inappropriate” 
(Jessa, 2012:29). Factors such as the non-commitment of management and 
stakeholders’ attitudes and culture also contribute to municipal organisational failure. 
It is the view of Armstrong, et al. (2000:16-17, cited by Henkin, 2002:32), that situations 





highlights that the environment or circumstances in which an organisation and the 
individual operate should also be considered when assessing an individual’s 
performance. 
Armstrong, et al. (2000) note that an employee’s performance is a factor of established 
systems, processes, human resource systems and management awareness, 
decisions and actions. This implies that an employee has little control over his 
performance and that it is dependent on management and major systemic changes 
on work systems (Beardwell, et al., 2001, cited by Henkin, 2002:32). 
Viedge Van Dijk (2007, in Jessa, 2012:29) notes that organisational performance 
failures could be attributed to a misalignment between individual employee goals and 
that of the organisation; no clearly defined managerial roles, which could lead to no 
clear organisational outcomes; lack of service excellence or delivery culture; non-
credible performance reward systems; and opposing interests of various stakeholders 
or customers. 
Armstrong, et al. (2000, in Henkin, 2002:32) highlights that employee performance is 
impacted by leadership (the ability to provide direction, support and guide staff); 
personal factors of the individual (skill competence commitment and motivation); work 
systems (work flow processes and constraints); and the situation or environment within 
which an employee operates. 
Mnguni (2016), in respect of local government (municipal) failures, highlights various 
contributing factors, ranging from the constitutional provisions, electoral system, staff 
capacity, the inability to impose corrective action as may be required when failures 
occur; political leadership and will; ill-directed funding; and the lack of communication 
with and engagement of communities. 
Financial management, control and reporting are considered key elements or 
indicators of municipal performance and are subject to the Auditor-General’s 
assurance that reporting on these are complete, accurate and verifiable. In cases 
where the AGSA are unable to provide this assurance, no provision is made in Law, 
does not have ‘teeth’ (despite being a Chapter 9 of the Constitution, body do not have 
any mechanism to enforce corrective actions) as its reports are submitted to minister’s 





nothing. It is hoped that the Public Audit Amendment Act will address these and that 
consequence management be enforceable. 
It is also noted that the constituency based electoral system, adopted by the South 
African Constitution, provides for a misalignment of accountability of elected officials 
to communities. Citizens elect a political party to govern them that, based on 
proportional representation deploys political leadership to any constituency it so 
chooses. This allows for the decision to deploy or recall politicians, based on party 
choice and not on whether they have performed or not performed. 
Mguni (2016) refers to Professor Emeritus Christopher Thornhill of the University of 
Pretoria who coined the phrase ‘political-administrative interface’ to highlight the 
overlaps and impossible separation of the two facets. “In South Africa, divisions 
between politics and administration as delineated by legislation are not being 
respected” (Mguni, 2016). Mguni (2016) makes the point that in many cases the mayor 
and “the municipal manager belongs to the same political party” and often “the latter, 
who is also the council’s chief accounting officer, may find him or herself drawn into 
political considerations … the disbursement of funds”. 
The implementation of the Municipal Systems Amendment Act of 2011 was to ensure 
that municipalities attract competent staff and that there is a separation of the political 
leadership and competence to perform tasks within municipalities. Despite the 
provisions in the amendments and regulations, observations suggest that past 
practices of not having appropriately qualified staff (municipal manager, chief financial 
officers and appropriately or suitably qualified senior managers), who are able to 
perform key leadership tasks remains a challenge. This is attributed to cadre 
deployment (only willing to take ill-informed political direction) and inability of local 
government to attract appropriately qualified staff. 
These decisions also resulted in the inefficient use of municipal resources as they 
must appoint staff and consultants to perform tasks, which may have been reasonably 
expected from staff (because they are being paid, based on their levels of 
competency). 
Mguni (2016), in his article in the Rand Daily Mail, makes the point that a critical 





(IDP) – “a five-year detailed plan on development priorities for a municipality”. The IDP 
is a legal requirement and is often outsourced. Mguni (2016) makes the point that IDPs 
“are linked to the municipalities’ budgets and all relevant stakeholders within their 
jurisdiction, including contractors, suppliers and residents, should be involved in their 
formulation. However, since they are often formulated by external consultants who are 
not accountable to citizens, members of municipal councils are not usually full 
custodians of their IDPs”. 
The ‘ownership’ of the IDP and the relevance thereof is often an issue that is at the 
root of dysfunction within municipalities and argued about amongst others. Mguni 
(2016), in his article highlights that “Mr. Zwelinzima Vavi, former Congress of South 
African Trade Unions secretary-general, calls it “a growing social distance between 
leadership and our mass constituency”. This is because senior managers are not able 
to engage communities on, and communicate, the IDP because a consultant drafted 
the IDP or because they do not have adequate knowledge or skills. 
In 2012, “Dr. Mamphela Ramphele, a senior academic – and, at the time, a prospective 
politician – observed that the country needed an active citizenry to mobilise citizens to 
voice their rights and exercise their responsibilities” (Mguni, 2016). Where 
communities have no further recourse, “poor or marginal communities who experience 
official obfuscation or poor service”, often resort to protest action (Mguni, 2016). 
 
3.6 CHARACTERISTICS OF HIGH PERFORMANCE (EFFECTIVE) 
MUNICIPALITIES 
According to the Centre for Organisational Design (2018), high performance 
organisations (HPOs) are defined as organisations that can align processes, 
structures and systems to achieve outstanding outcomes. These HPOs achieve 
financial and non-financial outstanding outcomes and, in most cases, often exceed 
exceptional results when compared with peers or optimal organisational performance. 
Evaluating efficiency and effectiveness, and adaptability to a changing environment 
are strategies to insure continued growth and development of an organisation. 
Included are also addressing issues such as “leadership; decision making and 





Organisations that achieve superior results, have met their customer expectations and 
have employees that are engaged, are considered HPOs, according to the Centre for 
Organisational Design (2018). The Centre highlights that the actions of HPOs are 
underpinned by principles that support the following: the vision and strategy is 
understood by every member of the organisation and guides their day-to day decision 
making; they acknowledge that people are their greatest asset, making sure that they 
are given adequate information, skills and understanding of each of organisational 
process, and that organisational processes have been streamlined to align to the 
organisational strategy, they have appropriate delegation to make decision, solve 
problems and resources to do their job; work is designed for the entire process, rather 
a narrow focus on job descriptions; people in the organisation have shared ideology, 
which guides them as opposed to rigid policies and procedures; and that management 
roles are clearly delineated to provide resources, solve day-to-day challenges and 
there are supportive environments for effective teamwork. 
The Centre for Organisation Design (2018) developed a High Performance 
Organisation Framework that, if applied with discipline, could lead to “a distinct and 
lasting improvement effect”. They contend that the framework provides a scientifically 
robust structure that can be adapted to suit any organisation and, if modified to suit 
organisational circumstances it will lead to organisational performance. 
To quote, Huw Owen, CEO of Ark Data Centre (in De Waal, 2012:28-29): “If your 
company is an HPO it will all be easier, more efficient, and more effective sailing. You 
will always have issues; however, these will be issues that you will be capable of 
dealing with. If you are not an HPO, if you are not well aligned, if you don’t have a 
common foundation, if everybody doesn’t know where they are going and don’t feel 
valued, people will not go the extra mile. As an HPO, you have got the ability to do an 
awful lot more than a non-HPO. Because people will step up and they will do more 
when required. So it means that you have got more agility, are more responsive, have 
got more fuel in your tank. If you have an underperforming business where people are 
frustrated and bitter, they will do the bare minimum that they can get away with to get 
their pay check and go home. Which means that you are less agile and less effective. 
As a high performing business you have got a far greater chance of ploughing through 





De Waal (2012:29) provides some distinguishing factors, techniques, methods and 
activities that organisations, such as municipalities, can apply to become high 
performing. These in summary deal with creating a clear vision; good leadership that 
is willing to focus its efforts on service, develop the requisite human resource capacity 
and competence; dealing with incompetence, reorganising and ensuring appropriate 
organisational structures; and improving listening skills and two-way communication. 
Considering assessments from the National Treasury, the DCOGTA, the AGSA (audit 
outcomes), the findings of other studies and assessments from rating agencies 
(Municipal IQ) and banks, according to the ICLD Swedish International Centre for 
Democracy (2018), “there are South African municipalities that perform well; 
sometimes they perform very well”. 
In conducting work for the Swedish International Centre for Local Democracy, Siddle 
and Koelble (2016:55) were able to interview administrators and politicians from many 
municipalities. They highlight that the appointment of strong political leadership is key 
to advancing the concept of a performing municipality and it is the task of the elected 
political party to appoint these politicians. They conclude that the failure to appoint 
competent politicians has been a major contributor to municipal failures. 
At local level there are many issues over which political parties could collaborate, 
despite being in competition, but have failed to do so. One possible area for improved 
collaboration is via the appointment of staff, other than those of a politico-advisory 
nature. This is particularly relevant to the appointment of municipal managers and 
other senior staff members. 
The ICLD Swedish International Centre for Democracy (2018) submits that “[g]etting 
the basics of management right is crucial. Care should be taken to ensure that even 
routine procedures are properly carried out and properly supervised. Administrative 
and other policies are devised and adopted by councils for a purpose, namely, to 
provide guidance for management in the achievement of municipal objectives”. They 
make the point that the policies should be implemented and carried-through and not 
be “allowed simply to gather dust”. In the event that the policies are inappropriate, 
maybe due to it having been poorly conceptualised or have become outdated, such 





According to Siddle and Koelble (2016, for the Swedish International Centre for Local 
Democracy, ICLD), “municipalities should strive for compliance with legislative and 
regulatory requirements, even if it is difficult to do so”. Where the demands “of 
compliance seem unreasonable, it is not for municipalities to ‘cherry pick’ those 
requirements which they find it convenient to adhere to, and to ignore others” (Siddle 
& Koelble, 2016). From a good governance perspective, it is imperative the 
municipalities institute the necessary processes and control to “[e]nsure accountability 
at all levels and that codes of conduct for staff and councillors should be properly 
applied”, municipalities must ensure and guarantee that proper consequence 
management processes are institutionalised to address poor performance and 
misconduct, whether the transgressor is a staff member or a councillor (Siddle & 
Koelble, 2016). 
In the interest of the citizens, Siddle and Koelble (2016, for the Swedish International 
Centre for Local Democracy, ICLD) emphasise that it is key to foster good relations 
with higher levels of governments, “even if they are not run by the same political party”. 
Even more important, “ensure good relations with the community, and be responsive 
to their needs (and not only when elections are approaching), whilst at the same time 
remembering that municipalities have obligations which, although they might not 
always be popular to enforce, such as debt collection, are essential to adhere to. Do 
not make unrealistic promises” (Siddle & Koelble, 2016). “Stick to the municipality’s 
mandate. Ideally, only those functions which a municipality is clearly mandated to 
perform in terms of the Constitution or legislation” should be prioritised and performed 
(Siddle & Koelble, 2016). 
 
3.7 CONCLUSION AND SUMMARY 
This chapter explored the key concepts and various definitional issues informing the 
understanding of organisational performance, both from the private- and public-sector 
perspectives. Concepts such as ‘organisation’, ‘performance’, ‘effectiveness’, 
‘performance management’ and ‘performance measurement; were included in the 
analysis, as these concepts form the basis of organisational performance, particularly 
its relevance to local government. Many similarities and contradictions between the 





understandings of the key concepts and measurement approaches of organisational 
performance. However, there are key dimensions that come from the concepts of 
organisation, performance, performance management and performance models that 
are useful for the service delivery context of a municipality 
Organisational performance at both a conceptual and operational level were explored. 
The essence of the chapter covered the various organisational performance 
theoretical frameworks and models, starting with a basic ‘input-output model’, 
extending to very sophisticated ‘input-activities-outputs-outcomes’ organisational 
performance models. No less than 12 organisational performance models and 
theoretical frameworks were analysed, each providing a different approach to the 
concept. As a collective these provided the research with some key points and 
indicators that will inform the ‘local government governance and performance model’ 
(Malila model).  
Performance measurements, both in the private and public sector, including the 
various definitional issues in the public sector, were explained. It was important to 
understand the viewpoints from the various oversight institutions in the public sector 
tasked with monitoring performance of municipalities. The chapter also addressed this 
matter. 
The chapter further explored reasons, root causes and factors leading to performance 
failures and concluded with an exploration of the characteristics and critical success 
factors of high-performance organisations and municipalities. These indicators will 
assist in the conceptualisation and development of the “municipal governance and 
performance model/framework” that will assist municipalities to build sustainable 
institutions able to deliver on service delivery obligations, needs and the requirements 
of communities, as set out in the Constitution of South Africa. 
In summary, the models presented earlier in this chapter are multidimensional and 
range from process driven to logic-, quality- and systems-driven. The strategy and 
results parts of performance were also highlighted and unpacked. Accountability and 
transparency are key in creating public value in municipalities and for enhancing 






CHAPTER 4: LEGISLATIVE AND REGULATORY FRAMEWORK OF 
LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN SOUTH AFRICA 
 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
The main objective of this chapter is to explore the complex legislative, regulatory and 
policy arrangements of the local government functional system and framework within 
the context of the overall intergovernmental relations system of South Africa. The 
analysis will cover the history and origin of the local government system in South 
Africa, its evolution (pre- and post-1994), as well as key policy developments. This 
information will be supplemented by a range of key concepts and definitions relevant 
to understanding the local government environment, and which will inform both this 
chapter and the overall research. 
The local intergovernmental relations system and functional framework as contained 
in the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (the Constitution), the White 
Paper on Local Government (1998) and associated enabling legislation, will lay the 
basis for understanding the legislative and policy environment informing local 
government performance. This will inform the development of the good governance 
and performance model, as set out in Chapter 6. 
This chapter elaborates on the powers and functions of local government and touches 
on the fiscal arrangements to gauge the extent to which it has been possible (or not) 
to align the local governmental fiscal and functional (service delivery) frameworks. The 
analysis of relevant and significant legal, regulatory and policy frameworks as these 
relate to organisational performance and oversight institutions, particularly in local 
government, will be covered in Chapter 5. Annexure 2, Annexure 3 and Annexure 4 
are relevant to this chapter as it provides a more detailed breakdown of the full 
quantum of local government powers and functions (Annexure 2) and the division 
between local and district municipalities (Annexure 3), as well as the Bill of Rights 






4.2 LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN SOUTH AFRICA: HISTORY, KEY CONCEPTS 
AND DEFINITIONS 
4.2.1 The History of Local Government in South Africa (Pre-1993 to Post-2000) 
The evolution and transformation of local government in South Africa occurred over a 
long period of time, stretching from around 1962 to the early 1990s. During this period, 
the face of local government was shaped by the political ideologies and views of the 
reigning authorities. Local government in 21st century South Africa was also formed 
by the advent of a new dispensation brought about by the Constitution of the Republic 
of South Africa, 1996. It is of particular importance to understand the historic role 
played by local government in the formation and perpetuation of local separation, 
apartheid, discrimination, injustice and inequity, as well as the negative impact these 
had on municipal institutions and human development. According to the Department 
of Provincial and Local Government (2008), equally significant is the history of the 
struggle and fight against pre-1994 apartheid laws, particularly at local level, which 
laid the basis for a new era of local government following South Africa’s transition to a 
democracy post the 1994 elections. 
The Nelson Mandela Metropolitan University (NMMU): Centre for Law (2015) 
summarises and describes the various stages of local government evolution from 1682 
to early 1990 as follows: 
• 1682: The early days of the first local community government (landdrost9 
and heemraden10) established by Dutch authorities in Stellenbosch. 
• 1836: The British colonial government’s introduction of a system of elected 
boards comprising of commissioners assisted by ward masters 
(wykmeesters). This was later replaced, in terms of the Municipal 
Ordinance (Cape) of 1836, by an elected council with an appointed mayor 
and town clerk. The Cape Legislative Assembly governed Natal, so the 
Ordinance was also applied in that territory. 
                                            
9 Merriam-Webster (2019). ‘landdrost’ meaning “a Boer magistrate in a rural district of South Africa prior to the 
establishment of British administration”. 
10 Merriam-Webster (2019). ‘heemraden’ meaning “a council assisting a local Boer magistrate in the government 





• 1909: The Union of South Africa, with four provinces and provincial 
councils, was given the powers to legislate on local government by the 
South Africa Act of 1909. Ordinances that created municipalities, divisional 
councils (such as the Cape Divisional Council), local and village 
management boards and councils, health committees and town boards 
were enacted in all four provinces. Segregation was simultaneously 
introduced and laid the basis for the apartheid era of the 1950s to the early 
1990s. 
 
Section A of the 1998 White Paper on Local Government (the White Paper) provides 
a more comprehensive historic context and analysis of the South African local 
government system, particularly between the 1960 apartheid and segregation period 
and the 1994 democratic and constitutional era. 
The apartheid system left a negative impact on South Africa’s housing and community 
settlements, as well as on local government institutions. Koma (2012:1) makes the 
point that the initiation of apartheid or segregation practices in South Africa at the time 
did not mark the commencement of geographical, institutional and social exclusion 
and separation at municipal level, as “segregation was already a policy by the time 
apartheid was introduced in 1948”. 
Koma (2012:1) highlights that the Group Areas Act, a significant piece of apartheid 
law, “instituted strict residential segregation and compulsory removal of black people 
to ‘own group’ areas” by spatially separating people based on race, “influx control, and 
a policy of own management for own areas” at municipal or local level. According to 
the White Paper (1998), this control was introduced to some extent to “compensate 
for restricted rights and to bolster the political and economic privileges of racial 
exclusion”. In this way, the apartheid government controlled the permanent occupancy 
and residence of inner-city areas through the enforcement of a permit or pass system 
applicable for non-white South Africans. 
In addition, Koma (2012:2) explains that through legislation the apartheid system 
limited the degree to which rich and well-off ‘white municipalities’ would be responsible 





and disadvantaged black areas. This “reserved a viable municipal revenue base for 
white areas by separating townships and industrial and commercial development” 
(Koma, 2012:2). 
In Bantustans (areas set aside specifically for black inhabitants of South Africa) service 
delivery was limited by legally restricted and inadequate local government powers. In 
zones with communally owned land, traditional and communal leaders were given the 
control and authority over development matters, land sharing, allocation and 
distribution. Some small rural settlements and communities, the ostensible ‘R293 
townships’, were permitted to have their own administrations, but without tangible 
powers or control. Some of these administrations include the following: 
• Coloured and Indian management committees were constituted in the 
1960s, but only as recommendation advisory bodies to white 
municipalities. The 1971 Bantu Affairs Administration Act recognised 
administration boards for township communities, which in essence 
removed accountability and obligation for black or African township 
settlements and communities from white municipalities. 
• Community councils were established in 1977 as elected bodies having 
limited financial and other resources and no significant powers. These 
community councils never attained real political credibility and authority. 
• In 1982, these community councils were substituted by black local 
authorities, still without any substantial financial resources and own 
revenue base. From the start these black local authorities were not 
recognised as politically authentic and, according to Koma (2012:2), they 
“were rejected by popular (and sometimes violent) community mobilisation 
in the mid-1980s”. 
 
It is clear that, although the above forms of ‘own local government’ recognised the 
permanent existence of black people in urban areas, their design and establishment 
was intended to reinforce and emphasise the apartheid government’s policies of 
separation by race and economic exclusion. In black areas, financial shortfalls were 
built into the local government fiscal framework. This was exacerbated by the 





black areas, which limited the tax revenue raising potential in these areas as 
inhabitants and retailers in black communities were required to spend most of their 
money in white areas. In this way the apartheid government ensured that 
municipalities in black areas were disadvantaged and deprived of financial means to 
meet the developmental needs and requirements of local residents. In essence, the 
system at the time guaranteed that these forms of ‘own local government’ had limited 
to no financial resources to make any impactful difference or transformation in the 
quality of life of their residents. 
The 1998 Local Government White Paper highlights that historically in urban (or non-
rural) South Africa, most local government and municipal revenue was self-generated 
and mainly sourced from property taxes and service delivery charges to residents and 
businesses. This historic practice predominantly suited white municipalities, which 
were mainly populated by small communities and insignificant service delivery areas. 
However, unlike black rural areas these white municipalities had large concentrations 
of financial and economic tax revenue bases. 
Within rural or non-urban areas, racial discrimination and separation were equally 
evident in that basic municipal or local government services, such as water and 
electricity, were provided to white inhabitants in rural (non-urban) areas at massive 
cost to municipalities, while limited to no regard was given to the basic services 
requirements of the majority rural (non-urban) population. This was a recipe for 
disaster, signalling an inevitable collapse in the system as citizens, societies and 
community organisations started to organise and rally against the apartheid system of 
government, shaking its fundamentals and directives. 
As part of the uprising in the early to mid-1980s there was a concerted effort to reject 
black local authorities as part of a call by communities to improve the socio-economic 
conditions in black communities and Bantustans, and to address the social injustice 
created as a result of the way human settlements were spatially and economically 
distorted. The mid-1980s were marked by a range of systematic, yet carefully planned 
consumer boycotts of rents and service charges, forcing the hand of the apartheid 
government in the late 1980s to develop and introduce ad-hoc intergovernmental 





disadvantaged areas and collapsing townships utilising regional services councils and 
joint services boards. 
The White Paper (1998) makes the point that most of these initiatives were viewed, 
particularly by black communities, as ‘too little too late’ as many black townships and 
homeland rural areas were, by the late 1980s, deemed to be effectively ungoverned. 
This clearly demonstrated that black local authorities, created by the apartheid system, 
would never be feasible nor sustainable and led to the recognition that a new local 
government system and arrangement was needed as a response to the crisis. Given 
the financial and economic impact of rent and consumer boycotts, particularly on the 
white municipalities’ tax revenue base, negotiations and talks were initiated between 
white municipalities and township representatives to end the impasse. These 
particularly focused on the fact that black residents were legislatively excluded from a 
substantial municipal tax revenue base, a matter that was required to be addressed 
through national legislative reform. The formation of the national Local Government 
Negotiating Forum provided a platform through which these national legislative 
reforms were to be addressed, particularly pushing the aims and agenda of the 
commonly known ‘One city, one tax base’ initiative. In essence, these negotiations 
and talks laid the foundation for the current system of local government. 
The constitutional era was introduced by the Interim Constitution (Act 200 of 1993) 
and the Local Government Transition Act (No. 203 of 1993) (LGTA). It commenced 
with the introduction of negotiating forums tasked with the establishment and selection 
of provisional or interim councils to administer and govern until democratic elections 
could be held. After the first democratic elections, transitional local government bodies 
were introduced throughout the entire South Africa. The LGTA succeeded in 
successfully deracialising the system and structure of local government through the 
unification and consolidation of earlier racially based structures. 
According to the White Paper (1998), the inauguration of the final 1996 South Africa 
Constitution “heralded a new legal order in which the constitutionally recognised status 
of local government was reconfirmed”. The process of transition was, however, not yet 
complete – extensive statutory measures were necessary. In this regard, the 1998 





developmental local government system and paved the way for new local government 
legislation within the parameters of the South African Constitution. 
Historically, many municipalities in the country were centred around main towns, 
suburbs and settlements and the municipal boundaries did not extend meaningfully 
outside the edges of those areas, resulting in some large, mainly rural (non-urban) 
areas in South Africa effectively having no real sustainable revenue and tax base. This 
weakened those areas’ ability to have their own legitimate municipal level of 
government. However, the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa (the 1996 
Constitution) requires “that the local government sphere consists of municipalities 
established for the whole area of the country, introducing for the first time, wall-to-wall 
municipalities so that the full territory of the country is covered by municipalities”. 
The 1996 Constitution introduces a drastic departure from the way government, and 
in particular local government, was structured in South Africa before 1994. The most 
important changes from a local government perspective are: 
1. Reverting from a system of parliamentary supremacy to one of 
constitutional supremacy; 
2. Embracing local government as integral and wholly part of the 
government system in South Africa; and 
3. Conferring original power on local government. 
 
The final stage of the transformation process in local government commenced with the 
general municipal elections in 2000. 
According to Venter, et al. (2007:110), pursuant to the changeover to democracy in 
1994, initial focus and emphasis was on policy development, followed by an 
implementation and application phase of these developed policies. Venter, et al. 
(2007:110) makes the point that “as the new democratic local government 
dispensation developed, it became crucial that the monitoring and evaluation of the 
implementation of these policies be undertaken, which resulted in the further 





According to the Financial and Fiscal Commission (2012:11), before 2000, 843 
municipalities existed in the country, which comprised quite a few provisional or 
transitional municipal councils from the erstwhile homeland areas. Pursuant to a 
demarcation process introduced in the year 2000, 284 wall-to-wall municipalities were 
established in the country incorporating all municipalities and the former homeland 
areas, ensuring that the entire country is covered by self-governing councils. A further 
demarcation process, initiated in 2005, ensured the full geographic alignment of all 
district and local municipalities to a specific province, resulting in the 284 municipalities 
being divided into six metropolitan areas (category A), 231 local municipalities 
(category B) and 46 district municipalities (category C). Subsequent to local 
government elections in 2011, the 284 municipalities established in 2005 were, 
through a further amalgamation process, reduced to 278, which incorporates an 
additional two metropolitan (category A) municipalities, one each in the Eastern Cape 
and Free State provinces. 
Chapter 7 of the Constitution provides a broad framework for the functioning of local 
government and sets about prescribing or permitting national legislation on a number 
of topics impacting on the local sphere of government. The first national Act to be so 
enacted in terms of Section 162 of the Constitution, was the Organised Local 
Government Act (No. 52 of 1997). The way in which organised local government was 
to play a significant role in related matters is clearly outlined in Section 8 of the Local 
Government: Municipal Demarcation Act (No. 27 of 1998). For example, through being 
part of a selection panel for appointing members to the Municipal Demarcation Board, 
which makes representation on legislation that affects the status, institutions, powers 
or functions of local government, as set out in Section 154 of the Constitution. 
Other enactments were initiated by the government’s policy formulation on local 
government, as set out in the White Paper on Local Government (White Paper), 
published on 9 March 1998. The White Paper is widely looked upon and referred to 
as the ‘mini-Constitution’ for the local government sphere, given that it does not 
specifically or exclusively address a sectoral policy or strategy, but rather 
encapsulates and deals with an entire sphere of government and affects all South 
Africans. The former Minister responsible for Provincial Affairs and Constitutional 
Development, Mr. Mohammed Valli Moosa, in the foreword to the White Paper (1998), 





closest with communities, is responsible for the services and infrastructure so 
essential to our people’s well-being, and is tasked with ensuring growth and 
development of communities in a manner that enhances community participation and 
accountability”. 
According to the introduction or executive summary of the White Paper (1998:8), 
developmental local government means a “local government system, which is 
committed to working with citizens, groups and communities to create sustainable 
human settlements which provide for a decent quality of life and meet the social, 
economic and material needs of communities in a holistic way”. Developmental local 
government also aims to advance the quality of the lives and environments of citizens 
and communities, focusing particularly on those that are most, or have often been, 
marginalised or excluded, such as the disabled, women, children and the poorest and 
most vulnerable people. Some municipalities, according to the White Paper (1998: 
section B) “face great challenges in promoting human rights and meeting human 
needs, addressing past backlogs and problems caused by apartheid planning, and 
planning for a sustainable future”. These challenges can only be addressed if 
municipalities, communities, citizens and businesses work together, following a whole-
of-society tactic in adopting a developmental government approach to achieve the 
many service delivery objectives and challenges. 
The 1998 White Paper was developed against the backdrop of the local government 
system of its time, which featured the following: 
• Major service delivery infrastructure inequalities, mainly as a result of the 
apartheid local government regime and the realisation that a new 
institutional framework is required to enable the delivery of the new 
municipal mandates; 
• In order to give effect to the new vision and development role identified for 
local government, legislative reform and review is required to address, 
rationalise and overhaul inherent legal shortcomings and lacunas in 
existing statutes that support deep-rooted apartheid local government 
systems; and 
• Enhanced and new capacities and capabilities, attitudes and approaches 





which requires a different partnering and relationship (co-creation) 
approach between councils, management, administration, other 
employees, and citizens or communities. 
 
The 1998 White Paper lists the challenges that will need to be addressed as part of 
moving towards a new local government system. The authors of the White Paper 
(1998: Section A) acknowledge that the “new local government system needs to build 
on the strengths of the current system” and that “equally it needs to address its 
weaknesses, and build the capacity of municipalities to address the considerable 
challenges they face”. 
The policy context of the White Paper (1998) highlights that at the time South African 
municipalities faced the following major challenges: 
• Human settlement patterns that were not integrated; 
• Disproportionate concentrations of billable financial and economic 
resources and tax bases; 
• Major frontline and basic service delivery infrastructure backlogs, 
particularly in historically previously disadvantaged and underdeveloped 
areas; 
• The absence of sustainable and financially viable municipal institutions 
allowing densification of rural settlements; 
• Apartheid spatial planning practices and inequalities between major towns 
and townships and city sprawl; 
• Local government institutions that do not appreciate and recognise the 
connections and relationships between urban and rural human 
settlements; 
• Deep-rooted and institutionalised approaches and methods of decision-
making that do not support running an efficient and effective administration 
and delivery system; 
• Incapability to influence and leverage private sector funding and other 
resources for economic and community development initiatives; 





• The major need to reconstruct and re-establish relationships and 
partnerships between municipalities and communities or citizens they 
serve. 
 
According to the Department of Performance Monitoring and Evaluation (DPME), in 
its 20 Year Review of Local Government, many of the challenges highlighted above 
from more than twenty years ago are still prevalent today. 
Given the above policy context and identified service delivery challenges in local 
government at the time, the White Paper suggests the basis and delivery programme 
to ensure that the existing local government system is radically and urgently 
transformed. The White Paper formulates policy on a wide range of subjects, namely 
“developmental local government; cooperative government; municipal institutional 
systems; municipal political systems; municipal administrative systems, municipal 
finances”, as well as encourages municipalities to concentrate on achieving 
developmental local government outcomes that include the delivery of domestic 
service delivery infrastructure and associated services (e.g. water, sanitation and 
electricity); the formation of liveable, unified and cohesive cities, major towns and rural 
areas; the advancement of local economic growth development and initiatives; 
community development; citizen empowerment; strategic partnering arrangements; 
and economic and social redistribution. 
The White Paper (1998:74) outlines key principles and philosophies intended to guide 
municipalities in deciding or choosing appropriate and responsive service delivery 
options for their own areas that will achieve the developmental goals of local 
government. These principles include: 
• “Accessibility of services: Municipalities must ensure that all citizens have 
access to at least a minimum level of services”. If there are any 
inequalities or differences in the level of access to public services, these 
must be attended to either through the rehabilitation (repairs and 
maintenance) and expansion of new public service delivery infrastructure 





• “Affordability of services: Accessibility is closely linked to affordability”. 
This principle considers affordability as a factor or prerequisite for 
accessibility to these services, particularly for the poor given the fact that 
in many cases key service delivery infrastructure may exist but remain 
outside the reach of many citizens, unless the municipality is able to 
financially afford it. 
• “Quality of products and services”: Service quality is tough to define as it is 
primarily based on perceptions and experiences by citizens. In general, 
quality of service delivery comprises qualities and characteristics, “such as 
suitability for purpose, timeliness, convenience, safety, continuity and 
responsiveness to service users”. 
• “Accountability for services”: Notwithstanding the service delivery 
mechanisms adopted by local government, a good governance 
requirement includes that “municipal councils remain accountable for 
ensuring the provision of quality services that are affordable and 
accessible”. 
• “Integrated development and services: An integrated approach to 
planning”, budgeting and service delivery implementation should be 
adopted by municipalities to ensure enhancement in the provision of 
municipal service delivery. It should include a whole-of-government and a 
whole-of-society approach as this will ensure optimal impact on 
communities. 
• Sustainability of services: Municipal service delivery sustainability is 
dependent on political, institutional, financial and organisational systems 
and procedures that support service delivery sustainability. Service 
delivery sustainability embraces all three essential or key elements: 
“financial viability and the environmentally sound and socially just use of 
resources”. 
• “Value-for-money: Value in the public sector is a matter of both the cost of 
inputs, and of the quality and value of outputs”. It necessitates optimal use 
of public resources (efficiency, effectiveness and economy). This principle 





affordable, within the financial means of communities and which can be 
delivered in a sustainable manner. 
• “Ensuring and promoting competitiveness of local commerce and 
industry”: The enabling role of the public sector in growing the economy 
and creating sustainable jobs through increased competition, reducing red-
tape and promoting ease of doing business by the private sector and 
industry must not be unfavourably affected by public sector (municipal) 
policies and practices such as “higher rates and service charges on 
industry and commerce in order to subsidise domestic users”. 
• “Promoting democracy”: The basic democratic values and principles by 
which the public sector should be governed are provided for in Section 
195(1) of the Constitution. The White Paper (1998:75) makes the point 
that “local government administration must also promote the democratic 
values and principles enshrined in the Constitution”. 
(The White Paper on Local Government (1998:74)) 
 
The new local government system required nationwide municipal elections. In terms 
of sections 155(3)(b), 157 and 190 of the Constitution, national legislation, as 
prescribed by the Constitution, had to be passed to allow an independent autonomous 
authority, namely the Municipal Demarcation Board, to re-demarcate municipal 
boundary areas and wards, prepare for elections and to produce a framework for the 
formation and establishment of the new local government system. 
The following acts were subsequently enacted to pave the way for elections in 
December 2000 that would signal the birth of new municipalities in what was called 
the final phase of transformation of local government: 
• Local Government: Municipal Demarcation Act (No. 27 of 1998); 
• Local Government: Municipal Structures Act (No. 17 of 1998); 
• Local Government: Municipal Electoral Act (No. 27 of 2000); and 






Other laws followed after the 2000 elections, most notably: 
• Local Government: Municipal Finance Management Act (No. 56 of 2003); 
and 
• Local Government: Municipal Property Rates Act (No. 6 of 2004). 
 
There are also a host of other laws, both pre-1994 and post-democratisation that 
directly and indirectly impact on the system and functioning of local government. 
Where relevant and appropriate, these will be covered later in this chapter. Figure 4.1 
sets out the process described above to deracialise local government in South Africa 
pre-1993 to post-2000. 
 
Figure 4.1: Deracialising Local Government in South Africa 





4.2.2 Key Definitions and Concepts 
4.2.2.1 Developmental local government 
Considerable research and policy documents have been written describing the 
developmental role of the state/government or commonly termed ‘developmental local 
government’. According to the UWC Community Law Centre (2007), one of the most 
suitable and appropriate “descriptions of the concept ‘developmental local 
government’ can still be found in the White Paper on Local Government, 1998”, which 
provides the vision for the concept. In terms of the White Paper (1998: Section B), the 
concept of ‘developmental local government’ requires municipalities to exercise their 
municipal powers and functions in a manner that supports the attainment of four main 
characteristics and aims, namely: 
1. “Maximising economic growth and social development: Local government 
is instructed to exercise its powers and functions in a way that has a 
maximum impact on economic growth and social development of 
communities”. 
2. “Integrating and coordinating: Local government integrates and 
coordinates developmental activities of other state and non-state agents 
in the municipal area”. 
3. “Democratic development of public participation: Local government 
becomes the vehicle through which citizens work to achieve their vision of 
the kind of place in which they wish to live”. 
4. “Leading and learning: Municipalities must build social capital, stimulate 
the finding of local solutions for increased sustainability, stimulate local 
political leadership and seek to empower marginalised and excluded 
groups within the community”. 
(The White Paper on Local Government (1998: Section B)) 
 
These characteristics are fully aligned with the principles underpinning the White 
Paper that guide municipalities in choosing appropriate and responsive delivery 
options. According to the UWC Community Law Centre (2007:9), the four 





developmental mandate of local government, but are also extremely beneficial and 
valuable in understanding the constitutional and myriad of other legislative provisions 
that deal with local government (municipalities). They argue that the “functional 
competences of local government should reflect the constitutional vision of 
developmental local government as outlined in the White Paper” and emphasise that 
the decentralised developmental local government role and strategic approach can 
only be effective and practically implementable “if the institutional framework for local 
government gives expression thereto” (UWC Community Law Centre, 2007). Further, 
the UWC Community Law Centre (2007:9) emphasises that “part of this expression 
must be the allocation of powers and functions that are relevant to the developmental 
mandate of local government”. 
The Palmer Development Group (2004, cited by the UWC Community Law Centre, 
2007:9) points out that a main problem is that “current local government functions do 
not enable it to make the maximum social and economic impact envisaged by the 
Constitution and the White Paper” and that given this incongruity or divergence 
between the concept and belief in developmental local government and the 
constitutional determined functional powers of local government, there is an increasing 
concern in government that the dream of creating local government that will make a 
fundamental impact in the socio-economic conditions of people might not realise or be 
possible in the short term.  
In this regard, the President’s Coordinating Council (PCC) resolved to commence a 
process of appraisal or assessment of the constitutionally determined Schedule 4 and 
5 functions. This resolution by the PCC was supported by an appeal by the former 
Finance Minister, Trevor Manuel, in his address to the National Council of Provinces 
at their intergovernmental relations summit in 2007, when he made an appeal for an 
unbiased and impartial assessment on the relevance and appropriateness of the 
current constitutional arrangement on the powers and functions of local government 
and to what extent these contribute or not to achieving the aims and objectives of 
developmental local government.  
The local and provincial government policy review process on the future of provincial 
and local governments, undertaken by the DPLG in 2008, was to give effect to this 





legislative reform perspective to give effect to achieving a more appropriate 
configuration and alignment between the powers and functions of local government 
and developmental local government’s aims and objectives. 
Given the mismatch between the schedules in the Constitution and the developmental 
objective, the UWC Community Law Centre (2007:10) suggests “that the Schedules 
should represent the ‘primary constitutional expression’ of municipal instruments 
towards achieving developmental objects, but that the ‘primary constitutional 
expression’ can then be complemented and refined by incremental decentralisation 
that does not detract or deviate materially from the vision enunciated in the 
Constitution” given that this suggested methodological approach is aligned with the 
main aims, role and function as set out in the Constitution and respective policy 
documents. In this way it will result and serve “as a ‘blueprint’ or ‘transformative’ 
Constitution, aimed at guiding transformation rather than capturing and safeguarding 
the results of transformation”. 
Two main problems emerged given this mismatch between the schedules in the 
Constitution and the concept and belief of developmental local government. Firstly, 
the aims and objectives of developmental local government are ‘not followed through’ 
to logical conclusion as in many cases municipalities are hampered in accomplishing 
their service delivery and developmental objectives, mainly as a result of a lack in 
policy-making capacity and ability, in addition to not having the required authentic 
financial authority on critical and impactful service delivery areas, such as human 
settlements and local economic development. Secondly, the problem of ‘creeping 
decentralisation’, mainly as a result of divergence or misalignment in the recent 
appearance of various forms of, and approaches to, decentralisation that are either 
not aligned with the objectives and or the legislative provisions of the Constitution. This 
is particularly prominent in particular sector-specific discussions. For instance, the 
case of housing accreditation in the human settlements sector relates to the devolution 
and assignment mechanism provided for in the Constitution and the Municipal 
Systems Act when compared against other constitutional instruments such as 
delegation or agency. 
The principle of ‘democratic local government development through public 





become the enabler and mechanism through which communities accomplish their 
aspirations, dreams and vision of the kind of environment in which communities and 
citizens wish to work, live and play. To ensure maximum citizen impact, municipalities 
have a duty or responsibility to collaborate and partner with local communities in the 
delivery of public services. In this way, citizen accountability is enhanced, as the 
solution to the service delivery problem is co-created, co-owned and co-delivered 
between the municipality, community and private sector. The preamble to the Local 
Government Municipal Systems Act (No. 32 of 2000) (Municipal Systems Act) 
confirms this notion when it states that: 
• “… a fundamental aspect of the new local government system is the active 
engagement of communities in the affairs of municipalities of which they 
are an integral part, and in particular in planning, service delivery and 
performance management”; 
• “… the new system of local government requires an efficient, effective and 
transparent local public administration that conforms to constitutional 
principles”; 
• “… there is a need to ensure financially and economically viable 
municipalities”; and 
• “… there is a need to create a more harmonious relationship between 
municipal councils, municipal administrations and the local communities 
through the acknowledgement of reciprocal rights and duties”. 
 
The object of the Municipal Systems Act is “to provide for the core principles, systems, 
mechanisms and processes that are necessary to enable municipalities to move 
progressively towards the social and economic upliftment of local communities, and 
ensure universal access to essential services that are affordable to all; to define the 
legal nature of a municipality as including the local community within the municipal 
area, working in partnership with the municipality’s political and administrative 
structures; to provide for the manner in which municipal powers and functions are 
exercised and performed; to provide for community participation; to establish a simple 
and enabling framework for the core processes of planning, performance 





notion of developmental local government; to provide a framework for local public 
administration and human resource development; to empower the poor and ensure 
that municipalities put in place service tariffs and credit control policies that take their 
needs into account by providing a framework for the provision of services, service 
delivery agreements and municipal service districts; to provide for credit control and 
debt collection; to establish a framework for support, monitoring and standard setting 
by other spheres of government in order to progressively build local government into 
an efficient, frontline development agency capable of integrating the activities of all 
spheres of government for the overall social and economic upliftment of communities 
in harmony with their local natural environment; to provide for legal matters pertaining 
to local government; and to provide for matters incidental thereto”. 
The Systems Act, with regard to developmental local government, as a pre-requisite 
sets the tone for how community financial resources, such as the “rates, taxes and 
levies paid by consumers of municipal goods and services”, in the delivery of public 
services should be applied, more particularly the requirement that the processes, 
systems and service delivery mechanisms should be efficient, effective and 
transparent. Ras (2016:49) makes the point that “gone were the days where 
municipalities had absolute discretion in respect of the application and use of 
resources because a new and fundamental aspect of the new local government 
system is the active engagement of communities in the affairs of municipalities of 
which they are an integral part, and in particular in planning, service delivery and 
performance management”.  
The attainment of developmental local government, as envisaged in the 1998 White 
Paper, is actually the responsibility of all three spheres of government, as a unitary 
state, and will not be assisted by over-emphasis on the disconnect of the unitary state 
through overtly complicated decentralised and asymmetrical models. The terminology 
‘unitary’ and ‘federal’ are often used with some misconception and one should be clear 
about the definition being used. South Africa is a united state, which differs from a 
unitary state and, given the three spheres of government structure (national, provincial 
and local), South Africa is clearly a multi-sphere state or, differently put, it has a multi-
sphere government system. In the classical sense a unitary state is when there is a 





national government for its scope of authority, which is not the case in South Africa. 
All three spheres are constitutionally defined and powers are constitutionally allocated. 
The unitary state is a ‘shared space’, which is typical of a multi-sphere system of 
government or of some federal systems, and South Africa is one with an increasing 
awareness of the complexities in the evolution of institutions and processes. The 
unique role of local government, as the sphere closest to communities, is not 
compromised by measured assessment of how to optimally harness the resources of 
a capacity-strained state, e.g. own revenues are rarely sufficient to provide for 
essential municipal services and support is required through both the grants system 
and in terms of technical capacity to manage infrastructure and service delivery 
challenges. The transformation challenge for government is at a critical stage – and it 
may be that the broader national political and economic transformation processes are 
those that will build the necessary intergovernmental linkages required to protect and 
build communities for the medium and long term. 
 
4.2.2.2 Defining ‘government’ and its workings in South Africa 
The DPSA (2003:11), in its work on ‘the machinery of the state’, defines ‘government’ 
as the “body or bodies responsible for governing the State”. These bodies, within the 
South Africa context, principally “refer to the political executive”, i.e. “the President and 
Cabinet at national level, Premiers and members of Executive Councils at the 
provincial level”; and the mayors and councillors at the local government or municipal 
level. Although the work of the DPSA in 2003 primarily focusses on the national and 
provincial spheres of government, municipal councils should also be included in the 
reference to the ‘political executive’. According to the DPSA (2003:11, citing 
Theunissen, 2000, in Venter, 2001:118), in “common usage, however, the term 
‘government’ is often used to refer to any part of the State and public administrative 
apparatus”, such as “the legislature, executive and judicial branches of government, 
and their respective components”. The DPSA (2003:11) makes the point that “every 
country has its own government and all governments have structures”, components 
and various elements that enable them to function properly and to work “individually 
and together as a system or ‘Machinery of Government’”. The former Minister of 





the structures, as well as various elements and components “contribute individually as 
cogs in the overall wheel of the service delivery machinery in the country”. 
In terms of Section 40(1) of the Constitution, “government is constituted as national, 
provincial and local spheres of government”. These three spheres (not levels) of 
government exist within their own right, but within an integrated intergovernmental 
relations system with each, according to the Constitution, being “distinctive, 
interdependent and interrelated”. 
The term ‘distinctive’ refers to the relative autonomy that each sphere has in respect 
of its powers and functions. The word ‘interrelated’ describes the hierarchal 
relationship between the three spheres, qualified by, in the case of local government, 
supervisory powers as outlined in sections 155(6) and (7) of the Constitution. The term 
‘interdependent’ suggests that the three spheres are dependent on one another so as 
to secure the wellbeing of the people when exercising and performing their respective 
powers and functions. It is for these reasons that the Constitution, in Section 41(1) 
requires that “all spheres of government and all organs of state within each sphere 
must”, given the clear separation of power between the three spheres of government, 
“respect the constitutional status, institutions, powers and functions of government in 
the other spheres”, and further are “not to assume any power or function except those 
conferred on them in terms of the Constitution” and follow and apply the governance 
principle of rule of law, and “exercise their powers and perform their functions in a 
manner that does not encroach on the geographical, functional or institutional integrity 
of government in another sphere”. The Intergovernmental Relations Framework Act 
(No. 13 of 2005) (IGFRA) was adopted to regulate the relationship between the three 
spheres of government, particularly as it relates to these spheres being distinct, 
interdependent and interrelated. 
The South African government system is premised on the doctrine of ‘separation of 
powers’, which requires that the functions of government be divided into legislative, 
executive and judicial functions. Trias politica, or separation of powers is a well-known 
concept internationally and is also part of the South African constitutional system. 
According to Vile (1998), “the name most associated with the doctrine of the 
separation of powers is that of Charles Louis de Secondat, Baron Montesquieu”. 





powers’, he formulated the concept of trias politica as it is known today. He contributed 
new ideas to the doctrine; and accentuated and highlighted essential fundamentals of 
the doctrine that had not previously been acknowledged, in the main as it relates to 
the judiciary. As a result, he rendered the doctrine a more significant meaning and 
application than most former authors on the subject. 
Venter (1998) makes the point that the purpose of the trias politica doctrine is mainly 
to: (a) prevent “excessive concentration of power in a single person or body”; (b) 
prevent the abuse of power by separating government into divisions, thereby 
balancing or limiting each other; and (c) promote greater efficiency. 
During the constitutional negotiations in South Africa, separation of powers was 
accepted as one of the key constitutional principles with which the new constitution 
has to comply (CP VI, 1993-Constitution). This is reflected in the First Certification 
case wherein the “Constitutional Court, in the Certification of the Constitution of the 
Republic of South Africa, 1996” (para. 109), describes it as follows: 
“The principle of separation of powers, on the one hand, recognises the functional 
independence of branches of government. On the other hand, the principle of checks 
and balances focuses on the desirability of ensuring that the constitutional order, as a 
totality, prevents the branches of government from usurping power from one another. 
In this sense it anticipates the necessary or unavoidable intrusion of one branch on 
the terrain of another. No constitutional scheme can reflect a complete separation of 
powers: the scheme is always one of partial separation”. 
This doctrine implies that separate branches of government, i.e. the government 
machinery (how government functions, operates and works), will perform clear, yet 
distinct, separate functions, as follows: 
• Laws will be made by the legislature, comprising of the elected members 
(parliament, legislatures and municipal councils) who, according to PAAB 
(2018) “represent the public, approve policies and laws and monitor the 
work of the executive and departments”; 
• The executive, comprising the Cabinet, provincial executive councils and 
municipal councils (president, premier, mayors, national and provincial 





responsible for the policy making and coordination, making of laws and 
overseeing the implementation of laws by the public sector institutions; 
and 
• The judiciary will enforce and judge the acts of both the legislature and 
executive. 
 
In the local government sphere, there is no division or distinction between legislative 
and executive power, as is the case in national and provincial governments. In terms 
of Section 160(1) of the Constitution, a municipal council (as a collective governance 
body) is empowered to make “decisions concerning the exercise of all the powers and 
the performance of all the functions of the municipality”. In other words, this includes 
the exercising of both legislative and executive powers and functions. This distinction 
is important for purposes of delegation in that it is allowable in law for municipal 
councils to delegate executive powers; however, the statutes do not permit municipal 
councils to delegate legislative powers and functions. 
In terms of the 1996 Constitution, in South Africa the governance arrangements of the 
state are comprised of three distinct parts, namely the legislature, executive and 
administration. The legislature and the executive were discussed earlier. The 
administration, as a part of the government architecture, consists of departments, 
municipalities and public servants who are accountable to the executive for the outputs 
of government and who do the day-to-day work of government as part of the public 
sector. The table below depicts the structural governance arrangements of the state 







Table 4.1: Governance Arrangements of the State 
SPHERE OF 
GOVERNMENT 
LEGISLATURE EXECUTIVE ADMINISTRATION / 
ACCOUNTING 
OFFICERS 
National sphere  National parliament President and 





Provincial sphere Provincial legislatures Premier and members 
of the executive 
councils (MECs) 
Director-general, 
heads of provincial 
departments and staff  
Local sphere Municipal councils Mayor and members 
of the mayoral 




and staff  
 
In summary, government has the overarching responsibility to formulate policies, laws 
and regulations about citizens’ and communities’ rights and responsibilities and also 
to determine accountability arrangements for the delivery of government services. On 
the other hand, government also has the right, subject to certain legislative conditions, 
to impose taxes, user fees and charges, to these citizens and communities and to 
apply these monies to deliver public services and infrastructure that enhances and 
improves the lives and overall socio-economic conditions of all people (not just 
citizens) in the country, particularly the poor and the most vulnerable. 
 
4.2.2.3 Defining ‘local government’ and its workings in South Africa 
‘Local government’ in South Africa is one of the three spheres of government and 
consists of the collective of 278 different municipalities that have been demarcated 
wall-to-wall in the country, and which as a collective constitute the whole of the territory 
South Africa. With the introduction of Chapter 7 of the 1996 Constitution, the standing 
of local government changed from a lower tier of government, as expressed in the 
1910, 1961 and 1983 constitutions, dependent for its very existence on higher 
legislative bodies, to a fully-fledged separate sphere of government. Local government 





constituted as a form of government with its own constitutional rights, responsibilities 
and functions, all of which are set out in the 1996 Constitution and the many statutes. 
Section 2 of the Constitution provides for the concepts of ‘constitutional supremacy’ 
and ‘rule of law’, particularly pronouncing the Constitution to be the supreme law of 
the Republic of South Africa and stating that the obligations imposed by the 
Constitution must be obeyed, observed and fulfilled, as well as that any other law, 
behaviour or conduct that is inconsistent with the provisions of the Constitution is 
invalid. Constitutional sovereignty or supremacy dictates that the ‘rules of the 
Constitution’ are binding on all spheres of government and have priority over any other 
rules or statute made by any of the three spheres of government. 
The ‘rule of law’ implies that each sphere of government, which includes local 
government, may only act within the constitutional powers lawfully conferred upon it 
and that exercising their public power is only legitimate, where lawful. The 
constitutional provisions and principles of ultimate supremacy or sovereignty and the 
‘rule of law’ therefore obliges municipalities, including their structures, office bearers 
and staff to, in all respects, comply with the provisions of the entire Constitution in the 
exercise of powers and performance of functions. Section 7(2) of the Constitution 
provides and sets out a distinct duty on the state, which includes local government, “to 
respect, protect, promote and fulfil the rights in the Bill of Rights” given that the Bill of 
Rights is applicable to all statutes, and the obligation to comply with it is fully binding 
on “the legislature, the executive, the judiciary and all organs of state”. 
The existence of local government originated on the principles and philosophies of 
democracy, which is the cornerstone of the Constitution in South Africa. Sections 
152(1)(a) and 160(8)(b) of the Constitution regulate democracy11, as it relates to local 
government, in the following manner: 
• “Objects of local government are to provide democratic and accountable 
government for local communities”; and 
                                            
11 Other references to ‘democracy’ can be found in sections 57, 59, 61, 70, 72, 116, 118, 195, 234, 236 





• “Members of a municipal council are entitled to participate in its 
proceedings and those of its committees in a manner that is consistent 
with democracy”. 
 
In the local government sphere, three types of democracy are distinguishable, namely 
(i) representative democracy, (ii) participatory democracy; and (iii) direct democracy. 
As indicated earlier, in local government there is no division or separation of powers 
between the executive and legislative powers of council. Legislative power is the 
authority or original powers conferred by the Constitution on a municipal council to 
make enforceable rules of general application, which apply to all residents in the 
municipal area, rather than to individuals. In this regard, a municipal council primarily 
exercises its legislative powers when it adopts a by-law or the budget (being legislative 
in nature). Municipalities do not have unfettered legislative powers. Section 156(3) of 
the Constitution expressly makes municipal by-laws subject to national and provincial 
legislation and provides that a by-law is invalid and as a consequence not enforceable 
if it is in conflict with or contradicts national or provincial statutes. In addition, the 
exercising of legislative power is also subject to compliance with the principle of 
legality (‘rule of law’). 
Executive powers refer to the authority to implement or give effect to the law created 
by the legislature or council. In most cases, executive action constitutes ‘administrative 
action’, which refers to those acts that implement or give effect to a policy or piece of 
legislation within the framework of administrative justice as contemplated in Section 
3312 of the Constitution and extensively defined in the Promotion of Administrative 
Justice Act (PAJA) (No. 3 of 2000). However, executive action that does not constitute 
‘administrative action’ is not left uncontrolled. Such acts must conform to the principle 
of legality, as set out in the Constitution. The basis for the administration of justice is 
                                            
12 “(1) Everyone has the right to administrative action that is lawful, reasonable and procedurally fair; 
 (2) Everyone whose rights have been adversely affected by administrative action has the right to be given 
written reasons; 
 (3) National legislation must be enacted to give effect to these rights, and must-  
 (a) Provide for the review of administrative action by a court or, where appropriate, an independent and 
impartial tribunal;  
 (b) Impose a duty on the state to give effect to the rights in subsections (1) and (2); and  





provided for in chapters 8 and 9 of the Constitution and sets out the provisions for 
government or state institutions to defend, guard, preserve, direct and manage the 
underlying spirit and principles of the Constitution. 
 
4.2.2.4 Defining ‘municipality’ and its workings in South Africa 
The establishment of municipalities for the whole of South Africa is founded in Chapter 
7, particularly in Section 151, of the Constitution. Section 155(3)(b) of the Constitution 
requires that the principles, criteria and procedures for determining municipal 
boundaries be determined by an independent authority13. A municipality may only 
govern, perform and execute its executive, legislative and administrative powers within 
its demarcated borders and for a specific purpose. In addition, it may only “exercise 
executive authority in the area of that other municipality” in concurrence with and by 
an agreement in writing, which has been approved by the respective municipal 
councils and subject to Chapter 5 of the Municipal Structures Act and other applicable 
national legislation (Section 11(2) of the Systems Act14). 
Section 2 of the Systems Act defines “a municipality as an organ of state within the 
local sphere of government exercising legislative and executive authority within its 
area of jurisdiction”. The Constitution, in Section 239, defines an ‘organ of state’ to 
include, amongst others, “any department of state or administration in the national, 
provincial or local sphere of government”. 
The Systems Act (2000) Section 2(b), describes a ‘municipality’ as comprising of 
political structures, the administration and the community. The political structures refer 
to the council of the municipality as the collective of council members and not to 
individual political officer bearers “or any committee or other collective structure of a 
municipality elected, designated or appointed in terms of a specific provision of the 
Municipal Structures Act”. The administration generally refers to the staff of the 
municipality and, in accordance with Section 55 of the Systems Act, the municipal 
                                            
13 The Local Government: Municipal Demarcation Act (No. 27 of 1998) provides for the appointment of a Municipal 
Demarcation Board to determine municipal boundaries. 
14 This provides for one exception in circumstances where a municipality could for instance establish a reservoir 





manager is the accounting officer and the head of the administration. The community, 
is an important element of the municipality and its members have statutory conferred 
rights and obligations, as reflected in the Bill of Rights and set out in Section 5 of the 
Systems Act. 
As indicated earlier, according to the National Treasury (2011) and confirmed by the 
Electoral Commission of SA (2017), since 2016 there have been 257 municipalities 
within the South African context. This consists of 8 (eight) Category A metropolitan 
municipalities with an executive mayoral system “with both a sub-council and a ward 
participatory system”, 205 (two-hundred and five) Category B local municipalities, with 
a mayoral executive system combined with a ward participatory system and covering 
areas outside of the metropolitan boundaries with each municipality broken into 
various wards, and 44 (forty-four) Category C or district municipalities, having an 
executive mayoral system and made up of a number of local municipalities that fall in 
one district (National Treasury, 2011). Section 4.7 expands on the types and 
categories of municipalities in South Africa as captured in Section 155 of the 
Constitution. 
Each municipality has a council that comprises a collective of councillors who are 
publicly elected members from the community and who, as a collective, fulfil both 
functions of the executive and the legislature. The municipal council is responsible for 
making policy decisions and by-laws for their area, overseeing the administration and 
ensuring that accountability arrangements are in place that will guarantee 
implementation of policies and by-laws by municipal officials and staff. As a collective, 
the municipal council is accountable to the public for delivery of public goods and 
services. The municipal council governs the specific demarcated municipal area and 
has the power to exercise authority and to, in terms of Section 152 of the Constitution, 
given its legislative authority, make and administer by-laws for the effective 
administration of the matters that it has legislative authority or right to administer, as 
set out in parts B of schedules 4 and 5 of the Constitution, or as assigned to it by 
national or provincial legislation. The municipal council also has the right, in terms of 
sections 160(1) and (2) of the Constitution and Section 75A of the Systems Act, to 
impose property rates, taxes, fees, levies and surcharges for services provided by or 





power to perform the function of imposition of taxes, fees or levies is exclusively vested 
in the municipal council and the council may not delegate this power to anyone else. 
Some of the main responsibilities of council, which functions under the political 
guidance of the mayor, are to decide on the quantum and level of basic service delivery 
provision for their municipal area, assess and consider spatial development plans and 
to pass a medium-term revenue and expenditure budget for its municipality each year 
that is funded, sustainable and responsive to the service delivery plans. In addition, 
given the accountability relationship, council is held accountable by citizens for 
delivery and, in return, through its institutionalised processes enforces appropriate 
accountability arrangements on the municipal administration to ensure delivery. 
 
4.3 THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS SYSTEM OF LOCAL 
GOVERNMENT IN SOUTH AFRICA 
4.3.1 Intergovernmental and Local Government Functional Framework 
As the supreme law of the country, the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 
(Act 108 of 1996) provides the legal basis for the existence of the Republic. The 
Constitution sets out the rights, duties and obligations of its citizens and its people and 
defines the structure of government and the relationship of various government 
structures to each other. 
Although South Africa can be regarded as having a united system of government, it 
has very strong features of decentralisation. The entire Chapter 3 of the Constitution 
deals exclusively with co-operative governance between the three spheres of 
government. Section 40 (Chapter 3) of the Constitution defines that the government 
of the Republic “is constituted as national, provincial and local spheres of government 
which are distinctive, interdependent and interrelated”. The Section sets a requirement 
that it is incumbent on all three spheres of government to observe, obey and adhere 
to the principles of co-operative government as set out in Chapter 3 and should 
conduct their business, activities and actions within the ambit and broad parameters 





Given the importance of local government as a separate sphere of government, 
Chapter 7 of the 1996 Constitution is exclusively dedicated to deal with local 
government matters and provides for, amongst others: 
• The status of municipalities, which is covered in Section 151; 
• The objectives and developmental obligations and duties of local 
government, as set out in sections 152 and 153 respectively; 
• The different kinds and the establishment of municipalities in Section155. 
A discussion of this was covered previously in Section 4.2.2.4; 
• Municipalities’ role in co-operative government is addressed in Section 
154 of the Constitution and is covered extensively in Section 4.3.2 below; 
and  
• The powers, functions, rights and authority of municipalities as listed in 
schedules 4 (Part B) and 5 (Part B) is set out in Section 156 of the 
Constitution. Depending on who the original legislative authority has been 
given to, Section 156 also covers matter appearing in schedules 4 (Part A) 
and 5 (Part A) that may be assigned to local government by either national 
or provincial government. 
 
Different powers, functions and service delivery responsibilities have been assigned 
by the Constitution to each of the three spheres of government. In this regard, local 
government and provincial government, as sub-national spheres, have been given an 
essential and indispensable role in the delivery of frontline basic services to 
communities, particularly to the vulnerable and poor. The Constitution delineates 
public service delivery functions, i.e. policy making, legislative, administrative and 
performance monitoring, into two main categories, namely exclusive powers and those 
powers and functions that are concurrent. 
Exclusive functions are those listed in Schedule 5 of the Constitution that have been 
allocated to be performed exclusively by one sphere of government. Concurrent 
functions, being the majority of functions and set out in Schedule 4, are those allocated 
to be concurrently shared between the spheres of government. Given that national 





that have not been explicitly assigned to either provincial or local government, the 
Constitution does not specifically describe nor set out the exclusive functions of 
national government. Exclusive national functions include matters such as national 
defence, police, state security, higher education, macro-economic and fiscal policy 
matters affecting the country, home and foreign affairs, matters affecting the judiciary 
and the broader criminal justice system (e.g. judges, magistrates and law courts). 
Safety (police services) has a concurrent character in terms of the Constitution. 
Schedule 5 (Part A) of the Constitution provides the provincial sphere’s exclusive 
legislative powers, functions and competence and includes major provincial functions, 
such as basic education, provincial health, provincial roads and provincial planning. 
For reasons of maintaining critical and indispensable national standards or in the 
interest of national security, the Constitution provides the power or rights to national 
government to enact legislation in these ‘exclusive’ provincial functional areas. The 
Constitution, in Schedule 4 (Part A), provides a list of the “functional areas of 
concurrent national and provincial legislative competence” and includes functions 
such as primary and secondary school education, primary and secondary health care 
services, social welfare and development services, human settlements and 
development planning and agriculture. The norm in relation to these services is for 
national government to take the central initiative to articulate and formulate policy, 
determine legislative and regulatory frameworks and conditions, determine and set 
norms and standards, and monitor and evaluate the overall implementation of such 
policies. On the contrary, provinces are generally responsible for implementation and 
to give effect to these nationally determined policies and frameworks during the 
implementation process and, as a consequence, given the separate responsibilities 
and the fiscal arrangements in the country, provincial expenditure budgets for these 
functions generally far exceed the budgets of the applicable national department. 
The primary functions performed by local government include the supply and 
reticulation of electricity, supply of potable water, sewerage and sanitation services, 
refuse and solid waste services, storm water protection services, municipal roads, 
governance and administration, and municipal public services, such as environmental 





The National Treasury, in its Local Government Budget and Expenditure Review 
(2011:32) makes the point that “there are very few, if any, local government functions 
that can be described as exclusive”, that the functions listed in Schedules 4 (Part B) 
and 5 (Part B) of the Constitution are concurrent functions and that “in nearly all 
instances, there is either national or provincial framework legislation.” The National 
Treasury emphasises that, notwithstanding the limitation in local government’s 
exclusive power and functions, municipalities “do exercise a high degree of autonomy 
when making by-laws and administrating these functions within the prescribed national 
or provincial frameworks”. Nonetheless, municipal legislative powers remain limited, 
particularly given that municipal by-laws, regulations and rules may not be in conflict 
with or contradict neither national nor provincial laws and regulations. 
 
4.3.2 The Constitution and Cooperative Government 
Chapter 3 of the Constitution provides a set of principles that should drive effective 
collaboration across the three spheres of government. Chapter 3, Section 41(1)(c) 
provides for effective transparent, accountable, responsive and coherent government 
across the three spheres. This is supported by principle (iv) of Section 41(h), which 
refers to cooperation in mutual trust and good faith between the spheres by 
“coordinating their actions and legislation with one another”. Co-operative government 
is further elaborated on in Section 154(1) of the Constitution which specifically deals 
with the role of municipalities in co-operative government. 
As the activities of the three spheres cannot be placed in water-tight compartments, 
overlapping is bound to occur, which may lead to confrontation. Co-operation within 
and between the spheres of government is essential in order to enhance effectiveness 
of government. For these reasons those drafting the Constitution thought it wise to 
dedicate an entire chapter in the Constitution to specifically dealing with co-operative 
government and intergovernmental relations. 
Section 151 of the Constitution provides for the ‘status of local government’ or 
alternatively put, the independence of municipalities as an autonomous self-regulating 
separate sphere of government with its own powers and functions and which is 





decision making and using its own initiative. However, the ‘independence’ of 
municipalities is debatable – it is rather a limited or relative autonomy. The reference 
to own initiative strengthens that autonomy, and simply means that a municipality has 
the freedom (inside the domain and scope of national and provincial legislation) to 
reflect on their particular circumstances and decide how to govern their affairs to serve 
the needs of that community. It does not have to wait for directions from national or 
provincial government to decide on local priorities. Own initiative suggests that a 
municipality can start the process and identify its own needs and priorities, e.g. in the 
Integrated Development Plan (IDP) and the Service Delivery Budget Implementation 
Plan (SDBIP). 
Jesse (2012:49) makes the point that “municipalities are engaged in constant debate 
on the interpretation and application of Section 151, concerning (i) the notion of 
municipal autonomy, which does not exonerate them from ties with national and 
provincial regulations; and (ii) the separation of the executive and the legislative and 
its effect on and subsequent impact on the performance of the municipality” and that 
in this regard, “provision is made for the executive and the legislative functions to 
reside with the municipal council”. 
Section 151 of the Constitution provides, amongst others, that: 
• “A municipality has the right to govern, on its own initiative, the local 
government affairs of its community, subject to national and provincial 
legislation, as provided for in the Constitution.” 
• “The national or a provincial government may not compromise or impede a 
municipality’s ability or right to exercise its powers or perform its 
functions.” 
 
Given that organisational service delivery performance can be regarded as the 
aggregate of service delivery performance outcomes in every aspect of the institution’s 
(municipality’s) operations, Section 152 of the Constitution identifies five key areas of 
municipal operations that are and should be measurable in terms of its services and 
products, i.e. the outputs and developmental outcomes, and that must be delivered 





Sections 152(1) and (2) of the Constitution provide the objects and main aims of local 
government and direct each municipality in the execution all of administrative, planning 
and service delivery processes and functions. Section 152 of the Constitution imbeds 
five key measurable performance areas for municipal success and measuring 
municipal performance. More specifically, Section 152(1) of the 1996 Constitution 
states that the “objects of local government are  
 To provide democratic and accountable government for local 
communities; 
 To ensure the provision of services to communities in a sustainable 
manner; 
 To promote social and economic development; 
 To promote a safe and healthy environment; and 
 To encourage the involvement of communities and community 
organisations in the matters of local government.” 
 
Further, Section 152(2) sets out that “a municipality must strive, within its financial and 
administrative capacity, to achieve the objects set out in” Section 152(1). The five key 
measurable performance areas (KPAs), as provided in Section 152(1)(a)-(e), provide 
a basis and should direct and guide municipalities in setting their strategic and key 
performance objectives in their respective policy and performance documentation and 
ultimately enable them to report on performance against these constitutionally stated 
objectives of local government. 
The developmental objectives and duties of local government are set out in Section 
153 of the Constitution and provide that “a municipality must –  
 structure and manage its administration and budgeting and planning 
processes to give priority to the basic needs of the community, and to 
promote the social and economic development of the community; and  






Sections 152(2) and 153 of the Constitution emphasise the responsibility that 
municipalities have to direct the use of their available financial and other resources to 
achieve the objectives of local government “within its financial and administrative 
capacity”. Given the constitutional obligation, municipalities should prioritise the 
delivery of basic services, such as water, electricity and sanitation in a sustainable 
manner within their financial means and administrative capacity and ability. 
Section 154 of the 1996 Constitution deals with ‘municipalities in co-operative 
government’. This Section places a constitutional responsibility on both “the national 
and provincial governments, by legislative and other measures, to support and 
strengthen the capacity of municipalities to manage their own affairs, to exercise their 
powers and to perform their functions”. In addition to support by national and provincial 
governments when a municipality is unable to fulfil an executive obligation in terms of 
the Constitution or legislation, provincial intervention in local government is provided 
for in Section 139 of the Constitution. Further, if a provincial executive council is unable 
to, or cannot effectively and satisfactorily, exercise the constitutional powers related 
to this intervention, the national executive (Cabinet) must intervene instead of the 
relevant provincial executive council. The intervention mechanism in terms of Section 
139 of the Constitution is covered later in this chapter. 
 
4.3.3 Powers and Functions of Local Government 
The primary source of the powers and functions of a municipality is founded in a 
number of sections in the Constitution, namely: 
1. Matters which are listed in Schedules 4B and 5B of the Constitution; 
2. Fiscal powers and functions, including the fiscal arrangements in Chapter 
13 and Section 229; and 
3. Powers and functions that may be assigned in terms of sections 44, 99, 
104, 126 and 156. 
The Constitution, in schedules 4 (Part B) and 5 (Part B), outlines the powers and 
functions of local government, with metropolitan municipalities having all of these 
functions. The SALGA (2015:13) makes the point that the “Constitution requires a 





provided for in Section 84 of the Municipal Structures Act. According to the SALGA 
(2015:13), it has for various reasons been an extremely difficult process to implement 
the division of responsibilities, powers and functions between category B (local) and 
category C (district) municipalities. They make the point that “instead of ‘taking the 
plunge’ and allowing the system as anticipated in the legislation to come into effect, 
an amendment to the Municipal Structures Act was made to allow the newly 
established municipalities in 2000 to continue performing the ‘status quo’ of the interim 
phase of local government transformation” (SALGA, 2015). This was mainly to 
guarantee that municipalities “were able to stabilise their structures and systems prior 
to any major reorganisation of powers and functions” (SALGA, 2015:13). 
4.3.3.1 Matters listed in schedules 4B and 5B of the Constitution 
The powers and functions of municipalities are set out in Section 156 of the 1996 
Constitution and are reflected in Schedules 4B and 5B, which are attached as 
Annexure 2. Section 156 of the 1996 Constitution highlights that “a municipality has 
executive authority in respect of, and has the right to administer- 
 The local government matters listed in Part B of Schedule 4 and Part B 
of Schedule 5; and  
 Any other matter assigned to it by national or provincial legislation”. 
(2) “A municipality may make and administer by-laws for the effective 
administration of the matters which it has the right to administer.  
(3)  … 
(4) The national government and provincial governments must assign to a 
municipality, by agreement and subject to any conditions, the administration of a 
matter listed in Part A of Schedule 4 and Part A of Schedule 5 which necessarily 
relates to local government if –  
 that matter would most effectively be administered locally, and  
 the municipality has the capacity to administer it. 
(5) A municipality has the right to exercise any power concerning a matter 





In 2005, the Municipal Demarcation Board (MDB) released a report that ranks each 
function according to the importance attached to the delivery of the service. Priority 1 
functions are regarded as high importance and must be delivered by municipalities. 
Priority 2 functions have moderate importance and should be delivered, while Priority 
3 functions are regarded as low importance only to be delivered if funds are available. 
The following table sets out the MDB’s priority ranking of local government functions: 
 
Table 4.2: The Municipal Demarcation Board’s Priority Ranking of Local Government 
Functions 
Priority 1 functions Priority 2 functions Priority 3 functions 
Potable water  
Municipal roads 
Sanitation 
Refuse, solid waste removal 
and disposal 
Waste management and 
rehabilitation of refuse dumps 
Municipal planning 
Storm water 
Cemeteries, funeral parlors 
and crematoria 
Electricity reticulation 
Municipal health services 
Fire fighting 




Licensing and control of 
institutions selling food to the 
public 
Street trading 
Trading by-laws and 
regulations 
Law enforcement, control and 
management of public 
nuisance 
Animal control including 




Beaches and amusement 
facilities (public spaces) 
Municipal public transport 
Pontoons and ferries 
Local community sports 
facilities 
Municipal recreation areas, 
such as parks and open public 
places 
Local tourism 
Advertising, commercials and 
billboards and the display of in 
public places 
Local amenities 




Accommodation, hostel and 
care facilities 
Burial of animals 
Markets 
Municipal abattoirs 





4.4 LEGISLATIVE AND POLICY REQUIREMENTS: KEY LOCAL GOVERNMENT 
FUNCTIONS 
The legislative and policy provisions covering the delivery of the main basic trading 
services (Priority 1 functions) are detailed in the following sections. 
 
4.4.1 Provision of Water and Sanitation: Water Services Act (No. 108 of 1997) 
The purpose of the Water Services Act (WSA) (1997) is “to provide for the rights of 
access to basic water supply and basic sanitation; to provide for the setting of national 
standards and of norms and standards for tariffs; to provide for water services 
development plans; to provide a regulatory framework for water services institutions 
and water services intermediaries; to provide for the establishment and 
disestablishment of water boards and water services committees and their powers and 
duties; to provide for the monitoring of water services and intervention by the Minister 
or by the relevant Province; to provide for financial assistance to water services 
institutions; to provide for certain general powers of the Minister; and to provide for the 
gathering of information in a national information system and the distribution of that 
information”. 
Furthermore, the WSA (1997) sets out the legislative competency of local government 
for “the provision of water and sanitation”, which is limited to the provision of safe or 
“potable water supply systems and domestic waste-water and sewage disposal 
systems”. The WSA (1997) defines ‘water services’ to mean “water supply services 
and sanitation services”, whilst ‘water supply services’ means “the abstraction, 
conveyance, treatment and distribution of potable water, water intended to be 
converted to potable water or water for commercial use but not water for industrial 
use”. ‘Sanitation services’ are defined as “the collection, removal, disposal or 
purification of human excreta, domestic waste-water, sewage and effluent resulting 







4.4.2 Provision of Electricity and Energy: Electricity Regulation Amendment Act 
(No. 28 of 2007) 
The Electricity Regulation Amendment Act (No. 28 of 2007) deals with the regulation 
of electricity reticulation by municipalities and clarifies the role of local government in 
the reticulation of electricity as “the trading or distribution of electricity and includes 
services associated therewith”. South African electricity distribution is mainly the role 
of Eskom, as the main electricity distributor in the country. The Electricity Regulation 
Act (2006) defines this distribution as the “conveyance of electricity through a 
distribution power system excluding trading, and ‘distribute’ and ‘distributing’ have 
corresponding meanings”. 
The Minister responsible for energy may, in terms of section 35 of the Electricity 
Regulation Act (2006), issue regulations to prescribe, amongst others: compulsory 
rules, “norms and standards for reticulation services [and] general key performance 
indicators” to regulate technical operational issues pertaining to electricity reticulation; 
principles, norms and standards to determine electricity reticulation tariffs in 
consultation with the Minister of Finance; and that the standards, measures and 
criteria to assess service mechanisms and standards be evaluated. 
 
4.4.3 Environment and Climate: National Environmental Management Act (No. 
107 of 1998) 
The Constitution lists ‘environment’ as a Schedule 4, Part A function, which is a 
functional area of concurrent national and provincial government legislative 
competence. The National Environmental Management Act (No. 107 of 1998) (NEMA) 
in section 1, defines the concept of ‘environment’ as 
“the surroundings within which humans exist and that 
are made up of - 
(i) the land, water and atmosphere of the earth; 
(ii) micro-organisms, plant and animal life; 





and between them; and 
(iv) the physical, chemical, aesthetic and cultural properties and conditions 
of the foregoing that influence human health and wellbeing”. 
The NEMA deals mainly with the use of natural resources and levels of air and water 
pollution. This Act was introduced as an all-encompassing piece of legislation covering 
waste and pollution matters and thereby amalgamating all previous fragmented 
legislation in a number of departments and institutions. The NEMA also clarifies and 
allocates specific roles and responsibilities within government for waste management 
and pollution matters. 
A host of environmental legislation has been issued over the last few years that 
regulate municipal environmental functions, such as refuse removal, landfill sites and 
coastal management to mitigate the environmental effects of South Africa’s over-
reliance on fossil fuels (coal) for energy, and to manage the demand for electricity. 
Waste management is regarded as the most urgent environmental management 
intervention by local government as a whole. Government and the broader public 
sector do not have exclusive sanctuary or preserve for waste management and 
pollution matters, as the private sector and civil society also have crucial roles to play, 
particularly given global risks and environmental challenges, especially around climate 
change and waste management. It is therefore crucial for government and the private 
sector to partner in all initiatives to ensure an environmentally sustainable future 
through effective pollution and waste management control. 
In the 1996 Constitution, ‘nature conservation’ is listed as a Schedule 4, Part A 
function, which is classified as a concurrent national and provincial government 
legislative competence. In terms of schedules 4 and 5, ‘nature conservation’ is not 
listed as a local government function. The key pieces of national and provincial 
legislation that regulate nature conservation include the National Environmental 
Management: Protected Areas Act (No. 57 of 2003) and the National Environmental 







4.4.4 Human Settlements and Housing: Housing Act (No. 107 of 1997) 
The Constitution sets ‘housing and human settlements’ as a concurrent national and 
provincial legislative competence and, in many cases, when the function is not 
performed by neither a provincial department nor national government, municipalities 
perform the function on an agency basis. The Housing Act (No. 107 of 1997) makes 
provision for municipalities to take responsibility for the planning process related to 
housing, development of land, the provision of bulk and connector subterranean 
infrastructure and, increasingly, the topping up of funding for internal infrastructure. 
The 1997 Housing Act provides “for the accreditation of local government to administer 
housing programmes to enable them to plan the implementation of their 
developmental objectives in a coordinated manner through a three step process”, 
namely levels one, two and three. Level One accreditation allows for the management 
of the processes as it relates to housing beneficiaries, the associated budget planning, 
subsidy management and subsidy allocation process and includes the administration 
and priority programme management related to the function. According to the Housing 
Act (1997), Level Two accreditation includes the functions allocated under Level One 
accreditation, plus permits full human settlement “programme management and 
administration of all housing instruments/programmes”. Accreditation on Level Three 
allows for the full package of services, namely it includes all the responsibilities linked 
to levels One and Two, as well as the full financial administration function related to 
the delivery of human settlements. 
 
4.4.5 Public Transport and Related Matters: National Land Transport Act (No. 5 
of 2009) 
The 1996 Constitution lists ‘public transport’ in Schedule 4A as “a functional area of 
concurrent national and provincial legislative competence”, whilst ‘municipal public 
transport’ is listed in Schedule 4B, also as “a functional area of concurrent national 
and provincial legislative competence”. The National Land Transport Act (No. 5 of 
2009) (NLTA) regulates matters relating to public transport and its object is to further 
the process of transforming and reorganising the national land transport system 





defines an integrated public transport network as “a system in a particular area that 
integrates public transport services between modes, with through-ticketing and other 
appropriate mechanisms to provide users of the system with the optimal solutions to 
be able to travel from their origins to destinations in a seamless manner”. 
The national sphere of government is responsible for, amongst others, the assignment 
of land transport functions to the sphere of government that is considered most 
appropriate to deliver the land transport functions. The provincial sphere of 
government, in terms of the NLTA (2009). is responsible for, amongst others, the 
“planning, co-ordination and facilitation of land transport functions in the province” and 
must also coordinate land transport functions between the various municipalities in the 
province in order to ensure that land transport activities are effectively and efficiently 
executed and that the people receive optimal benefit and public value. 
The responsibility for the development of land transport policies and strategies within 
a specific municipal area rests within the local government sphere. These policies and 
strategies must be based on the national and provincial norms, standards and 
guidelines. They should, on a high level, include the vision for the specific municipal 
area and should include and integrate the specific municipal spatial development 
policies and frameworks “on matters such as densification and infilling as well as 
development corridors; financial planning with regard to land transport within or 
affecting its area; managing the movement of persons and goods on land within its 
area by coordinating such movement; encouraging and promoting the optimal use of 
the available travel modes so as to enhance the effectiveness of the transport system 
and reduce travelling time and costs; undertaking functions relating to municipal roads, 
as well as measures to limit damage to the road system; the planning, implementation 
and management of modally integrated public transport networks and travel corridors 
for transport within the municipal area” (section 11 of the NTLA 2009) and linking and 
coordinating with adjacent neighbouring municipalities. The municipality must also 
determine and “set standards for interoperability between fare collection and ticketing 
systems” in its area (section 5 of the NTLA 2009). 
Any municipality that has an acceptable integrated transport plan in place may request 
the Minister of Transport or relevant MEC in a province to assign to them any function 





subject to the provisions and requirements of Section 156(4) of the Constitution and 
sections 9 and 10 of the Municipal Systems Act. However, according to the 
Parliamentary Monitoring Group (2018), in the case where a municipality was already 
performing a function contemplated in subsection (1)(a) when the NTLA commenced, 
such function was deemed to have been assigned to that municipality under 
subsection (2). According to the NTLA (2009), the “Minister may make regulations or 
issue guidelines providing for transitional arrangements where a function is assigned 
under subsection (2), which may differentiate between (a) different categories of 
municipalities, budgetary size or in any other determinable manner; or (b) functional 
areas”. Therefore, the legislation covering public transport and mobility holds far-
reaching implications for municipalities as it signals and provides a significant shift in 
the powers and functions in relation to the role of municipalities in public transport. 
 
4.4.6 Municipal Health Services: National Health Act (No. 61 of 2003) 
Municipalities are responsible for the delivery of ‘municipal health services’ in terms of 
Schedule 4B of the Constitution, whilst provinces are responsible for ‘health services’ 
in terms of Schedule 4A of the Constitution. ‘Health services’ and ‘municipal health 
services’ are further defined in section 1 of the National Health Act (No. 61 of 2003) 
(NHA). 
The definition of ‘health services’, which is the constitutional responsibility of provincial 
governments, includes “(a) health care services, including reproductive health care 
and emergency medical treatment, contemplated in Section 27 of the Constitution; (b) 
basic nutrition and basic health care services contemplated in Section 28(1)(c) of the 
Constitution; (c) medical treatment contemplated in Section 35(2)(e) of the 
Constitution; and (d) municipal health services”. ‘Primary health care services are 
defined, in section 1 of the NHA as any “such health services as may be prescribed 
by the Minister” responsible for health to be regarded as primary health care services. 
The delivery of primary health care services is assigned to the provincial sphere of 
government. 
Municipal health care services are defined, in section 1 of the NHA (2003) as “(a) water 





premises; (e) surveillance and prevention of communicable diseases, excluding 
immunisations; (f) vector control; (g) environmental pollution control; (h) disposal of 
the dead; and (i) chemical safety”. The functions of “port health, malaria control and 
control of hazardous substances”, have been excluded from the definition of ‘municipal 
health services’ (section 1 of the NHA, 2003).  
The delivery of municipal health services is assigned to every metropolitan and district 
municipality and, therefore, the definition of municipal health services limits local 
government’s role, particularly the larger urban municipalities, which prior to 2004 
often provided the primary health care function. The National Health Act, however, 
makes provision that “the relevant member of the Executive Council must assign such 
health services to a municipality in his or her province as are contemplated in Section 
156(4) of the Constitution”. In this regard, the conditions of assignment set out in a 
service level agreement must, amongst others, “provide for (a) the services to be 
rendered by the municipality; (b) the resources that the relevant member of the 
Executive Council must make available; (c) performance standards which must be 
used to monitor services rendered by the municipality; and (d) conditions under which 
the agreement may be terminated” (Section 32 of the NHA, 2003). 
 
4.4.7 Libraries Function 
Prior to the 1996 Constitution, municipalities were functionally responsible for the 
delivery of the library function. The library function, other than national libraries, in 
terms of Schedule 5A of the Constitution, has been exclusively assigned to provincial 
governments. The library function is thus, according to the 1996 Constitution, “a 
functional area of exclusive provincial legislative competence”. 
According to Provincial Government (2018), the Western Cape, Provincial Library 
Service Ordinance No. 16 of 1981, which amended previous provincial library service 
legislation, “on 9 October 1981, together with the Regulations regarding a Free 
Provincial Library Service” as provided for in Regulations 689 of 1980, are the only 
two pieces of provincial legislation that currently legislate the “performance of libraries 
as a function”. There are two options of how a municipality can perform this function, 





municipality can perform the library function on behalf of a provincial government 
utilising a service delivery agreement. 
The provision of library services is currently a highly contested area between the 
provincial government and municipal sphere and is regarded by many municipalities 
as another ‘unfunded mandate’ that is required to be financed from an already highly 
constrained municipal fiscal framework. 
 
4.5 FISCAL POWERS AND FINANCIAL ARRANGEMENTS IN LOCAL 
GOVERNMENT 
The fiscal powers and financial arrangements for local government are set out in 
Chapter 13 of the Constitution, particularly sections 227, 229, and 230. In terms of 
Section 229 of the Constitution, “municipalities may impose rates on property and 
surcharges on fees for services provided by or on behalf of the municipality”, which 
may be regulated through national legislation to ensure that macro-economic 
considerations are not prejudiced. Section 229(1)(b) regulates the imposition of “other 
taxes, levies and duties appropriate to local government or to the category of local 
government into which that municipality falls”, but subject to it being allowed or 
authorised by national legislation. Further, in terms of this Section, given the macro-
economic implications, the fiscal transfer system and public sector financial 
arrangements in the country, there is an explicit prohibition that “no municipality may 
however impose income tax, value-added tax, general sales tax or customs duties”, 
as these are regarded as the major revenue and tax instruments available to 
government to give effect to funding the service delivery requirements and 
arrangements across the three spheres of government. 
In terms of Section 155(3)(c) of the Constitution, national legislation must, subject to 
Section 229 of the Constitution, “make provision for an appropriate division of powers 
and functions between municipalities when an area has municipalities of both category 
B and category C”. It is evident that the constitutional assignment of powers and 
functions to local government has direct implications for the configuration of the fiscal 
framework of local government and therefore the Constitution acknowledges the 





the division of powers and functions between the category B and C municipalities. The 
ideal and aim of the local government fiscal framework, as set out in the Division of 
Revenue Act and in Section 152(2) of the Constitution, is to provide municipalities with 
adequate and appropriate access to revenue raising powers and fiscal resources that 
are commensurate and will enable them to deliver the services that they are 
responsible for providing and to achieve the objectives of local government “within 
their financial and administrative capacity”. Given the requirements of Section 
155(3)(c) of the Constitution, in the event that equivalent and similar fiscal powers and 
functions with regard to the same area are shared by both district and local 
municipality, national legislation must provide for the appropriate division of those 
powers and functions, with the understanding that nothing precludes the sharing of 
revenue between municipalities in the same demarcated district that have the same 
or shared fiscal powers and functions in the same district area. 
The local government fiscal framework refers to all sources of revenue that 
municipalities have at their disposal to meet their expenditure obligations, namely 
municipal own revenues, equitable share, grants from other spheres and borrowing. 
The functional structure of the local government fiscal framework is contained in the 
Constitution and various pieces of national and provincial legislation. The entire local 
government fiscal framework, and not just one singular sub-component of it, is 
intended and configured to provide municipalities with access to sufficient revenue 
sources that will enable them to finance local government obligations and to empower 
municipalities to deliver the community services as set out in the Constitution. 
Table 4.3 sets out the sources of local government funding (fiscal framework), the 







Table 4.3: Sources of local government funding and empowering legislative 
provisions 





Municipality’s own revenue 
sources 
  
Rates on property Section 229 and 227(2) Municipal Property Rates Act 
Surcharges on fees for 
services provided by or on 
behalf of the municipality 
Section 229 and 227(2) Municipal Fiscal Powers and Functions Act 
Service charges/fees Section 229 and 227(2) Municipal Finance Management Act and 
Regulations 
Municipal Systems Act 
Electricity Act and Electricity Regulation Act  
National Water Act 
Provincial land use planning ordinances 
Other taxes, levies or 
duties 
Section 229 and 227(2) Municipal Fiscal Powers and Functions Act 
Administrative fees  Municipal Systems Act; municipal by-laws 
Fines  National Road Traffic Act; municipal by-laws 
Borrowing Section 230A Municipal Finance Management Act and 
Regulations 
Credit control and debt 
collection 
 Municipal Systems Act 
Transfers from national and provincial government  
Local government 
equitable share of 
nationally collected 
revenues 
Section 214 and 227 Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations Act  
The annual Division of Revenue Act 
Fuel levy sharing with 
metropolitan municipalities 
Section 229(1)(b) The annual Taxation Laws Amendment Act 
Conditional grants from 
national government 
Section 214(c), 226(3) 
and 227(1)(c) 
Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations Act  
The annual Division of Revenue Act      The 










Conditional grants from 
provincial government 
Section 226 The annual Division of Revenue Act 
The annual Appropriation Act of the relevant 
province 
Provincial Gazettes 
Source: Adapted from National Treasury. IGFR (2011). 
 
Transfers from the national sphere are governed by sections 214 and 227 of the 
Constitution, which stipulates that local government is “entitled to an equitable share 
of revenue raised nationally to enable it to provide basic services and perform the 
functions allocated to it”. The local government sphere may also receive other 
allocations from national and provincial government, which can either be conditional 
or unconditional. The Constitution provides that when determining a municipality’s 
equitable share allocation of nationally collected revenues, which are outlined in the 
annual Division of Revenue Act and related national budgetary documentation, 
national government must take into account the fiscal capacity of a municipality as well 
as commentary from the Financial and Fiscal Commission (FFC)15. 
Given the broad revenue raising powers of local government, it is a constitutional 
requirement, in terms of section 229 of the Constitution (1996), for municipalities to 
also raise their own revenues from, amongst others, service fees, property rates, 
surcharges and other taxes, levies and duties and other own revenue. It is important 
to note that in terms of Section 227(2) of the Constitution, “additional revenue raised 
by municipalities may not be deducted from their share of revenue raised nationally, 
or from other allocations made to them out of national government revenue”. This 
Section expands and emphasises that, “equally there is no obligation on the national 
government to compensate municipalities that do not raise revenue commensurate 
                                            
15 The FFC is a body established in terms of Chapter 9 of the Constitution and has a legislative mandate set out in 
the Financial and Fiscal Commission Act of 1997 to make recommendations, on an annual basis, to parliament “on 
financial and fiscal matters across all three spheres of government in terms of Section 214(1) of the Constitution, 
the Financial and Fiscal Commission Act of 1997, the Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations Act of 1997, and the 
Money Bills Amendment Procedure and Related Matters Act of 2009”. These recommendations from the FFC and 
responses from government on them are contained in the explanatory memorandum accompanying the annual 





with their fiscal capacity and tax base”, making it compulsory for municipalities to 
explore and maximise revenue utilising their own fiscal capacity rather than expecting 
national government to fund or reimburse them for shortfalls in revenue collection. 
The ability of municipalities to collect own revenues is influenced by the economic and 
social realities prevalent in those municipal jurisdictions as well as those municipalities’ 
management practices in respect of revenue collection, and whether a municipality is 
legislatively empowered and authorised to perform a function, such as the water and 
sanitation (water services) function in the case of category B and C municipalities 
under the two-tier system of local government. The Municipal Systems Act, in Section 
75A(1), provides wide-ranging powers “to levy and recover fees, charges and tariffs” 
and provides that “a municipality may (a) levy and recover fees, charges or tariffs in 
respect of any function or service of the municipality, and (b) recover collection 
charges and interest on any outstanding amount”. 
Municipal loans are regulated through Section 230A(1) of the Constitution, which 
provides that “a municipal council may, in accordance with national legislation, raise 
loans for capital or current expenditure for the municipality, but loans for current 
expenditure may be raised only when necessary for bridging purposes during a fiscal 
year”. Municipalities can only use borrowing as a source of capital financing and are 
also allowed to run an overdraft on their operating budget, as long as such overdraft 
is cleared by the end of the financial year. The Constitution, in Section 230A(1)(b), 
makes it clear that “a municipal Council binds itself and a future Council in the exercise 
of its legislative and executive authority to secure loans or investments for the 
municipality” and should therefore be very responsible and attentive, and not reckless, 
in their actions when considering proposals for borrowing given the long-term 
sustainability implications, which in many cases will materialise way beyond their own 
political term of office. 
There is a fundamental difference between ‘actual revenue raised’ and the ‘fiscal 
capacity’ of a municipality, and this point is acknowledged given the differentiation 
provided in the Constitution. These two concepts are very often misguidedly conflated, 
particularly in assessing the sustainability of municipalities and analysing their fiscal 
ability and capacity and whether or not they have access to sufficient revenue sources. 





municipalities with low fiscal capacity to receive a higher proportion of their funding 
from national transfers than municipalities with high fiscal capacity. Notwithstanding 
this fiscal arrangement, municipalities cannot merely expect a national ‘hand-out’, but 
it is expected that all municipalities demonstrate fiscal effort and collect their own 
revenues that they have been empowered to collect and that are legislatively available 
to them. 
The Municipal Finance Management Act, 2003 (MFMA) regulates financial matters 
within the local government sphere. In this regard, Section 18 of the MFMA regulates 
the composition of budgets and makes it a requirement for municipal budgets to be 
funded by realistically anticipated revenues to be collected, and that budgets be 
financially cash-backed by accumulated reserves or borrowings but only for capital or 
short-term requirements. By implication, in computing the fiscal framework 
municipalities are obligated to limit their expenditure budget to the realistically 
available revenue envelope and should concomitantly reduce expenditure to come in 
line with the expected realistic revenue flows. In this regard, it is noteworthy that 
national government does not have any legislative mandate or empowering legal 
provisions to ‘bail out’ or provide financial guarantees for municipalities that fail to 
collect own revenues or mismanage their funds. 
The expenditure responsibilities of municipalities are determined by the functions that 
municipalities are required to perform in terms of schedules 4 and 5 of the Constitution. 
However, in terms of Section 153(a) of the Constitution, municipalities are required to 
prioritise “basic needs and social and economic development”. The local government 
fiscal framework, utilising local government equitable share and conditional grants, 
assists municipalities with the provision of these basic services. It is important to note 
that beyond the provision of basic services it is up to municipalities to prioritise to what 
extent they perform the other functions for which they are responsible. 
It is obviously not possible to provide supreme service for every function and so 
municipalities must determine how they will spend their resources to prioritise the 
functions they consider the most important. Although there are cases where 
municipalities take on functions without adequate funding (unfunded mandates), in 





municipalities are not reprioritising these functions within the allocation of their own 
resources. 
Primary national legislation regulating the fiscal arrangements (municipal finances) 
includes the following: 
• The annual Division of Revenue Act, required in terms of Section 214 of 
the Constitution, divides nationally raised revenues amongst the three 
“spheres of government and the responsibilities of all three spheres 
pursuant to such division”; 
• The Municipal Finance Management Act sets the legal framework for 
financial management, such as borrowing, budgeting, expenditure and 
revenue management, procurement, reporting, roles of administrators and 
political official bearers with regard to financial matters, and regulates the 
process of financial recovery for distressed municipalities; 
• The Municipal Systems Act regulates the internal systems of 
municipalities, including municipal services (which includes municipal tariff 
setting). Various sector legislation also regulates municipal tariff setting 
practices; 
• The Municipal Property Rates Act (No. 6 of 2004) regulates the “power of 
a municipality to impose rates on property” in an equitable and responsible 
manner; 
• The Municipal Fiscal Powers and Functions Act (No. 12 of 2007) regulates 
the power of a municipality to impose municipal taxes other than property 
rates, including the imposing of surcharges on fees for the provision of 
municipal services and the process to apply for the possible introduction of 
a new municipal tax; and  
• The Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations Act (No. 97 of 1997) (IGFR) 
regulates fiscal arrangements between the three spheres of government 
and, importantly for the local government sphere, this piece of legislation 
establishes the Budget Forum. The Budget Forum plays a key role in local 
government financial and fiscal matters and, in terms of Section 5 of the 





councils who are responsible for finance in each of the nine provinces, as 
well as local government representatives. 
 
The White Paper on Local Government (1998: Section G) provides an entire section 
on municipal finance and in 1998 set principles for the new municipal finance system 
that would enable local government to meet the objectives of the Constitution. Most of 
these principles have been taken up in the various pieces of legislation referred to 
earlier in managing municipal finances, and are still very relevant today. The 
principles, according to the White Paper and the SALGA, include the following: 
• Revenue adequacy and certainty: This principle covers the requirement, 
as discussed earlier in this chapter, for municipalities to have certainty on 
the adequacy of revenue sources that will allow for realistic planning and 
empower them to deliver on constitutionally assigned functions and give 
effect to developmental objectives of local government. 
• Financial sustainability: Municipalities are required to ensure that they 
table funded, realistic and balanced budgets, that they fully exploit their 
revenue potential, ensure that services are provided at affordable levels 
for citizens (that make economic sense and that citizens can pay for), and 
that tariffs are cost reflective and recoverable through service charges. 
Financial sustainability also includes fiscal discipline, i.e. no overspending 
of budgets, proper financial controls and no fruitless and wasteful 
expenditure, whilst considering, in delivering basic services, the 
application of some form of cross-subsidisation between various classes of 
the population. 
• Effective and efficient resource allocation, application and use: Given the 
scarcity of financial and other resources, this principle makes a case for 
the most effective, efficient and economic use of resources to obtain 
maximum benefit (public value) for local communities: It calls for 
community involvement and accountability in key processes, such as 
participating in the IDP planning and budgeting processes to safeguard 





community and are aimed at increasing the access of the poor to basic 
services. 
• Development and investment: In order to arrest the increased service 
backlogs, bigger investment, particularly in municipal infrastructure, is 
required to meet the growing basic needs of communities. Mechanisms, 
such as the use of public private partnerships, utilising financial 
instruments “such as leases and concessions, provide a mechanism for 
attracting investment in municipal infrastructure” (White Paper on Local 
Government, 1998: Section G). 
• Macro-economic implications and management: “Municipalities form an 
integral part of the public sector and their actions can substantially affect 
national policy”, particularly from a macro-economic and fiscal perspective, 
which requires municipalities “to operate within the national 
macroeconomic framework and their financial activities should not be such 
as to destabilise macroeconomic fiscal policy” (White Paper on Local 
Government, 1998: Section G). 
• Accountability, transparency and good governance: The process by which 
municipalities, particularly councillors and administration, are “held 
responsible and accountable to local taxpayers for the use of public funds” 
(White Paper on Local Government, 1998: Section G). Revenue and 
expenditure decisions must be rational, justified and explained, coupled 
with the reasons as to “why and how the revenue necessary to sustain that 
expenditure is raised”. The local government “fiscal system should be 
designed to encourage accountability”, “accounting and financial reporting 
procedures should minimise opportunities for corruption and malpractice”, 
“municipal budgeting and financial affairs should be open to public 
scrutiny” (White Paper on Local Government, 1998: Section G) and should 
include a capacity-building element so that people understand the process 
of policy and budget prioritisation. Community participation, particularly 
from vulnerable groups is crucial and should be encouraged. 
• Equity and redistribution: This requires municipalities to, in terms of the 
White Paper on Local Government (1998: Section G) “treat all citizens 





and provincial government must treat municipalities equitably with regard 
to intergovernmental transfers”. The function of redistribution and the 
development of local communities is not only a function and responsibility 
of local government, but the entire system of government (i.e. all spheres). 
Everyone has a crucial role to play, particularly as it relates to the delivery 
and subsidisation of the provision of basic public services to communities. 
In this regard, the municipal equitable share and the provision of targeted 
subsidies to poor households by municipalities through cross-subsidisation 
between high and low-income consumers, as fiscal instruments for 
development, fulfils a key role to enable community development. 
 
The Municipal Systems Act, 2000, supplemented by the MFMA, sets the broad 
legislative framework for municipal service provision. According to Section 74(2) of the 
Municipal Systems Act, “a municipal council must adopt and implement a tariff policy 
on the levying of fees for municipal services”. A municipality is expected to charge for 
various consumption services it provides such as “water, electricity, sanitation, refuse 
removal, planning and building permissions and the hiring out of municipal facilities”. 
Various sector legislation also regulates municipal tariff setting practices, such as the 
MFMA, its regulations and the various National Treasury circulars issued in this 
regard. Municipal tariffs and the tariff structures must be cost reflective and include 
“costs reasonably associated with rendering the service, including capital, operating, 
maintenance, administration and replacement costs, and interest charges”, in relation 
to main revenue generation trading services, such electricity, water, refuse removal 
and sanitation as these services are expected to be structured and performed 
according to good business principles and, as a consequence, must produce a profit 
or be largely self-financing. It is good budget practice for municipalities to ensure 








4.6 ASSIGNMENT AND/OR DELEGATION OF POWERS AND FUNCTIONS IN 
TERMS OF SECTIONS 44, 99, 104, 126 AND 156 OF THE CONSTITUTION 
In addition to the constitutional functions assigned to local government in schedules 
4B and 5B, certain functions can be devolved by delegation or assignment from 
national and provincial governments to local government. The Constitution, in Section 
156(4), entrenches the principles of subsidiarity and provides for the mandatory 
decentralisation of the administration of a provincial or national government function 
to a municipality where such function necessarily relates to local government, “if the 
matter would most effectively be administered locally”, if there is agreement and if it 
would facilitate better service delivery to the communities. In such instances, the 
legislative authority will remain with national and provincial government, while the 
administration of the function is assigned to the municipality, which implies that “the 
municipality is not simply being contracted to do things on behalf of national or 
provincial government as in the case of a delegation”, but that it takes full responsibility 
for determining how the function will be carried out, how financial and other resources 
will be allocated to the specific function and how the function will be executed and 
delivered. This provision in Section 154(6) requires that a government function should 
be performed as close to the people as possible and should be considered as an 
option by an assignor at all times. 
The Municipal Structures Act of 2000 provides the framework and conditions by which 
the MEC for local government may reallocate a function or power. The MEC for local 
government may only do so if the municipality in which the function or power is vested 
lacks the necessary capacity to perform that function or exercise that power; “and the 
MEC has consulted the MDB and considered its assessment of the capacity of the 
municipality concerned”. Functions have been assigned to municipalities based 
largely on their capacity and, as a result, not all municipalities have the same powers 
and functions. For example, most local or category B municipalities are responsible 
for providing water and sanitation to their residents, but in weak capacity local 
municipalities that function is usually given to the district municipality instead. Several 
functions have been devolved to some municipalities but not others, providing a very 





Assignment is a tool whereby the authority, duty and responsibility to exercise a power 
is transferred in full from one entity to another. Delegation represents a less complete 
transfer. The Constitution provides for the assignment of matters from the national or 
provincial spheres of governments to local government. In some cases, only legislative 
powers may be assigned, whilst in others only executive powers may be assigned. 
Assignment and delegation must always be done in writing and very specifically to 
ensure clarity and legal certainty. 
 
 
Powers and functions may be assigned in a threefold manner, namely - 
1. General assignment of legislative and executive powers, which is set out 
in Section 156(b) of the Constitution; Assignment of legislative power 
does not mean that every municipality is obliged to adopt by-laws on the 
topic – it is discretionary. Section 9 of the Systems Act prescribes a 
number of requirements for general assignments by legislation; 
2. Individual assignments of legislative powers, whereby legislative powers 
can be assigned to specific municipal councils in terms of sections 
44(1)(a) and 104(1)(c) of the Constitution. Legislative power in such 
circumstances is discretionary – in other words a municipality can choose 
whether or not to legislate. In terms of Section 44(1)(a)(iii) of the 
Constitution, existing national legislative powers or laws can also be 
assigned to a municipality as a “legislative body in another sphere of 
government”. In that case, such legislation becomes either provincial or 
municipal legislation given that it has been delegated, and the sphere of 
government to which it has been delegated to can amend or repeal it; and 
3. Individual assignments of executive powers: sections 99 and 126 of the 
Constitution allow a national minister or MEC to assign executive powers 
to specific municipal councils. 
 
When a constitutionally assigned function is delegated by national or provincial 





responsibility to execute and deliver the delegated function under the guidance, 
authority and direction of the delegating authority. There is no prescription for 
municipality to strictly act in accordance or within the boundaries and limitations of the 
agreed-to agency or service level agreement. It is common practice in the country for 
provinces to regularly delegate the administration of some constitutionally assigned 
functions, such as clinics, libraries, archives, the execution of human settlements 
projects and emergency medical services to municipalities. The assignment of 
functions is deemed to be a more comprehensive method to devolving a function. To 
date, the researcher could not find an example of a full assignment of a national and/or 
provincial government function to local government either collectively or individually. 
Municipalities can also use different and innovative service delivery mechanisms to 
deliver on their mandate. The Municipal Systems Act provides for various service 
provision mechanisms, which include the use of internal mechanisms, external 
mechanisms, establishment of multi-jurisdictional municipal service districts and the 
establishment of internal municipal service districts. The legislative framework does 
not prescribe what service delivery mechanisms municipalities must use for the 
provision of different services. The Municipal Systems Act and the MFMA do however 
provide processes for applying various available mechanisms and options. 
Municipalities that are authorised for water services (water service authorities), 
licensed to reticulate electricity or authorised for refuse removal have an option to 
decide on who should deliver services within their areas of jurisdiction. Many 
municipalities have entered into service level agreements with service providers, such 
as Eskom, water boards and private entities for the provision of various services. 
 
4.7 TYPES AND CATEGORIES OF MUNICIPALITIES 
The Constitution and other legislative frameworks for local government have never 
presumed that all municipalities are the same or that all municipalities should be 
treated in the same manner. The Constitution enshrines the principle of differentiation 
as an integral part of the local government system, as several provisions in major 






Section 155 of the Constitution defines three different categories of municipalities as 
a broad framework within which to further refine the system. A “category A municipality 
has exclusive municipal executive and legislative authority in its area”, a “category B 
municipality shares executive and legislative authority in its area with a category C 
municipality within whose area it falls”, and a “category C municipality has municipal 
executive and legislative authority in an area that includes more than one municipality”. 
The different categories of municipalities were discussed earlier in this chapter in 
Section 4.2.2.4, when the definition of a ‘municipality’ was unpacked. 
The Constitution, in Section 155(2), stipulates that “national legislation must define the 
different types of municipality that may be established within each category”. With 
regard to the demarcation of municipal boundary areas, the Constitution, in Section 
155(3), indicates that “national legislation must establish criteria for determining when 
an area should have a single category A municipality or when it should have 
municipalities of both category B and category C”, it must “establish criteria and 
procedures for the determination of municipal boundaries by an independent 
authority”, as well as make “provision for an appropriate division of powers and 
functions between municipalities when an area has municipalities of both category B 
and category C”. Given the legislative requirement for the provision of municipal 
services in an equitable, fair and sustainable manner, it is possible that the division of 
powers and functions between a category B municipality and a category C municipality 
may differ from the division of powers and functions between another category B 
municipality and that category C municipality. 
The Local Government: Municipal Structures Act (No. 117 of 1998) (Structures Act) 
has been enacted as the national enabling national legislation to, in accordance with 
the requirements of the Constitution, regulate the structure, type and form of 
municipalities in South Africa. The purpose of the Structures Act (1998) “is to provide 
for the establishment of municipalities in accordance with the requirements relating to 
categories and types of municipality; to establish criteria for determining the category 
of municipality to be established in an area; to define the types of municipality that may 
be established within each category; to provide for an appropriate division of functions 
and powers between categories of municipality; to regulate the internal systems, 
structures and office-bearers of municipalities; to provide for appropriate electoral 





The Structures Act defines the type of municipality in each category, as well as the 
criteria for creating a ‘category A’ municipality. The Structures Act (1998) also 
“determines the appropriate division of powers and functions between categories” of 
municipalities and defines different types of municipalities in terms of their governance 
structures and electoral systems. Sections 7 to 11 of the Structures Act give effect to 
the provision for different types of municipalities within the same category by defining 
the different types of governance structures they may adopt. In other words, the 
Structures Act provides different options for governance structures in municipalities 
but does not differentiate between types of municipalities based on their fixed 
characteristics. Important to note is that any area that does not comply with the criteria 
for creating a category A municipality, will have both category B (local) and category 
C (district) municipalities. District municipalities were created to enable local 
government functions to be regionalised where appropriate. Legislatively, outside of 
the three categories listed in the Constitution, there are no other recognised types of 
municipalities in South Africa. 
Section 155 of the Constitution further requires that “provincial legislation must 
determine the different types of municipality to be established in the province” and that 
“each provincial government must establish municipalities in its province” by legislative 
or other measures in a manner that is consistent with the national legislation enacted 
(i.e. the 1998 Municipal Structures Act) and that such provincial legislation “must 
provide for the monitoring and support of local government in the province; and 
promote the development of local government capacity to enable municipalities to 
perform their functions and manage their own affairs”, i.e. to assist them to discharge 
their statutory obligations. 
In the province of the Western Cape, the Western Cape Monitoring and Support of 
Municipalities Act (No. 4 of 2014) was enacted “to give effect to sections 154(1) and 
155(6) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, by making further 
provision for measures to support municipalities, to develop and strengthen the 
capacity of municipalities and to improve their performance; to give effect to Section 
106(1) of the Local Government: Municipal Systems Act, 2000, by providing in greater 
detail for the monitoring of suspected non-performance and maladministration in 





The Constitution, in Section 155(7), states that “the national government, subject to 
Section 44, and the provincial governments have the legislative and executive 
authority to see to the effective performance by municipalities of their functions in 
respect of matters listed in Schedules 4 and 5, by regulating the exercise by 
municipalities of their executive authority referred to in Section 156(1)”. Related to this, 
Section 160(1), (a) and (d) of the Constitution, “places all power relating to the 
performance of the municipality in the hands of the municipal council, who may 
assume responsibility for the employment of personnel, necessary for the effective 
performance of its functions”. According to Jessen (2012:50), “herein lies a major 
contention with respect to the political-administrative dilemma given that the 
Constitution does not advocate clarity on the political-administrative interface but does 
give municipalities the power to administer their own affairs”. 
The Municipal Structures Act in Section 83, read together with Section 84(1) and (2), 
allocates the constitutionally assigned functions listed in Schedules 4B and 5B of the 
Constitution between local and district municipalities. Sections 84(3) and 85(1) of the 
Structures Act empowers the Minister and the MEC to adjust the functions and powers 
of local and district municipalities by way of public notice in the national and provincial 
Government Gazette, respectively. The assignment of certain duties, obligations and 
responsibilities concerning national or provincial government powers and functions, as 
discussed earlier in this chapter under Section 4.6, is subject to the provisions of the 
national enabling legislation. 
In Section 83(3), the Structures Act provides that a district municipality is obligated to 
“seek to achieve the integrated, sustainable and equitable social and economic 
development of its area as a whole by ensuring integrated development planning for 
the district as a whole; promoting bulk infrastructure development and services for the 
district as a whole; building the capacity of local municipalities in its area to perform 
their functions and exercise their powers where such capacity is lacking; and 
promoting the equitable distribution of resources between the local municipalities in its 
area to ensure appropriate levels of municipal services within the area”. This purpose, 
as set out in the Structures Act, is aligned to the original role of district municipalities 
as contained in the 1998 Municipal Structures Act, which is aligned with the vision 





is usually assigned all the ‘general’ local functions, such as the provision of water and 
sanitation, sewerage, electricity reticulation, waste removal, and so forth. 
In essence, although there was broad alignment, the definitions contained in Section 
84 of the 1998 Structures Act were revised in 2000, which substantially amended the 
roles of responsibilities of category B (local) and category C (district) municipalities. 
Whereas the 1998 Structures Act limited the role of district municipalities to bulk 
infrastructure and provision, the definitions were extended to include reference to the 
‘full’ local government function. 
Therefore, where local municipalities had the ‘original’ power to perform primary local 
government functions, local municipalities must now first be identified and specially 
authorised by the Minister responsible for local government to perform the water, 
sewage, electricity or health function, or by a MEC responsible for local government 
(informed by the capacity assessment undertaken by the Municipal Demarcation 
Board) to perform the remainder of the local government functions not authorised by 
the Minister, such as waste disposal, roads and transport, firefighting or local tourism. 
In terms of the final authorisations between category B and C municipalities made in 
2002 by the then Minister for Provincial and Local Government in terms of the 
Municipal Structures Act, an asymmetric approach has been followed in respect of 
water and sanitation given that category B municipalities are authorised in certain 
instances and category C municipalities in others. Further, the status quo in respect 
of electricity (category B municipalities) must be maintained until the reform of the 
electricity distribution industry has been finalised, and district municipalities are 
authorised for municipal health (defined as environmental health services). The MECs 
for local government follow an asymmetric approach in respect of the remaining 
functions. Where the assignments by the Minister for Provincial and Local Government 
are permanent (excluding electricity), the MECs generally review the placement of 
powers and functions on an annual basis. 
The Constitution, in Section 155(3)(b), provides for an autonomous body to “establish 
criteria and procedures for the determination of municipal boundaries”. The Municipal 
Demarcation Board (MDB) was established to perform this function and is also tasked 
with assessing the capacity and ability of municipalities to perform their constitutionally 





“consider the capacity of a district or local municipality to perform the functions and 
exercise the powers vested in the municipality in terms of Section 84(1) or (2) when 
determining or re-determining the boundaries of the district and the local 
municipalities; or when requested in terms of subsection (2)(b) by the MEC for local 
government in the province concerned to do so; and convey its assessment in writing 
to the relevant MEC”. 
A consequence of such authorisations is that the transfer of staff, assets, liabilities, 
and so forth, will have to follow such an authorisation. Over time it has been found that 
there are substantial overlaps in provision of services between district and local 
municipalities, creating major delivery challenges in the local government sector and 
“clouding” good governance performance. 
 
4.8 COOPERATIVE GOVERNMENT AND Intergovernmental Relations: 
MUNICIPAL, PROVINCIAL AND NATIONAL GOVERNMENT COORDINATION 
AND COOPERATION 
The Constitution and cooperative government were covered earlier in this chapter, in 
Section 4.3.2. As indicated, the constitutional basis for coordination, cooperation and 
coherence is set out in Chapter 3 of the Constitution, which defines cooperative 
government as a set of principles that should drive effective collaboration in policy-
making across the three spheres. Section 41(1)(c) of the Constitution calls on “all 
spheres and all organs of the state” to “secure the well-being of the people of the 
Republic” and provides for “effective, transparent, accountable and coherent 
government for the Republic as a whole”. This provision is supported by principle (iv) 
in Section 41(h), which refers to cooperation in mutual trust and good faith between 
the spheres by “coordinating their actions and legislation with one another”. 
Section 41(2) of the Constitution provides for the establishment of an Act of Parliament 
to “provide for structures and institutions to promote and facilitate intergovernmental 
relations”. The Intergovernmental Relations Framework Act (2005) (IGRF Act) was 
promulgated to give effect to this provision, but to date no other subordinate legislation 
has been established to provide more substance to the principles of Chapter 3 of the 





operative government and governance in a wide-ranging legislative framework 
appropriate to all government spheres and in all sectors of government. The IGRF Act 
sets out the general principles and objects of intergovernmental relations (IGR) and 
provides a framework that redefines the IGR structures of provinces to ensure more 
coherent intergovernmental relations and closer synergy and alignment between 
provincial and local government. Its approach is to provide limited legislative 
intervention so as not to stifle a dynamic system of intergovernmental relations, but 
rather to promote cooperative government and coordination through a structured 
approach. The focus of IGR is primarily on the outcomes that the system must achieve, 
such as coherent government, effective provision of services, monitoring the 
implementation of policy and legislation and the realisation of national priorities. 
The IGR system is intended to facilitate and promote shared information and 
coordinated decision-making between the three spheres of government. However, as 
expressed by Cyril Ramaphosa, President of the Republic of South Africa, in his 
Presidency Budget Speech (2019), in order to maximise the impact of service delivery 
on the citizen, the “structures of government will need to function with maximum 
coordination and cooperation as it is envisaged in the Constitution”. In his speech, 
President Ramaphosa (2019) emphasises that notwithstanding South Africa’s 
constitutionally determined IGR system, “the truth is that lack of coordination between 
the national and provincial governments, between departments and particularly at 
local government level, have not served us” as the three spheres have “slid into a 
pattern of operating in silos”, which has resulted in a “fragmented approach to 
development, lack of coherence in planning and implementation and has made 
monitoring and implementation of government’s programmes difficult”. Through the 
use of the intergovernmental technical and political forums at national, provincial and 
district level, the application of intergovernmental relations, according to the National 
Treasury (2011) is expected to: 
• Coordinate and align priorities, budgets, policies and activities across 
interrelated functions and sectors; and 
• Ensure a smooth flow of information within government, and between 
government and communities, with a view to enhancing the 





(National Treasury (2011)) 
 
However, in reality, the IGRF Act only guides the establishment and constituencies of 
structures to manage and coordinate intergovernmental relations, as well as provide 
guidelines for settling intergovernmental disputes. The principles of Chapter 3 of the 
Constitution more aptly capture the spirit of cooperative governance. No framework 
has been provided to date for the specific institutionalisation of coordination beyond 
the use of the coordinating structures and the application of voluntary cooperation. 
The IGRF Act will not solve the IGR problems and therefore an improved application 
of Chapter 3 of the Constitution is required, which can include further exploring shared 
services arrangements but in different ways, such as agency agreements and bilateral 
horizontal cooperation agreements, all aimed at improving IGR within and across the 
three spheres of government. 
The Democracy Development Programme (2018) acknowledges that the IGRF Act 
“will not by itself achieve the desired outcomes of cooperative government” and that 
“non-statutory measures must ensure that the system works in a predictable yet 
flexible manner by strengthening intergovernmental relations processes, the 
functioning of intergovernmental forums, and the implementation of joint work and 
programmes”. While the vision set out in the IGR framework (Constitution and 
legislation) is progressive, the realities and challenges of that broad framework for 
province and municipalities require a more provincial specific approach to ensure more 
efficient management of the relationship between the three spheres, but particularly 
between provincial and local government. 
It was observed in the first IGR Report to Parliament by the DPLG (2005/06 – 2006/07) 
(2018) that many informal networks and liaisons worked very well to promote 
coordination, but “that the establishment of IG Forums is a necessary, but not a 
sufficient condition” for effective inter-governmental relations. This element of 
coordination can thrive on a voluntary basis, but may not be sustainable in situations 
where budgetary resources are in contestation, or where trade-offs have to be made 
in respect to service delivery choices and longer-term viability for which structural 
oversight is still needed to ensure proper balance between structures for coordination, 





The assumption and underlying philosophy underpinning cooperative government, as 
taken up in the Constitution and the IGRF Act, is that the three spheres of government 
would, as a collective, work together organically, instinctively and spontaneously. 
However, it is exactly because of the failure of the three spheres of government to 
work together in this manner that the need and requirement arises for a more bespoke 
approach to intergovernmental relations. The intergovernmental relations structures 
must be aligned with the vision of the IGRF Act and a proliferation of structures is 
detrimental to effective governance of both the province and local government. Some 
key structures advocated by the IGRF Act to ensure a structured and coordinated 
working relationship between a province and local government, include: 
1. The Premier’s Coordinating Forum (PCF), which should be the primary 
political-administrative IGR forum and serve as an interface between the 
provincial and local government consisting of the premier (as the chair) 
and all MECs, the mayors of all municipalities supported by the director-
general (DG), heads of departments (HODs) and municipal managers. It 
should include the cluster (i.e. social, economic, governance and 
administration) component as this is meant to bring synergy between the 
province and local government. 
2. The Premier’s Coordinating Forum Technical Committee, a technical 
forum between the DG and his/her officials, municipal managers and their 
designated representatives to support the PCF and, on a technical level, 
consider policy implications of provincial and national legislation for local 
government, as well as attend to the needs of the municipalities, such as 
the development of by-laws and regulations. 
3. The Premier’s Metro Coordinating Forum (PMCF), which in terms of 
the IGR Framework Act, is the Premier’s prerogative to establish “any 
other IGR forum(s) he sees fit”. This PMCF can consist of the premier, the 
executive mayor, MECs, members of the mayoral committee, the director-
general and HODs of provincial departments, city manager and the 
executive directors of a city (metro municipality). A technical committee 
(PMCF-Tech) could be established between the administrative heads of 





and to improve intergovernmental coordination in the areas of the 
economy, social and community, and governance. 
 
The consequences of poorly coordinated and managed policy-making and 
implementation have arguably contributed to certain performance stresses 
experienced at each sphere of government. The practice of integrated planning, 
functional coordination and cooperative governance requires strong institutions with 
strong political and administrative leadership. On the other hand, cooperation between 
the spheres of government and municipalities holds huge potential for enhanced 
municipal organisational performance and service delivery. Increased cooperation 
between spheres of government and municipalities can take many forms and can 
range from sharing of knowledge to joint service delivery and joint planning. 
A legislative and policy framework in support of inter-municipal and intergovernmental 
cooperation is already in place. Part of the reason for the existence of district 
municipalities is to allow for the regionalisation of services where appropriate. Section 
88 of the Municipal Structures Act stipulates that local and district municipalities must 
cooperate, assist and support each other. Sections 78 to 81 of the Municipal Systems 
Act provide the regulations for a service authority (local or district municipalities) to 
decide on the mechanisms of service provision. In addition to delivering the service 
themselves (internal mechanisms), different forms of municipal service delivery 
partnerships are laid out (external mechanisms.). Amongst these are: 
• Outsourcing mechanisms to municipal entities; 
• Entering into partnering and service delivery agreements with another 
municipality to provide the service; and 
• Setting up of an independent entity by two or more municipalities for the 
purpose of delivering specific services. 
 
The White Paper on Municipal Service Partnerships (MSP) (2000) refers to both, i.e. 
cooperation between local government and the private sector but also to partnerships 
between public actors (e.g. inter-municipal cooperation). In practice, however, MSP 





mechanisms in local government. The public-public cooperation mechanism was 
further developed as part of promoting the ‘shared services centre’ (SSC) model. 
Shared services are also highlighted in the 5-Year Local Government Strategic 
Agenda, as well as in Outcome 9 of the South Africa government’s 12 Priority 
Outcomes. However, this model is limited in various ways. First, it is linked to the 
debate around the division of powers and functions between district and local 
municipalities and so inter-municipal cooperation is not discussed in its own right.  
Unfortunately, the shared services model came to be viewed as an inter-municipal 
service delivery cooperation mechanism between a district municipality and its local 
municipalities and little consideration was given to the potential of horizontal (local-
local) inter-municipal service delivery cooperation. The second limitation of the shared 
services centre model was that it focuses on back-office functions and not on how 
cooperation can enhance the delivery of basic services. Not many shared services 
centres have actually been set up (despite Project Consolidate incentives) and, as 
government has put aside the shared services centre model, it has to be assumed that 
the concept was not embraced by municipalities. 
Section 88 of the Municipal Systems Act also provides that the Minister of Cooperative 
Governance may “request two or more municipalities to establish designated multi-
jurisdictional municipal service districts”. Municipalities then have two months to 
decide whether to implement such a joint services area or not. Although inter-
municipal cooperation has not been broadly embraced there are some examples, such 
as the delivery of water services and fire services by both district and local 
municipalities, where it has been implemented successfully.  
Voluntary horizontal cooperation of municipalities can be organised in a multitude of 
different ways and forms and can be facilitated through several mechanisms provided 
in South Africa’s local government system. Other national intergovernmental 
coordinating structures include the President’s Coordinating Committee (PCC), the 
Budget Council, the FOSAD (Forum of South Africa Directors-General), and 
MinMECs16. All of these structures provide for information sharing and adopt 
                                            
16 The MinMEC structure consists of the national Minister for DCoGTA and the nine MECs. The 






resolutions and recommendations that may have to be implemented at provincial or 
local level. The provincial municipal/MEC structure of MECMays provide for liaison 
between local and provincial role-players, and the MinMECs between sector ministries 
and provincial government ministries (MECs). 
Greater cooperation across boundaries has enormous potential to smooth over 
differences in functionality caused by differences in the size and shape of 
municipalities and should be considered and promoted as a potential mechanism to 
improve service delivery. The main benefits of proper coordination and cooperation 
can be summarised as follows: 
• Demand orientation: As compared to top-down approaches, inter-
municipal cooperation puts municipalities in the driving seat to define with 
whom to cooperate, on what and how. It thus holds the promise of being 
much better geared to the specific demands and needs of the 
municipalities. 
• Capacity building: Inter-municipal learning mechanisms (e.g. knowledge 
sharing and peer learning) can build individual and organisational 
capacities of municipal practitioners. 
• Potential savings: Through inter-municipal learning mechanisms, 
municipalities can learn from the best practices of other municipalities. 
This prevents municipalities having to ‘re-invent the wheel’ and thus might 
save them money. 
• Economies of scale/increased value for money: Inter-municipal service 
associations – i.e. inter-municipal cooperation mechanisms with regard to 
the delivery of municipal services – are expected to help build economies 
of scale (which do not concur with municipal borders) and to minimise the 
costs for each single municipality. 
• Risk sharing: Through inter-municipal service associations municipalities 
can share the risk of public investment. 
 
In relation to policy making, the constitutional provisions guiding policy making are 





authority of the Republic, which is vested in the president and who, with his or her 
Cabinet exercises that authority by developing and implementing national policy. This 
is echoed in Chapter 6, Section 125(2) of the Constitution, as the same responsibility 
is conferred via the executive powers of the premier of a province. The Constitution 
does not refer or provide any procedures for the implementation of national or 
provincial policy directives at local level. There is no explicit reflection on local 
government powers regarding policy-making. Local government’s powers are far more 
clearly centred upon delivering services through the exercise of powers and functions, 
the exercise of necessary by-laws, raising of revenue and taxes, and the council’s role 
of approving local policy, budgets and plans. 
There is a lacuna between the intergovernmental ‘fit’ between local government, 
endowed with its own functional responsibilities, and the other two spheres with their 
own regulatory and oversight responsibilities and spending programmes. Both these 
tasks have generated complex problems of intergovernmental coordination and policy 
sequencing. Municipalities are expected to respond immediately to the myriad of 
national and provincial policies seeking to redress poverty, promote economic 
development and build sustainable communities. This places enormous pressure on 
the capacity and ability of municipalities to reconcile or align sector policies and 
budgets with their statutory integrated development plans. 
However, according to a 2016 article in The Citizen, in the local government space, it 
is the municipal councils “who approve policies and by-laws for their area” and further 
“the work of the Council is coordinated by a Mayor who is elected by council and is 
assisted by an executive or mayoral committee, made up of councillors from the ruling 
party”. The executive committee is elected by council whilst the mayoral committee is 
appointed by the mayor. In some very small municipalities, the entire council as 
elected members or public representatives, forms the mayoral committee and, in that 
case, it is known as a plenary council. From an institutional accountability perspective, 
the mayor, together with the executive or mayoral committee, manages and directs 
the activities of the administration, particularly the activities of the municipal manager 
and department executive heads. 
Given the recent upsurge in community disputes, clashes and protests between 





delivery, Baatjies (2009:11) explains that “the advent of co-operative governance and 
public participation grows in importance, since municipalities require resources and 
have the need to build its capacity, provincial and national government are required to 
act constitutionally and in good faith in offering support to struggling municipalities”. 
 
4.9 PUBLIC/STAKEHOLDER CONSULTATION, PARTICIPATION AND 
ACCOUNTABILITY 
The Constitution, in Section 152(e), places a responsibility on every “municipality to 
encourage the involvement of communities and community organisations in the 
matters of local government”. It also requires municipalities to prescribe to the 
following democratic values as set out in Section 195(e) and (g), particularly that (a) 
peoples’ “needs must be responded to, and the public must be encouraged to 
participate in policy-making”; and (b) transparency “must be fostered by providing the 
public with timely, accessible and accurate information”. The 1998 White Paper on 
Local Government sets the long-term vision and objectives for developmental local 
government, in the main, as “local government committed to working with citizens and 
groups within the community to find sustainable ways to meet their social, economic 
and material needs and improve the quality of their lives”. 
In Borbet South Africa (Pty) Ltd and Others v Nelson Mandela Bay Municipality 
(3751/2011) [2014] ZAECPEHC 35; (2014) (5) SA 256 (ECP), the point is made that 
the “Structures Act, the Systems Act and MFMA give expression to the constitutional 
obligations of the local sphere of government and reflect the means by which national 
government ensures the effective performance by municipalities of the functions of 
local government”. In this case, and with specific reference to Section 16 of the 
Systems Act, Judge Goosen (2014: para. 15) makes the point that the “use of the 
phrase ‘develop a culture of municipal governance’ suggests that a municipal council 
is obliged to take steps to extend and deepen its democratic processes”. The Judge 
further emphasises that the municipal council “must ‘create conditions’, ‘build capacity’ 
and, most importantly allocate resources to comply with its obligations. It is required 
to take these steps in relation to encouraging public participation in the preparation 
and implementation of its Integrated Development Plan (IDP) and the preparation of 





concerning the available mechanisms, processes and procedures to encourage and 
facilitate community participation”. 
These values, principles and philosophies must be transformed into practise and, 
therefore, the Systems Act, in sections 16 and 17, “provides that a municipality must 
involve the community in matters such as the preparation of the IDP, budget, 
performance management system” and the provision of services. Given the 
importance of public and community participation in developmental local government, 
the Systems Act dedicates an entire chapter by providing comprehensive and in-depth 
guidance and direction on how to accomplish effective community participation and 
involvement in municipal processes. 
The Systems Act, in Section 17 suggests that “participation by the local community in 
the affairs of the municipality must take place through political structures”. Section 16 
of the Systems Act prescribes that stakeholders (communities, business and citizens) 
must be actively involved and engaged in the finalisation of the municipality’s strategic 
Integrated Development Plan. 
Sections 42 of the Systems Act and 15 of the Local Government: Municipal Planning 
and Performance Management Regulations, GN 796 dated 24 August 2001, places a 
statutory obligation on municipalities to ensure that “communities must be involved in 
the development, implementation and review of the municipality’s performance 
management system”. Further, the legislation explicitly regulates that communities 
must also be involved in and “participate in the setting of appropriate key performance 
indicators and performance targets for the municipality”. 
The Structures Act regulates and prescribes the important structures through which 
public participation is to occur as well as key role players that must be involved in the 
process. One of these structures is ward committees. The responsibility to inspire 
broad public involvement and participation in key processes and to make suitable 
mechanisms available to facilitate public participation, is not limited or restricted only 
to these structures. Sections 72 to 78 of the Structures Act provides for the 
establishment of ward committees, their functions and powers and related matters. 
The main purpose of a ward committee is to improve “participatory democracy in local 
government”. The committee acts as an advisory body and does not have any 





participatory structure in a municipality to enhance public consultation, public 
participation, transparency and accountability. 
The prime areas of public participation should include at least the following: the 
adoption of by-laws and policies; adoption of the IDP; approval of budget, rates and 
tariffs; spatial and human settlement development and planning; application and 
continuous review of the municipality’s performance management system; land use 
planning; property management; and liquor licences. 
Section 23 of the MFMA explains the consultative and public participation processes 
that must be followed in relation to a budget that has been tabled, until its final 
approval. The MFMA, inter alia, requires that “a council must consider any 
submissions received from the public or national treasury and to give the mayor an 
opportunity to respond to such submissions” and it allows for an advertisement or 
notice period. It also provides and sets out the procedure for considering comments 
and a mechanism for amending a tabled budget before final approval in council. 
Ras (2016:33) makes the point that the “new democratic South African local 
government legislation regime is comprehensive and elaborate to the extent which 
makes performance monitoring and reporting peremptory”. He elaborates and 
highlights that “performance monitoring is intended to constantly monitor performance 
of municipalities in fulfilling their developmental and service delivery mandate and if 
developed and implemented proper performance monitoring can become a powerful 
tool for building a high performance municipality and bridging the gap between 
planning and implementation” (Ras, 2016:33). 
One of the cornerstones of the Constitution is the concept of democracy. Participatory 
democracy, being one of three forms of democracy, allows individuals and bodies to 
participate in decision making that affects them. As an example, Section 195 covers 
the “basic values and principles governing public administration”, espoused in Section 
195(1) of the Constitution: 
• In Section 195(1)(e), “people’s needs must be responded to, and the 
public must be encouraged to participate in policy-making”; and 
• In Section 195(1)(g), “transparency must be fostered by providing the 






Section 5(1) of the Systems Act is another good example of participatory democracy. 
Direct democracy refers to mechanisms that may be used by individuals and groups 
who feel that their interests are neglected by political parties, or find it difficult to make 
use of the avenues for participation. Section 17 of the Constitution provides a good 
example when indicating “everyone has the right, peacefully and unarmed, to 
assemble, to demonstrate, to picket and to present petitions”. 
According to Ras (2016:50), pursuant to constitutional democracy and given the 
specific legislative requirement for communities to participate in determining and 
setting suitable key performance indicators targets for the institution, many concerns 
emerged and were clearly noticeable, particularly during the local government 
transition phase, essentially from inside the fundamentally inherited local government 
organisations against the new constitutional and legislative provisions. Some question 
and concerns that arose during the pre-1994 dispensation was that it was 
inconceivable that people and communities would “be allowed to be involved with 
complex issues such as the setting of appropriate key performance indicators and 
performance targets for a municipality”. Ras (2016) attributes these concerns “largely 
because the skills set required to adapt to this new developmental approach differed 
dramatically from traditional approaches to management and even more so in relation 
to performance measurement”. Ras (2016:50) explains that under the post 1994 
regime attention shifted from only focusing on performance by individual specialists 
and progressed to following the private sector’s so-called ‘bottom line (of the balance 
sheet) approach’ to the performance assessment of the entire organisation. 
The Constitutional Court of South Africa made two ground breaking rulings that, in 
many respects, assisted in reducing the struggle and resistance in the local 
government system against public participation and consultation. In the judgments 
Doctors for Life International v Speaker of the National Assembly and Others 
(CCT12/05) (2006) ZACC 11; 2006 (12) BCLR 1399 (CC); 2006 (6) SA 416 (CC) and 
Matatiele Municipality and Others v President of the Republic of South Africa and 
Others (1) (CCT73/05) (2006) ZACC 2; 2006 (5) BCLR 622 (CC); 2006 (5) SA 47 (CC), 
the Constitutional Court judges voiced their collective concerns and came out “strongly 





and well-being”. Nowadays, according to (Ras, 2016:50), effective, public participation 
and consultation “is now standard practice” and it is prioritised and seen as one of the 
“most important matters affecting the external environment of municipalities”. 
Accountability refers to the constitutional obligation of government to be accountable 
and an added requirement to respond to the ‘will of the people’. Accountability requires 
the government to explain its laws and actions. Should government fail to do so, they 
may be in conflict with some of the provisions in the Bill of Rights, for example the right 
of access to information and administrative justice.  
The good governance principles of openness, transparency and accountability are 
fundamental to the requirements of sections 152(1), 160(7), 195(1) and 215(1) of the 
constitution in that it regulates these principles in the following manner: 
• “Section 152 of the Constitution sets out that “the objects of local 
government are”-  
“(a) to provide democratic and accountable government for local 
communities”; and ... “(e) to encourage the involvement of communities 
and community organisations in the matters of local government.” 
 
Section 160(7) of the Constitution provides that “a Municipal Council must conduct its 
business in an open manner, and may close its sittings, or those of its committees, 
only when it is reasonable to do so having regard to the nature of the business being 
transacted”. Section 195(1) of the Constitution requires that “public administration 
must govern by the democratic values and principles enshrined in the Constitution”, 
amongst others:  
“(a) a high standard of professional ethics must be promoted and maintained”; … “(d) 
services must be provided impartially, fairly, equitably and without bias”; “(e) people’s 
needs must be responded to, and the public must be encouraged to participate in 
policy-making”; “(f) public administration must be accountable”; and “(g) transparency 






Section 215(1) of the Constitution requires “national, provincial and municipal budgets 
and budgetary processes must promote transparency, accountability and the effective 
financial management of the economy, debt and the public sector”. 
 
4.10 CONCLUSION AND SUMMARY 
The review of multi-level government in South Africa provides a mixed picture. In each 
of the areas of service delivery significant governance deficits have been identified. 
Notwithstanding this, some progress has been made post democracy particularly in 
that improved access to basic services has been made possible. Some remaining 
challenges are to improve the effectiveness of the IGR system in order to improve 
performance and the socio-economic conditions of people. 
The Constitution initiated a new regime in South Africa, of which a significant part was 
the move away from a system advocating levels of government to a multi-sphere 
system of government where each sphere is now distinct, independent and 
interrelated. South Africa has transformed into a unified or united state, allowing for a 
multi-level or quasi federal system of government wherein powers and functions have 
been vertically divided between the three spheres of government. The chapter 
highlights that none of the three spheres of government have complete independence 
– they co-exist and are interrelated and must cooperate in delivering the services of 
government. Each sphere has relative autonomy for those functions for which they 
have a constitutional mandate, allowing for some degree of independence in 
exercising its powers and functions. The South African intergovernmental system also 
allows for the separation of power between the executive, legislative and judicial 
branches, which allows for the distribution of powers and functions between the three 
spheres of government and thereby divides government into three distinct 
components. This chapter highlights that almost every single component of the post 
1994 intergovernmental system was new. 
Post 1994, most public institutions and their practices had to be created and executed, 
but in a very short time in the face of unusual developmental challenges, mainly as a 
result of the apartheid legacy, and associated fiscal challenges given the history of 





the surprise is not that South Africa has fallen so short, but rather how successful it 
has been in establishing a working system of multi-level governance. 
More than twenty years after democracy was attained, there is now a clear need to 
reassess the powers, functions, roles and responsibilities of the three spheres of 
government as this process allows for a detailed assessment of the future role and 
structure of developmental local government. One can argue that such a review or 
reassessment should also include the regulatory framework. Some rationalisation and 
streamlining of rules is arguably necessary to improve the governance of 
municipalities. Notwithstanding the many challenges, attaining the objectives of 
development local government is possible, but it will require a concerted effort by the 
political executive, the administration and community stakeholders to keep each other 
accountable for service delivery and the creation of public value. 
It is clear that the myriad of legislation, frameworks and policy instruments as this 
relates to organisational performance management in South Africa has provided clear 
directives for the implementation of performance management in municipalities. 
Organisational performance management aims to align the objectives of the legal, 
institutional and organisational frameworks in such a manner, as is required to gear 
the municipality to achieve outputs and outcomes of a high standard in providing 
services to communities and creating public value. 
On the challenges, it is clear that government must find sustainable solutions for 
improving intergovernmental relations and co-operation, address the separation of 
powers and functions dilemma, some over-regulation in certain areas and deal with 
capacity challenges to enabling local government to perform. There is a need to 
strengthen the enforcement and setting of standard minimum outcome performance 
indicators linked to the Section 152 objectives of local government. The legal and 
regulatory frameworks facilitate the use of performance indicators to measure 
organisational and individual capabilities and outputs in satisfying stakeholder 
demands, internal growth and development at South African municipalities. 
What is clear from the chapter is that the management and improvement of 
organisational performance requires the following ‘non-negotiable’ principles to be 
recognised: the need for leadership, effective intergovernmental relations, community 





resources and a skilled and motivated workforce. It requires a full delivery chain, i.e. 
a performance monitoring mechanism, starting with ‘outcomes’ to be achieved, after 
which the outputs, activities and inputs are recorded and evaluated. To be effective, 
the key is to ensure: (i) support and buy-in from all employees as opposed to 
‘achievement by coercion’ in the implementation of the full delivery chain; (ii) credible, 
validated, timely information on each phase of delivering outputs; and (iii) reporting 
service delivery outcomes and financial information from a effectiveness, efficiency, 
economy/quality, access, equity, timeliness and financial perspective. 
Finally, this Chapter, connects to Chapter 5 which explores the legislative and 
regulatory policy oversight and financial governance framework with respect to 







CHAPTER 5: LEGISLATIVE, POLICY, OVERSIGHT AND FINANCIAL 
GOVERNANCE FRAMEWORK FOR LOCAL GOVERNMENT 
ORGANISATIONAL PERFORMANCE IN SOUTH AFRICA 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
The local government functional system and framework in the context of the overall 
intergovernmental relations system of the country was extensively discussed in 
Chapter 4. In addition, Chapter 3 defined and discussed the concepts of 
‘organisational performance’ and ‘performance management’, with a particular focus 
on the public sector, and inclusive of the many theoretical frameworks and conceptual 
models developed on this subject. Chapter 3 also unpacked the reasons and root 
causes for organisational performance failures, particularly from the viewpoints of 
some key external institutions that report on and monitor performance of the local 
government sector. 
This main aim of this chapter is to unpack the legislative, regulatory and policy 
framework with respect to municipal organisational performance and governance in 
South African local government. The chapter also includes an analysis of the 
legislative and policy framework as it relates to financial governance and oversight, 
particularly by municipal councils, external and internal assurance providers, the main 
oversight institutions and by key stakeholders. Finally, this chapter sets out the 
legislative and regulatory requirements as they relate to the intervention and 
supervision mechanisms available to the provincial and national executive in the event 
of performance failures in municipalities. Chapter 5 connects, and should be read in 
conjunction with, chapters 3 and 4. 
5.2 ORGANISATIONAL PERFORMANCE: CONTEXT 
Venter, et al. (2007:111) describe performance management “as a multidimensional 
construct, the measurement of which varies depending on a variety of actors that 
compromise it” and “is the outcome of work because it provides the strongest linkage 
to the strategic goals of the institution, customer satisfaction and economic 
contributions”. Given its many public sector service delivery performance failures, the 
public sector in South Africa has recognised the important role of performance 





and processes are successful and make a difference in the lives of communities and 
why. It is about measuring and instituting necessary controls to ensure delivery in 
accordance with agreed upon standards. This aligns with the frequently quoted 
proverb of the management thinker Peter Drucker (2018), who states: “you can’t 
manage what you can’t measure” and “what gets measured, gets managed”, implying 
that you cannot recognise or distinguish whether or not you are effective and 
successful unless the effectiveness or success standards and measurements are 
defined and tracked. Venter, et al. (2007:111) make the point that effective 
performance management, as part of good governance, and a suitable system of 
performance or result measurement should be regarded as a tool that enables good 
governance as these provide “meaningful information to assist stakeholders that may 
be utilised for improvements in the service delivery processes” and that guarantee that 
the local government sphere reaches its developmental objectives. 
The table below provides key pieces of statutes, regulations, policies and guidelines 
that capture the legislative foundation for performance management in South African 
local government. 
Table 5.1: Key Statutes, Regulations and Polices for Local Government Performance 
Acts and laws Regulations Policy determinations, 
frameworks and circulars 
The Constitution of the 
Republic of South Africa (1996) 
The Organised Local 
Government Act (No. 52 of 
1997) (OLGA) 
The Local Government: 
Municipal Structures Act (No. 
117 of 1998) (Structures Act) 
The Local Government: 
Municipal Systems Act (No. 32 
of 2000) (Systems Act) 
The Local Government: 
Municipal Finance 
Management Act (No. 56 of 
2003) (MFMA) 
The Local Government 
Municipal Planning and 
Performance Management 
Regulations, dated 24 August 
2001 
The Local Government 
Municipal Performance 
Regulations for Municipal 
Managers and Managers 
Directly Accountable to 
Municipal Managers, dated 1 
August 2006 
The Local Government 
Municipal Budget and 
Reporting Regulations, dated 
17 April 2009 
The White Paper on 
Transforming Public Service 
Delivery (1997) 
The White Paper on Local 
Government (1998) 
National Treasury: Framework 
for Managing Programme 
Performance Information 
Circulars and guidelines issued 
by the National Treasury in 
terms of the MFMA 
Circulars and guidelines issued 
by the Department of Co-
operative Government and 






Annexure 5 provides a quick guide to the various main pieces of legislation and policy 
frameworks that regulate and impact on the overall functioning and performance of 
local government (municipal performance) in South Africa. What follows is a high level 
analysis of the practical implications of these main pieces of legislation and policies 
that regulate organisational performance in local government. 
 
5.3 LEGISLATION AND POLICY GOVERNING ORGANISATIONAL 
PERFORMANCE IN LOCAL GOVERNMENT 
5.3.1 The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa (1996) 
As extensively outlined in Chapter 4 of this dissertation, the Constitution of the 
Republic of South Africa (1996) (the Constitution) sets aside an entire chapter to 
exclusively deal with matters affecting the local government sphere, including setting 
out and listing the developmental duties and objectives of local government 
(municipalities). 
In Section 152, the Constitution (1996) deals with the objectives of local government, 
which provide the basis and paved the way for performance management in local 
government with the explicit requirement of an ‘accountable government’. The 
Constitution determines the objects of local government as: 
 To provide democratic and accountable government for local 
communities; 
 To ensure the provision of services to communities in a suitable manner; 
 To promote social and economic development; 
 To promote a safe and healthy environment; and 
 To encourage the involvement of communities and community 
organisations in the matters of local government. 
(RSA, 1996) 
 
Section 152(1)(a) of the Constitution provides one of the objects of local government 





local government provides specifically for good corporate citizenship, and is further 
elaborated on by the Institute of Performance Management (2012), which defines 
good corporate citizenship as being “all about how the municipalities set their priorities 
through the performance management system as per the IDP, conduct their business 
as per the SDBIP and relate to the community they serve through community input 
and public participation”. 
The Constitution (1996) provides that a municipality, in striving to give effect to the 
objects of local government as set out in Section 152(1) of the Constitution, must do 
so “within its financial and administrative capacity”. According to the Performance 
Management Policy Framework of Beaufort West Municipality (2009:6), the 
democratic values and principles set out in Section 195(1) of the Constitution directly 
connect with the concept of municipal performance management, particularly referring 
to the principles of “the promotion of the efficient, economic and effective use of 
resources, accountable public administration, displaying transparency by making 
available information, being responsive to the needs of the community, and by 
facilitating a culture of public service and accountability amongst staff”. 
The Constitution also creates the framework for numerous pieces of enabling 
legislation enacted to regulate municipal performance assessment, monitoring and 
reporting. These are set out in Table 5.1 above. 
 
5.3.2 Framework for Managing Programme Performance Information 
The Government-wide Monitoring and Evaluation Policy Framework (GWM&E) (2007) 
also emphasises that monitoring and evaluation is key in realising a more effective 
public sector. In the GWM&E framework, the National Treasury is recognised as the 
main department responsible for programme performance indicators, which is in line 
with the National Treasury’s statutory or constitutional authority for government 
performance information and responsibility for prescribing, in accordance with Section 
216(1)(a), “measures to ensure transparency and expenditure control in each sphere 
of government” This is set out in sections 215 and 216 the Constitution. The 
Framework for Managing Programme Performance Information (FMPPI) (2007) was 





managed and reported on. Given the importance of government delivery within the 
provincial and national government space, the responsibility for programme and 
performance management has since been made the responsibility of the Department 
of Performance Monitoring and Evaluation (DPME) within the Presidency since 2009. 
The main objectives of the FMPPI (2007) include: 
• Outlining the key roles and responsibilities for managing programme and 
performance information and evidence; 
• Promoting accountability to national parliament, provincial legislatures, 
municipal councils and the public through timely, accessible and accurate 
publication of performance information; 
• Clarifying standards for performance information, supporting regular audits 
of non-financial information where appropriate; and 
• Improving the structures, systems and processes required to manage 
performance information. 
 
The FMPPI (2007) also provides a framework for “key concepts in the design and 
implementation of management systems to define, collect, report and utilise 
performance indicators in the public sector”. Within the local government context, the 
implementation of an integrated performance management system is generally 
regarded as a good governance practice as it provides a solid foundation that 
guarantees sustainable methods for attaining good governance standards and 
requirements, legislative conformance and ensuring the attainment of community 
needs. Effective performance management systems require continuous assessment, 
refinement and review of key processes, such as planning, budgeting, implementing, 
monitoring, reporting and evaluating the effectiveness of policy implementation. 
Given the MFMA requirements for non-financial reporting against service delivery 
objectives, a statutory obligation was introduced within the local government 
environment for the implementation of service delivery budget implementation plans 
(SDBIPs) as defined in the MFMA, as another form of managing municipal 
performance to improve delivery and accountability in municipalities. The SDBIP has 





The implementation of the SDBIP is required to be measured on a quarterly basis and 
as part of the statutory mid-year or six-monthly performance implementation and 
reporting process. 
Section 53(c)(ii) of the MFMA (2003:72) requires that within 28 days of the approval 
of the budget the mayor must approve “the municipality’s service delivery and budget 
implementation plan”, which includes quarterly financial and non-financial 
performance targets and that performance agreements of the municipal manager and 
all senior managers, in terms of Section 53(3)(c)(bb), “are linked to the measurable 
performance objectives approved with the budget and to the service delivery and 
budget implementation plan” and, to improve accountability, that such SDBIP be made 
public within 14 days of approval by the mayor. The linking of the performance 
agreements of the municipal manager and the senior managers to the objectives and 
targets as set out in the SDBIP form an essential part of the specifics that will be 
measured by the performance management system. 
Given the linkages, the completion of the annual SDBIP, including the quarterly 
financial (budget) and non-financial targets, requires detailed planning and 
consultation prior to completion and approval. The SDIP must include project plans 
and detailed cash flow forecasts as essential elements to ensure that SDBIPs are 
credible, meaningful and implementable. 
One of the most difficult parts of the SDBIPs remains the setting of credible and 
meaningful performance targets and indicators that are specific, measurable, 
achievable, realistic and time bound. De Bruijn (2007:19) warns against the risk of 
“negative strategic behaviour and gaming of the numbers” and makes the point that 
municipalities must guard against merely going “through the motions” and should 
“deliver an SDBIP with easily measurable indicators and even more achievable 
targets”. In addition, although compliance and conformance to legislative requirements 
are non-negotiable given the tight timelines for the SDBIP approval, the focus should 
not be to prioritise the completion of the SDBIP over its substance and content. The 
SDBIP may be seen as adequate during evaluation and assessment by those tasked 
with its adjudication, yet it can be non-compliant with legislative and policy 
requirements and not entirely linked to performance outcomes and development 





According to the Guidelines for Framing Performance Indicators for Metros in South 
Africa (2013:8), the National Treasury’s discussion document recognises “that all 
metros already measure their performance in delivering services, infrastructure and 
housing through extensive existing indicators”. The National Treasury makes the point 
that “most metros do this as part of their established internal performance 
management and monitoring functions which themselves have been rapidly evolving 
and improving”. The National Treasury emphasises that these processes, systems 
and instruments have been constructed based on the legislative requirements as they 
relate to the “integrated development plans (IDPs), medium term revenue and 
expenditure frameworks (MTREFs), and service delivery and budget implementation 
plans (SDBIPs)”. 
In the case of metros, and which can be applied to most of the secondary cities in 
South Africa, “more systematic monitoring and evaluation of performance in relation 
to urban integration and spatial and sustainable built environment transformation is 
critical to all”. According to Turok, et al. (2013). (cited in the National Treasury’s 
Guideline for Framing Performance Indicators for Metros in South Africa, 2014:5), the 
City Support Programme (CSP) was introduced by national government in 2012, 
mainly aimed at accelerating “the process of spatial transformation in South African 
cities and towns by influencing where and how public funds are invested in the urban 
environment in order to promote more functional, productive, inclusive and sustainable 
cities”. The CSP also seeks to manage and synchronise the various funding and 
support programmes and to connect “these to national regulatory reforms in the built 
environment, and to support enhanced capacity in the metros themselves”. 
A system of performance indicators can assist the national, provincial and local 
government intergovernmental process to achieve transformation and deliver on the 
priorities and objectives of developmental local government. In relation to spatial 
transformation and urban integration as a key priority of developmental local 
government, particularly within metros and secondary cities, the National Treasury in 
its Framework document (2014:11) makes the point that it “is seeking to establish a 
more comprehensive set of indicators that are of general applicability and that will help 
the task of bringing about more efficient, inclusive and resilient cities through the 
concerted efforts of different spheres of government and other stakeholders”, these 





The Guidelines for Framing Performance Indicators (2014:11) provides three essential 
reasons why municipalities require a sophisticated and refined performance 
management system with suitable performance indicators. These are: 
(1) To provide accountability, which includes “public accountability between 
government and citizens, or internal accountability between spheres of 
government, or between department heads and elected politicians, or 
between senior managers and other officials”. Accountability is a key feature 
of good governance and therefore “monitoring the detailed allocation and 
effects of public spending is a crucial feature of transparency in a 
democratic system”; 
(2) To improve planning and performance, including “the policies, programmes 
and processes used to provide services, including their quality, quantity and 
value-for-money”. Formulating appropriate performance indicators can 
assist in highlighting and bringing out requirements and specific tasks to 
achieve spatial transformation and sustainable urban restructuring and built 
environments, including determining desired changes and outcomes and 
measurements of success. In cases where performance is inadequate or 
where gaps in implementation are identified, remedial steps can be 
implemented as part of the performance management process and system 
to correct the situation; and 
(3) To help determine spending priorities. Implementing “a results-based 
budgeting approach connects resource allocation to specific, measurable 
results” and analysing the “evidence of the impact and effectiveness of 
public investment can provide vital information to influence and amend 
strategic priorities”. Given that that the MFMA and Budget Regulations 
require “municipalities to consider the future operational costs and revenues 
of planned projects before approving them”, it is therefore “imperative that 
budget procedures and decisions should be influenced by the impact of 
previous spending in order to provide feedback and close the loop”. 






Craythorne (2006:120, in Ras, 2016:53) makes the point “that there should also be 
performance measurement of political figures in local government” and “if not, a 
situation of master and slave may well be at the order of the day where the politicians, 
under the auspices of political oversight, lambasts senior management irrespective of 
whether the performance measurement is a comprehensive assessment or not”. In a 
‘master-slave’ relationship, which is generally governed by exploitation and authority 
and where the slave has to bow to their master's wishes under the constant threat of 
punishment, Ras (2016:53) emphasises that “performance measurement can easily 
be misused by political masters to mob the administration for performance failures 
without accepting accountability themselves”. 
 
5.3.3 The Batho Pele White Paper on Transforming Public Service Delivery 
(1997) 
Batho Pele, a Sesotho phrase or adage translated into English to mean ‘People First’, 
was introduced in the form of a white paper 1997 and is aligned with the Constitution 
as it provides and lays the foundation for the developmental approaches in the broad 
public service delivery agenda. Batho Pele consists of eight key principles all aimed 
at ensuring improved public service delivery to the communities they serve. The Batho 
Pele principles empower communities by setting service standards, implying that 
communities now know the services they are entitled to receive and how these will be 
delivered to them by public servants. Applying the principles of Batho Pele or ‘People 
First’ provides a commitment by government officials to the broader public that they 
will be polite, open and transparent and that they will deliver good service to the public. 
The maximisation of service delivery through a high level of performance requires the 
creation of an ethos or culture of service delivery that will enable the public to benefit 
from each official performing at their utmost. The cultivation of a favourable ethos is 
dependent on all officials who deal with the public exhibiting a positive attitude. 
The main purpose of the White Paper on Transforming Public Service Delivery 
(WPTPSD) (1997:11) is “to provide a policy framework and a practical implementation 
strategy for the transformation of public service delivery” within the entire public sector 





the ‘what’ in relation to public service delivery. It provides the framework for how public 
services are delivered, more explicitly about how to improve the efficiency and 
effectiveness of public service delivery. Transforming public service delivery “is not 
about what services are to be provided – their volume, level and quality”, but about 
how the service is delivered. 
Batho Pele (1997) was launched with a view to impact on the skills and attitudes of 
officials who are required to develop ‘a people first’ a culture of “we belong, we care, 
we serve”. However, Ras (2016:58), makes the point that Batho Pele suggests a 
holistic approach to excellence in service delivery and that “decisions about what 
should be delivered will be improved as a result of the Batho Pele approach through 
systematic consultation with users of services, and by information about whether 
standards of service are being met in practice”. 
The 1997 Batho Pele WPTPSD encompasses the constitutional philosophies and 
ideologies of developmental local government, as outlined in Section 152 of the 
Constitution and “advocates that municipalities are the focal point of public service 
delivery”. The WPTPSD consist of eight principles, mainly aimed at the transformation 
of public service delivery, public consultation and participation. These principles, 
according to the WPTPSD (1997:8) include the following: 
• Consultation – Citizens should be consulted about the level and quality of 
the public services they receive and, wherever possible, should be given a 
choice about the services that are offered; 
• Service standards – Citizens should be told what level and quality of public 
services they will receive so that they are aware of what to expect; 
• Access – All citizens should have equal access to the services to which 
they are entitled; 
• Courtesy – Citizens should be treated with courtesy and consideration; 
• Information – Citizens should be given full, accurate information about the 
public services they are entitled to receive; 
• Openness and transparency – Citizens should be told how national and 
provincial departments are run, how much they cost and who is in charge; 
• Redress – If the promised standard of service is not delivered, citizens 





effective remedy; and when complaints are made, citizens should receive 
a sympathetic, positive response; and 
• Value for money – Public services should be provided economically and 
efficiently in order to give citizens the best possible value for money. 
(WPTPSD, 1997) 
 
According to Uys, et al. (2013), the Batho Pele principles advocate, and commit the 
broad public sector to: “(i) efficient monitoring; (ii) rating of employees at the point of 
service to customers; (iii) adoption of key output indicators; (iv) cost efficiency; (v) cost 
effectiveness; (vi) adoption of standards of service outputs; (vii) annual performance 
reports; and (viii) public involvement in holding departments accountable”. 
The Batho Pele White Paper does not explicitly set out any directives or commands 
for the existence of a performance management function; however, according to Van 
der Waldt (2007, in Jesse, 2012:50), the eight Batho Pele principles, as highlighted 
earlier, may be viewed as objectives for the organisational performance management 
function and process from which specific performance measures and key indicators 
may be developed in a public sector organisation. 
The WPTPSD (1997:10) reaffirms the constitutional principles and determinations to 
which the broader public sector should adhere. These include: 
• A high standard of professional ethics must be promoted and maintained;  
• Services must be provided impartially, fairly, equitably and without bias;  
• Resources must be utilised efficiently, economically and effectively;  
• Peoples’ needs must be responded to;  
• The public must be encouraged to participate in policy-making; and  








The WPTPSD is more focussed on the citizen as the customer of public service 
delivery. It encourages innovation “to tackle inefficient, outdated and bureaucratic 
practices, to simplify complex procedures, and to identify new and better ways of 
delivering services” (Section 5.1 of the WPTPSD, 1997) and rewards excellence in 
individuals or groups of public service officials who perform well in delivering public 
services. 
 
5.3.4 The Organised Local Government Act (No. 52 of 1997) 
Section 163 of the Constitution provides for ‘organised local government’. It sets out 
the framework and procedures, subject to Section 76 of the Constitution, for enabling 
legislation to establish national and provincial representative bodies or organisations 
for municipalities in the country. The Organised Local Government Act (No. 52 of 
1997) (OLGA) is the enabling legislation or Act of Parliament established to regulate 
the establishment of these representative organisations. The South African Local 
Government Association (SALGA) is an organisation or body established in terms of 
Section 163 of the Constitution during 2001 and derives its mandate from the OLGA. 
The OLGA (1997) stipulates that “national and provincial representatives for 
municipalities occupy seats on the Financial and Fiscal Commissions and the National 
Council of Provinces (NCOP)”. The SALGA fulfils the functions of an oversight, 
advisory and advocacy institution for municipalities in the country. Although the 
SALGA has no authority or power over municipalities, it protects and represents the 
interests of local government by acting as an employer body for municipal members. 
The SALGA serves as a knowledge- and information-sharing hub for local government 
and endeavors to build capacity and develop leadership capabilities in municipalities, 
as well as support and advise their members and work to improve the image of local 
government. Core to the mandate of the SALGA is the improvement of 
intergovernmental relations within and across the spheres of government by focusing 
on six key performance or strategic areas, namely “intergovernmental relations, 
economic development, municipal infrastructure and services, local economic 
development, social development and municipal finance”. Reporting by municipalities 
to the SALGA working groups is quarterly and in such reports municipalities are 





focus areas. These focus areas are all linked to the development role of local 
government as envisaged in Section 152 of the Constitution. 
 
5.3.5 The White Paper on Local Government (1998) 
The 1998 White Paper on Local Government, which was addressed alongside other 
key local government issues in Chapter 4 of this dissertation, introduces “integrated 
development planning, budgeting and performance management in municipalities” as 
one of the core principles when creating developmental government premised on the 
fundamental of the Constitution. In paragraph 3.2 of Section B, the White Paper on 
Local Government (1998:33) makes the point “that these are powerful tools which can 
assist municipalities to develop an integrated perspective on development in their 
area. It acknowledged that performance management is critical to ensure that plans 
are being implemented, that they are having the desired development impact, and that 
resources are being used efficiently”. According to Ras (2016:58), in this regard 
parliament, by making performance management a peremptory requirement in local 
government legislation, significantly recognises the relevance, value and importance 
of performance management as a key instrument to achieve the developmental 
objectives of local government. 
According to Van der Waldt (2007:41), the “White Paper advocates that municipalities 
should be developmental bodies with developmental objectives; that municipalities 
require a performance management function, with the involvement of communities. 
The White Paper states that municipalities must act responsibly in the efficient use of 
resources and should ensure that the intended users benefit from expended 
resources”. The White Paper (1998:32) promotes “and provides a mandate for the 
establishment of a performance management function, as it offers the basic principles 
for such a function to be instituted, which are: (i) to ensure that plans are implemented; 
(ii) setting down measures or key performance indicators; (iii) community involvement 
in the design of key performance indicators; (iv) setting down monitoring indicators; 
and (v) consideration for the goals and unique circumstances of local municipalities”. 
Section H, paragraph 3 of the White Paper on Local Government (1998:98) provides 





organisational or institutional performance instruments and that these must be 
developed in partnership with local government. These performance instruments, 
according to the White Paper of Local Government, 1998, must have the following 
aims: (1) to allow and enable realistic planning in accordance with the SMART 
principles; (ii) to allow “municipalities to assess the impact of their administrative 
reorganisation processes and development strategies”; and (iii) to improve or enhance 
local government performance and accountability. 
The 1998 White Paper on Local Government introduces the IDP as a primary and key 
strategic planning tool or instrument that local municipal councils can use in the 
implementation and achievement of developmental goals of local government. The 
IDP aims to embed participatory democracy in municipalities and “to integrate 
municipal planning and to consolidate departmental plans in the execution of 
delivering uniform services and products to communities”. According to the 
Department of Provincial and Local Government (2001:7), the IDP process “is meant 
to help local role players to plan better and effectively implement plans in the municipal 
area” and is aimed at assisting municipalities to identify their needs and local 
government “developmental priorities, set developmental objectives and set local key 
performance indicators and targets consistent with their budget”. 
In the execution of the IDP, the White Paper on Local Government (1998:23) demands 
the incorporation of criteria for ‘developmental local government’ in four key areas: “(i) 
social development; (ii) economic growth; (iii) integration, coordination and democratic 
development; and (iv) leading and learning”. These criteria are simultaneously key 
performance areas (KPAs) that are applicable in the implementation of the IDP. 
Through effective performance management, municipalities are able to monitor the 
implementation of their integrated development plans and through continuous 
monitoring municipalities are able to continuously improve their operations, service 
delivery performance, accountability and oversight. By continuous and persistent 
assessment of performance against the set lDP targets, municipalities ensure effective 
and efficient implementation of service delivery to local citizens, which includes 
ensuring that there is effective participation of citizens in government processes. 
The Service Delivery Budget Implementation Plan (SDBIP), discussed earlier, is 





strategic budgeting and performance instrument with the main focus of allocating and 
monitoring the application of financial and non-financial resources where these are 
most needed. The SDBIP is the mechanism currently used and is progressively being 
integrated into the municipal performance planning, and quarterly and mid-year 
performance reporting of municipalities as part of the many reforms on the local 
government front. 
According to Van der Waldt (2007, cited by Jesse, 2012:52), in the 1998 White Paper 
ward committees are mentioned as “partners in resource mobilisation for the 
development of the municipal area”. Ward committees, while having no powers or 
resources, are regarded as a representative community-based legal and formal 
structure of Council, acting as an advisory body through which people from their 
respective localities and interest groups make their voices heard and hold Council 
responsible and accountable in their term of Office. It is a participatory form of structure 
intended to complement the representative form of structure. Ward committees may 
participate in the ‘performance appraisal’ and annual reporting processes of the 
municipality as per legal prescription on public participation, with the discretion of the 
municipal council. 
Municipalities have the discretion whether or not to set up ward committees. These 
are internal structures of a municipality established in terms of Chapter 4 of the 
Municipal Structures Act (No. 117 of 1998) to enhance public participation and 
community involvement in municipal decision-making processes. Jesse (2012:52) 
makes the point that “ward committees may (i) serve as a ‘stakeholder voice’ in that 
community; (ii) stimulate public involvement in municipal programmes and projects; 
(ii) be instrumental in the evaluation process of municipal performance on programmes 
and projects; (iv) the establishment of Ward Committees should go hand in hand with 
strengthening support to ward councillors and building accountable and effective local 
political leadership; and (v) monitor the allocation of resources”. Both the Municipal 
Structures Act and the Municipal Systems Act provide a solid legal authority and 
governance framework for complementing representative democracy with 







5.3.6 The Local Government: Municipal Structures Act (No. 117 of 1998) 
As set out in Chapter 4, the Local Government: Municipal Structures Act (No. 117 of 
1998) (the Structures Act) provides for the establishment of municipalities, which 
includes the categories and types of municipality within each category, as well as the 
appropriate division of functions and powers between categories of municipalities. The 
Structures Act determines the obligation of municipalities to achieve the objects set in 
Section 152 of the Constitution and also regulates “the internal systems, structures 
and office-bearers of municipalities to provide for appropriate electoral systems”. 
Therefore, given the linkages to the local government objectives as provided in Section 
152 of the Constitution, the decision-making powers of these internal systems and 
political office bearer structures, bears evidence on municipal performance. 
Section 44 regulates the functions of executive committees. In particular, Section 
44(3)(a), (b) and (c) of the Structures Act deals with “the powers and functions of the 
Executive Committee of the council and their responsibility to review and evaluate the 
needs of the municipality in terms of its priorities” and is therefore also relevant to the 
performance. In addition, an important function of the Executive committee, in terms 
of the Structures Act (1998), is to “review the performance of the municipality in order 
to improve its efficiency, effectiveness and economy”. The role of the executive 
committee extends beyond to review and recommend priorities and performance to 
also include that it may recommend improvements and the best methods to deliver 
products and services in the interest of the community. 
Section 44(3)(g) of the Structures Act (1998) has direct relevance on municipal 
performance management, particularly as it requires that “the Executive Committee 
deliver a report on the quality and extent of community involvement in the affairs of the 
municipality”. Therefore, to enable the delivery of such a report the executive 
committee is tasked, as part of their role in managing the performance function of the 
municipality, with monitoring and evaluating progress against key performance 
indicators. In addition, in Schedule 5 of the Structures Act the code of conduct for 
councillors also has a direct relevance on the performance of councillors and their 
constituency interests. 
Section 56 of the Structures Act provides for the functions and powers of executive 





the executive mayor over performance of the municipality. It provides that the powers 
and functions of an “executive mayor, in performing the duties of office, must - 
  Identify and develop criteria in terms of which progress in the 
implementation of the strategies, programmes and services referred to in 
subsection (2)(c) can be evaluated, including key performance indicators 
which are specific to the municipality and common to local government in 
general; 
 Evaluate progress against the key performance indicators; 
 Review the performance of the municipality in order to improve - 
(i) The economy, efficiency and effectiveness of the municipality; 
(ii) The efficiency of credit control and revenue and debt collection 
services; and 
(iii) The implementation of the municipality's by-laws; 
 Monitor the management of the municipality’s administration in 
accordance with the directions of the municipal council; 
 Oversee the provision of services to communities in the municipality in a 
sustainable manner”. 
 
In terms of the Structures Act (1998), “an executive mayor has the right to appoint a 
mayoral committee, whose function it would be to ensure effective and efficient 
government”. The executive mayor or mayoral committee has the authority to initiate 
and institutionalise any functions in the municipality, which includes the function of 
performance management, and to exercise control over it. In this regard, the legislation 
is clear in that it provides that any political decision on administrative and managerial 
systems that would facilitate the measurement and management of municipal 
performance is strategically placed with the mayoral committee and municipal council, 







5.3.7 The Local Government: Municipal Systems Act (No. 32 of 2000) 
The whole of Chapter 6 of the Local Government: Municipal Systems Act (2000:56-
60) (the Systems Act) provides a very comprehensive legal basis for the 
institutionalisation of organisational performance management at municipalities. The 
Systems Act, read in combination with the Constitution, the White Paper (1998) and 
the Municipal Finance Management Act (No. 56 of 2003), makes up the key statutes 
for local government performance, monitoring and reporting. The object of the 
Systems Act (2000) “is to solidify processes in the delivery of services to the public 
through implementation of appropriate programmes and policies on matters such as 
municipal powers and functions, the IDP, public participation, performance 
management, human resources, debt collection and the codes of conduct for 
councillors and municipal employees”. The “core principles, mechanisms and 
processes that are necessary to enable municipalities to move progressively towards 
the social and economic upliftment of local communities and to ensure universal 
access to essential services that are affordable to all” of the Systems Act (2000) were 
extensively discussed in Chapter 4 of this dissertation. The Systems Act (2000) can 
be regarded as an extension to the Municipal Structures Act as “it gives very specific 
attention to municipal performance management.” 
The entire Chapter 6 of the Systems Act is devoted to performance management, 
which indicates a priority and focus on performance management as a key mechanism 
to improve local government accountability for service delivery. Section 38 of the 
Systems Act is authoritative and peremptory in that it regulates that “a municipality 
must establish a performance management system and promote a culture of 
performance management among its political structures, political office bearers and 
councillors and in its administration” and that it is commensurate with its resources. 
The critical components for an effective performance management function are 
provided in Section 38(a), (b) and (c) of the Systems Act (2000), more particularly, 
effective performance management: (i) stipulates and specifies performance priorities; 
(ii) states and affirms performance objectives; (iii) provides a choice and selection of 
key performance indicators and service delivery targets; (iv) is geared and links 
organisational and individual performance management to the outcomes and results 





amongst the administrative and political leaders; and should (vi) “maintain an 
accountable, efficient, effective and economic performance management system” 
from which measurable performance objectives and indicators may be derived. 
Ras (2016:61) makes the point that the terminology in the Systems Act does not 
explicitly or particularly refer to organisational performance management; however, it 
is strongly inferred and suggested, since there is prescription for the existence of an 
organisational performance function. He notes that “whilst Section 38(b) of the 
Systems Act does refer to the promotion of a culture of performance management 
within the administration, performance management referred to in Chapter 6 of the 
Systems Act implies the management of performance of the municipality as a whole” 
(Ras, 2016). 
In addition, Ras (2016:61b) further explains that Chapter 6 of the Systems Act requires 
that municipalities incorporate, integrate and report on a set of universal indicators 
prescribed nationally by the Minister for Co-operative Government and Traditional 
Affairs. In Section 42, the Systems Act, from a developmental local government 
perspective, further requires broader community and citizen involvement, as a client, 
in the setting of indicators and targets and in reviewing municipal performance through 
the budget, mid-year and annual report processes. However, to enhance 
administrative and political accountability, it is a requirement, in terms of Section 45 of 
the Systems Act, for annual performance reports of municipalities to be audited by the 
auditor-general and for municipalities to publish an annual report on their financial and 
non-financial performance. 
In terms of Section 39 of the Systems Act (2000) the executive of the council, or a 
committee of councillors (or mayoral committee) is obligated to “manage the 
development of organisational performance management, assign responsible persons 
to it and submit such a report on the implementation status to the municipal council for 
adoption”. Section 40 of the Systems Act (2000) advocates that “a mechanism for 
monitoring and review” of performance, such as an organisational performance 
management function, be established. The Systems Act sets a statutory requirement 
and obligation for municipalities to, on an annual basis, review the IDP. The IDP review 
process comprises a composite set of processes and procedures that measure results 





accountability perspective, it is close to impossible to effectively and efficiently manage 
and coordinate organisational performance and actions for the entire organisation if 
an exclusive and dedicated function for organisational performance management has 
not been established. As proposed and recommended by Section 40 of the Systems 
Act, organisational performance monitoring and evaluation activities can best be 
attended to by the establishment of a dedicated unit of professionals. 
A detailed breakdown of the core and essential elements and components of an 
effective organisational performance management function is provided in Section 41 
of the Systems Act. These key elements and components include: “(i) the design and 
construction of key performance indicators, drawn from the strategic objectives of the 
municipality and in line with the objectives of the IDP; (ii) design and construct a 
performance model which will measure outputs, outcomes and impacts, with 
measurable targets; and (iii) monitoring and evaluation reports to be issued at least 
once per annum”. Section 41(e)(ii) of the Systems Act calls for community involvement 
in the entire organisational performance and accountability framework and 
arrangements of the municipality. 
In line with the principles of participatory democracy and the advancement of 
community involvement in municipal activities and arrangements, Section 42 of the 
Systems Act connects with Section 41(e)(ii) in that it “calls for the effective 
performance of programmes and projects, with public involvement”. The functions and 
activities of effective organisational performance management demand that broad 
public involvement and inclusive community participation be an essential and key 
organisational performance indicator, particularly given that communities in general 
observe and expect municipalities to be developmental in nature and should function 
as democratic institutions of government. Given that the IDP is the top strategic and 
integrative instrument of planned delivery of stated or promised goals, the broad civil 
society and communities rightfully expect to be involved as a key stakeholder and 
client in the formulation and goal setting stages of the IDP. It is clear, given the recent 
rapid increase in service delivery protests, particularly at community level, that there 
appear to be anomalies and peculiarities between the defined and stated ideals of the 





In Section 43(1)(a), the Systems Act empowers the Minister responsible for the 
administration of the Act to determine key performance indicators that are relevant 
and applicable to the programmes of the municipality and that measure local 
government performance. The Minister is required to consult SALGA and the 
provincial MECs on these indicators. These key performance indicators should be 
relevant to the IDP and aligned to government’s strategic priorities of each electoral 
cycle and as outlined in the Medium-Term Strategic Framework (MTSF). Every 
municipality is required to comply with these predetermined key performance areas 
and indicators and, as a consequence, the compliance requirements have direct 
implications on community and public participation processes and on institutional 
arrangements with regard to performance management and evaluation in 
municipalities. According to Mathekga and Baccus (2006, cited in Jesse, 2012:56), 
“there is also the implication that a municipality is compelled to offer leadership, 
direction and resources and in so doing bring awareness to the public of at least some 
of the performance objectives of the municipality”. 
Section 44 of the Systems Act requires the notification and publication of public 
information and comment on key performance indicators and targets in that “a 
municipality, in a manner determined by its council, must make known both internally 
and to the general public the key performance indicators and performance targets set 
by it for purposes of its performance management system”. 
In terms of sections 46(2), 47(1) and 47(3) of the Systems Act, the relevant MEC must 
submit the analysis of municipal annual reports to the provincial legislature, the 
national Minister responsible for the Systems Act and to the National Council of 
Provinces (NCOP) for discussion and recommendations. This report is commonly 
referred to as the Section 47 Report and should include an analysis of the municipal 
performance for a particular year against stated objectives, a comparison with the 
previous years’ performance and should highlight any under- or outstanding 
performance matters. 
Section 49 of the Systems Act provides a list of the performance management 
regulations and guidelines issued by the Minister in terms of the empowering 
provisions of the Act. Municipalities are not permitted and cannot contravene any of 





caused the deviation”. The Systems Act provides a mandatory requirement for the 
internal audit committee to occasionally review the performance measures and 
indicators of the municipality. 
In terms of Section 55(1)(a)(ii) of the Systems Act, the administration of the 
municipality, which is headed by the municipal manager, is held accountable to ensure 
that the municipality operates “in accordance with the municipalities’ performance 
management system”. Section 152 of the Constitution, while setting out the objects of 
local government, provides the guiding framework for each municipality to ensure 
alignment of strategic objectives with the institutionalised organisational performance 
management system. 
The requirements for the employment contracts of municipal managers and managers 
directly accountable to the municipal manager are set out in Section 57 of the Systems 
Act. The Municipal Performance Regulations, issued in terms of the Systems Act, 
provide that the municipal council is responsible for monitoring the performance of the 
municipal manager and municipal executive team. 
The Municipal Systems Amendment Act (No. 44 of 2003) provides for amendments to 
the Municipal Systems Act of 2000, particularly as these relate to annual performance 
reports as set out in Section 46 of the Systems Act. These amendments have been 
necessitated chiefly as a result of the enactment of the MFMA in 2003. 
 
5.3.8 The Local Government: Municipal Planning and Performance Management 
Regulations (2001) 
The Municipal Planning and Performance Management Regulations (MPPMR) (2001) 
has been issued in terms of the Municipal Systems Act (No. 32 of 2000) and connect 
directly to chapters 5 and 6 of the Systems Act. The main goals of the MPPMR are to 
regulate the process that municipalities must follow with the finalisation of the 
municipality’s Integrated Development Plan. Chapter 2 of the MPPMR sets out specific 
strategic planning requirements for the IDP, whilst Chapter 3 explains the regulations 
as they relate to performance management and its associated processes. The form 
and nature of a municipal performance management system, a description of the 





be followed in the design, implementation, measurement and reporting on municipal 
performance, are set out in Regulation 7 of the MPPMR. 
Sections 3 to 5 of the MPPMR (2001) set the requirements for the adoption and 
implementation of an organisational performance management system, which 
includes the setting of the following prescribed key performance indicators, linked to 
Section 152 of the Constitution (1996): 
• The percentage of households with access to basic level of water, 
sanitation, electricity and solid waste removal; 
• The percentage of households earning less than R1 100 per month with 
access to free basic services; 
• The percentage of a municipality’s capital budget actually spent on capital 
projects that have been identified for a particular financial year in terms of 
the municipality's IDP; 
• The number of jobs created through municipalities’ local economic 
development initiatives including capital projects; 
• The number of people from employment equity target groups employed in 
the three highest levels of management in compliance with a municipality’s 
approved employment equity plan; and  
• The percentage of a municipality's budget actually spent on implementing 
its workplace skills plan. 
 
As part of the strategic planning and indicator development process integral to the 
compilation of the IDP, municipalities are obligated to consider and implement the 
requirements of the MPPMR, particularly in developing inputs, outputs and outcomes. 
The IDP and municipal performance benefits from the planning regulations. Given 
potential changes in the internal and external environment, the MPPMR, in sections 
11(1), (2) and 13(2), indicates that the key performance indicators of the SDBIP and 
the IDP have to be reviewed at the mid-term and annually to ensure a flexible and 
responsive IDP over the full electoral period of Council. In this regard, both the IDP 
and the performance management and evaluation processes benefit from the 





provides that the process and methodology for organisational performance evaluation 
“identify strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats in meeting its KPIs and 
targets”. A municipality must guard against striving “to meet its KPIs but rather use its 
KPIs as measuring tools” for organisational performance. Jesse (2012:61) makes the 
point that, “whilst the Regulations provide details on the requirements for a municipal 
performance management system, they do not propose exactly how the system 
should function which means that the best suited for local circumstances approach 
within the confinements of the law prevails”. 
The MPPMR, in Regulation 14(1)(a) and (b)(i), provides that “the functionality of the 
municipality’s performance management system” must be the responsibility of the 
internal audit committee and further that a municipality must, “devise a method for 
auditing performance management as prescribed by the internal auditing process”. 
Further, in terms of sections 14(1)(c) and 14(2)(a)(b)(c), a performance audit 
committee must consist of three persons, but the Regulation sets specific obligations 
and requirements for “at least one person who has expertise in performance 
management” and to ensure independence and credibility, “the majority of which may 
not be involved in the municipality as a councillor or an employee”. 
The MPPMR, in Regulation 15(2)(iv)(v), supports Section 40 of the Municipal Systems 
Act (2000) with a requirement for review and enhancement of the organisational 
performance management system. This is particularly interesting as it gives 
municipalities the authority “to develop, review and revise the performance 
management system” and further states that they may “monitor the municipality's 
performance in relation to the key performance indicators and performance targets set 







5.3.9 The Local Government: Municipal Performance Regulations (2006)  
The 2006 Municipal Performance Regulations (‘MPR’), issued in terms of the 
Structures Act, is aimed at regulating and bringing about uniformity in how the 
performance of municipal managers and those reporting directly to the municipal 
manager is managed, directed, monitored and improved. The 2006 MPR covers both 
the employment contract of a municipal manager, in terms of Section 57 of the 
Systems Act, and the managers directly accountable to the municipal manager (in 
terms of Section 56). Section 57 of the Systems Act (2000) provides that “a person to 
be appointed as the municipal manager of a municipality, and a person to be appointed 
as a manager directly accountable to the municipal manager, may be appointed to 
that position” in terms of an employment contract and a separate performance 
agreement that is concluded annually. The MPR specifies performance agreements 
and associated performance contracts, job descriptions and tasks, a process to deal 
with disputes and differences through grievance, as well as objection procedures 
aimed at resolution inclusive of a mechanism for continuous improvement in 
performance. 
In terms of Section 56 of the Systems Act (2000), “a municipal council, after 
consultation with the municipal manager, appoints a manager directly accountable to 
the municipal manager”. The Section further provides that, subject to considering 
candidates from previously disadvantage backgrounds, such persons “must have the 
relevant skills and expertise to perform the duties associated with the post” (Systems 
Act, 2000). 
The specific applicability and relevance of the MPR to municipal performance 
management is found in sections 55 and 56 of the Systems Act, which defines top 
management’s leadership role in performance management and an outcomes and 
evidence driven performance function and insistence on community involvement in the 
performance of the municipality as required by sections 45 and 44 of the Systems Act. 
The code of conduct for councillors and municipal staff members, particularly senior 
management, is set out in schedules 1 and 2 of the Systems Act, respectively. 
Municipal managers and those reporting to them accept the code of conduct upon the 
signing of a contract of employment with the municipality. Regulation 32 of the Local 





municipal managers and managers directly accountable to municipal managers), 
provides for and regulates the payment of a performance bonus, but only “after the 
annual report has been reviewed and adopted by the municipal council and upon the 
affordability of the municipality to pay a bonus”. It further provides the pre-requisite 
that municipal managers must accomplish the public announced performance 
objectives as outlined in the IDP and SDBIP and that these objectives be achieved 
within time frames and targets. The measurement of the performance of managers 
reporting directly to the municipal manager will be based on their individual 
contribution to the strategies, goals and objectives, as set out in the municipality’s IDP 
and SDBIP. The performance of the municipal manager and senior managers is 
evaluated and adjudicated by an evaluation panel appointed by Council. Such an 
evaluation panel consists of the mayor and mayoral committee member of the specific 
municipality, the performance audit committee (with a requirement that at least one 
member must be a performance specialist), a ward committee member in the 
municipality and a municipal manager from another municipality. 
Through the institutionalisation of annual performance agreements, the municipal 
council is provided with the necessary assurance on the performance expectations of 
the municipal manager and managers directly accountable to the municipal manager. 
The purpose of the performance agreements, as outlined in the MPRMM and as 
summarised by Ras (2016:63), is to: 
• Comply with the provisions of sections 57(1)(b), (4A), (4B) and (5) of the 
Act as well as the employment contract entered into between the parties;  
• Specify objectives and targets defined and agreed with the employee and 
to communicate to the employee the employer’s expectations of the 
employee’s performance and accountabilities in alignment with the IDP, 
SDBIP and the budget of the municipality;  
• Specify accountabilities set out in a performance plan, which forms an 
annexure to the performance agreement; monitor and measure 
performance against set targeted outputs; 
• Use the performance agreement as the basis for assessing whether the 





• In the event of outstanding performance, reward the employee, and give 
effect to the employer’s commitment to performance excellence. 
 
The MPR (2006) is directly linked and aligned to the requirements of Section 120 of 
the Municipal Systems Act and, therefore, it is a requirement for the individual 
performance plans and agreements of the municipal manager and senior managers 
reporting to the municipal manager to be aligned to the IDP, SDBIPs and budget of 
the municipality. However, according to Ras (2016:64), this is constrained by the 
different application and interpretation of terminology and wording, particularly as it 
relates to defining and understanding key performance areas (KPAs), used in the 
municipality’s IDP and SDBIP with the interpretation set out in Regulation 26 of the 
MPR and the core or minimum competency requirements referred to in Regulation 28 
of the MPR, which makes understanding and alignment extremely difficult. 
 
5.3.10 The Local Government: Municipal Finance Management Act (No. 56 of 
2003) (MFMA) 
The purpose of the MFMA is to implement and sustain sound financial management 
practices in municipalities and to set out the principles and procedures for financial 
planning, budgeting, accounting (financial and managerial), control and reporting by 
municipalities in the country. The MFMA (2003) establishes an extensive but “strict 
framework for the financial performance management of municipalities and other 
institutions in the local sphere of government”. The MFMA also sets the standards for 
performance reporting and provides for the entire accountability framework, from 
planning to reporting, and provides the financial norms and standards for successful 
implementation of performance measurement and the management and reporting of 
performance. It also sets out the procedure for intervention and appropriate action 
against persons responsible for non-compliance. The MFMA therefore strengthens the 
core of organisational performance management and sets out the framework to 






In relation to performance management in municipalities, it commences with the 
planning (IDP) and budgeting processes as provided in the MFMA. The annual budget 
and associated planning processes (SDBIP and IDP Review) are some of the most 
important performance management tools in municipalities. In Section 17(3), the 
MFMA sets out the entire process, starting with the requirement of setting measurable 
and achievable performance objectives in the early stages of the annual budget 
process that are aligned with Section 152 of the Constitution. The MFMA (2003) 
complements other legislation that prescribe procedures and requirements for a 
performance management system as alluded to earlier in this chapter, as it focusses 
on “reporting on financial issues and performance with guidelines in respect of roles 
and responsibilities of the mayor, the accounting officer and other senior officials of 
the municipality”.  
The MFMA sets a requirement, as part of the annual budget process, for mayors to 
submit their annual budgets “to a council meeting 90 days prior to the commencing of 
the new financial year”. The municipal budget and associated documents are subject 
to public oversight, scrutiny and commentary before final adoption and submission to 
stakeholders. In this regard, municipalities must table a draft budget annually, before 
the end of March, and make this public for comment and considered for final approval 
before the end of June. 
In Section 52 of the MFMA, the mayor is assigned general responsibilities, which 
include the responsibility to provide political guidance over the fiscal and financial 
affairs of the municipality. Furthermore, the mayor is empowered to monitor and 
oversee the legislative responsibilities specifically assigned, in terms of the MFMA, to 
the municipal manager (as accounting officer and the chief financial officer), but the 
mayor or council is not allowed to interfere in the administrative exercise of those 
responsibilities by the municipal manager or the chief financial officer. The statutory 
responsibilities of the mayor, as outlined in the MFMA and according to Ras (2016:62), 
include “the authority to monitor and to take all reasonable steps associated with the 
performance of the municipality”. 
In addition to the general roles and responsibilities of the mayor as provided for in 
Section 52 of the MFMA, the mayor’s responsibilities in relation to the budget process 





the roles and responsibilities of the mayor in providing political guidance to councillors, 
specifically as this relates to the annual municipal planning processes regarding the 
budget, setting measurable service delivery objectives in consultation with 
communities, and concluding annual performance agreements for senior managers 
that are aligned to the IDP, SDBIP and the budget. In addition, the mayor must also 
ensure that the goals, objectives and associated measurable performance objectives, 
as specified in the municipality’s IDP and SDBIP, are linked to the budget and are 
implemented accordingly. The municipal manager, as accounting officer and head of 
the administration, accounts to the mayor on implementation and integration of the 
stated objectives in the municipal area. The mayor is also responsible, in terms of 
Section 53 of the MFMA, for taking necessary steps to guarantee that the annual 
budget of the municipality is approved within the legislative timeframes, that the SDBIP 
is approved by the mayor within 28 days of the approval of the budget and that the 
annual performance contracts of the municipal manager and the senior managers 
reporting to the municipal manager, as required by Section 57(1)(b) of the Municipal 
Systems Act, are approved within the legislative timeframes and are aligned to the 
IDP, the SDBIP and the annual budget. 
The fiduciary responsibilities of the municipal manager, as head of the administration 
and accounting officer, are set out in Section 61 of the MFMA. It requires the 
accounting officer to, at all times, act and manage the activities of the institution in the 
‘best interest of the municipality’. In terms of the MFMA and treasury norms and 
standards, the municipal manager has the responsibility to build the required internal 
capacity, particularly within the financial accounting department, to ensure adherence 
to, and compliance with proper financial governance practices. The entire suite of 
financial management, which includes the management of revenue, expenditure, 
assets and liabilities is entrusted in the accounting officer of the municipality. 
Although the application of financial management standards as these relate to budget 
and financial management, municipal borrowing and liability management, supply 
chain management, cash flow, revenue and liquidity management, banking, monthly 
revenue and expenditure reconciliation and reporting are delegated to the chief 
financial officer, it is the municipal manager who is ultimately accountable to the mayor 
to ensure good financial governance in the municipality. The MFMA, in Section 





municipality, to report any irregular, fruitless and wasteful expenditure to the mayor, 
the council, the Auditor-General of South Africa (AGSA) or the Provincial Treasury. In 
terms of Section 92 of the MFMA, the AGSA is empowered to audit and issue a report 
on the financial performance and financial management practices of each municipality. 
In terms of in-year financial and non-financial performance, the municipal manager, in 
terms of Section 71 of the MFMA, is obligated to prepare monthly in-year-monitoring 
budget performance statements and must report on the financial performance to the 
mayor, Provincial Treasury and National Treasury. Section 52 of the MFMA requires 
the mayor of the municipality to “within 30 days of the end of each quarter, submit a 
report to the council on the implementation of the budget and the financial state of 
affairs of the municipality”. Section 72 of the MFMA requires the accounting officer 
(municipal manger) conduct a mid-year budget and performance assessment for the 
first six months, ending 31 December, and submit such a performance assessment 
with recommendations for adjustments to the mayor, and national and Provincial 
Treasury. 
In terms of Section 74 of the MFMA, the municipal manager, as accounting officer of 
a municipality, “must submit to the National Treasury, the Provincial Treasury, the 
department for local government in the province or the auditor-general such 
information, returns, documents, explanations and motivations as may be prescribed 
or as may be required”. Such information to be submitted includes matters of 
noncompliance with the MFMA or non-compliance on financial accounting norms, 
standards and practices. 
The Municipal Annual Report is another mechanism used to report on overall 
municipal performance, as well as promote accountability to the local community for 
decisions made by the municipality throughout the year. Section 121 of the MFMA 
(2003) covers the legislative requirements and the process of “preparation and 
adoption of annual reports” by municipalities. The annual report includes an 
assessment of financial performance, the financial position, non-financial performance 
on the IDP and SDBIP and reports from AGSA (on the audit) and the various 
committees tasked with oversight and governance, such as the audit and risk 
committees. The municipal annual report serves as a summary reflection on the 





The financial statements must be submitted to the AGSA for audit purposes within two 
months of the end of the municipal financial year. The AGSA must issue an audit report 
within three months of receiving the statements from the accounting officer of the 
municipality. In terms of Section 127(2) of the MFMA, “the mayor of a municipality 
must, within seven months after the end of a financial year (by 31 January each year), 
table in the municipal council the annual report of the municipality”. 
In accordance with Section 46 of the Municipal Systems Act, it is a requirement that 
the annual report include a performance report of the municipality. In terms of Section 
129 of the MFMA, the municipal council must consider the annual report of the 
municipality and “by no later than two months from the date on which the annual report 
was tabled in the council in terms of Section 127, adopt an oversight report containing 
the council’s comments on the annual report”. In terms of Section 129(3) of the MFMA, 
“the accounting officer must in accordance with Section 21A of the Municipal Systems 
Act make public an oversight report … within seven days of its adoption” by Council. 
In terms of the MFMA, Section 132(2), both the Annual Report and Oversight Report 
of the municipality must be submitted to the provincial legislature “within seven days 
after the municipal council has adopted the relevant oversight report”. Given the 
requirements for the MEC local government, in terms of Section 132(3) of the MFMA, 
to monitor the submission of these reports to the legislature by municipalities, it is good 
practice that these also be sent to the relevant treasury and MEC for local government. 
Sections 77 and 78 of the MFMA place a responsibility and duty on senior managers 
within the municipality to not only assist the accounting officer co-administer and 
accept responsibility and accountability for the financial administration, but the MFMA 
also places an obligation on them to act in the interest of the municipality, with 
diligence and in an effective, efficient and economic manner within the financial and 
other resources of the municipality. Financial misconduct is covered in Section 171 of 
the MFMA and includes to mislead or incorrectly report on the performance of a 
municipality against stated IDP and SDBIP objectives and targets. 
The MFMA supports performance auditing as a function of the internal auditing unit of 
the municipality, which is covered in Section 165 of the MFMA. Further, Section 166(1) 
of the MFMA sets a requirement that a municipality must have an audit committee as 





bearers, the accounting officer and the management staff of the municipality … (v) on 
performance management [and] (viii) performance evaluation.” 
Given Section 166 of the MFMA, and depending on the interpretation and application 
of regulations by municipalities, it is crucial for the internal auditing unit to be involved 
in all areas impacting on the municipality’s performance. This proposed involvement 
should not be restricted to financial matters, as is the case in many municipalities. 
 
5.3.11 The Local Government: The Municipal Budget and Reporting Regulations 
(2009) 
The Municipal Budget and Reporting Regulations (2009) (MBRRs) for local 
government were issued by the Minister of Finance in terms of the empowering 
provisions of the MFMA. The main objective of the MBRRs is to formalise norms and 
standards for local government aimed at improving the credibility, sustainability, 
transparency, accuracy and reliability of municipal budgets. To achieve this objective 
and to translate the budget regulation requirements into practical outcomes, the 
various budget schedules, supporting tables and associated standard chart of 
accounts were developed and are included in the MBRRs and as a minimum 
requirement to be progressively implemented by municipalities. The MBRRs mainly 
cover the performance and reporting requirements as set out in: 
• Sections 71 and 72 of the MFMA, particularly as it relates to improving the 
quality, standardisation and comparability of the monthly budget 
statements and mid-year budget and performance assessment; 
• Sections 52 to 54 as it relates to the general responsibilities, budget 
processes and related matters and budgetary control and early 
identification of financial problems; 
• The Municipal Budget and Reporting Regulations of 2008 by 
supplementing and extending the coverage and applicability; and 






The National Treasury in its LGBER (2011:78) makes the point that the main purpose 
of the MBRRs 2009 “is to regulate the format and content of annual budgets, 
adjustment budgets and in-year reports to promote greater transparency and facilitate 
the alignment of policy priorities, plans, budgets and reports”. The MBRRs give deeper 
practical content and application to the MFMA’s objective and primarily assist in the 
regulation of budget matters, such as municipal finance policies, annual budgets, 
adjustments budgeting process and time-provisions in respect of municipal 
compliance to these regulations. The MBRRs propose to strengthen public financial 
management and governance in municipalities, particularly on matters of fruitless and 
wasteful, irregular and unauthorised expenditure. The MBRRs also aim to strengthen 
and improve transparency in public financial management and internal and external 
accountability processes. In addition, the MBRRs provide supplementary guidance to 
improve planning and effective resource allocation and set even higher standards for 
improved management of public finances. In this way the MBRRs contribute to the 
effective maintenance of sound financial performance and improved financial 
governance practices. 
 
5.3.12 The Service Delivery Budget Implementation Plan 
The requirements for the Service Delivery Budget Implementation Plan (SDBIP) are 
covered in Section 1 of the MFMA and further espoused in the National Treasury 
Circular 13 issued on 31 January 2005. The MFMA (2003), in Section 1, defines a 
SDBIP as: 
“A detailed plan approved by the mayor of a municipality in terms of Section 53(1)(c)(ii) 
for implementing the municipality’s delivery of municipal services and its annual 
budget, and which must indicate -  
 projections for each month of —  
(i) revenue to be collected, by source; and 
(ii) operational and capital expenditure, by vote;  





 any other matters that may be prescribed, and includes any revisions of 
such plan by the mayor in terms of Section 54(1)(c).” 
 
The National Treasury (NT) Circular 13 (2005:2), issued in terms of the MFMA, 
describes the SDBIP “as a management, implementation and monitoring tool that will 
assist the mayor, councillors, municipal manager, senior managers and community”. 
NT Circular 13 (2005) emphasises that “a properly formulated SDBIP will ensure that 
appropriate information is circulated internally and externally for purposes of 
monitoring the execution of the budget, performance of senior management and 
achievement of the strategic objectives set by council”. This is a point that was 
emphasised earlier in this chapter in that detailed, understandable and measurable 
SDBIPs are fundamental to effective municipal performance measurement and 
accountability. De Bruijn (2007:19) makes the point that “if the SDBIPs are merely a 
gaming of the numbers exercise where professionals increase their output on matters 
of no real significance for the organisation albeit legal, the measurement of SDBIPs 
hold no strategic value for the organisation”. Furthermore, De Bruijn (2007) makes the 
point that “the increased numbers look good on paper but have limited to no social or 
productivity value”. 
NT Circular 13 (2005) outlines the guiding framework and assists municipalities in the 
preparation and compilation of the SDBIP to ensure alignment and compliance with 
the requirements of the MFMA. It can be concluded that the annual budget gives 
funding affect to the municipality’s IDP, whilst the SDBIP gives implementation and 
monitoring effect to the budget of the municipality. 
NT Circular 13 (2005) sets out the following five components of a proper SDBIP: 
(1) Monthly projections of revenue to be collected for each source; 
(2) Monthly projections of expenditure (operating and capital) and revenue for 
each vote; 
(3) Quarterly projections of service delivery targets and performance indicators 
for each vote; 
(4) Ward information for expenditure and service delivery; and  






According to the NT Circular 13 (2005:4), “whilst the SDBIP is largely a one-year 
detailed plan, it should include a three-year capital plan” and further that “municipalities 
are encouraged to also include three-year (by quarter) service delivery targets, to the 
extent that this is possible and feasible”. In this regard, municipalities may also opt to 
consider and include past and current year performance information as this would help 
to conduct detailed comparative analysis and to provide a framework for instituting 
remedial action aimed at addressing past problems. 
According to the NT Circular 13 (2005:4), “the budget funds the strategic priorities of 
the municipality and is not a management or implementation plan” and, therefore, the 
SDBIP “serves as a tacit agreement between the administration, council and 
community translating the goals and objectives set by the council as quantifiable 
outputs that should be implemented by the administration during a particular financial 
year”. The SDBIP provides the foundation for effective performance measurement of 
municipal service delivery juxtaposed against the stated quarterly and annual targets 
through implementation of the budget and application of other municipal resources as 
the ‘funding resource’ towards the attainment of stated outputs. 
Given the importance of the SDBIP as a municipal performance instrument, it can be 
regarded as an important management tool for the municipality to measure systematic 
progress and service delivery implementation. As set out earlier in this chapter in 
Section 5.3.2, the MFMA in Section 53(c)(2) places an obligation on the accounting 
officer to submit the SDBIP within fourteen (14) days of approval of the budget to the 
mayor and for the mayor to ensure “that the municipality’s service delivery and budget 
implementation plan is approved by the mayor within 28 days after the approval of the 
budget”, and further in Section 53(3)(a) that “the service delivery targets and 
performance indicators for each quarter, and … (b) the performance agreements of 
the municipal manager, senior managers and any other categories of officials as may 
be prescribed” be made public within 14 days of approval of the SDBIP by the mayor. 
The MFMA requires that the annual budget of a municipality be approved by latest 30 
May annually, which is within 30 days before the start of the new financial year on 1 
July. In this case, the annual SDBIP must be approved by no later than 28 June of 





The intention of parliament is that the annual SDBIP is approved prior to the start of 
the new municipal financial year, which is 1 July. In cases where the budget is not 
approved within 30 days before the start of the financial year, the provision and 
requirements as set out in both the MFMA and the MBRRs should be followed until 
such budget is approved prior to the commencement of the financial year. The SDBIP 
is then required to be approved within 28 days of the approval of the budget, which 
could be post commencement of the municipal financial year on 1 July. In the unlikely 
event of the annual municipal budget not being approved by Council before the start 
of the financial year, a mandatory intervention by the provincial executive council 
becomes unavoidable. This will be discussed later in this chapter. 
 
5.3.13 The Intergovernmental Relations Framework Act (No. 13 of 2005) (IGRFA) 
According to Jessa (2012:62a), the IGRFA “places the emergence of 
intergovernmental relations (IGR) between spheres of government and departments 
on a legitimate and institutional platform and since the promulgation of the IGFRA, 
government spheres have begun to work in a co-operative manner, implementing the 
ideals of the IGFRA in order to add value, effectiveness, and cost benefits to 
government programs such as the IDP”. The intergovernmental relations systems, 
which are underpinned by the IGFRA, were extensively discussed in Chapter 4 of this 
dissertation, and the chapter particularly set out the object of the IGFRA as “to address 
intergovernmental co-ordination and alignment of work required between national, 
provincial and local planning as well as the need to avoid duplication by departments 
in the delivery of services”. In addition, the IGFRA affords a structured and organised 
system for intergovernmental engagement and interaction within and between the 
three spheres of government, all aimed at ensuring improved outcomes for municipal 
programmes in pursuit of increased service delivery performance of municipalities. 
The various IGR structures that give effect to improved intergovernmental relations 
were also extensively covered in Chapter 4 (Section 4.8), under the heading 
‘Cooperative Government and IGR: Municipal, Provincial and National Government 






Jesse (2012:62b), citing the Green Paper on National Strategic Planning (2009:27), 
highlights that municipal performance objectives, which are aligned to the Section 152 
constitutional objectives of local government and those that advance IGR interests, 
are acceptable for inclusion as part of the performance management process and 
system. Intergovernmental planning, which is integral to improve intergovernmental 
collaboration and coordination, is defined by the Green Paper on National Strategic 
Planning (2009:27) according to the following parameters: “(i) coherence in planning; 
(ii) coherence in policy making; (iii) national strategic planning should be informed by 
sector, provincial and local plans; (iv) coordination; and (v) cooperation, mutual trust 
and good faith between parties”. It further states that the IGRFA is “based on the 
assumption of good faith and mutual trust between government spheres, to work 
together almost spontaneously and organically, with commitment to joint planning and 
budgeting and the promotion of seamless government” (Green Paper on National 
Strategic Planning, 2009:27). 
Baatjies (2009:11-14, cited by Jessa, 2012:62c), stresses the importance of 
developing an intergovernmental cooperative governance culture amongst all 
employees of the state and that such a culture will pave the way for the successful 
implementation of the IGRFA, in order to “assist, support, inform and consult” within 
each of, and across, the three spheres of government in a collaborative and co-
ordinated manner, all aimed at improving municipal organisational performance. In this 
regard, proper intergovernmental relations are encouraged to improve the 
effectiveness and efficiency of government programmes, since intergovernmental 
cooperation and co-ordination embraces all municipal programmes to some degree 
and, according to Baatjies (2009:11-14, in Jesse, 2012:62-63), municipalities have 
become “IGR impact zones or a convergence place for national programmes, making 







5.3.14 The National Development Plan and Medium-Term Strategic Framework 
(2009-2014 and 2014-2019) 
The 2030 National Development Plan (NDP), which was approved and made public in 
2012, sets out the long-term vision for the country and defines the desired destination, 
as well as identifies roles and responsibilities that different sectors of society need to 
fulfill in achieving the long-term goal and vision. 
According to the Alfred Nzo District Municipality (2017:16), the NDP 2030, as a long-
term visionary strategic plan for South Africa, aims to achieve four main 
comprehensive objectives: 
Providing overarching goals for what South Africa wants to achieve by 2030; 
(1) Building consensus on the key obstacles to South Africa achieving these 
goals and what needs to be done to overcome those obstacles; 
(2) Providing a shared long-term strategic framework within which more 
detailed planning can take place in order to advance the long-term goals 
set out in the NDP; and 
(3) Creating a basis for making choices about how best to use limited 
resources. 
 
The apex objective of the NDP (2012) is to give effect to developmental local 
government and to guarantee that all South Africans accomplish a “decent standard 
of living through the elimination of poverty and reduction of inequality”. Many of the 
essential elements or components describing a decent standard of living, as 
recognised in the NDP, are those that are required to be delivered by local government 
and which are taken up in the Medium-Term Strategic Framework (MTSF)17. 
The MTSF determines a set of national strategic priorities that should be considered 
and prioritised within the strategic plans and budgets across all three spheres of 
government and public sector institutions. The 2014-2019 MTSF has 12 priority 
                                            
17 Each MTSF is informed by the formation of ‘a new government’ nationally, following the outcome of the national 





outcomes and has been adopted by the fifth political executive and administrators as 
informed by the 2014 electoral mandate. These priority outcomes are linked to the 
National Development Plan 2030. The 2019-2014 MTSF is still under development 
and has not as yet been approved by the national Cabinet. Municipalities are obligated 
to accept and implement the MTSF strategic priorities and the MTSF should form the 
cornerstone of the IDP, SDBIP and budget processes. The MTSF priorities in local 
government require the formulation of accurate performance outcomes per applicable 
priority area and should include a comprehensive monitoring, evaluation and reporting 
component for local, provincial and national government. 
The MTSF for local government is guided by the developmental local government 
objectives, as set out in Section 152 of the Constitution and the 1998 White Paper on 
Local Government, which in turn informed the NDP 2013. The underlying MTSF 
priorities and performance drivers cut across all three spheres of government and are 
aimed at improving co-ordination, co-implementation, co-accountability and 
integration of priority areas across the spheres of government. The organisational 
performance management system, as informed by the performance of government 
programmes, must reflect this cooperative government arrangement as it relates to 
government service delivery and as it is outlined in the 1996 Constitution. Within the 
local government environment, although the electoral cycles between the national and 
provincial elections overlap with that of local government, the MTSF priorities must 
form part of the municipalities’ five-year local government strategic agenda and be 
reflected in the IDP, the SDBIP and the budgets. 
These local government objectives in the 2014-2019 MTSF and the NDP 2030 include 
(i) to speed up economic growth to create ‘sustainable livelihoods’; (ii) programmes to 
build economic and social ‘infrastructure’; (iii) rural development and food security; (iv) 
skills development and strengthening the human resources pool; (v) health 
improvement; (vi) reduction in crime and corruption; (vii) regional and international co-
operation; (viii) sustainable resources management; (ix) delivery of quality services; 
and (x) to build a developmental state and improve public services and democratic 
institutions (Medium Term Strategic Framework, 2014-2019). In analysing and 
unpacking these objectives, it is clear that they are fully aligned to the objectives set 
more than 20 years ago when the 1998 White Paper on Local Government was 





The NDP 2030, as it relates to local government, emphasises the need to strengthen 
the capability and capacity of local government to accomplish its developmental role 
as outlined in the Constitution and the 1998 Local Government White Paper. It requires 
an approach to IDPs’ development that is much more strategically focused on critical 
priority areas as outlined in the NDP, particularly those that fit into the essential 
responsibilities of municipalities, relate to the mandate of local government and are 
aimed at improving the living conditions of citizens. The DPME (2012) highlights “there 
are also many areas where municipalities could start implementation immediately by 
engaging with aspects of the NDP that speak to their core competencies and 
identifying how they can action proposals for improving implementation”. 
This calls for an IDP and annual budget process that is strategically managed and led 
by a senior team of the municipality and not by consultants, and which is aimed at 
having a more inclusive and meaningful public participation process. Following this 
approach will facilitate and help to narrow the lacuna between the aspirational goals 
as contained in the IDP and budget and what can actually or realistically be achieved. 
Priority areas, such as the delivery of basic services, infrastructure development and 
spatial planning that would improve community configuration, integration and create 
economic opportunities for the vulnerable, must be prioritised. 
5.4 FINANCIAL GOVERNANCE AND COUNCIL OVERSIGHT 
The MFMA and Systems Act are key pieces of local government legislation that set 
up the local government governance framework18 within a municipality. The 
governance framework must clarify, separate and clearly differentiate between the 
respective roles of the mayor, councillors, municipal employees (particularly senior 
officials), and the governance system of accountability and oversight. As indicated in 
Chapter 2, governance is ‘the way of doing things’. 
Practising and applying sound financial governance within all financial activities and 
transactions in municipalities is one of the main objects of the MFMA, and includes the 
development of an all-inclusive system that clarifies, separates and distinguishes 
between the responsibilities of mayors, councillors and municipal officials. The MFMA 
                                            
18 Mainly from a financial management perspective. The legislative, regulatory, policy and governance 





provides a comprehensive legislative framework to clarify and differentiate between 
the different roles and responsibilities. The local government governance framework, 
as set out in the MFMA and its Regulations, is constructed around the separate and 
distinct roles and responsibilities that enhance accountability and oversight, which is 
underpinned by advocating the institutionalisation of a system and a culture of 
transparency and regular reporting in municipalities. The governance system should 
create no scope or opportunity to confuse or duplicate responsibility and accountability 
as any ambiguity will fundamentally weaken accountability and oversight mechanisms. 
In Section 2, the MFMA (2003) establishes “norms and standards and other 
requirements for – (a) ensuring transparency, accountability and appropriate lines of 
responsibility in the fiscal and financial affairs of municipalities”. In terms of local 
government accountability and governance arrangements, the executive mayor or 
executive committee, as outlined in the MFMA, is responsible for “providing political 
leadership, proposing policy and overseeing its implementation” in the municipality. 
The municipal council, as a collective, remains responsible for approving municipal 
policies and must exercise oversight over the mayor or executive committee. 
The administration (municipal manager, senior management and staff) must answer 
and remain accountable to the municipal council, but through the mayor of the 
municipality. The municipal managers, senior managers and other officials remain 
responsible for implementing municipal policy and providing the executive mayor or 
executive committee with sound, comprehensive and professional advice in the 
interest of the municipality. In addition, the municipal manager is also required to take 
on a number of specific decisions in executing the legislative responsibilities, 
particularly in relation to the MFMA, which include but are not limited to: (1) certifying 
the correctness of the reports and submission thereof as outline in Section 71 of the 
MFMA; (2) budget preparation as outlined in Section 68 of the MFMA; and (3) reporting 
and publishing as outlined in sections 73 and 74 of the MFMA. 
The MFMA, together with the Systems and the Structures acts is clear in outlining and 
differentiating between the respective roles and responsibilities of councillors and 
officials. In respect of the accountability framework and responsibility for inputs, 
outputs and outcomes, the municipal council or executive committee exercises 





manager, as the accounting officer for the municipality, remains accountable for the 
utilisation and application of inputs to achieve specific predetermined outputs. The 
mayor is therefore responsible for overseeing and managing the municipal manager, 
mainly to guarantee delivery on the agreed outputs. The council’s and mayor’s roles 
are therefore to set policy and ensure positive outcomes, while the municipal manager 
must implement the policies and perform all the functions to ensure positive outputs. 
Outcomes can be described as the measurement of the effect of outputs. Outputs are 
the finished product, such as the number of built houses, whilst inputs refer to the 
application of any resources towards achieving specific outputs. 
In terms of concluding the accountability and oversight loop, and to fulfil the 
requirements of the Systems Act, the mayor must ensure that the agreed upon outputs 
are included in the annual performance agreement of the municipal manager and that 
the outputs are aligned and consistent with the IDP, SDBIP and the budget. The local 
government governance framework, gleaned from the MFMA and the Structures and 
Systems acts, sets out specific responsibilities for the municipal council, the mayor, 
councillors and key municipal officials (particular the municipal manager and chief 
financial officer). These are outlined in Table 5.2 below. 
Table 5.2: The Governance Framework for Local Government 
 Responsible for Oversight over Accountable to 
Municipal Council Approving policy and budget, 
monitoring performance of the 
organisation (outcomes). 
Mayor or executive 
committee 




Policy, budgets, outcomes, 
management of/ oversight over 
municipal manager and performance 
monitoring. 
Municipal manager Council, executive 




Outputs (performance) and 
implementation – institutional 
conformance and performance. 









Outputs (mainly financial). 











The MFMA provides the oversight and lines of authority arrangements for financial 
management in local government. To enhance accountability and oversight, the 
MFMA provides and institutionalises a clear separation of roles and responsibilities 
between the political functionaries, i.e. the mayor (or executive committee) and council 
and, in relation to the political and administrative interface, between the mayor and the 
municipal manager and other senior officials, which creates a clear and unambiguous 
line of authority, responsibility and accountability between the municipal council or 
executive committee, who is responsible for approving policies of council; the 
municipal mayor, who is responsible for providing political oversight, guidance and 
leadership, as well as for implementing council policy; and the municipal manager, 
who is accountable to the mayor (or executive committee) and council for ensuring 
that the administration is functional and that council policies and legislation are 
successfully implemented. 
The MFMA recognises the municipal council or executive committee as the highest 
authority in the municipality. The MFMA strengthens and re-enforces the power of the 
council by conferring it with significant powers of approval and oversight throughout 
the legislation. In terms of the power of council to delegate its legislative or original 
powers, a municipal council may delegate its executive authority to the executive 
mayor or executive committee, but the council is not allowed to delegate its original 
legislative powers, inclusive of the power to approve municipal policies and budgets 
and to exercise oversight and control over the mayor in ensuring the implementation 
of municipal policies, the budget and municipal by-laws. Council cannot delegate the 
accountability to residents and other stakeholders and remain accountable as the 
legitimate representative institution to the residents, broader community and 
stakeholders which it serves. 
In terms of the provisions of the Structures Act and the MFMA, the municipal council 
can delegate certain powers and duties to the mayoral political structures and senior 
municipal staff, including the municipal manager and chief financial officer. Where a 
municipality has an executive committee it may also delegate powers and duties, 
assigned in terms of the MFMA, to the mayor or to another member of the executive 





duties to another member of the municipality’s mayoral committee in terms of Section 
59 of the Structures Act. To assist municipalities, the Western Cape Provincial 
Treasury developed a delegation framework and distributed it to all municipalities for 
consideration and adoption. 
Municipal councillors provide the critical political linkage and interface between the 
mayor or the executive committee and the broader community as part of enhancing 
accountability to communities. Public and community participation and consultative 
engagement processes, as required by the MFMA and the Systems Act – specifically 
with regard to the IDP, the budget and the related budget policies, tariff proposals, 
indigent policies, long-term borrowing and contracts – can be facilitated by councillors. 
In terms of the Systems Act and the MFMA, councillors have a key responsibility to 
review, debate, modify, recommend and approve policies that have been 
recommended by the mayor or the executive committee and include the by-laws and 
municipal policies on key objectives and priorities that ultimately have an impact on 
the ability of council to deliver services. 
According to the National Treasury (2014:34) Guide on the Modernising Financial 
Governance: Implementing the MFMA, both the Systems Act and MFMA expand and 
clarify the role of municipal councillors, which includes that of monitoring and oversight 
over the mayor and the activities of the administration using committee and municipal 
council meetings to execute their functions. Their main function is to ensure through 
oversight that the administration establishes effective operational and financial policies 
and procedures to enable the municipality to produce the desired results and 
outcomes. If councillors wish to be effective in their oversight role, they are required 
to have a full understanding of their councillor oversight responsibilities. 
In order to ensure good governance through oversight as governance champions and 
assurance providers, councillors must resist the temptation to get involved in 
implementing policies, procedures and directions that they have established and 
approved and that are fundamental for the advancement of the broader community. 
According to the NT Guide (2004:34b), “councillors cannot have an operational role, 
as this would interfere with the role of the executive (executive mayor or executive 
committee) and also weaken the accountability of officials to the council”. To improve 





separated from the implementation role played by municipal officials. The NT Guide 
(2004:34c) summarises the oversight role of municipal councillors as follows: 
• Setting the direction for municipal activities; 
• Setting policy parameters to guide these activities; 
• Setting strategic objectives and priorities stating what outcomes and 
outputs are to be achieved; 
• Monitoring the implementation of policies and priorities by evaluating 
reports of outputs and outcomes; 
• Ensuring that corrective action is taken where outputs deviate from plans; 
and  
• Accounting back to the community for performance in terms of objectives. 
(NT Guide, 2004:34c) 
 
Both the Systems Act and MFMA protect the independence of municipal councillors 
and shield them from getting involved in matters that may create a potential ‘conflict 
of interest’; hence councillors are prohibited, in terms of Section 93F of the Systems 
Act, from being board members of municipal entities and, in terms of sections 166(5) 
and 117 of the MFMA, to be members of audit committees or a tender or bid committee 
member. In keeping with the instilling of sound and transparent financial governance 
practices, the mayor and councillors collectively may, in terms of Section 5219 of the 
MFMA, oversee the supply chain management (SCM) policy but may not get involved 
in the implementation of the SCM policies in any manner. As indicated earlier, 
councillors are prohibited by the statute to be members of tender or bid committees or 
take part in any of the tender (SCM) processes. 
In order to improve and strengthen the oversight role of council, the municipal council 
may, in accordance with the MFMA, create specific municipal council portfolio 
committees within the council. These committees, sometimes also referred to as 
Section 79 committees derive their existence and powers or duties from the relevant 
                                            
19 Section 52 authorises the mayor of a municipality to monitor and oversee the exercise of responsibilities assigned 





legislation. They are comprised of councillors and consequently Section 160(8) of the 
Constitution applies to them. 
Although not peremptory, other committees also form part of the political structure of 
municipalities. A municipal council may, in terms of Section 79 of the Structures Act 
(1998), appoint committees to “exercise any of its functions or obligations” or, in terms 
of Section 80 of the Structures Act (1998), to “assist the executive mayor or executive 
committees in executing their functions”. 
The Section 79 committees are responsible for the effective performance of functions 
of the Council. They are appointed by the executive committee as needed; are usually 
temporary in nature; do not have any decision-making powers but can make 
recommendations to Council; and are, in most cases, appointed to investigate a 
particular issue. Generally, once the Section 79 committee has completed their task, 
they are disbanded. Outside experts as well as councillors can be included in Section 
79 committees. 
The Section 80 committees are responsible to assist the executive mayor or executive 
committee in performing their responsibilities. They are usually permanent committees 
that specialise in a specific area of work and are sometimes given the right to make 
decisions over small issues. Section 80 committees, according to the delegation of 
decision-making framework of Ndlamba Municipality (2018), normally consist of a 
budget and finance committee, public accounts committee and municipal services 
committee (to cover water, electricity and refuse removal). Section 80 committees can 
also advise the executive committees on policy matters and make recommendations 
to council. 
A municipal council has a wide discretion to appoint any or both types of committees. 
According to Mangaung Metropolitan Municipality’s Delegation of Powers Policy 
(2018), the municipal council is only constrained when deciding whether the 
“establishment of a committee is necessary, taking into account (a) the extent of the 
functions and powers of the municipality; (b) the need for the delegation of those 
functions and powers in order to ensure efficiency and effectiveness in their 
performance; and (c) the financial and administrative resources of the municipality 





These ‘other committees’ are commonly referred to as section 79-committees and 
section 80-committees. They are ‘committees of the council’ and, in terms of Section 
160(8) of the Constitution, members must therefore be composed in “a manner that 
allows parties and interests reflected within the Council to be fairly represented” or 
proportionately composed. However, in terms of the judgements of the Court in the 
cases of Democratic Alliance and another v Amos Masondo and another (2001) [WLD] 
[Case No 01/92600] and Democratic Alliance and another v Amos Masondo N.O. and 
the Minister of Provincial and Local Government (CC) [Case No CCT 29/02], a mayoral 
committee was found to not be a committee of a municipal council. The Council may 
therefore not appoint the mayoral committee to perform such investigation, e.g. 
establish a committee to investigate any suspected or reported cases of unauthorised, 
irregular or fruitless and wasteful expenditure. Such a committee can only be 
appointed by Council. 
The Structures Act (No. 117 of 1998) also regulates the following aspects of 
committees: composition; term of office, powers and functions; election of a 
chairperson; and procedures. In addition, the Systems Act provides for the 
establishment of two ‘other’ statutory committees: (i) an appeal committee in terms of 
Section 62 of the Systems Act; and (ii) a disciplinary committee established in terms 
of the Code of Conduct for Councillors. 
In terms of the MFMA, the municipal council, in order to fulfil its oversight and 
accountability functions, is empowered to make a number of financial management 
decisions on financial management tasks, which include budgetary related 
responsibilities, community participation, performance management, oversight reports 
(audit, annual and mid-year) and dealing with misconduct. These are set out in 
sections 24-29, 32, as well as in 33, 45-48, 87-88, 121-134 and 171 of the MFMA. 
The MFMA also sets specific accountability and oversight responsibilities for councils 
in relation to the annual and oversight reports. These were extensively discussed 
earlier under Section 5.3 and therefore do not warrant further analysis. However, in 
addition to what was discussed in Section 5.3, a Municipal Public Accounts Committee 





municipality. In this regard, the National Treasury has issued a MPAC Guideline20 and 
various MFMA circulars to guide municipalities on the role and functions of MPACs. 
In terms of the MFMA, the provincial legislature has an oversight role in respect of: 
• Municipal quarterly financial performance in respect of municipalities’ 
budgets; 
• Any delay by the auditor-general to complete an audit in respect of 
municipal annual financial statements within the prescribed timeframe; 
• Non-compliance of municipalities not submitting annual financial 
statements to the auditor-general as received by a report by the auditor-
general; 
• Non-compliance by municipalities to address issues raised by the auditor-
general within the prescribed timeframe; and 
• Annual reports together with oversight reports of municipalities and 
municipal entities. 
 
Council and the administration should put controls and measures in place to deal with 
corruption in the public sector. A variety of statues, circulars and policy papers have 
been compiled to curtail and stop corruption in the municipal environment. The 
Systems Act, in Section 106 empowers the MEC for local government “who has 
reason to believe that a municipality in the province cannot or does not fulfil a statutory 
obligation binding on that municipality or that maladministration, fraud, corruption or 
any other serious malpractice has occurred or is occurring in a municipality in the 
province, the MEC must … request the municipal council or municipal manager to 
provide the MEC with information” in relation thereto and may, if deemed appropriate 
and necessary, the MEC may “designate a person to investigate the matter”. The MEC 
is also permitted to utilise a commission to conduct an investigation. Needless to say 
                                            
20 The main aim and purpose of the MPAC Guideline is “to assist municipalities in establishing Municipal Public 
Accounts Committees (MPAC) in terms of the provisions of the Local Government Municipal Structures Act (No. 
117 of 1998 and the Municipal Finance Management Act (No. 56 of 2003) to serve as an oversight committee to 
exercise oversight over the executive obligations of council. The MPACs will assist council to hold the executive 
and municipal entities to account, and to ensure the efficient and effective use of municipal resources. By so doing, 
the MPAC would help to increase council and public awareness of the financial and performance issues of the 





the MEC may in terms of his/her oversight responsibilities institute criminal action 
against perpetrators. 
The Systems Act also provides, in a number of sections as well in the schedules to 
the Act, a number of ‘codes of conduct’. The sections and schedules include key 
legislative provisions relating to dealing with corruption and related corrupt activities: 
• Section 54 of the Systems Act and Schedule 1 provides the Code of 
Conduct for councillors; 
• Section 69 of the Systems Act and Schedule 2 provides the Code of 
Conduct for municipal staff members; and 
• Section 70 of the Systems Act requires and regulates that the Code of 
Conduct be provided to staff members and communicated to the local 
community. 
 
In relation to instituting controls and addressing corruption within municipalities, the 
MFMA, in Section 32 covers unauthorised, irregular or fruitless and wasteful 
expenditure and places an obligation on the accounting officer to “report to the South 
African Police Service (SAPS) all cases of alleged (a) irregular expenditure that 
constitutes a criminal offence; and (b) theft and fraud that occurred in the municipality” 
Section 32 also places an equivalent obligation on council to report such matters to 
SAPS if “the charge is against the accounting officer; or the accounting officer fails to 
comply” with the reporting obligation as set out in Section 32 of the MFMA. Section 67 
of the MFMA, covering “funds transferred to bodies and organisations outside of 
government”, places an obligation on the accounting officer to implement “effective, 
efficient and transparent financial management and internal control systems to guard 
against fraud, theft and financial mismanagement” 
The MFMA, in Section 112, deals with “supply chain management policy to comply 
with prescribed framework” and requires in subsection (1) that the municipality’s 
“supply chain management policy … must be fair, equitable, transparent, competitive 
and cost-effective” and, according to the anti-corruption policy of Beaufort-West 





• Compulsory disclosure of any conflicts of interest prospective contractors 
may have in specific tenders and the exclusion of such prospective 
contractors from those tenders or bids; 
• The barring of persons from participating in tendering or other bidding 
processes, including persons who were convicted for fraud or corruption 
during the past five years; 
• Measures for combating fraud, corruption, favouritism and unfair and 
irregular practices in municipal supply chain management and for 
promoting ethics of officials and other role players involved in municipal 
supply chain management; and 
• The invalidation of recommendations or decisions that were unlawfully or 
improperly made, taken or influenced, including recommendations or 
decisions that were made, taken or in any way influenced by councillors or 
officials, which contradict the codes of good practice. 
 
Further, in relation to combatting corruption within the SCM processes, Section 
115(1)(b) of the MFMA places an obligation on the accounting officer to “take all 
reasonable steps to ensure that proper mechanisms and separation of duties in the 
supply chain management system are in place to minimise the likelihood of fraud, 
corruption, favouritism and unfair and irregular practices”. 
The Prevention and Combating of Corrupt Activities Act (No. 12 of 2004) (PACCA), 
the Protected Disclosures Act (No. 26 of 2000) (PDA), and the Electronic 
Communications and Transactions Act (No. 25 of 2002) (Electronic Communications 
Act) are some key pieces of legislation in the country that are relevant to the objective 
of minimising and preventing fraudulent and corrupt activities within the public sector, 
enhancing public financial management practices and improving the effectiveness of 
council and administrative oversight. 
 





Some national departments have sphere-wide authority and are playing the leading 
role in formulating policy and legislation that impacts directly on local government and 
its performance. According to DCoGTA (2018), regulatory responsibility can be divided 
into two clear and district categories or types, namely sphere-wide authority, 
horizontally across the national departments; and specialised authority over a 
particular policy sector. In this regard, the National Treasury and the Department of 
Co-operative Governance and Traditional Affairs (DCoGTA) are the two departments 
that are primarily responsible for regulating provincial and local governments (as 
spheres) in relation to IGR and IGFR, as opposed to regulating the specific functions 
performed by local and provincial government spheres. No other national department 
has such an extensive legislative and political mandate to act on the entire 
intergovernmental system as a whole and therefore these two departments have 
sphere-wide regulatory jurisdiction. 
 
5.4.2 The Department of Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs 
(DCoGTA) 
The role of the Department of Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs 
(DCoGTA) vests sphere-wide authority in respect to provincial and local government. 
It has a primary role in the promotion of developmental local government, and the 
support and protection thereof. It provides for both ‘hands-on’ technical support to 
municipalities in areas such as skills development, planning and implementation of 
policy, as well as implements the regulatory environment. It plays a key role in 
developing and reviewing policy and legislation, such as for traditional leadership, 
governance of municipalities, disaster management and for effective utilisation of the 
municipal infrastructure grant (MIG). 
The DCoGTA, with the support of its provincial counterparts, must effectively 
administer its legislation for local government, which amongst others includes the 
Local Government Municipal Systems Act and the Local Government Structures Act, 
both of which have a direct impact on influencing municipal policies. 
In terms of Chapter 7, Section 151(3) of the Constitution, while local government has 





legislation”. The provincial MEC of local government and the Department are 
responsible for effective “co-ordination, monitoring and support of municipalities in 
each province”, in line with the constitutional obligation of support to local government 
provided for in Section 154 of the Constitution. 
The department responsible for local government matters is thus tasked with the 
responsibility to oversee and monitor effective legislative and policy implementation, 
and support municipalities in the fulfilment of their executive obligations. In so doing, 
the department aims to create sustainable, viable municipalities and develop policy 
and programmes that enable optimal functionality of municipalities. 
 
5.4.3 The National and Provincial Treasuries 
The 1996 Constitution of the Republic provides an entire chapter, namely Chapter 13, 
to deal with financial matters. Section 216 of the Constitution provides that “national 
legislation must establish a National Treasury and prescribe measures to ensure both 
transparency and expenditure control in each sphere of government”. Both the 
National Treasury and provincial treasuries are established by the Public Finance 
Management Act (No. 1 of 1999) (PFMA). The National Treasury, with the assistance 
of provincial treasuries, supports efficient and sustainable public finance management 
across government and helps to “ensure transparency, accountability and sound 
financial controls in the management of public finances”. Having a strong treasury 
(national and provincial) that can enforce good financial governance norms and 
standards and simultaneously promote and enable good service delivery practices, 
remains fundamental to the promotion and advancement of economic development, 
social progress and facilitates the attainment of developmental goals and objectives, 
particularly focusing on enabling the aim of improving the general standard of living of 
all South Africans. 
The PFMA regulates financial management matters in the provincial and national 
spheres of government, whilst the MFMA regulates financial management matters in 
the local government sphere. Both the PFMA and MFMA provide a legislative mandate 
for the national and provincial treasuries as it relates to each of the government 





Minister of Finance is the head of the treasury and, at provincial level, the head of the 
treasury is the MEC for Finance in a province. In terms of Section 6 of the PFMA, the 
National Treasury is mandated by statute “to promote the national government’s fiscal 
policy framework; to coordinate macroeconomic policy and intergovernmental 
financial relations; to manage the budget preparation process; to facilitate the 
implementation of the annual Division of Revenue Act, which provides for an equitable 
distribution of nationally raised revenue between national, provincial and local 
government; and to monitor the implementation of provincial budgets”. Moreover, the 
National Treasury plays a critical role in policy development and legislative drafting 
pertaining to the local government sphere. 
The MFMA (2003) empowers the National Treasury to perform its constitutional duties, 
i.e. to monitor the budgets of municipalities; “monitor the implementation of municipal 
budgets [and] monitor and assess compliance by municipalities” with the MFMA and 
applicable standards of accounting practices; assist with financial management and 
internal controls; and take punitive and remedial action where municipalities breach 
the MFMA. 
As the custodian of the Municipal Fiscal Powers and Functions Act, the Municipal 
Finance Management Act and Division of Revenue Act, the National Treasury, 
together with provincial treasuries, has a significant policy and legislative role in the 
local government sphere, particularly in relation to its role of monitoring, oversight and 
reporting on municipal performance. Furthermore, some legislation, such as the Local 
Government Municipal Property Rates and Municipal Systems Act, requires 
concurrence of the Minister of Finance, which also necessitates the role of the National 
Treasury in policy developing and legislative drafting. 
In terms of Section 5(7) of the MFMA, “the MEC for finance in a province, as the head 
of the Provincial Treasury, takes all decisions of the Provincial Treasury in terms of 
the [MFMA]”, “except those decisions taken as a result of a delegation”. In terms of 
Section 5(3) of the MFMA (2003), the MEC, together with the Provincial Treasury 
must, “in accordance with a prescribed framework: 
• Fulfil its responsibilities, as stipulated and required by the MFMA; 
• Promote the object, aims and the spirit of the MFMA within the framework 





• Assist the National Treasury in enforcing compliance with the measures 
established in terms of the Constitution and the MFMA. 
 
In order to comply with these provisions, the Provincial Treasury, in terms of Section 
5(4) of the MFMA (2003), must monitor: 
(i) Compliance with the MFMA by municipalities and municipal entities in the 
province; 
(ii) The preparation by municipalities in the province of their budgets; 
(iii) The monthly outcome of those budgets; and 
(iv) The submission of reports by municipalities in the province as required in 
terms of” the MFMA; 
 
In addition, in terms of the MFMA (2003), the Provincial Treasury: 
 May assist municipalities in the province in the preparation of their 
budgets; 
 May exercise any powers and must perform any duties delegated to it by 
the National Treasury in terms of the MFMA; and 
 May take appropriate steps if a municipality or municipal entity in the 
province commits a breach of the MFMA. 
 
5.4.4 Other Stakeholders 
Historically, and possibly for logistical reasons, the voice of local government has been 
fairly absent and in many cases non-existent in the development of national and 
provincial policies, even in areas where these policies directly and indirectly affect and 
impact the local government sphere of government. The 1998 White Paper on Local 
Government assigns a key role to the South African Local Government Association 
(SALGA) for “the effective representation of local government in the legislative process 
of all spheres of government, and in intergovernmental executive processes”. 
Organised local government fulfils a significant role in officially representing local 





organisation, established in terms of the Organised Local Government Act (No. 52 of 
1997) consists of members of the municipal councils in the province. The SALGA, 
established in terms of the Act, has a meaningful role to play in influencing national 
views, sentiments and policy on local government matters. 
Furthermore, the main role of SALGA, as set out in the Organised Local Government 
Act (No. 52 of 1997), is to represent local government interests in various forums, such 
as the National Council of Provinces (NCOP)21 (having ten seats in observer status), 
in the Financial and Fiscal Commission (FFC)22, in budget forums, in MINMECs, as 
well as in drafting of legislation that affects the status, institutions, powers and 
functions of municipalities. 
SALGA also has the opportunity to play an interface role between municipalities and 
national government in policy making. Through its representation of municipalities, 
SALGA conducts stakeholder engagement and lobbies on behalf of local government 
in relation to national policies and legislation. It should be noted that before amending 
or further regulating legislation that directly impacts on local government, consultation 
with SALGA is required. 
 
5.5 INTERVENTION MECHANISMS DUE TO LACK OF MUNICIPAL 
PERFORMANCE 
5.5.1 Intervention and Supervision in terms of Legislative Provisions in the 
Constitution 
Section 139 of the Constitution deals with provincial supervision and intervention in 
local government, whilst sections 136 to 139 in the MFMA deal with interventions, 
particularly from a financial perspective. Section 139 of the Constitution permits and 
requires provincial governments to supervise the affairs of local governments and to 
intervene when things go wrong. Intervention by one sphere of government in the 
                                            
21 Section 3(2)(a) Organised Local Government Act (No. 52 of 1997): The “national organisation must designate 
not more than 10 persons” as representatives “to participate in the proceedings” of the National Council of 
Provinces. 





affairs of another is in itself an extraordinary measure provided by the Constitution to 
ensure constitutional and legal compliance by the defaulting government. 
Section 139(1) of the Constitution systematically sets out the steps and procedures to 
be followed “when a municipality cannot or does not fulfil an executive obligation” in 
terms of the Constitution or legislation, in that “the relevant provincial executive may 
intervene by taking any appropriate steps to ensure fulfilment of that obligation”. The 
term ‘appropriate steps’ has not been defined in the Constitution (1996), but Section 
139(1) highlights the following steps to be included as appropriate before any 
provincial intervention in a municipality: 
 Issuing a directive to the Municipal Council, describing the extent of the 
failure to fulfil its obligations and stating any steps required to meet its 
obligations;  
 Assuming responsibility for the relevant obligation in that municipality to 
the extent necessary to-  
(i) maintain essential national standards or meet established minimum 
standards for the rendering of a service;  
(ii) prevent that Municipal Council from taking unreasonable action that 
is prejudicial to the interests of another municipality or to the 
province as a whole; or 
(iii) maintain economic unity; or 
 Dissolving the Municipal Council and appointing an administrator until a 
newly elected Municipal Council has been declared elected, if 
exceptional circumstances warrant such a step. 
 
Sections 139(2) and (3) of the Constitution deal with procedural issues in the event of 
a provincial executive intervention in terms of sections 139(1)(b) and (c). 
Section 139(4) of the Constitution (1996) sets out the steps and procedures “if a 
municipality cannot or does not fulfil an obligation in terms of the Constitution or 
legislation to approve a budget or any revenue-raising measures” (by 30 June of each 





intervene by taking any appropriate steps to ensure that the budget or those revenue-
raising measures are approved, including dissolving the Municipal Council and -  
 appointing an administrator until a newly elected Municipal Council has 
been declared elected; and  
 approving a temporary budget or revenue-raising measures to provide 
for the continued functioning of the municipality”. 
 
In The Premier of the Western Cape v Overberg District Municipality23, the Supreme 
Court of Appeal interpreted this provision as obliging an intervention, but stated that 
dissolution “is the most drastic step the provincial executive can take, while the two 
steps referred to in (a) and (b) are concomitant to the most drastic step”. An 
‘appropriate step’ could, for example, include a direction to approve the budget at 
some later date. At par [31] of the judgement the court concludes that “[t]he fact that 
in terms of s 27(2) the MEC cannot extend the deadline imposed by s 16(1) does not 
mean that the provincial executive cannot do so under s 139(4) of the Constitution. In 
short, s 27(2) imposes a limitation on the powers of the MEC, which has nothing to do 
with the powers of the provincial executive under s 139(4) of the Constitution and s 
26(1) of the MFMA”.  
Section 139(5) of the Constitution (1996) sets out the steps and procedures “if a 
municipality, as a result of a crisis in its financial affairs, is in serious or persistent 
material breach of its obligations to provide basic services or to meet its financial 
commitments, or admits that it is unable to meet its obligations or financial 
commitments, the relevant provincial executive must —  
 impose a recovery plan aimed at securing the municipality’s ability to 
meet its obligations to provide basic services or financial commitments, 
which —  
(i) is to be prepared in accordance with national legislation; and binds 
the municipality in the exercise of its legislative and executive 
                                            





authority, but only to the extent necessary to solve the crisis in its 
financial affairs; and  
 dissolve the Municipal Council, if the municipality cannot or does not 
approve legislative measures, including a budget or any revenue-raising 
measures, necessary to give effect to the recovery plan, and —  
(i) appoint an administrator until a newly elected Municipal Council has 
been declared elected; and  
(ii)  approve a temporary budget or revenue-raising measures or any 
other measures giving effect to the recovery plan to provide for the 
continued functioning of the municipality; or 
 if the Municipal Council is not dissolved in terms of paragraph (b), 
assume responsibility for the implementation of the recovery plan to the 
extent that the municipality cannot or does not otherwise implement the 
recovery plan”. 
 
Section 139(6) of the Constitution deals with the procedural issues to give effect to the 
requirements of Section 139(5) of the Constitution. Section 139(7) of the Constitution 
provides for the event “if a provincial executive cannot or does not or does not 
adequately exercise the powers or perform the functions referred to in subsection (4) 
or (5), the national executive must intervene in terms of subsection (4) or (5) instead 
of the relevant provincial executive”. 
Sections 139(8) of the Constitution provides the empowering provision for national 
legislation that may regulate the implementation of Section 139 of the Constitution, 
including the processes established by this section. In this regard, the MFMA is such 
enabling legislation and provides the processes in Chapter 13, part 2 (sections 136 to 
150) of the Constitution for intervention in local government as set out in Section 139 







5.5.2 Interventions in terms of Legislative Provisions in the MFMA 
Section 136 of the MFMA provides for provincial intervention in local government, 
which can be either a discretionary provincial intervention or a mandatory provincial 
intervention. A discretionary provincial intervention is provided for in Section 137 of 
the MFMA and provides that if the conditions “in terms of Section 139(1) of the 
Constitution are met and the provincial executive decides in terms of Section 136(2) 
of the MFMA to intervene in the municipality, the provincial executive may take any 
appropriate steps referred to in Section 139(1) of the Constitution”. These steps are 
set out in Section 137(1)(a)-(d) of the MFMA. The criteria for determining a serious 
financial problem is provided in Section 138 of the MFMA, namely “when determining 
for the purposes of Section 137 the seriousness of a financial problem, all relevant 
facts must be considered”. Section 138(1)(a)-(h) of the MFMA sets out the factors, 
singly or in combination, which “may indicate a serious financial problem”. 
A mandatory provincial intervention is provided for in Section 139 of the MFMA, 
inclusive of how a provincial intervention is to be affected in terms of Section 139(5) 
of the Constitution. In particular, sections 139 to 143 of the MFMA set out how the 
recovery plan is to be prepared and approved before it is imposed by the provincial 
executive in terms of Section 139(5)(a) of the Constitution and implemented in terms 
of sections 139(5)(b) or 139(5)(c) of the Constitution, read with Section 146 of the 
MFMA. The remaining part of Section 139 of the Constitution deals with procedural 
matters, particularly as these relate to the provincial executive (as a collective), that of 
the MEC of Finance and MEC responsible for local government. 
The criteria for determining serious or persistent material breach of financial 
commitments in terms of Section 139, are set out in Section 140 of the MFMA. Section 
141 of the MFMA deals with the preparation of a financial recovery plan, whilst Section 
142 of the MFMA sets out criteria that must be met when preparing the recovery plan. 
The approval, amendment and implementation, whether triggered by a discretionary 
or mandatory intervention, reporting and reviewing on such recovery plans are set out 
in sections 143 to 147 of the MFMA. 
Sections 148 and 149 of the MFMA respectively deal with “the termination of provincial 
interventions and access to information, records and documents of municipalities”. 





the event that the “conditions for a provincial intervention in a municipality in terms of 
Section 139(4) or (5) of the Constitution are met and the provincial executive cannot 
or does not or does not adequately exercise the powers or perform the functions” as 
outlined in sections 139(4) and (5) of the Constitution. 
 
5.6 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
This chapter connects and is complementary to Chapter 4, which provided an analysis 
on the history of local government but focussed specifically on unpacking the 
numerous, yet complex legislative, regulatory and policy arrangements applicable to 
the local government functional system and intergovernmental relations framework of 
South Africa. 
This chapter further unpacked the legislative, regulatory and policy framework, with a 
specific focus on municipal organisational performance and governance in South 
African local government, which forms the theoretical basis of this dissertation. In 
addition, from a governance perspective this chapter analysed, on a high level, the 
legislative and policy framework as it relates to mainly financial governance and 
oversight arrangements of municipal councils, the main internal and external 
assurance providers and oversight institutions’ other key stakeholders and partners. 
Of importance, this chapter deliberated on the legislative and regulatory requirements 
for municipal intervention and supervision mechanisms available to the provincial and 
national executive in the event of performance failures in municipalities, as provided 
in the Constitution and the MFMA. 
The legislative, governance and accountability arrangements for municipalities, as 
these relate to performance, are comprehensively defined and unpacked in this 
chapter, starting with the Constitution, which sets out the developmental objectives of 
local government and which creates the framework for many pieces of enabling 
legislation enacted to regulate municipal performance, monitoring and reporting. The 
main pieces of legislation and policy include the Systems and Structures acts, the 
MFMA, the 1998 White Paper on Local Government and the Planning, Performance 
and Reporting Regulations issued over the last 20 years or so. Although most of the 





per se, they provide for the existence of an organisational performance function and 
call for the creation and promotion of a culture of organisational performance 
management. This call primarily comes from the Systems Act and the MFMA, which 
provides for the IDP, the SDBIP, the budget and the mid-year and annual reports as 
key documents for institutionalising a performance management culture in 
municipalities. These are supported by the requirement for comprehensive 
performance agreements for senior municipal staff and linked to performance 
objectives set out in the IDP and SDBIP. Annexure 6 aims to provide a consolidated 
view on the relevant local government legislation and policy prescripts as it relates to 
municipal performance. 
Performance management and monitoring requires a strong sense of accountability, 
which this chapter also touched on. The political and administrative governance and 
oversight frameworks that promotes municipal performance and accountability are 
also covered in the chapter. In addition, the chapter included an analysis and 
explanation of inter-relationships between the council, mayor, municipal councillors, 
administration and community. The chapter acknowledges the existence of other 
external oversight institutions and their respective important roles and responsibilities 
to enhance oversight, municipal performance and service delivery, most notably, the 
provincial legislature and its portfolio committees, the national and provincial 
treasuries, the DCoGTA and the AGSA. 
In the event of performance failure or the inability of a municipality to fulfil its executive 
obligations as set out in the Constitution, this chapter explains the legislative 
requirements, mainly from the Constitution and the MFMA, and recognises the 
important role of both the provincial and national executive to oversee and intervene, 
and ultimately to normalise matters and ensure that the municipality is able to fulfil and 
execute its service delivery obligations. 
In conclusion, it is gleaned from this chapter that from a legislative and policy 
perspective there are sufficient and clear directives and guidelines in place for the 
effective implementation of performance management, oversight and accountability 
arrangements in municipalities, all of which are geared towards improving service 
delivery in municipalities. Given the current municipal environment, which is fraught 





deliver public services to communities and give effect to the objects of local 
government as espoused in Section 152 of the Constitution, it calls for those tasked 
with service delivery and oversight responsibilities to demonstrate leadership and 
seriousness and use the empowering legislative provisions to turn things around and 





CHAPTER 6: A PROPOSED MODEL FOR LOCAL GOVERNMENT 
GOVERNANCE AND PERFORMANCE 
 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
The main aim of this chapter is to develop and propose a municipal good governance 
and performance model that can be used to identify and determine the key elements 
and variables for ensuring positive performance of local government. In Section 6.5, 
the chapter includes a structured testing and validation process utilising a focus group, 
as well as structured and semi-structured interviews with key role players and 
specialists in the field of municipal governance and performance. Understanding the 
causes and factors impacting on municipal performance is imperative, particularly in 
the current socio-economic context as this enables the identification of factors that 
should be considered and prioritised in order to ensure the sustainable performance 
of local government. 
The proposed governance and performance model is primarily based on the 
identification and, secondly, application of good governance principles across the 
dimensions of governance in the public sector. The proposed model is informed by the 
detailed literature review in chapters 2 and 3, utilising the myriad of legislative and 
policy requirements set out in chapters 4 and 5 of the dissertation. This chapter will 
reflect, expand on and describe a set of key indicators for good governance in the 
public sector (mainly gleaned from Chapter 2) and organisational performance 
(primarily gleaned from Chapter 3), taking into account the constitutional, legislative 
and policy requirements in the local government sphere relevant to the subject, i.e. 
governance and organisational performance, and as set out in chapters 4 and 5. 
The aim of the municipal good governance and performance model is to identify key 
performance areas for measuring performance in local government and then to identify 
good governance factors that have an impact on the performance of local government. 
The model proposed in this dissertation is not an exhaustive one and can be further 
extended by adding other variables, depending on each unique situation at a 
municipality. Notwithstanding, it provides a good basis that could have universal 





required good governance arrangements that must be in place for each dimension of 
good governance, aimed at ensuring effective performance of a municipality. There 
are a number of studies and researched articles that have investigated factors that 
have a supposed critical role in the success of local government, but none that the 
researcher could locate provide a logical connection between the good governance 
dimensions and organisational performance in local government. 
The proposed municipal good governance and performance model, as set out in 
Section 6.3, consists of the following four key elements that serve as building blocks: 
• Constitutional obligations, as the key measurement for local government 
performance, inclusive of other legislative and policy requirements 
measuring municipal performance; 
• The legislative and structural arrangements of local government 
(municipality) to understand what ‘a municipality’ is and the environment 
within which it operates; 
• The dimensions of good governance, based on the literature review and 
grounded theory as set out in chapters 2 and 3, with each broken down 
into constituent parts, underpinned by legislative and policy requirements; 
and 
• External and internal environment impacting on good governance and the 
performance of local government, inclusive of the oversight responsibilities 
of internal and external stakeholders. 
 
Section 6.3 sets out the details of each key element of the municipal good governance 
and performance model, while Section 6.4 includes an outline, main concepts, 
construction and unpacking. The model validation process and the case study analysis 







6.2 THEORETICAL MODELS AND FRAMEWORKS: DEFINITION AND 
APPLICATION IN RESEARCH 
According to USC Libraries (2018), “theories are formulated to explain, predict, and 
understand phenomena and, in many cases, to challenge and extend existing 
knowledge within the limits of critical bounding assumptions”. Further, “[t]he theoretical 
framework is the structure that can hold or support a theory of a research study and 
introduces and describes the theory that explains why the research problem … exists”. 
There is common agreement amongst many authors that it is very difficult to form a 
universally accepted definition of a ‘model’. This is demonstrated by Frigg and 
Hartmann (2012:13) who attempt to respond to the question: ‘what are models?’ 
referring to it as “a variety of things that are commonly referred to as models: physical 
objects, fictional objects, set-theoretic structures, descriptions, equations, or 
combinations of some of these”. According to Mouton (2001:196), “the term ‘model’ 
can be considered as one of the vague terms in the social sciences and points to the 
similarities between the terms ‘model’ and ‘theory’”, which, at times, are 
interchangeably used by many researchers. 
Falletta (2005, cited by Scheepers, 2015:166) makes the point that a theoretical 
“model provides a systematic way to collect data on the organization and to 
understand and categorize the data” and further that “an explicit model greatly aids 
the diagnostic process, given the complexity of organizations and the massive amount 
of information available for analysis”. De Koning and Cloete (in van der Rheede, 
2005:24), describe “a model as a representation of a more complex reality that has 
been oversimplified in order to describe and explain the relationships among variables, 
and even sometimes to prescribe how something should happen”. 
Falletta (2005:4) “lists four reasons advanced by Burke (in Howard & Associates, 
1994) as to why models are valuable”. Scheepers (2015:166) lists these four reasons 
as follows: 
1. “They help to enhance understanding of organisational behaviour. 
2. They help to categorise data about an organisation. 
3. They help to interpret data about an organisation. 






According to Mouton (2001:195), a “model is one of three types of conceptual 
frameworks, namely typologies, models and theories”. He describes the three 
frameworks as follows: 
• Typologies have “a classifying or categorising function and [are] based on 
single variables”; 
• Models provide “a systematic depiction of phenomena by identifying 
patterns and regularities amongst variables”; and 
• Theories provide “an explanation of phenomena by suggesting an 
underlying causal mechanism”. 
 
According to Clarke (2005:9, citing Creswell, 2003), there are broadly “two major types 
of research models or research paradigms” and they can be in either physical science 
or social science. These research models or research paradigms can be: 
• “Quantitative – also known as traditional, positivist, experimental or 
empiricist, as advanced by authorities such as Comte, Mill, Durkheim, 
Newton, Locke; and  
• Qualitative – constructivist, naturalistic, interpretive, post positivist or 
postmodern perspective, as advanced by Dithey, Kant, Wittgenstein 
(latter), Foucault, Miles and Huberman”. 
(Clarke, 2005:9, in Creswell, 2003) 
 
Clarke (2015:17) makes the point that “researchers in natural science will try to define 
meanings with great precision”, in other words by exact science, whilst researchers in 
the social science environment “often recognise that concepts within their models may 
be based on opinions, values, traditions, cultures and rules that cannot be precisely 
pinned down”. Frigg and Hartmann (2012:3) make the point that models have two 
divergent representative purposes, namely “[on] the one hand, a model can be a 





nature of the target, such models are either models of phenomena or models of data. 
On the other hand, a model can represent a theory in the sense that it interprets the 
laws and axioms of that theory. These two notions are not mutually exclusive as 
scientific models can be representations in both senses at the same time”. 
Given the above, most of the organisational performance models discussed in Chapter 
3, as well as the governance models discussed in Chapter 2, can be classified as 
qualitative diagnostic models in the social science environment as, through their 
application, one can clearly identify challenges faced by the organisation and specific 
areas that require attention. This is a key step in improving organisational 
performance. There is a strong diagnostic element to most of these models as they 
conform to the description by Brown and Harvey (2006, in Scheepers, 2015:163), who 
describe the concept of ‘diagnosis’ as “a systematic approach to understanding and 
describing the present state of the organization. The purpose of the diagnostic phase 
is to gather information to specify the exact nature of the problem requiring solution, 
to identify the underlying causal forces, and to provide a basis for selecting effective 
change strategies and techniques”. It is therefore important that the diagnostic element 
is not weak, out of order, nor imprecise or defective, as this will be expensive and 
ineffective for a municipality and not serve the intended aims and objectives of the 
diagnostic exercise. 
The proposed municipal governance and performance model, as presented in Section 
6.3, can be regarded as a qualitative normative social science model as it advocates 
a specific desired state or position before an assessment is done. It can be applied by 
municipalities, researchers and oversight institutions, again as a qualitative descriptive 
model, as the current status quo could be juxtaposed against the desired state as a 
measurement instrument or benchmark. The proposed normative governance and 
performance model can also provide diagnostic orientation as, according to Scheepers 
(2015:164), it provides the “framework to: (1) determine the status quo; (2) evaluate 
the status quo against a desired state; and (3) identify the gap between status quo 







6.3 PRESENTING THE PROPOSED MUNICIPAL GOVERNANCE AND 
PERFORMANCE MODEL 
The proposed normative municipal governance and performance model, set out in 
Figure 6.1, captures the key findings from the literature review in Chapter 2 (on 
governance) and Chapter 3 (on organisational performance) and the legal and policy 
discussions in chapters 4 and 5. The aim of the model is to provide a broad, yet 
concise framework that will serve as a roadmap for municipal performance to guide 
politicians, administrators and those tasked with oversight responsibilities, in 
identifying critical requirements to ensure the attainment and sustainable 
institutionalisation of developmental government and performance, underpinned by 


























6.4 DESCRIBING THE CONSTITUENT PARTS OF THE PROPOSED MUNICIPAL 
GOOD GOVERNANCE AND PERFORMANCE MODEL (MALILA MODEL) 
In conceptualising and developing the municipal good governance and performance 
model (the Malila model), it is important that the model and its constituent parts and 
elements subscribe to, and are underpinned by, some key principles and 
requirements, which include the following: 
• The model must subscribe and adhere to the governance principles of the 
rule of law, particularly to the Constitution and main local government 
legislation and policy requirements highlighted in chapters 4 and 5 of this 
dissertation. For example, the White Paper on Local Government, the 
Systems Act, the Structures Act and the MFMA; 
• The Malila model must have universal application across South Africa, 
regardless of the type or size of a municipality, e.g. whether or not it is a 
Category A (metro), Category B (local) or Category C (district) 
municipality, as defined in the Structures Act; and 
• It must reflect both the good governance indicators and organisational 
performance requirements gleaned from the literature review and reflected 
in chapters 2 and 3. 
 
The Malila model will not attempt to develop sub-indicators for the identified key 
performance indicators (KPIs) and objectives, nor develop key activities for each 
element of the model. The National Treasury, DCoGTA and DPME, who are primarily 
responsible for performance monitoring and oversight of local government, have 
already commenced with some work in this regard, namely developing a set of 
standardised indicators for performance measurement of local government. The 
researcher believes that this dissertation will complement, inform and enrich the 
National Treasury, DCoGTA and DPME processes, ultimately making municipalities 
more responsive to deliver on their constitutional requirements. It should be kept in 







6.4.1 The Key Building Blocks Informing the Malila Model 
In Chapter 2 it was submitted that in order to develop sound strategies to address 
municipal performance failures, it is necessary to describe what constitutes a 
functional, well-performing local municipality in order to have a benchmark to measure 
against. In this regard, the research considers three important dimensions for 
assessing municipal performance. Firstly, whether the municipality is performing its 
functions and delivering on the desired outcomes as set in the Constitution, particularly 
in Section 152; secondly, whether the political leadership and organisational capacity 
of the municipality is of such a nature that it will be able to perform functions and deliver 
outcomes on a sustainable basis; and, thirdly, whether the execution of political and 
administrative actions is underpinned by the principles of good governance and aimed 
at improving the conditions of citizens and service users. 
 
6.4.2 Broad Outline and Main Concepts of the Malila Model 
The municipal governance and performance model should, as a basis, be developed 
taking into account the objectives of local government, as this reflects the aim of local 
government and its desired developmental local government impact. The Constitution, 
in sections 152(1) and (2), provides this basis and determines the objectives or aims 
of a municipality (local government), as well as guides each municipality in all 
activities, including its planning and service delivery processes. Section 152 imbeds 
“five key measurable areas (key performance areas) for municipal success” and 
measuring municipal performance and impact. More specifically, the 1996 Constitution 
states in Section 152(1) that the objects of local government are: 
 “To provide democratic and accountable government for local 
communities; 
 To ensure the provision of services to communities in a sustainable 
manner; 
 To promote social and economic development; 
 To promote a safe and healthy environment; and 
 To encourage the involvement of communities and community 






Further, Section 152(2) of the Constitution requires that “[a] municipality must strive, 
within its financial and administrative capacity, to achieve the objects set out in” 
Section 152(1). This requires an unpacking of both the financial and administrative 
capacity or, collectively, the institutional and governance arrangements of local 
government (municipalities) in order to further develop the proposed governance and 
municipal performance model. 
The legislative basis for dealing with the institutional arrangements, which includes 
both financial and administrative capacity, of local government, is found mainly in the 
Structures Act, Systems Act and MFMA. In Chapter 4, it is submitted that Section 2 of 
the Systems Act (No. 32 of 2000) describes a ‘municipality’ as an institution consisting 
of the following three dimensions: 
• “Political structures: in relation to a municipality this means the council of 
the municipality (and not individual political officer bearers) or any 
committee or other collective structure of a municipality elected, 
designated or appointed in terms of a specific provision of the Municipal 
Structures Act”; 
• An administration: generally, refers to the staff of the municipality, which is 
headed by the municipal manager and set out in Section 55 of the 
Systems Act; and  
• The community: this is an important element of the municipality. Its 
members have statutory conferred rights and obligations, as reflected in 
the Bill of Rights and set out in Section 5 of the Systems Act. 
 
Chapter 2 of the dissertation deals exclusively with the concept of governance: the 
various definitions, forms, models and dimensions. In Chapter 2, the researcher 
highlights that governance has three widely accepted dimensions, namely: 
• The political dimension – this includes, as submitted by the Governance 
Working Group (1996), the “processes by which those in authority are 





United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia 
(ESCWA) (2018), the “structure of government and the structure of 
accountability and contestability of political leaders”; 
• The economic (technical) dimension – an element of institutional 
governance focussed “on resource constraints and the technical know-
how on resource mobilisation and utilisation, quality service delivery and 
economic development”. According to the Governance Working Group 
(1996), it is the “process by which public resources are effectively 
managed and sound policies implemented”; and 
• The institutional dimension – “processes by which citizens and the state 
itself respect society’s or the public’s institutions” and “includes the 
capacity of the government to effectively and efficiently formulate and 
implement sound policies” (Governance Working Group, 1996). 
 
These governance dimensions are pulled into the Malila model and form the 
foundation of the existence of other components within the model. What is interesting 
is the fact that there is perfect alignment and overlap between the institutional 
arrangements of local government and the dimensions of good governance as both 
encapsulate the three important elements of political, administration and the 
community, and therefore the success of any municipality is dependent on an 
appropriate interface between the political, administrative, community and private 
sector (economic development) structures. The proposed model includes and 
demonstrates these interfaces and connectors. 
Whilst a comprehensive framework of local government legislation exists, as 
demonstrated in chapters 4 and 5 of this dissertation, the financial arrangements are 
primarily covered in the MFMA and Chapter 13 of the Constitution, whilst the 
institutional (administrative and political) arrangements are primarily covered in the 
Systems and Structures acts of local government. All these various pieces of local 
government legislation contribute to ensuring enabled, well-capacitated, high-
performing, well-integrated and sustainable municipal service delivery. 
Chapter 4 sets out the functions of local government in accordance with Section 153 





key basic services include the provision of bulk services, such as water, electricity, 
sanitation and refuse removal. According to the National Treasury (2014), a 
municipality that achieves and consistently delivers on the constitutional objects of 
local government by performing these functions “within its financial and administrative 
capacity”, whilst adhering to the standard of applying good governance practices in its 
operations (Section 152(2)), “could be described as a functional, well-performing 
municipality” and, therefore, the service delivery obligations, as expressed in Section 
152 of the Constitution, represent the foundation of the proposed municipal 
governance and performance model. 
As indicated earlier, the ability to deliver on the constitutional requirements is premised 
on the effective institutional (municipality) arrangements and its composition and is 
subject to the application of good governance principles by the administration 
(leadership and organisational capacity), politicians (oversight and political leadership) 
and the community (transparency, oversight and accountability). The model includes 
the key principles of good governance and its dimensions, which were extensively 
covered in Chapter 2 of this dissertation. The external and internal factors impacting 
municipal performance, as well as the role of various oversight institutions is integral 
to promote accountability to council, parliament and communities, and will inform the 
proposed governance and performance model as these underpin and support the 
delivery ability of local government. 
 
6.4.3 Constitutional and Key Local Government Legislative Obligations 
The National Treasury MFMA Circular 88 (2017), points out that the Department of 
Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation (DPME), the National Treasury and the 
Department of Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs (DCoGTA) have in 
aggregate currently developed 157 indicators for the metropolitan municipalities24. 
Examples of these are outcomes (transformational and functional), output, compliance 
and questions. These are intended to monitor municipalities’ performance of functions 
                                            
24 Down from 2 572 indicators, requiring 18 467 data elements to be reported upon annually by metros. These 
indicators are catalogued and analysed according to their location on the results-chain, consistent with provisions 





and delivery against stated constitutional objectives. These indicators will inform 
intended revisions to the Local Government: Municipal Planning and Performance 
Management Regulations of 2001. In analysing these outcome and output indicators 
across a spectrum of key priority areas, it is clear that there is a strong bias towards 
measuring the provision of services to communities, with an emphasis on outputs 
rather than outcomes and impact, with far less attention being given to whether or not 
these are being performed in a sustainable manner. 
The MFMA Circular 88 highlights that the work of the reporting reforms project has 
been focused on the following “municipal functions which informed the development 
of a set of indicators … water and sanitation; electricity and energy; housing and 
community facilities; roads and transport; environment and waste management; fire 
and emergency services; and governance”. In each case the functions are organised 
around a set of framing outcomes. The outcomes are generic, non-prescriptive (in 
terms of municipalities replicating their formulation in planning documentation) and 
provide the common organising and logical frame through which both outcome and 
output indicators should be understood. 
In this process it is clear that the other objectives of local government, as set out in 
Section 152 of the Constitution, received very little attention and expansion when 
these standardised indicators were formulated. The proposed Malila model will expand 
on these and include all local government objectives as set out in Section 152 of the 
Constitution as there is clear evidence of municipal performance failures in some of 
these other constitutionally obligated responsibilities, which are generally ignored in 
many assessments and analyses. 
 
6.4.3.1 To ‘Provide Democratic and Accountable Government of Local 
Communities [Section 152(1)(a) of the Constitution]’ 
Chapter 4 provides a section on the history of local government and the evolution of 
the local government system pre- and post-2000, particularly focusing on the 
transformation of apartheid local government structures into the establishment of 





The provision relating to the provision of democratic government, underpinned by the 
fundamentals of the Constitution, is discussed extensively in Chapter 4 of this 
dissertation. Democratic government, and for that matter democratic governance, 
includes key principles such as ‘freedom of speech’, ‘freedom of association’, ‘the 
promotion of human rights’, ‘public voice and opinion’ and ‘transparency’. Some of 
these principles that informed the model will be discussed later in this chapter. 
Accountable government of local communities, along with its legislative and policy 
provisions, deals with one of the remaining fundamental good governance principles 
enshrined in the Constitution, aimed at promoting local government performance, 
particularly post democratisation in South Africa. This provision is aimed at addressing 
accountability arrangements between council (politicians), the administration and the 
community, which was discussed extensively in chapters 3, 4 and 5 of this dissertation. 
From an accountability perspective, and as outlined in Chapter 5 of this dissertation, 
Section 153 of the Constitution necessitates that “a municipality must structure and 
manage its administration and budgeting and planning processes to give priority to the 
basic needs of the community, and to promote the social and economic development 
of the community”. The MFMA on the other hand, together with the Municipal Systems 
Act, aims to enable and ensure compliance with this constitutional duty by 
guaranteeing that priorities and plans outlined in the IDP, MTREF budgets, reports of 
municipalities, as well as implementation actions set out in the SDBIP are properly 
aligned to ensure progressive implementation and the realisation of the developmental 
goals and objectives of local government. Figure 6.2 below illustrates the key 
components and elements of the local government administrative, financial 
management and accountability cycle, the respective responsibilities of all the 
governance role-players in the local government system and how they should be 
aligned and operate in a virtuous cycle, as envisaged by the Constitution, the MFMA 
and Municipal Systems Act. What follows below Figure 6.2 is a summary of the key 
accountability arrangements to be included in the components integral to the proposed 







Figure 6.2: Local Government Accountability Framework 
Source: National Treasury 2011 (LGBER, 2011:76). 
 
• The integrated development plan (IDP): This sets out the goals and 
development objectives of the municipality over the five-year electoral term 
(five-year strategy). These objectives must be aligned with the available 
financial and administrative resources of the municipality. The municipal 
council must adopt an IDP for five years and conduct an annual review as 
part of the annual budget and SDBIP processes and also based on the 
outcome of the assessment of performance as part of the mid-year and 
annual report processes. Council must consult the community on the 
compilation of the IDP. 
• The budget: the medium-term revenue and expenditure (MTREF) budget 
(three-year budget) sets out the realistic revenue raising ability and 
expenditure plans of the municipality, which is subject to annual approval 














• Organisational structure aligned to basic services
• Sound municipal policies, processes and procedures 












budget must be aligned with the developmental and economic priorities of 
the municipalities as set out in the IDP and SDBIP. The budget consists of 
both an operational and capital budget to facilitate planning and execution 
across the MTREF period. 
• The service delivery and budget implementation plan (SDBIP): this 
provides the monthly and/or quarterly financial and non-financial (service 
delivery) targets, which in aggregate should be aligned with and add-up to 
the annual targets set in the IDP and budget. The SDBIP is regarded as 
the implementation plan of the budget and the IDP, and is the main source 
of information for compiling the performance agreements of the municipal 
manager and senior management. 
• In-year reports: consist of the monthly, quarterly and mid-year reports by 
management to the municipal council on the implementation and 
application of the annual budget and SDBIP. According to the National 
Treasury (LGBER, 2011:75), through its legislative oversight 
responsibilities the municipal council, “uses these reports to monitor both 
the financial and service delivery performance of the municipality’s 
implementation actions”. 
• Annual financial statements: set out the financial performance and position 
of the municipality and together form a comprehensive report reflecting all 
financial and non-financial activities as these relates to implementation of 
the budget. Annually, the financial statements “are submitted to the 
Auditor-General, who issues an audit report indicating the reliance council 
can place on the statements in exercising oversight” (LGBER, 2011:75). 
• Annual report: this is regarded as the main accountability instrument of 
reporting by the mayor and municipal manager to council and the broader 
public on the performance and application of financial and administrative 
resources in implementing the IDP priorities, the SDBIP and the budget. 
• Oversight report: this is a report by council to conclude the accountability 
loop, which is “based on outcomes highlighted in the annual report and 






Figure 6.2 also illustrates that the level of correctness or accuracy of information, as 
provided in the respective accountability documentation, is reliant on a municipality 
having a strategy and organisational structure that are aligned to the basic service 
structure and that is supported by institutional mechanisms. This includes sound and 
effective municipal processes, and policies and procedures that include performance 
management and implementing a standard chart of account (SCOA)25. 
 
6.4.3.2 To ‘Ensure the Provision of Services to Communities in a Sustainable 
Manner [Section 152(1)(b) of the Constitution]’ 
In Chapter 3 of this dissertation the researcher highlighted that the 2017 State of Local 
Government Report, as compiled by the DCoGTA, acknowledges the progress made 
by local government since 2004 in providing access to basic services, more 
specifically that access to basic services for households has increased from 70 per 
cent to 85 per cent between Census 2001 and Census 2011. Over the same period 
access to energy increased from 72 to 85 per cent; access to water from 64 to 73 per 
cent; and access to flush, chemical or ventilated pit toilets and refuse removal from 55 
to 62 per cent. 
The challenge that remains is to ensure the provision and expansion of these services 
to communities in a sustainable manner, as failure to do so or failure to maintain the 
current service standards will compromise the progress made thus far and highly likely 
result in growing community frustrations and violent public protests through which 
much needed public infrastructure is often destroyed. It will also result in a total loss 
of trust and confidence in the delivery ability of local government, which in turn will 
negatively impact on the ability of the economy to grow and act as a catalyst and 
enabler to address and improve the socio-economic conditions of citizens. 
From a financial perspective, sustainable local government is built on the basis of 
sustainable financial management, or on the sustainable management of the fiscal 
and financial affairs of municipalities. Municipalities must take full accountability for 
their administrative and political actions and cannot expect any form of financial bailout 
                                            





from either national or provincial government in the event that failure is a result of bad 
management. The IGFR system does not provide any bailout mechanisms or 
provisions, other than the support and intervention mechanisms set out in the 
Constitution, the MFMA and the Systems Act. Municipalities must prioritise the level 
and quantum of service delivery and ensure that service delivery is cost reflective, 
affordable for ratepayers and clients, and that the services are delivered in such a 
manner that sustainability is ensured. 
According to the National Treasury (2019), the object of the MFMA is to regulate 
financial governance matters in a way that promotes and encourages sustainable 
developmental local government and, in doing so, to not compromise or impede on 
the right of a municipality to exercise its constitutional and legislative powers and 
functions. Chapter 5 of this dissertation highlights the legislative and policy 
requirements that municipalities may only pass budgets that are fully funded, have no 
deficit and that they may borrow only for capital and infrastructure expenditure. In 
addition, the MFMA sets strict requirements for short- and long-term borrowing. In this 
regard, the MFMA specifically provides that municipalities are allowed to only spend 
the money that they have collected within a fiscal year, and limits borrowing for current 
expenditure only for bridging purposes. Further, the MFMA does not allow for short-
term borrowing to cover current or operational expenditure other than for bridging 
purposes, but sets the requirement that bridging finance may not be carried over to 
the next financial year. 
Central to the MFMA, its Regulations and the many National Treasury circulars issued 
in relation to the MFMA is the issue of improved strengthening of financial governance 
as it relates to accountability, oversight, transparency, communication, empowerment 
and clarity and differentiation of roles and responsibilities between council, the mayor 
and the accounting officer. As highlighted in Chapter 5 and earlier in this chapter, the 
MFMA requires regular (monthly, quarterly, six monthly and annually) and accurate 
financial and non-financial reporting to the council in the interest of providing an early 
warning system that facilitates an environment in which potential or actual financial 
and non-financial problems are reported in a timely and appropriate manner. This early 
warning system embedded within the MFMA and its regulations allows the municipal 
council to remedy the situation of potential non- or under-performance and 





The annual assessments of budgets by national and provincial oversight institutions, 
such as the National Treasury, provincial treasuries and provincial DCoGTAs, focusing 
on financial and institutional sustainability and responsiveness, should be considered 
by municipalities. This includes the five yearly assessments of the IDPs, the annual 
reviews of the IDPs, municipal spatial development frameworks (MSDFs) and SDBIPs. 
The importance of these assessments by external stakeholders is stipulated in 
Chapter 5 of the Municipal Systems Act, the MSA Regulations and the MFMA and 
were extensively discussed in Chapter 5 of this dissertation. According to Stellenbosch 
Municipality (2018:66), this annual assessment of the budgets’ process affords the 
“provincial sphere of government an opportunity to exercise its monitoring and support 
role to municipalities as stipulated by the Constitution” and, in addition, “provide an 
indication of the ability and readiness of municipalities to deliver on their legislative 
and Constitutional mandates” and seeks to ensure that the budgets, programmes and 
projects of municipalities and provincial and national departments “are derived from 
robust and integrated planning processes, at the heart of which is the development of 
an IDP” and its core components, such as a MSDF. 
MSDFs must direct the spatial location of growth and development within municipal 
areas for a period of up to 20 years, and the evidence of the implementation of this 
spatial vision must be evident in the programmes, projects and budget allocations 
within the IDPs. This golden thread must be clearly and unambiguously evident in 
these policy documents. 
Other key issues that may affect municipal sustainability and should be considered by 
councils include the constrained economic and fiscal environment impacting on 
revenue, employment and poverty coupled with growing service delivery demands and 
rising cost pressures in excess of annual inflation targets affecting, in particular, input 
costs mainly related to personnel costs and bulk purchases. Municipalities must 
therefore adjust their approach and, from a risk perspective, adopt a more realistic 
approach in estimating municipal revenue, as well as tighten poverty relief policies, 
ensuring that the most deserving population is targeted. Municipalities should also 
fast-track service delivery objectives within affordable revenue and expenditure 
parameters; manage water and electricity losses by, amongst others, replacing 
dilapidated infrastructure, fixing water leaks, embarking on educational campaigns 





efficiencies in processes, systems and operations to contain rising cost pressures and 
progressively move towards more sustainable solutions. 
Municipalities must guard against negative factors that will impact their ability to 
provide services in a sustainable manner, such as corruption and maladministration, 
and focus on providing an enabling environment for sustained service delivery. A focus 
on infrastructure delivery and ensuring adequate expenditure on repairs and 
maintenance is important to avoid threatening the quality and reliability of municipal 
services. The National Treasury (2019:146) highlights that the “medium to long term 
consequences of underspending on repairs and maintenance include: deteriorating 
reliability and quality of services; move to more expensive crisis maintenance, rather 
than planned maintenance; increasing the future cost of maintenance and 
refurbishment; shortening the useful lifespan of assets, necessitating earlier 
replacement; and reduced revenues due to the failure to sell water and electricity, and 
other services”. 
To ensure sustainable municipal performance and respond to the innumerable amount 
of challenges that they face, municipalities should strengthen their internal and 
institutional ability, particularly in human resource management, planning, 
engineering, financial administration and oversight. Municipalities must also consider 
following an integrated management approach to planning, budgeting and delivery to 
ensure delivery of services on a sustainable basis, as required by the Constitution. 
Regional and local economies are interconnected and delivering public value in an 
impactful manner cannot be done independently of each other. Therefore, integrated 
management that will lead to a more coordinated approach to government planning, 
budgeting and delivery across provincial and local spheres is seen as a catalyst for 
service delivery impact and inclusive growth on a sustainable basis, particularly pulling 
in both the provincial and national spheres of government to ensure coordinated 
service delivery, more optimal use of resources and better alignment of objectives and 
outcomes of which social and economic growth and development on a sustainable 
basis remain key. The principle of integrated management connects to the next 
objective of promoting social and economic development and inclusion, as outlined in 






6.4.3.3 To ‘Promote Social and Economic Development [Section 152(1)(c) of the 
Constitution]’ 
The proposed municipal governance and performance model (Malila model) 
acknowledges the role of local government in promoting social and economic 
development, particularly in building more inclusive and shared local economies and 
unlocking opportunities for growth and jobs. The current economic outlook for the 
world, South Africa and municipalities, remains fragile and is extremely vulnerable to 
any external factors impacting on the ability of the economy to grow. However, it is 
important to recognise that there are significant changes to the context in which 
municipalities are implementing their mandates. In the context of a VUCA (volatile, 
uncertain, complex and ambiguous) world, the more traditional assumptions and ways 
of working to create a developmental local government (state) are increasingly ill-
fitting. Factors in South Africa putting extraordinary pressure on the ability of the 
economy to grow include stubbornly high unemployment rates coupled with growing 
fiscal austerity; social inequality; changing demographics and population pressures 
linked to service delivery demands; and socio-economic dynamics and social ills, 
particularly related to youth, coupled with gender and race inequalities. These remain 
some of the key challenges that municipalities need to respond to in crafting their IDPs. 
These economic pressures emphasise the essential requirements of systematic and 
exhaustive integrated development planning; effective public participation processes 
and measured, well thought out policymaking; and active economic transformation and 
suitable public policy responses aimed at stimulating economic growth and human 
development. Municipalities are at the vanguard of public service delivery and public 
policy implementation and this confirms the strategic importance and location of 
municipalities to drive development initiatives that will improve the socio-economic 
conditions of people. Despite great strides made in addressing governance issues and 
attaining unqualified audits, the sustainability of municipalities is under threat given, 
amongst others, challenging economic, social and political realities and resultant 
pressures on budgets and service delivery. There is increasing recognition that 
sustainable local government is in its broader sense dependent on and linked to 





Inclusive economic development entails a large proportion of the labour force 
participating in and enjoying the benefits of growth. Attaining inclusive growth goes 
further than promoting broad-based growth that creates employment opportunities; it 
should also improve quality of life through basic services that in turn influence levels 
of economic growth. Municipalities should strive for inclusive growth and utilise levers 
of economic growth that are contained in local government mandates and the ‘basic’ 
functions that local government performs by creating an attractive environment 
through providing affordable, quality services. 
Municipalities can create enabling opportunities and attract investment, which is 
largely done through the provision and delivery of basic services, such as water, 
electricity and refuse removal. Other levers within local government include 
infrastructure development, local economic development and procurement. Skills 
development, training and internships are also ways to influence employment 
outcomes. Spatial and environmental engagement is another key element of inclusive 
economic development where municipalities play a critical role. Local government can 
also be a catalyst for social and economic investment through the consideration of 
municipal policies and by-laws that enable a thriving economic environment that 
attracts investment into the area, as well as incentivise and encourage inclusion of the 
community and support of the vulnerable. 
Municipalities have a key role to play in creating an environment for economic 
investment and growth by doing the basics well, e.g. well-managed town and business 
centres, clean and safe areas, the provision of services and infrastructure, speedy 
approval processes, administrations that are responsive to business requests and 
councils that are able to make consistent decisions. Infrastructure investment is a key 
priority for supporting growth and socio-economic transformation, and is a key 
instrument or level to ignite and support economic growth and development as it 
provides an effective and targeted mechanism to support and enable socio-economic 
development as well as lays the foundation for advancing to an improved new level of 
economic resilience and responsiveness in an increasingly challenging, uncertain and 
volatile fiscal and economic environment. Better basic services significantly improve 
the well-being of people who are less advantaged and especially those most 





There is a concentration of economic activity at different levels and one needs to 
understand the concentration and linkages of the spatial economy to plan for economic 
development, e.g. links between urban and rural are important for sustainability. 
Spatial transformation is essential to address the legacy left by apartheid, to bridge 
the policy-practice gap and to achieve social-ecological resilience and inclusion. 
Municipalities should consider how to: 
• Capitalise on their unique settlement typologies/assets/knowledge 
economy; 
• Consolidate and enhance investment in economically vibrant areas/service 
delivery/resources and development management; 
• Cluster activities to demote suburban development/investment in 
economic infrastructure/resource management; and 
• Connect economic and social opportunities, regional economic 
infrastructure or climate change adaptation. 
 
Municipalities can also take more innovative and entrepreneurial approaches to 
economic development, being more active in creating and shaping markets or 
developing new skills sets, and should use technology as an enabler (e.g. for 
efficiency). Infrastructure spending and targeting is key. Integrated development 
planning is a tool for the more effective use of resources and should take a more 
holistic economic development approach. Each municipality or region should be 
familiar with the key risks and opportunities and factor these into the IDP formulation 
and budgeting processes. 
Municipalities need to consider organising themselves differently for socio-economic 
development, which is a role beyond the delivery of traditional municipal services. 
Municipalities need to specifically consider their partners for socio-economic 
development, as there are mandates and levers beyond their control. Local 
municipalities need to be able to form cross-boundary partnerships with their 
neighbours in support of regional economic development initiatives. Municipalities 





as the private sector and community sector through partnerships to achieve socio-
economic development. 
Municipal performance and sustainability requires successful socio-economic 
development and spatial transformation. The best way to grow and sustain a municipal 
revenue base, deliver basic services and reduce the number of poor households is by 
growing the economy in an inclusive way. To do this, municipalities need to engage 
proactively in a variety of partnerships and relationships beyond conventional public-
private partnerships (PPPs). Municipalities must adopt an explicit partnering (or 
integrated management) approach in the formulation and implementation of their 
integrated development plans (IDPs) and spatial development frameworks (SDFs). 
The effective use of private sector expertise through co-production of public services 
is key as it suggests an openness to being innovative and exploring new ways of 
designing and delivering public services. The types of partnerships that could be used 
for economic development partnerships include transversal, intergovernmental, cross-
boundary and cross-sector partnering and can include local government bodies like 
SALGA and Cities Support Programme. 
 
6.4.3.4 To ‘Promote a Safe and Healthy Environment [Section 152(1)(d) of the 
Constitution]’ 
The issue of providing a safe and healthy environment, particularly as it relates to 
spatial planning, is integral to growing the local economy. The spatial planning function 
(as distinct from municipal planning) of municipalities is key to achieving this objective. 
It is critical to determine and remould the urban form to create safer, healthier and 
more functional cities. Municipalities must develop clear and unambiguous policies in 
this regard and appoint qualified staff to deal with the issue of spatial planning. 
The planning function is executed across a range of complex institutional 
arrangements, which makes co-ordination of processes relating to the built 
environment difficult. Municipalities must ensure that there is periodic review of 
planning frameworks and activities given the vulnerability of this area for improper 
behaviour and influence of staff responsible for the planning portfolio. Mechanisms 





plan and influence the spatial form of land use patterns and not be overly dependent 
on consultants. The perpetuation of apartheid-style spatial development patterns and 
undirected developments that compromise communities’ health and safety (e.g. 
developments in areas prone to flooding, or the location of housing developments next 
to heavy industries), influences developmental local government and performance. 
Other functions important to this objective are fire-fighting, building inspections, air and 
noise pollution control, water purification, the proper management of refuse dumps 
and sewerage works, and the provision of municipal amenities (such as parks and 
sports facilities). Municipalities should guard against under-funding these functions 
that are not ‘directly’ linked to the provision of the key basic services, or which have 
simply not yet had their functions established. 
 
6.4.3.5 To ‘Encourage the Involvement of Communities and Community 
Organisations in the Matters of Local Government [Section 152(1)(e) of the 
Constitution]’ 
Embedding involvement of communities, community organisations and other key 
stakeholders in the matters of local government is by far one of the most important 
cornerstones of developmental local government, particularly post the establishment 
of the Constitution and democratically accountable local government. Section 
152(1)(e) of the Constitution provides for and places great emphasis on the 
“involvement of communities and community organisations in the matters of local 
government”, highlighting the importance of being community focussed. Section 19(1) 
of the Structures Act refers to the clear objectives as provided for in Section 152 of the 
Constitution. Section 19(2) of the Structures Act provides “that municipal councils must 
annually review; the needs of the community, its priorities to meet those needs, its 
process for involving the community, its organizational and delivery mechanisms for 
meeting the needs of the community, and its overall performance in achieving the 
objectives “of local government as set out in Section 152 of the Constitution”. The 
Structures Act, in Section 19(3), requires municipal councils to “consult the community 
and community organizations in performing their functions and exercising its powers”, 





In addition to the legislative requirement of consultation with communities in key 
municipal processes, Moyo (2016:23, citing David, 2009) makes the point that “there 
are distinct advantages to consulting with communities on matters that affect them”, 
highlighting that some include: “a sense of belonging to communities, in other words, 
if communities are consulted there is a sense of ownership and pride, communities 
assist with the prioritizing of needs, communities get what they need in terms of 
priorities, and by participating in decision-making, communities are more likely to pay 
for services because they understand the inner workings of municipalities better and 
the system of prioritizing projects”. In Moyo (2016:23, citing David, 2009) some 
disadvantages of communities include issues such as “delays in decision-making, 
over-consulting (consultative paralysis), also leads to delays in decision-making, 
identifying community leaders, people have hidden agendas, roles are often confused, 
for example, the role between the elected community leader (councillors) and the non-
elected community leader, and financial impact of consulting must be considered, 
consulting not only takes time, it also costs a lot of money”. 
A recent case study by Brand (2019) analyses a new innovative web-based 
mechanism developed and introduced by a non-profit community organisation that 
enabled South African citizens to respond to the recent water shortage in Cape Town, 
recording the largest number of participants in a public policy matter in Cape Town. In 
the case study, he found that “the web-based platform, Dear South Africa enables 
citizens to influence policies by making submissions concerning pieces of legislation 
and policies under consideration by a Parliamentary Committee or other government 
institution”, and “provides citizens with the opportunity to take part in a legally protected 
policy-shaping process and to make written or oral submissions in order to influence 
public policies at national and local levels”. Brand (2019) points out that “Dear South 
Africa provides a tool to overcome obstacles to public participation by highlighting 
important public policy issues at the national, provincial and local levels and providing 
a user-friendly forum which enables citizens to submit comments on government 
policies or proposed legislation”. 
This new approach to public consultation and participation is a major departure from 
the traditional legislative public participation processes with which South Africans have 
become accustomed, particularly within the local government environment as it relates 





this approach has the ability to fundamentally ‘change the game’ in public participation 
and community involvement in policy and law making and can serve as a potentially 
valuable mechanism for co-production. Brand (2019) highlights that one of the key 
lessons and potential steps in taking this forward is the hope that “this initiative will 
also influence government institutions to shift more towards co-production and to work 
more closely and from an earlier stage with those citizens in co-design processes who 
have made the most useful contributions” and that it “could be the next step to allow 
the platform to shift from simply hosting public campaigns towards promoting a 
genuine dialogue where both sides make a significant contribution towards better 
public policies for South Africa”. 
The constitutional provision for community and public participation requires more than 
mere compliance, as this constitutional objective does not have rule compliance in 
mind, but rather looks at the quality of governance and the role that the community 
could play in it. Public participation must have an effect. Part of this should be to create 
effective channels of communication, but at the next level it also includes, where 
applicable, co-production of services. This goal is also linked to the concept of citizen-
centric governance and responsive governance, which are related issues that reflect 
on quality and impact. 
The proposed governance and performance model (Malila model) provides a basis for 
municipalities to establish meaningful community participation and stakeholder 
management and guard against issues such as doing community and public 
consultation for mere compliance purposes and effectively just paying lip-service to 
the process. Councillors and municipal officials must take ownership of the 
stakeholder engagement processes, thereby strengthening accountability – 
preventing public consultation from becoming information sessions with little input from 
the community being solicited or considered and compiling wish-lists that have little 
value for planning and budgeting purposes – and using the processes to establish the 







6.4.4 A Municipal Governance and Performance Model: Internal and External 
Factors 
In Chapter 3 of this dissertation, the Gavrea Model, the Rogers Model, the Nicolson 
and Brenner Model and the Burk and Litwin Model acknowledge the existence and 
influence of both the internal and external environment on organisational performance. 
In Chapter 2 there are various governance models that consider internal and external 
dynamics and their impact on the governance arrangements of institutions. The 
National Treasury (2014) equally acknowledges that municipalities, as an 
organisation, function “within a system of local government”, and that in addition to the 
constitutional and legislative obligations for delivery, from which an assessment of 
performance could be made, there are both internal institutional factors and a range 
of external factors that impact on the environment within which municipalities work and 
deliver on the constitutional objectives of local government. Very often problems in the 
external environment cause or aggravate problems inside municipalities and hamper 
them from optimal performance. 
Internal factors impacting on the performance and delivery ability of a municipality are 
the primary accountability of the council and the mayor. Whilst the responsibility for 
developing a strategy to address the service delivery problems lies with the council as 
a collective, the responsibility to implement the strategy rests with the mayor, the 
municipal manager and the executive management of the municipality. In this regard, 
as set out in the Constitution and in national and provincial legislation, both national 
and provincial government, as well as district municipalities must play a supporting 
role to enable the metropolitan and local municipalities to perform their function. If the 
problem lies in the external environment, the different role-players’ roles, 
responsibilities and parameters must be clearly articulated, defined and understood to 
ensure proper accountability arrangements and execution. 
The internal and external factors affecting municipal performance form an integral part 
of the proposed municipal governance and performance model. What follows is some 
of the internal and external factors that impact directly on the governance and 






6.4.4.1 Internal factors and oversight impacting on governance and performance 
Internal factors are those that are under direct control and influence of the 
administration and mostly governed by legislative provisions and requirements, or by 
good governance practices. Some of the internal factors impacting on governance and 
performance of a municipality include the following. 
 
6.4.4.1.1 Community oversight, accountability and leadership 
Community oversight and accountability is probably the most important incentive for 
municipalities to perform, as five-yearly municipal elections provide for periodic 
accountability, both from a political and administrative perspective. However, these 
need to be supplemented by ongoing interactions between communities, councillors 
and municipalities, as the absence of such interactions may lead to a disconnect 
between the municipality and citizens and even result in service delivery protests. 
Councils and municipalities need to put more constructive mechanisms in place to 
facilitate community oversight and accountability – such as the proactive 
implementation of ward committees, performance scorecards, effective consultation 
processes linked to the IDP and budgets, and the publication of user-friendly and 
transparent accountability documents and reports. 
Political accountability and taking responsibility for failures in political leadership in a 
municipality vests with the mayor. The constitutional and legal framework make the 
council and mayor of a municipality responsible for ensuring that the municipality is 
structured and functions in a way that ensures the sustainable delivery of services. If 
the municipality fails to do so and the cause for the failure is internal to the municipality, 
the council/mayor is accountable for such performance failures. This implies that 
persistent municipal performance failures that have internal causes can be mainly 
attributed to failures in the council and mayor’s political leadership. It is the 
council/mayor’s responsibility to provide good political leadership and the strategic 
guidance to ensure that the municipal management resolves the factors that are 
hindering the municipalities’ performance. 
Despite appreciating and acknowledging the importance of strong ethical leadership, 





leadership actually is or how to define it”. Many authors have written literature on the 
subject of leadership, yet Stogdill (1974, in Bolden, 2004:4), in an analysis and review 
of research and literature on the subject of ‘leadership’, submits that “there are almost 
as many definitions of leadership as there are persons who have attempted to define 
the concept”, noting that Stogdill (1974) made this finding over 45 years ago. 
Bolden (2004:5), in a research report titled ‘What is leadership?’, cites Northouse 
(2004) who “identified four common themes in the way leadership now tends to be 
conceived: (1) leadership is a process; (2) leadership involves influence; (3) leadership 
occurs in a group context; and (4) leadership involves goal attainment”. In this process 
of unpacking the four themes, Northouse (2004) defines leadership as “a process 
whereby an individual influences a group of individuals to achieve a common goal”. 
Bolden (2005:5b) summarises the many theories on leadership in a short, yet impactful 
statement as “a complex phenomenon that touches on many other important 
organisational, social and personal processes … depends on a process of influence, 
whereby people are inspired to work towards group goals”. Leaders, particularly in the 
public sector, must therefore aim to adhere to the Norton good governance principles 
of ‘public life’, which, according to Education Alliance (2018), include “selflessness, 
integrity, objectivity, accountability, openness, honesty and leadership”. 
Scheepers (2015:189, citing Schwella, 2013) identifies “five approaches to leadership, 
namely (1) the traits approach; (2) behavioural approach; (3) situational or contingency 
approach; (4) transformational or new charismatic approach; and (5) the social 
learning approach”. In addition, “Schwella (2013:68-69) identified the specific 
contextual realities of public sector leadership”, as including the following: 
• Public leadership takes place within the social political system, creating 
the need to understand and work with political processes and role players. 
The status and motivation of political role players are not the same as 
those of board members of any company. 
• Public leaders have to work with public pressure and protest. In the public 
domain, these matters are necessary for functional democratic purposes 
and are not signs of something that might have gone wrong as they may 





• Public leaders should actively pursue a sense of democratic public 
accountability where openness is not only tolerated or accepted, but 
actively encouraged. 
 
In their findings, the National Treasury (2014) makes the point that many municipal 
performance failures can be directly ascribed to failures in political leadership and 
oversight, which includes some of the following: 
• A council paralysed by disruptive, internal political conflicts is unable to 
fulfil its decision-making role properly: consequently, key appointments do 
not get made, plans and budgets do not get passed and critical decisions 
on tariffs are not made; 
• Councillors and mayors that are corrupt, undermine municipal systems 
and service delivery, and are often directly responsible for performance 
failures; 
• Slightly more-subtler are those councillors and mayors that are in it for 
themselves, but rather than being overtly corrupt seek to ‘work the system’ 
to their advantage. They push the boundaries of good governance, which 
will ultimately undermine the organisational culture and impact negatively 
on service delivery; and 
• Certain councillors are simply incompetent, unable to give strategic 
leadership on critical issues. If they remain in council they can hide in the 
group, it is when they are made mayor that it becomes a problem. 
 
When analysing these political root causes for municipal failures, it is clear that many 
of them cannot be solved through technical support or technical intervention. They 
require political solutions that address the issue of leadership and accountability at 
political level. 
Bolden, et al. (2003:23) assessed 24 different leadership models and competency 
frameworks across various disciplines and makes the point that the employee 





councils achieve the high standards of people management needed to ensure the 
continuous improvement of services”, and has developed “a compendium of 
leadership competencies … local authorities across the UK” and that “[t]hese have 
been classified into 20 different categories”, which can be equally applied to the local 
government environment in South Africa and which have been incorporated and 
mainstreamed in the good governance and performance model (Malila model) as 
outlined in Figure 6.1. These competencies for local government leaders (politically 
and administratively) include: 
1. “Change: includes challenging leadership for change, managing 
change/strategic thinking; 
2. Communication: includes communicating, customer care, listening and 
organising; 
3. Corporate focus: includes collective responsibility, corporate focus, 
developing a learning organisation, evaluating and improving 
organisational performance, organisational awareness, organisational 
effectiveness; 
4. Customer focus: includes commitment to quality customer service, 
customer focused service delivery, sharpening customer and service 
focus; 
5. Decision making: includes analysing and solving problems, decision 
making, identifying and solving problems, judgement; 
6. Equality and diversity: includes achieving equal opportunities, 
demonstrating leadership in implementing equalities, managing equitably, 
valuing diversity; 
7. Focus on results: includes achievement focus, focusing on results, 
managing for results; 
8. Impact and influence: includes acting assertively, impact and influence, 
interpersonal skills, networking and influencing, partnership working, 
persuasiveness; 
9. Information management: includes gathering and using information, 
getting unbiased information, giving clear information, information and 
communication management, searching for information; 





11. Leading people: includes appraising people and performance, 
developing others, disciplining and counselling, enabling, leadership, 
managing people, developing and understanding others, personal and 
staff development, training, coaching and delegating, valuing people; 
12. Partnerships: includes community leadership, co-operating with others, 
leading integrated working, networking and influencing, working in 
partnership; 
13. Personal management and drive: includes determination, managing 
self, motivation and drive, personal effectiveness, personal management, 
planning and scheduling work, setting goals and standards, time 
management and prioritising; 
14. Political awareness: includes democratic support, political and 
organisational awareness, working competently within the political 
environment; 
15. Project and process management: includes managing projects, 
organisational and project management;  
16. Resource management 
17. Safety 
18. Service improvement: includes continuous improvement to service 
delivery, delivering excellence, leading the challenge on continuous 
service improvement, managing the executive programme and 
performance, service co-ordination and management, sharpening 
customer and service focus; 
19. Strategic focus: includes acting strategically, developing strategy, 
managing change/strategic thinking, strategic behaviour, vision; and  
20. Team Building: includes building teams, working in and developing 
teams”. 
 
It is important for both political and administrative leadership in local government to 







6.4.4.1.2 Institutional and organisational capacity 
Strong institutional or organisational capacity is built upon the way the municipality is 
structured and functions in practice. In a functional, well-performing municipality, when 
crafting the back-to-basics strategy for local government improvement, the national 
DCoGTA and the National Treasury (2014) found that organisational capacity built 
upon: 
• Sound political leadership skills: councils with vision and good working 
relationships with management (political-administrative interface) are 
essential to ensure municipal performance. Councillors committed to the 
principles of good governance and service delivery play a critical decision-
making and oversight role; 
• Sound administrative leadership skills and staff complement: this includes 
a municipal manager, and senior and technical staff that are qualified, 
competent, committed to service delivery and community oriented, can 
manage the political-administrative interface and who have good 
leadership abilities. A functional organisational structure and competent 
staff complement, particularly in key positions, including a sound system of 
delegation, strong internal and external co-ordination, appropriate 
reporting and oversight mechanisms, as well as learning and growth 
opportunities that pass on skills and preserve institutional memory; 
• Governance: good governance practices facilitate transparent, 
accountable and participative decision making and oversight and includes 
responsiveness to community and stakeholder participation and feedback. 
Good governance includes ethical behaviour, sound work ethic, striving for 
excellence, acceptance of diversity and a ‘public service’ that subscribes 
to Batho Pele oriented service standards; 
• Priorities, policies and plans: priorities and plans that addresses the 
communities’ social and economic development needs, with an emphasis 
on the interests of the poor, the youth, the vulnerable and women. This 
includes a sustainable, community-driven IDP, budget and spatial plan; 
• Institutional systems and technology: key decision-making, management 





include effective and efficient service delivery and monitoring systems. 
This should also include financial management systems for budgeting, 
accounting, cash-flow management, debtor management and financial 
reporting systems; supply chain management systems, especially for 
procurement; human resource management systems, especially the 
appointment processes; spatial planning and development approval 
processes; capital project management processes; and asset registers 
and planned maintenance systems; and 
• Financial management, budget and SCM: sound revenue, expenditure, 
asset and liability management processes, as well as SCM processes that 
are innovative and free from unnecessary ‘red-tape’; transparent; 
customer focused; fair, efficient and honest; effective contract and good 
project management, processes, systems and procedures. 
 
From an internal perspective, the role, functions and responsibilities of oversight 
institutions and bodies having an impact on municipal performance have been covered 
extensively, primarily in Chapter 5, with the underlying theories covered in chapters 2, 
3 and 4 of this dissertation. Their role is captured extensively in the legislative and 
policy documentation and includes the council and individual councillors, the mayor, 
the mayoral Committee and its members, other council oversight committees, internal 
audit and risk management committees, the municipal manager and senior staff, and 
the various administrative committees, such as finance, human resource 
management, supply chain management and infrastructure and technical. 
 
6.4.4.2 External Factors and Oversight Impacting on Governance and 
Performance 
External factors are those things that are not necessarily under the direct control of 
the municipality (the administration). This does not however imply that the 
administration (institution) is unable to influence external factors so as to minimise the 






6.4.4.2.1 Political environment 
Earlier chapters expressed the sentiment that, in order to ensure sustainable municipal 
performance, the national, provincial and municipal political leadership must play a 
critical role in shaping the political environment of local government. This should firstly 
be done by setting an example of good governance practices; secondly, by the 
messaging from political leaders, mainly on ethical conduct and behaviour; and, 
thirdly, through demonstrating political will to deal with the poor performance of political 
colleagues in local government. The National Treasury (2014) and AGSA (2018) found 
that some reasons for the persistence of political problems in local government can be 
attributed to a failure by the national and provincial executives to properly exercise the 
powers vested in them by Section 139 of the Constitution and to deal decisively with 
dysfunctional councils and corrupt mayors and councillors. A political climate must be 
created that places pressure on mayors and councillors to give strong and effective 
leadership to their municipalities so as to ensure success. In addition, a zero tolerance 
stance or signal must be conveyed regarding mediocrity, careerism, self-enrichment 
and corruption, and for harsh and decisive sanctions should be actioned for non-
delivery and corruption. This will provide assurance to the communities that no one, 
including mayors and councillors, is ‘above the law’. 
 
6.4.4.2.2 Intersphere roles and responsibilities 
Chapters 2, 3 and 4 of this dissertation highlight the roles and oversight responsibilities 
of the national and provincial spheres of government as these relate to local 
government. It is obvious that there is no clarity as to who is responsible for some 
areas. Duplication and overlap in some local government legislation and policy 
documentation creates uncertainty and impacts on the governance and performance 
arrangements of municipalities. Of particular concern are issues relating to the powers 
and functions of local government; duplication and overlap between the MFMA and 
Systems Act; mechanisms for intervention in municipalities as set out in the 
Constitution and MFMA; and the role of the national executive (cabinet) and provincial 
executive councils, as well as clarifying the roles of the National Treasury and the 
DCoGTA and their respective provincial counterparts regarding oversight over 





to local government, it is absolutely essential that the roles and responsibilities of all 
role-players are clearly defined, and mechanisms put in place to ensure proper co-
operation and co-ordination between them. 
 
6.4.4.2.3 Other external factors impacting municipal governance and 
performance 
Some other factors that impact on the performance of local government, highlighted 
in Chapter 3, include responses from stakeholders and communities to service 
delivery issues that fall outside of the scope of local government; constraints in the 
fiscal environment (fiscal framework and economic climate); clarifying the structure, 
role and functions of local government; assessing the extent of the impact of national 
polices on the delivery mandate of local government; and reviewing the 
intergovernmental system and legislative framework of local government, particularly 
as it relates to oversight, accountability and support and intervention arrangements. 
Other external factors that impact local government, such as economic and 
environmental factors, include the current negative international and domestic 
economic environment, poor national economic and fiscal policy responses and 
uncertainty, fiscal uncertainty and sustainability, urbanisation and population shift, 
increase in service load pressures, high-tech developments and climate change 
(drought), all of which require specific response strategies to ensure municipal 
performance sustainability. 
From an external perspective, the role, functions and responsibilities of oversight 
institutions and bodies that have an impact on municipal performance were covered 
extensively in the earlier chapters of this dissertation. Their role is captured in the 
legislative and policy documentation and includes institutions such as the AGSA and 
Public Protector (Constitution Chapter 9 institutions); national and provincial 
legislatures and the respective oversight committees, national cabinet and provincial 
executive councils; national departments, such as the Treasury, DCoGTA, DPME in 
the Presidency, as well as their respective provincial counterparts; StatsSA; and, 






6.4.5 Municipal Governance and Performance Model: Good Governance 
Elements and Indicators 
Chapter 2 of the dissertation deals exclusively with the concept of governance, and 
particularly focuses on good governance in the public sector. Good governance is 
defined by various institutions, and consists of various elements that were 
comprehensively analysed in Chapter 2. The World Bank (1992) “has defined ‘good 
governance’ as epitomized by predictable, open and enlightened policy making; a 
bureaucracy imbued with a professional ethos; an executive arm of government 
accountable for its actions; and a strong civil society participating in public affairs; and 
all behaving under the rule of law” and as characterised by “participation, consensus 
orientation, rule of law, transparency, accountability, responsiveness, effectiveness 
and efficiency, equity and inclusiveness”. Good governance, according to BMZ 
(2014:10), contributes to the achievement of good governance targets and is thus 
geared to sustainable development: 
• By promoting a socio-economically and environmentally sustainable pro-
poor policy, good governance contributes to reducing poverty and shaping 
sustainable policies; 
• By redressing the unequal distribution of assets, financial governance 
helps to protect and safeguard human rights and promotes a social and 
sustainable market economy; 
• By increasing the transparency of state action thus improving the 
conditions for opinion formation, political participation and personal 
initiative; 
• By supporting the separation of powers and thus promoting the rule of law 
and effective state action, as well as anti-corruption work in the field of 
public finance; and 
• Enabling citizens to participate and engage in financial oversight and thus 
promoting democracy and accountability, as well as constructive 






In South Africa, the various King Reports26, in addition to the various legislative 
requirements for good governance, provide the norms and standards for good 
governance in the private and public sectors. The Institute of Directors (IoD) (2016:82-
86) makes the point that the King IV Report embraces the four key principles of 
sustainable development, ethical and effective leadership, integrated thinking and 
stakeholder inclusivity. The King IV Report provides a sector supplement exclusively 
devoted to local government (municipalities). It lays the basis for governance 
outcomes extensively discussed in King IV, and includes “ethical culture, good 
performance, effective control and legitimacy” under the umbrella of good governance 
principles 1 to 16, but with particular application in local government. These are more 
or less the same principles that the AGSA uses to test municipalities’ adherence to the 
good governance principles, an area where major shortcomings have already been 
identified in recent years. 
 
6.4.5.1 Governance dimensions and elements of good governance 
In addition to defining good governance and analysing the various good governance 
models, Chapter 2 also provides an analysis of the three governance dimensions: 
political, institutional/technical and normative, which underpins the good governance 
element of the proposed municipal good governance and performance model in this 
chapter. The dimensions of good governance captured in the Malila model, include 
the following. 
 
6.4.5.1.1 Political (democratic) dimension of good governance 
The political dimension of governance includes “the processes by which those in 
authority are selected, elected, monitored and replaced” and has two sub-
components: (1) the structure of government; and (2) “the structure of accountability 
and contestability of political leaders”. The structure of government is concerned with 
the legal and practical separation of powers between the executive, legislature and 
                                            





judiciary, whilst the structure of accountability and contestability of political leaders 
deals primarily with the quality of public policies designed by political leaders as a 
measure of the quality of governance, whilst the policy choices depend in part on the 
degree to which leaders are held to account. This dimension, according to the World 
Bank (2018), covers the “degree of political competition in choosing both leaders and 
civil servants, the credibility of political parties, the orderly transfer of power, 
transparency in party financing, disclosure of parliamentary votes and asset 
declaration, and the existence and enforcement of conflict-of-interest rules, general 
openness of the political structure, including the opportunities for multi-faceted political 
expression and for non-elites, minorities, and the disenfranchised to gain access to 
political power”. 
In Chapter 2, it is submitted that “good political governance helps enhance the 
credibility of government” and contributes to improving the effectiveness of the state 
and the administration. It boosts investor confidence and trust, which in turn can 
support economic development and growth. Good political governance impacts on the 
economy, particularly on addressing socio-economic challenges of unemployment, 
skills and human development. Good political governance creates a more conducive 
environment for growth, development, increased investment and the creation of 
employment opportunities, particularly in local government. Success is dependent on 
an appropriate interface between the political, administrative, community and private 
sector (economic development) structures, an approach that is supported and aligned 
to the definition of ‘municipality’ as set out in the Structures Act. 
 
6.4.5.1.2 Institutional/technical dimension of good governance 
According to the Governance Working Group (1996), the institutional dimension of 
governance “is concerned with the ability of governmental institutions to manage and 
get … done through institutional mechanisms”, which includes the “state’s institutional 
capacity, structural arrangements, decision making processes and the interaction and 
relationship between government officials, public agencies and the local people” 
(community) with the main objective to effectively and efficiently formulate and 





processes and procedures by which local communities and government itself respect 
societies and public institutions. 
The technical (or economic) dimension of governance is regarded as an element of 
institutional governance and focusses on the technical capacity, expertise and 
knowledge of the state (public servants) to make and implement technical decisions. 
It is about the ability to operate efficiently and effectively within a resource constrained 
environment while having, according to the Governance Working Group (1996), the 
“technical know-how on resource mobilisation and utilisation, quality service delivery 
and [an] economic development process by which public resources are effectively 
managed and sound policies implemented”. 
The technical dimension of governance calls for improvement in the quality of public 
servants’ execution of technical processes, such as public finance management 
(revenue, expenditure, asset and liability management), and civil service reform (cost 
containments measures, strengthening personnel management practices and the 
effectiveness and efficacy of public agencies). It requires administrative capacity, 
structures and systems designed to accomplish goals and objectives (perform) and 
includes the regulatory, administrative, technical and extractive (revenue) dimensions 
of state capacity. These dimensions are highly interrelated and it is cumulative 
weaknesses, and not necessarily a single weakness, that make the function of a 
municipality effective or not. 
In the main, as highlighted in Chapter 2 of this dissertation and submitted by Silvestrum 
(2012:6), this dimension of governance is about assessing: 
(1) Government effectiveness – capturing perceptions of the quality of public 
services, the quality of the civil service and the degree of its 
independence from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation 
and implementation, and the credibility of the government’s commitment 
to such policies; and  
(2) Regulatory quality – capturing perceptions of the ability of government to 
formulate and implement sound policies and regulations that permit and 






The dimension does not only assess the effectiveness of the state, but also includes 
the assessment of the remaining two components of the three ‘e’s’, i.e. efficiency 
(input-output relationship) and the economy (public value and impact). From an 
institutional perspective the effective promotion of good governance is based on a 
public administrative system that is effective, efficient, responsive in its service delivery 
mandate, concerned about the impact of services and public value creation, 
transparent and accountable, competent in its leadership and staff to design and 
implement policies that are developmental and that has the capability to manage both 
the public and private sectors, whilst also managing the interface with politicians 
(political governance). 
 
6.4.5.1.3 Normative dimension of good governance 
Iftimoaei (2015:309) describes the normative dimension of good governance, stating 
that it “comprises principles, values and norms that are guiding the international 
community or the government in the management of policymaking on different levels 
of government”. The normative dimension of good governance is highly contested 
given its focus on principles, ethics, values and norms, which may differ from country 
to country and from institution to institution. However, Kotzenstein (1996:5, in Iftimoaei, 
2015:310) is of the view that this dimension of good governance dictates the “collective 
expectation for the proper behaviour of actors with a given identity”. However, 
according to Iftimoaei (2015:310), “good governance has a deeper normative 
implication which refers to some ethical principles, norms and values”, and defining 
the “normative dimension of good governance is not an easy task”. 
Iftimoaei (2015:310) argues that the normative dimension of good governance 
indicators is premised on “the classification of key principles of good governance 
according to four major domains of activity”, namely (1) the international donor 
community and its institutions27, as comprehensively discussed in Chapter 2 of this 
dissertation; (2) “public sector represented by government and its branches”; (3) 
private sector with the world of business and multinational corporations; and (4) “civil 
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society with the voices of NGOs, professional associations and interest groups”. Given 
the applicability of this dissertation, only the normative dimension of good governance 
indicators for the international donor community and public sector dimension will be 
highlighted, and set out in Table 6.1 below. 
 
Table 6.1: Normative Dimension of Good Governance 
International Donor Community Public Sector/Government 




Performance (effective and efficient) 
Accountability 
Fairness (equity and inclusion) 
Rule of law 
Legitimacy and credibility of government/ 
democratic government 
Ethics and accountability of governmental elites 
and policy makers 
Respect for human rights and rule of law 
Effective and efficient public administration 
Improving the capacity of the state and 
responsiveness 
Transparency in the decision-making process and 
eradicating corruption 
Social protection and inclusion of the poor and 
vulnerable 
 
These elements of good governance, inclusive of its dimensions, have been taken up 
in the proposed municipal governance and performance model (Malila model), as 
captured in Figure 6.1 of this dissertation. The Malila model encapsulates the detailed 
description of the above elements as contained in Chapter 2 of this dissertation, which 
extensively covers the subject of governance with a focus on good governance. 
 
6.4.5.1.4 Participatory (stakeholder) governance: a proposed 4th dimension of 
good governance 
The proposed governance and performance model in this dissertation proposes to 
introduce a fourth dimension of good governance in municipalities, namely that of 





This proposed dimension is underpinned by constitutional requirements and the White 
Paper on Local Government as it relates to community and stakeholder involvement 
in the activities of local government. 
The concept of stakeholder governance, as part of the new public management 
approach and network governance, is discussed in detail as part of Chapter 2. In 
Chapter 2, the researcher highlights that even the World Bank (2018) acknowledges 
the importance of civil society, voice and participation in the business of local 
government and highlights that governments must “focus on the variety of other 
channels that help assure stronger voice and participation by society at large – 
including the role of civil society organizations in the management of public agencies, 
the use of public hearings and consultations on proposed laws and regulations, 
freedom of the press and the diversity of public opinion that is tolerated, both legally 
and socially, and the activity of independent government watchdog agencies like 
consumer protection agencies, the media, and independent academic institutions and 
think tanks”. 
According to Sowden, et al. (2011) and the Project Management Institute (2013), a 
stakeholder can be defined as “an individual, group, or organization, who may affect, 
be affected by, or perceive itself to be affected by a decision, activity, or outcome of a 
project”, which can be either positive or negative. This proposed fourth dimension of 
good governance suggests appropriate stakeholder management and engagement, 
integral to participatory governance, and which “creates positive relationships with 
stakeholders through the appropriate management of their expectations and agreed 
objectives” aligned with the expectation theory organisational performance model 
discussed in Chapter 3. “Stakeholder management is a process and control that must 
be planned and guided by underlying principles” as it will guide municipalities to 
prepare appropriate strategies using information (or intelligence) gathered during the 
stakeholder management and engagement processes in formulating policies. 
The Association for Project Management (APM) (2018) makes the point that 
stakeholder engagement, which is a different concept to stakeholder management, “is 
the practice of influencing a variety of outcomes through consultation, communication, 
negotiation, compromise, and relationship building”. Stakeholder management is 





analysis, planning and implementation of actions designed to engage with 
stakeholders”. Therefore, stakeholder engagement is about ‘relationship and 
influence’ whilst stakeholder management is about ‘processes and organisation’. 
According to the APM (2018), stakeholder management consists of four steps: (1) 
“identify, recognize and acknowledge stakeholders; (2) determine their influence and 
interest; (3) establish communication management plan; and (4) influencing and 
engaging stakeholders”. These four steps are supported by ten key principles that 
underpin successful stakeholder engagement: 
• “Communicate: To ensure the intended message is understood and the 
desired response achieved; 
• Consult, early and often: To get the useful information and ideas, ask 
questions; 
• Remember, they are human: Operate with an awareness of human 
feelings; 
• Plan it: Time investment and careful planning, this has a significant payoff; 
• Relationship: Try to engender trust with stakeholders; 
• Simple but not easy: Show you care. Be empathetic. Listen to 
stakeholders; 
• Managing risk: Stakeholders can be treated as risks and opportunities that 
have probabilities and impact; 
• Compromise: Compromise across a set of stakeholders’ diverging 
priorities; 
• Understand what is success: Explore the value of the project to the 
stakeholder; and 
• Take responsibility: Project governance is the key to project success”. 
 
It is acknowledged in previous chapters of this dissertation that municipalities have 
multiple stakeholders, including, but not limited to, the community and service users 
(shareholders), politicians (councillors), employees, suppliers, and so forth. As 
indicated in the proposed governance and performance model, the citizen is the most 





value and customer satisfaction through the delivery on the constitutional “objectives 
of local government” as set out in Section 152 of the Constitution, hence the focus on 
the citizen, who is placed in the centre of the proposed municipal governance and 
performance model (Malila model). 
Another element included in this dimension is the principle of “active citizenship (or 
‘participation’)”, which is particularly important in the South African context given the 
legacy of the black majority’s exclusion from the right to vote, to own significant 
economic assets and even to live in cities, except under restrictive conditions. Mass 
unemployment and the absence of social security for working age adults reinforces 
the need to increase economic participation and for people to contribute to 
development by being productive in the labour market and through self-employment 
and enterprise formation. Political participation is also vital to improve government 
accountability and responsiveness at all levels, and to counter authoritarian 
tendencies. Consultation and persuasion are necessary to negotiate socio-economic 
change and transformation without eroding confidence amongst economic interests 
and provoking political instability. Chapters 4 and 5 of this dissertation provide an 
extensive analyses of the legislative and policy requirements to give effect to the 
objectives of community and stakeholder involvement and participation in local 
government and how it impacts on local government performance. 
In addition to the significance of civil society, voice and participation in the business of 
local government, this dimension takes it a bit further to include exploring and creating 
or co-creating appropriate partnering solutions between the community, different 
spheres of government, non-governmental institutions and the private sector 
(business) and through following a ‘whole of society approach’ to tackling the many 
challenges of local government. The ‘whole of society approach’ calls for collaborative 
action across spheres of government, sectors and community organisations. It is, 
according to Cloete (2018), “guided by a shared purpose to impact meaningfully on 
the lives of citizens” and calls for a different way of being and a different way of doing 
what the Constitution mandates the government” and communities to do and has the 
potential to enhance the effectiveness of existing and new projects, programmes and 
coordinating mechanisms between various government role-players, communities and 





The importance of sharing mandates, i.e. the need to reflect on the ‘shared ownership 
of mandates’; the joint problem-solving approach across mandated responsibilities 
and ‘shared learning and joint problem solving’; is key for successful partnering 
approaches involving the ‘whole of society’. Brand, et al. (2014:63) argues that 
municipalities must create a citizen-centric approach to governance and makes the 
point that this requires “a culture shift towards co-creation and collaborative ownership 
and the need to reflect on high levels of buy-in and the positivity created through a 
culture of mutual respect, trust, co-creation and collaborative ownership” underpinned 
by principles of human rights, fairness, social cohesion and citizen-centeredness, i.e. 
the need to reflect on the foundational principles enshrined in the Constitution, which 
should guide the collective actions of all role-players. 
According to Visagie and Turok (2017:29), strengthening collective action by 
institutions that cut across different sectors of society and the economy, or 
‘partnerships’ is key to ensure developmental and sustainable local government. For 
various reasons, gleaned from research articles, newspaper articles and public 
commentary, there appears to be deep suspicion and mistrust between government 
and the private sector and, therefore, improving relationships and building confidence 
between all role-players is necessary to negotiate changes that will prove to be 
durable. Practical collaboration on a wide range of development projects could share 
the risks and rewards and achieve better outcomes than each sector acting alone. 
According to Boraine (2017), the partnership principle also applies to the government’s 
relationship with civil society. Partnering works more easily if you focus on the issue, 
not the institutional mandate and Boraine (2017) makes the point that it works when 
there is ‘skin in the game’. Inter-municipal partnering is possible when it is focused on 
particular issues of mutual interest and benefit. For partnering to work, it has to involve 
leaders at multiple levels, i.e. strategic leadership, middle management and 
operational/technical project managers. Conversely, collaborative processes can be 
paralysed if institutions only focus on their own mandate and authority. It is 
acknowledged that there are limits to what can be achieved through policies of 
redistribution and paternalistic decision-making; however, on the contrary, there are 
substantial benefits from greater empowerment of communities and involvement of 





There is much increased involvement of citizens and key stakeholders in public service 
delivery. Governance International (2019) submits that it is timely to ask citizens and 
key partners a new question, namely “[w]hat role do they play and are they prepared 
to play in the design and delivery of those public services which matter most to them?”. 
In this regard, a new concept has emerged, namely co-production and community 
governance. Governance International (2019) emphasises that it is about creating 
partnerships to institutionalise “co-commissioning, co-designing, co-delivering and co-
assessing public services and outcomes with service users and local communities with 
the aim of improving high priority public outcomes through new forms of user and 
community co-production”. According to Governance International (2019b), some 
recent publications, most notably “‘Bringing the power of the citizen into local public 
services’ by Prof. Tony Bovaird and Dr. Elke Loeffler reviews the evidence for user 
and community co-production”, whilst the publication by Prof. Tony Bovaird called 
‘Community Democratic Governance: Evidence Syndissertation and Advice’ 
“syndissertationes existing evidence from the UK and internationally”. 
According to Beaufort West Municipality IDP (2017-2022 IDP) (2017:115), there are 
various forms of partnering arrangements that could support a municipality in 
delivering key services, some of which include: 
• Transversal partnering (between line-function departments within the 
municipality and with municipal entities); 
• Inter-governmental partnering (between the municipality and other spheres 
of government, public entities and state-owned companies); 
• Cross-boundary partnering (partnerships with other municipalities across 
municipal boundaries, within a functional region); and 
• Cross-sector partnering (partnering with external role-players such as 
business or civil society). 
 
In conclusion, at the centre of it all and appropriately reflected in the proposed 
governance and performance model, the focus is on the citizens and the broader 
community and service users (as clients), which through a developmental process and 





progressively achieve a better life and improved living conditions. This is ultimately the 
aim of development local government as set out in the 1996 Constitution and the 1998 
White Paper on Local Government. 
 
6.5 VALIDATION OF THE MUNICIPAL GOVERNANCE AND PERFORMANCE 
MODEL (THE MALILA MODEL) 
6.5.1 Validation of the Malila Model through Focus Group Discussions 
Pursuant to developing and presenting the proposed municipal governance and 
performance model, and discussing the key elements of the Malila model as depicted 
in Figure 6.1., the model was subject to a structured process of testing and validation. 
This was conducted, firstly, by subjecting the model to external assessment by a focus 
group and, secondly, through structured and semi-structured interviews with key role 
players with the requisite experience and who are knowledgeable on the subject 
matter of governance and performance of local government, particularly as part of the 
municipal case study analysis. 
According to Agar and Macdonald (1995, in Bloor, et al., 2001:3), “focus groups are 
well established in advertising and marketing research and have been successfully 
adapted to the social sciences, they involve getting a group of people together to 
discuss their beliefs and practices”, and “[t]he groups are interactive and group 
members are encouraged by a moderator to talk to one another”. The researcher did 
not interview the group members, either individually or as a collective, but facilitated 
the discussion of the focus group. Morgan (1997, cited by Rhodes and Tiernan, 
2015:6) submits that the “hallmark of focus groups is the explicit use of group 
interaction to produce data and insights”. However, according to Krueger (2008:18), 
“there are no guarantees that a group assembled by researchers will promote 
participation and discussion on a defined area of interest in a permissive, 
nonthreatening environment” and, therefore, according to Rhodes and Tiernan 
(2015:6, citing Morgan, 1997; Krueger, 1998), “it is important to prepare carefully for, 
structure, and manage focus group interactions”. This is precisely what the researcher 






6.5.2 Validation of the Malila Model through Interviews with Key Stakeholders 
and Local Government Specialists 
The importance of group interaction and contributions, as well as group member’s 
comments on each other’s experiences and opinions in the field of local government 
and governance is paramount and regarded as a valuable source of illuminating 
insight into complex issues relating to local government performance. This interactive 
process assisted in producing the required data for this research. There are both pros 
and cons to using focus groups (Rhodes and Tiernan, 2015). The comments, 
contributions and interactions flowing from the focus group session have been 
documented, an approach that Bloor, et al. (2001:3) “consider the most rigorous 
analytical strategy for focus group research”. A list of the members of the focus group 
and their redacted curriculum vitae, demonstrating the applicability of their experience 
on the subject matter, is attached as Annexure 8 to this dissertation. 
The interview process consists of structured and semi-structured interviews as a 
method for data collection. One researcher in Rhodes and Tiernan (2015:18) is of the 
view that focus groups may be somehow inferior, remarking that “I think people tell 
you a lot more in interviews than probably they tell you in the focus group setting”. 
Rhodes and Tiernan (2015) disagree with this view, but the current research is of the 
view that data from focus groups can be supplemented by interviews, allowing a 
golden opportunity to corroborate findings across the two methods and audiences. 
The key role-players that were interviewed were chosen based on the applicability of 
their own experience and knowledge of the subject matter and respective governance 
areas. They were selected based on their ability to contribute their understanding and 
application of the four dimensions of good governance and their input on the extent to 
which these dimensions contribute to municipal performance. The interviewees 
include some of key role-players under the different areas, as depicted in Table 6.2, 







Table 6.2: Interview groups for each dimension of good governance 
Dimensions of Good 
Governance 
Interview Groups 
Normative dimension Municipal managers; mayors; oversight institutions (NT, PT, 
COGTA, DLG); and subject experts 
Technical/institutional dimension Municipal managers; CFOs/technical heads; mayors; 
oversight institutions (NT, PT, COGTA, DLG and AGSA) 
Political dimension Chairpersons of the Standing Committee on Local 
Government and Finance; MEC Finance; MEC Local 
Government; mayors; municipal managers; oversight 
institutions (NT, PT, COGTA, DLG and AGSA); SALGA 
Participatory/stakeholder 
dimension 
Municipal managers; mayors; business 
chambers/stakeholders; WC-EDP; community leaders; 
oversight institutions (NT, PT, DCoGTA, DLG and AGSA); 
SALGA 
 
In addition, prior to conducting the interviews the researcher constructed a desktop 
analysis of at least four chosen municipalities in the province of the Western Cape. 
The choice of municipalities includes the following categories: 
• A municipality that demonstrated consistently good organisational 
performance; 
• A municipality that has demonstrated consistently poor or sub-optimal 
organisational performance; 
• A municipality that initially demonstrated poor performance, but has been 
able to progressively turn things around (improved/getting on the right 
path); and 
• A municipality that consistently demonstrated good performance, but has 
recently shown some signs of regress. 
 
The desktop analysis and probing during the interviewee process has, where practical 
and where the information was publicly available, covered the periods between 
2009/10 until 2017/18, primarily focusing on the four key areas (dimensions of good 





performance. The data sources that were used to conduct the desktop analysis include 
publicly available information reflecting performance information, such as the IDPs; 
SDBIPs; assessments from the NT, PT, DCoGTA and DLG; AGSA audit outcomes; 
StatsSA basic services performance information and various reports, assessments by 
agencies such as Ratings Afrika and Municipal-IQ; as well as newspapers articles and 
reports. 
The outcomes of the desktop assessments, interviews and inputs from the reference 
group have been captured and utilised to validate the proposed model. Where 
appropriate, some of the proposed interviewees have been collectively utilised as a 
‘separate reference group’ and source of information to aid the external validation of 
the proposed model. Amendments to the proposed Malila model have been made 
where required, pursuant to the external validation process utilising inputs, comments 
and contributions of the focus group. 
 
6.5.3 Key Findings and Recommendations from the Focus Group and Interviews 
with Local Government Specialists 
The recommendations for improvement to the Malila model and responses from both 
the focus group and interviews with key stakeholders and subject specific specialists 
(i.e. in local government, municipal performance and governance) have been 
considered and utilised to enhance the model and to improve the recommendations 
and conclusions, as set out in Chapter 7 of this dissertation. 
The following key points and recommendations informed the final construction of, and 
improvements to, the municipal governance and performance model (Malila model) in 
local government: 
• The internal and external factors that resulted in the governance failures 
needed to be clarified and expanded upon, as successes and failures can 
be multi-factorial; 
• Political and administrative interface and linkages must be highlighted, 






• Strengthen the connection and respective roles of state-owned 
enterprises, business and private sector, as part of the influencers from 
the ‘external environment’; 
• The risk of a one-size-fits-all approach, given that wall-to-wall 
municipalities, irrespective of capacity, have all been given the same type 
of powers and functions. The model considers a differentiated approach to 
governance and performance sustainability; 
• A municipality is a set of prevalent relationships and in practice local 
government is stuck on structures. Typically, when failures occur the 
following happens, which should be considered or catered for in the 
model: 
o Community blames the political structures  
o Political structure blames the administration 
o Administration blames the political structure; 
• Good governance must not be reduced to compliance or as being 
conducted for the AGSA. It should be targeted towards ‘governance for 
delivery’ and, given the increased demand for compliance, the 
accountability upwards to council and AGSA has reduced accountability at 
lower levels of the institution. A compliance-driven approach erodes the 
developmental role of local government; 
• Participatory governance as a dimension and a ‘new’ focus in the model 
was deemed appropriate and relevant, given the need for improved 
stakeholder participation and co-creation. There is a desperate need to 
build communities’ confidence in the future, and provide them with hope 
and trust in the public sector. Innovative initiatives to engage citizens more 
strategically via social media should be a consideration; 
• Measurement of the social contract between citizens and the municipality 
must come through in the model; 
• Problem-driven iterative approach: the model could use this to 
demonstrate how the ‘top down’ and ‘bottom up’ relationship will be 
managed, as well as how small municipalities failing in this versus 
municipalities waiting on government to do this for them, will be 





• The local government legislation mandate is too broad, there is some 
scope creep across the spheres and the model must consider the various 
local governance systems and stability at political and institutional levels. 
 
6.5.4 Methodology for Choosing Specific Municipalities to be Included in the 
Sample and Utilised in the Case Studies 
For practical reasons, the four sample municipalities conforming to the sampling 
criteria as set out above will be drawn from the 30 municipalities in the province of the 
Western Cape. The Western Cape province (the Province), according to the 2019 
Provincial Economic Review and Outlook (PERO) and the 2019 Municipal Economic 
Review and Outlook (MERO) is the fourth largest of the nine provinces, with an area 
of 129 462 square kilometres (or 49 986 sq. miles28), and the third most populated, 
with an estimated 6.844 million29 inhabitants in 2019 (StatsSA, 2014). There is one 
metro municipality (category A), 24 local municipalities (category B), and five district 
municipalities (category C), spread across the province. The various municipalities in 
the province can be categorised into urban, semi-urban, semi-rural and rural and 
therefore the researcher was comfortable selecting a sample of four municipalities, 
based on set criteria, sampled from the total population of 30 municipalities. This is in 
accordance with the dimensions of the good governance and performance framework 
and model. 
As indicated earlier in this chapter, there are a number of institutions that have 
conducted assessments aimed at categorising municipal performance using a range 
of different criteria to determine if a municipality is performing or not. The aim of this 
dissertation is not to assess the criteria used by these institutions or to express a view 
on their findings. Those assessments are rather used as a basis to identify the four (4) 
municipalities that best suit the categorisation of municipalities as set out in section 
6.5.2 above, from which the sampling was done. 
                                            
28 1 square kilometre = 0.386 square miles (the area value is divided by 2.59. 





Based on an analysis by the researcher, initially several lists such as the financially 
distressed list of the National Treasury, the list of disclaimer and adverse opinions from 
the Auditor-General (AGSA), the list of dysfunctional municipalities according to the 
DCoGTA, the Municipal Infrastructure Support Agent’s (MISA) MIG underperformance 
list, the DCoGTA’s B2B list, simplified revenue intervention list and the list of defaulters 
to bulk creditors, were used to determine and inform the common list that was used 
as a basis of assessment in the latest State of Local Government Report and Financial 
Management (SoLGR&FM) released in May 2018. The joint decision between the 
National Treasury and DCoGTA, as the two key departments responsible for local 
government monitoring and oversight, was that the basis for the common list will be 
dominated by municipalities that have defaulted on service delivery, are financially 
distressed (for example adopted unfunded budgets or deficits) and those experience 
major governance failures. 
The National Treasury, in the 2016/17 SoLGR&FM (2018:8) report uses eight (8) key 
financial indicators30 as a basis to comprehensively discuss the financial health and 
financial performance of all 257 of the country’s municipalities and provides 
information as “an initial indication of which municipalities may be approaching 
‘financial crisis’”. 
The DCoGTA uses twenty-five (25) indicators within five (5)31 main areas to assess 
progress and challenges in municipalities. The latest report on the state of local 
government service delivery performance in South Africa as at June 2016, was issued 
in October 2017. It was compiled by the DCoGTA and the National Treasury, mainly 
from service delivery performance information released by Statistics SA (StatsSA) 
showing local government performance in delivering basic services between 2011 and 
2016 and focusses on issues of service delivery, governance, legislative compliance, 
implementation challenges, as well as support initiatives and their impact. The 2016 
DCoGTA report also provides a ranking by both the DCoGTA (B2B classification in 
February 2015) and the provincial DCoGTA (reclassification in 2016) for the different 
                                            
30 (1) Cash as a percentage of operating expenditure; (2) Persistence of negative cash balances; (3) Overspending 
of original operating budgets; (4) Underspending of original capital budgets; (5) Debtors as a percentage of own 
revenue; (6) Year-on-year growth in debtors; (7) Creditors as a percentage of cash investments; and (8) Reliance 
on national and provincial government transfers”. 
31 (1) Demographic indicators; (2) governance indicators; (3) service delivery indicators; (4) financial management 





municipalities using a scale of (1) municipalities doing well, being the best position; (2) 
potential to do well; (3) not doing well; and (4) dysfunctional. 
In the SA Local Government Briefing of May (2018:7), the Cooperative Governance 
Minister, Zweli Mkhize, indicated that 87, or approximately 31%, of the country's 
municipalities are ‘dysfunctional or distressed’ and that only 7% of the country’s 
municipalities are classified as well-functioning. In the Western Cape municipalities, 
Kannaland is the only municipality assessed by the provincial DCoGTA as not doing 
well. The national DCoGTA classified Kannaland, together with some others in the 
province, as dysfunctional. Oudtshoorn, classified as dysfunctional in 2015, has made 
the substantial progress of two categories to being classified as having the ‘potential 
to do well’. Most municipalities in the Western Cape province have been categorised 
as ‘doing well’. 
The Auditor-General (AGSA) releases the consolidated audit outcomes of 
municipalities in South Africa on an annual basis (AGSA, n.d.). The AGSA, in the local 
government audit outcome reports for 2016/17 released in May 2018, highlights the 
fact that, notwithstanding the many support initiatives, municipal audit outcomes have 
overall shown very little improvement and in some areas even regressed. In its latest 
2018/19 report, released in June 2019, the AGSA emphasises that not much has 
changed and that “accountability for financial and performance management 
continues to deteriorate”. The audit opinion for municipalities from the AGSA can either 
be classified as (1) an unqualified audit with no findings (clean audit), this being the 
best outcome; (2) an unqualified audit with findings; (3) a qualified audit; and (4) a 
disclaimer, being the worse. The table below sets out the meaning of each type of 







Table 6.2: Classification of the different kinds of audit opinions by the AGSA 
Unqualified Opinion: No 
Findings 
The Auditor-General can state, without reservation, that the financial 
statements of the municipality fairly represent the financial position of the 
municipality and are in line with Generally Recognised Accounting 
Practices (GRAP). 
Unqualified Opinion: 
Emphasis of Matter 
Items 
Same as an unqualified opinion with no findings, but the Auditor-General 
wants to bring something particular to the attention of the reader. 
Qualified Opinion 
The Auditor-General expresses reservations about the fair presentation of 
the financial statements. There is some departure from the Generally 
Recognised Accounting Practices (GRAP) but it is not sufficiently serious 
as to warrant an adverse opinion or disclaimer of opinion.  
Adverse Opinion 
This is expressed when the auditor concludes that the annual financial 
statements do not present the municipality’s financial position, results of 
operations and cash flows in line with Generally Recognised Accounting 
Practices (GRAP). 
Disclaimer of Opinion 
The Auditor-General does not have all of the underlying documentation 
needed to determine an opinion. For example, the lack of underlying 
documentation and the amounts in question may be so great so that it is 
impossible to give any opinion. 
An Outstanding Opinion 
The Auditor-General raised queries with the municipality and therefore 
has not submitted another opinion. 
Source: www.municipalmoney.gov.za (2018). 
 
A good audit outcome cannot be equated to, or assumed to demonstrate, performance 
and delivery on constitutionally required service delivery obligations. Nonetheless, it 
provides a good indication of the state of governance and conformance to laws and 
regulations and adherence to the constitutional and good governance principle of the 
rule of law. The provincial municipal audit outcomes between 2009/10 and 2017/18 
(nine-year period) will be used as key inputs in determining the sample municipalities 
in accordance with the four stated principles. An analysis of the outcomes over this 
period demonstrates generally good progress, with most municipalities either 
receiving an ‘unqualified opinion: no findings’ (clean) audit outcome or an ‘unqualified 
opinion: emphasis of matters items’, except for municipalities like Kannaland and 
Oudtshoorn, who have, notwithstanding substantial investment by particularly 





outcomes. Since 2009/10 to date, neither of the two municipalities were able to receive 
a ‘clean audit’ from the AGSA. Aside from Prince Albert municipality, this status is 
shared by all municipalities in the Central-Karoo. 
In the case of Kannaland municipality, over the nine-year period between 2009/10 to 
2017/18 the municipality received five disclaimer or adverse reports, one qualified 
report and three unqualified reports, but with major audit findings of non-compliance. 
In many cases over the year, the financial statements were not submitted to the AGSA 
within the legislative timelines. Kannaland municipality, from an audit outcome 
perspective in comparison with the other 29 municipalities in the province, is regarded 
as the worst performer in the province. Kannaland municipality received four 
disclaimer or adverse opinions in a row between 2009/10 and 2012/13, followed by 
two unqualified reports in 2013/14 and 2015/16, regressing to a disclaimer in 2015/16 
and marginally improving to receive a qualified opinion in 2016/17 and an unqualified 
report in 2017/18, but only after submitting financial statements long after the due date 
and the audit being completed more than eight months after the due date. 
Notwithstanding the unqualified report for 2017/18, many issues of financial 
irregularities and mismanagement and findings of non-compliance with financial and 
legal prescripts and regulations continue to exist in Kannaland municipality. The 
municipality is currently under Section 139 of the Constitution and the MFMA 
intervention, a process that has existed since 2016 with very little progress. Both the 
Provincial Treasury and the Department of Local Government confirm that 
“notwithstanding substantial financial and administrative capacity support in 
Kannaland municipality, progress with the provincial intervention in Kannaland has 
been extremely slow, with most intervention targets either being missed or the rate of 
implementation is below optimal”. Kannaland municipality, in terms of the researcher’s 
decision matrix, is regarded as ‘a municipality that has demonstrated consistently poor 
or sub-optimal organisational performance’ over the period. 
Oudtshoorn municipality performed marginally better than Kannaland municipality 
over the nine-year period (2009/10 to 2017/18), receiving three disclaimer or adverse 
reports, three qualified reports and three unqualified reports, but with major audit 
findings of non-compliance over the period. Oudtshoorn municipality was able to 
obtain an unqualified report for three years in a row for 2011/12, 2012/13 and 2013/14, 





interventions in the municipality, particularly post the 2016 local government elections, 
due to allegations of financial and administrative management. The municipality 
showed some improvement, moving from a disclaimer or adverse opinion in 2014/15 
to three consecutive qualified audit opinions in 2015/16, 2016/17 and 2017/18. The 
municipality received an award from the AGSA in 2018 for making the best progress 
amongst all municipalities in the province over a sustained period of time. 
Oudtshoorn municipality, like Kannaland municipality, was also under Section 139 of 
the Constitution and the MFMA intervention pre the 2016 local government elections. 
Notwithstanding, Oudtshoorn has recently, particular pursuant to the 2016 local 
government elections and with extensive support from provincial government, 
demonstrated the required commitment from the municipal council and management 
to turn things around. Given all the efforts, the provincial executive council (Cabinet) 
also decided to suspend Section 139 of the Constitution intervention in Oudtshoorn 
municipality. Oudtshoorn municipality, in terms of the researcher’s decision matrix, is 
regarded as a municipality that has demonstrated poor performance initially, but has 
been able to progressively turn things around (improved/getting on the right path) over 
the period. 
In assessing the performance of all the category B and C municipalities, it was found 
that Swartland municipality and the West Coast District have been the first category B 
and category C municipalities in the province respectively to have been awarded a 
‘clean audit’ status by the AGSA, i.e. an ‘unqualified opinion: no findings’. Both have 
been able to maintain this status for seven years consecutively until 2016/17. During 
the 2016/17 audit process, Swartland municipality has not received a single 
‘communication of audit finding (COMAF)’ from the AGSA – this makes it the first of 
its kind in the entire South Africa, as far as the researcher could determine. In 2017/18, 
Swartland municipality received an ‘unqualified audit opinion: with findings’ on a matter 
of non-compliance. The municipality has taken the matter on legal review. For the 
2017/18 financial year, the municipality has zero irregular expenditure and an 
immaterial amount of fruitless and wasteful expenditure. Swartland municipality, in 
terms of the researcher’s decision matrix, is regarded as ‘a municipality that has 





The City of Cape Town metropolitan municipality (the City) has had a consistently 
good performance and is the first metropolitan municipality in the country to receive a 
‘clean audit’. It boasts no less than four consecutive clean audits between 2012/13 
and 2015/16, but has shown consecutive regressions in audit outcomes in 2016/17 
and 2017/8. Although the City is regarded and respected as a municipality that has 
generally done well financially and administratively over an extended period of time, 
gleaned from many newspaper reports, legal papers and audit reports from AGSA, it 
appears that it has recently experienced some major political and institutional 
governance challenges, with some of the governance lapses resulting in the City 
losing their ‘clean audit status’ in 2016/17 and 2017/18. There is wide speculation, 
based on recent media reports in the local newspapers, presentations by local 
specialist and the national Treasury, concerning some of the political governance 
lapses and internal party political battles within the ruling party at the City. These 
internal party political differences have also impacted on the effectiveness and 
efficiency of the administration, which possibly contributed to the resignation of the 
previous City Manager in early 2018, amidst reports on News24 (2018) that the he 
was “facing possible suspension in the fallout involving [the] mayor”. At the time of his 
resignation, the City Manager was the longest serving metropolitan municipal manager 
in the country and someone who served local government and the City with distinction 
for close to 40 years, 12 of those as the City Manager of Cape Town. The City of Cape 
Town metropolitan municipality, in terms of the researcher’s decision matrix, is 
regarded as ‘a municipality that has consistently demonstrated good performance, but 
has recently shown some signs of regress’. 
Both the April 2018 (no. 04/2018) and May 2018 (no. 05/2018) SA Local Government 
Briefing publications provide extensive public detail on current issues plaguing the City 
of Cape Town, both politically and administratively. The evidence suggests that it is 
unavoidable for these issues to impact on the administration of the City, given the 
administrative-political interface requirements, particularly at metros. In addition, one 
of the biggest sustainability risks of the City of Cape Town was to carefully manage 
the water crisis in 2017 and 2018 and to limit the potential negative impact of the water 
resource crisis on the city’s residents and businesses. Effective management of the 
water crisis (drought) requires an extensive amount of resilience on the side of the 





between the City (politicians and administrators) and key stakeholders, which in many 
respects was non-existent at the time, given the political and administrative in-fighting 
and public disagreements at the City. 
Some external institutions utilising their own assessment criteria, such as Ratings 
Afrika and Municipal IQ, also release information on the best and worst performing 
municipalities in South Africa on an annual basis. The indicators and criteria used by 
these agencies dovetails and in most cases even overlaps, or they use the same 
criteria utilised by the National Treasury, DCoGTA and AGSA. Municipal IQ, as a 
Municipal Compliance and Governance Index (CGI) weighs up basic municipal 
compliance with legislative processes with governance outcomes. The scores reflect 
whether a municipality has met the basic legislated requirements, such as submitting 
an IDP, the latest AGSA audit opinion, as well as the accuracy and outcomes of 
financial planning, capacity and leadership levels. Using these measures, Swartland 
municipality was the top scorer with 98.1%. 
According to Ratings Afrika (2013), the organisation of Ratings Afrika “is a ratings 
agency that specialises in ratings and similar opinions gauging the soundness of 
governance in” municipalities. According to Compareguru (2018), “[t]he Good 
Governance Africa ranks 213 local municipalities from best to worst” based on how 
they have performed across three main areas: quality of administration, economic 
development, and service delivery, whilst “[t]he Government Performance Index 
assesses whether a municipality has an adequate amount of skilled personnel to 
manage the area, and how well it delivers on services such as sanitation, water, 
electricity, waste removal, policing, housing, healthcare and education”, in addition it 
also “looks at financial management and reporting”. Swartland municipality, was in 3rd 
place for this index in 2018. 
Ratings Afrika uses the Municipal Financial Sustainability Index (MFSI), which “is a 
scoring model that evaluates the operating performance, liabilities management, 
budget practices and liquidity position” of a sample of the 100 largest local 
municipalities and the eight metropolitan municipalities and scores these components 
out of 100. According to the Midvaal Local Municipality (2019), Ratings Afrika defines 
financial sustainability as “[t]he financial ability to deliver services, develop and 





rates and taxes or a reduction in the level of services, and the capacity to absorb 
financial shocks caused by natural, economic and other adversities without external 
financial assistance”, which is more or less aligned to the financial health assessment 
conducted by the National Treasury. 
Compareguru (2018) submits that the latest South African Customer Satisfaction 
Index, which “measures citizen satisfaction and trust in service delivery across eight 
metropolitan municipalities has revealed that South Africans just don’t trust 
metropolitan municipalities anymore, and find most to be dangerously incompetent”. 
Although the City of Cape Town has emerged as the clear best of the eight 
metropolitan municipalities for the sixth consecutive year, at least in terms of overall 
citizen satisfaction, “the results revealed that trust in municipal service delivery is 
currently the lowest that it has been since the inception of the index in 2014. Every 
single metro rating is in decline”. The municipal performance ratings by these 
respective ratings institutions have, with a few exceptions, received wide 
acknowledgement and acceptance by municipalities as a credible and objective rating 
measurement for municipal performance. 
According to the SA Local Government Briefing of April (2018:2), the MFSI report for 
2016/17 reveals shocking results and the magnitude of the financial trouble in which 
most of the municipalities find themselves. The Western Cape’s average MFSI score 
of 62 makes them the highest scoring province and also the one that has improved 
the most over the last five years, from 47 in 2013 to 62 in 2017. It is the only province 
whose governance practices are considered sound. According to Ratings Afrika 
(2018), Mossel Bay municipality and Swartland municipality are jointly the best scoring 
municipalities for 2017, each with a score of 84. Swartland municipality in particular 
has made a great effort to strengthen its sustainability, improving its score from 61 in 
2013 to 84 in 2017, to become one of the leading municipalities in South Africa. On 
the contrary, Kannaland is the municipality with the lowest MFSI score of 25, 
demonstrating major financial and governance concerns. The highest scoring metro 
according to Ratings Africa using the MFSI, is the City of Cape Town, which has shown 
sound improvement over the last five years from 59 to 74 in 2017. 
From a financial perspective, based on the 2016/17 SoLG&FM report published on 22 





the worst performing municipalities, with Swartland and Overstrand receiving an 
assessment of being the best local municipalities in the province. On the persistent 
‘distress list’, which measured the consolidated audit outcomes in 2015/16, as well as 
interventions, vacancies, financial and governance performance, both Kannaland and 
Beaufort West are again featured, with the only difference being that Kannaland 
received a worse audit opinion (disclaimer) for that year in comparison to Beaufort 
West and Oudtshoorn, who both received qualified audit opinions. Comparing the 
audit outcomes over the nine-year period (2009/10 to 2017/18)32, Kannaland 
municipality by far performed worst in this category, followed by Oudtshoorn, who, as 
earlier indicated, was initially disclaimed in 2014/15 and which, under a Section 139 
constitutional provincial intervention for most of 2015/16, managed to turn things 
around and receive qualified audit reports for 2015/16, 2016/17 and 2017/18. 
In summary, given the methodology described, the municipalities that will be included 
in the sample are as follows: 
• Swartland municipality: a municipality that has demonstrated 
consistently good organisational performance; 
• Kannaland municipality: a municipality that has demonstrated 
consistently poor or sub-optimal organisational performance; 
• Oudtshoorn municipality: a municipality that has demonstrated poor 
performance initially, but has been able to progressively turn things around 
(improved/getting on the right path); and 
• City of Cape Town Metropolitan Municipality: a municipality that has 
consistently demonstrated good performance, but has recently shown 




                                            






6.5.5 Key Observations and Findings from the Desktop Analysis, Case Studies 
and the Interview Process of Municipalities Included in the Sample 
According to the Socio-Economic Profile: City of Cape Town (2017:15) (SEP-LG), 
constitutionally required basic service delivery information includes “services such as 
potable water, basic sanitation, safe energy sources and refuse removal services, to 
ensure that households enjoy a decent standard of living”. These will be reflected on 
in this section for each of the municipalities that form part of the sample. This section 
will mainly cover the period between the 2011 Census and 2016 Community Survey 
and other relevant more recent data to demonstrate the incremental progress that 
municipalities have made in realising or working towards the goals and objects of the 
NDP. The information is taken from, amongst others, the respective IDPs, the socio-
economic profiles, the StatsSA service delivery progress report, annually published 
budgets and IDP reviews, and annual AGSA reports. For each municipality in the 
sample population, progress and performance will be assessed against the following 
standards for basic service delivery, as espoused in the 2017 SEP-LG (2017:15-18) 
for each of the Municipalities in the sample and as set out in Annexure 7A: 
• For housing: the number of “households with access to a formal dwelling”; 
• For potable water: “the number of households with access to piped water 
inside the dwelling or yard or within 200 metres from the yard”; 
• For sanitation: the number of “households with access to a flush toilet 
connected to the sewerage system”; 
• For electricity: the number of “households with access to electricity as the 
primary source of lighting”; and 
• For “refuse removal: the number of households who have waste removed 
by local authorities at least weekly”. 
 
Key observations and findings also include information and analysis flowing from the 
interview process with key stakeholders at the respective municipalities. The main aim 
is to establish to what extent governance factors have contributed or not to the 






6.5.5.1 Swartland municipality (‘Swartland’) 
Swartland municipality, based on the criteria applied by the researcher and as outlined 
earlier in the chapter, has been identified as a municipality that has demonstrated 
‘consistently good organisational performance’ over a sustained period of time, in this 
case for a period spanning at least three political terms of office (2009 to 2018). 
Swartland is classified as a category B1 local municipality. Swartland municipality at 
a glance, as reflected in the SEP-LG 2017, is depicted in Annexure 7B of this 
dissertation. 
According to the 2017 SEP-LG (2017:15) for Swartland municipality, the “number of 
formal dwellings in Swartland increased by 10 374 between 2011 and 2016, at an 
average annual rate of 6.8 per cent, which translates into approximately 2 075 
additional formal dwellings per year over this period”. This increase in formal dwellings 
was greater than the additional total households annually, resulting in an increasing 
proportion of households to a formal dwelling from 90.9 per cent in 2011 to 94.6 per 
cent in 2016. The 2017 SEP-LG (2017:17a) for Swartland finds that, although 
Swartland municipality “experienced an annual increase of households with access to 
piped water (to within 200 metres of the yard) of approximately 1 428 households per 
annum between 2011 and 2016, the proportion of households with access declined 
over this period from 99.5 per cent in 2011 to 92.8 per cent in 2016”. The municipality 
was able to provide an additional 1 428 households or 4.5 per cent more with access 
to potable pipe water. However, according to Swartland municipality, all urban 
households have access to piped water. The provision of basic services to farming 
communities remains a major challenge and affects the outcome of these type of 
community surveys conducted by StatsSA. 
According to the Stats SA Community Survey (2018) and the 2017 SEP-LG (2017:17), 
Swartland municipality “experienced significant progress in household access to 
sanitation services with the proportion of households with access to acceptable 
standards increasing from 91.0 per cent in 2011 to 96.2 per cent in 2016” and “was 
able to provide an additional 2 196 households with access annually; access growing 
at an average annual rate of 7.1 per cent”. The annual growth of 1 965 households 
being given access to electricity kept pace with the total household growth of 1 963 on 





access to electricity, increasing from 97.8 per cent in 2011 to 98.4 per cent in 2016. 
The 2017 SEP-LG (2017:18) for Swartland highlights that “[h]ousehold access to 
refuse removal services in Swartland has increased from 76.1 per cent in 2011 to 83.5 
per cent in 2016; household access to this service increasing faster (additional 2 069 
households annually) than the growth in formal households (1 963 annually)”. The 
municipality indicates that all households for which it is responsible for providing this 
service, i.e. all urban households, receive a weekly refuse removal service. 
The 2017-2022 IDP for Swartland provides the strategic direction for all activities of 
the municipality over the period covering current council’s term of office. It takes into 
consideration the integration of social, economic and environmental concerns of the 
municipal area through an evidence-based approach, which includes “an analysis of 
environmental and socio-economic issues, the formulation of strategic development 
objectives, and the development of assessment and prioritisation criteria, the setting 
of indicators, targets and performance assessment”. The vision of Swartland 
municipality encompasses the five most important focus areas of local government as 
set out in the legislation and proposed in the performance and governance model. The 
strategic objectives of the municipality are also aligned to the national and provincial 
priorities, supported by the relevant legislation linked to these objectives, making it 
easier to create the required partnering arrangements with various stakeholders, 
internal and external to the municipality. 
From a financial governance and performance perspective, most of the key financial 
indicators and ratios assessed by the national and provincial treasuries for Swartland 
municipality have shown progressive improvement between 2010 and 2016. In this 
regard, Swartland municipality has a healthy financial state of affairs and has also 
received the highest possible audit outcome for seven years in a row. 
In aiming to define key reasons for the sustained success of Swartland municipality, 
at least over the last decade, interviews were conducted with the mayor, municipal 
manager and the senior management team of Swartland, as well as officials at national 
and provincial treasuries, the DCoGTA and from the provincial Department of Local 
Government. These responses were captured and documented and below are some 
of the key reasons advanced for their success, noting that both the Municipal Manger 






Table 6.3: Swartland Municipality: Interview summary and key points 
Governance 
Dimension 
Some Key Success Factors 
Political 
Dimension 
Political stability, coherence, credibility and respect. 
Same political party for almost two decades, with an overall political majority 
(limited party political risk). 
Strong sense of political transparency, accountability, integrity and will. 
Political/administrative interface is excellent with clear lines of accountability 




Respect for the rule of law. 
Bill of Rights principles enshrined in all policy documents, IDP and budget. 
Policy choices are evidence-based, supported by research, e.g. SEP-LGs, 
MEROs and own internal research. 
Clear separation of powers between the executive, the administration and 
communities. 
Transparency, responsiveness and accountability is embedded in all activities. 
Technical 
Dimension 
Leadership stability and continuity with most senior staff serving for more than a 
decade. 
Visionary, ethical and value-driven leadership philosophy, with high levels of 
integrity, trust and honesty. 
Strong sense of performance management throughout Swartland with the MM 
leading from the front and being a stickler for quality and delivery. 
Strong institutional structures supported by high levels of strategic and technical 
skills, competence and capacity throughout Swartland. 
Main focus is on people, institutions, public services and the economy. 




Strong sense and acknowledgment of the role of civil society (for example, 
communities, NGOs and business) in co-creating and co-implementation. 
Innovative processes around stakeholder participation and partnering. 





High levels of public trust and responsiveness by the politicians and 
administration. 
Strong support for effective IGR and applying the principles of ‘whole-of-








Creative way in dealing with challenges (embrace the opportunity) 
Cultural diversity is embraced 
Connectivity to the world through ICT as an enabler 
Community cohesion 
Capacity – there are technical skills and ability 
Service delivery: radical, urgency, absolute commitment and economic growth. 
Biggest Risks 
for Swartland 
Changes in the political and institutional landscape, creating instability, 
continuity and political and institutional succession. 
Current negative economic environment and fiscal framework, urbanisation and 
population shifts coupled with increased demand for public services (increased 
service level expectations). 
Ageing infrastructure, increased demand for housing, jobs and increased 
service delivery protests. 
Institutional capacity, the increased regulatory cost of good governance, role of 
oversight institutions and support, and failures in effective co-operative 
governance. 
Deterioration of public trust, given inability to be responsive to the rising demand 
of citizens for basic service needs. 
 
In summary, the municipality is of the view that there is a direct link and 
(inter)relationship between good governance and performance, with the municipal 
manager stating: governance and performance is like a ‘chicken and egg’ situation, 
good governance lays the basis for performance, good governance leads to improved 







6.5.5.2 Kannaland municipality (‘Kannaland’) 
Based on the criteria applied by the researcher and as outlined earlier in the chapter, 
Kannaland municipality has been identified as a municipality that has demonstrated 
‘consistently poor or sub-optimal organisational performance’ over a long period of 
time, in this case for a period stretching over at least three political terms of office 
(2009 to 2018). Kannaland is classified as a category B333 local municipality. 
Kannaland municipality, as reflected in the SEP-LG 2017 for Kannaland, is depicted 
in Annexure 7C of this dissertation. 
According to the 2017 SEP-LG (2017:15) for Kannaland municipality, “[a]ccess to 
formal housing and services in Kannaland is measured against a total number of 
households of 6 212 in 2011 and 6 333 in 2016” and, therefore, Kannaland 
“experienced a lower growth rate in the number of households from 2011 to 2016” 
when compared to the Garden Route (previously Eden) district. It has a small 
population, an economy of just over R800 million in 2016 and the per capita income 
of the municipal area was estimated at R32 995 in 2015, which was almost half that 
of the Western Cape province (R63 925). 
The number of formal dwellings in Kannaland, as submitted by the SEP-LG (2017:16), 
increased by 187 units between 2011 and 2016 (from 6 212 in 2011 to 6 333 in 2016, 
i.e. a mere 37 “additional formal dwellings per year over this period”), or at an average 
annual rate of 0.6 per cent, which is far lower than the 2.9 per cent annual average 
increase in the number of households in the Eden region. The 2017 SEP-LG 
(2017:17a) for Kannaland finds that the increase in formal dwellings in Kannaland 
municipality “resulted in the proportion of formal households increasing from 96.3 per 
cent in 2011 to 97.4 per cent in 2016 … [t]he proportion of households with access to 
water declined over this period from 95.8 per cent in 2011 to 93.6 per cent in 2016” 
and, as a result, the “access to piped water was unable to keep pace with the growth 
in the total number of households”. 
                                            
33 National Treasury (2011:193). LGBER. Small towns (B3): “characterised by no large town as a core 
urban settlement, typically have a relatively small population, mostly urban and based in few small 






According to the 2017 SEP-LG (2017:17), Kannaland experienced good “progress in 
household access to sanitation services with the proportion of households with access 
increasing from 74.6 per cent in 2011 to 85.7 per cent in 2016” and, given the focus of 
increasing the access levels to humane sanitation services, “[t]he municipality was 
able to provide an additional 158 households with access annually; access growing at 
an average annual rate of 3.2 per cent”. Similarly, Kannaland municipality experienced 
good progress in providing household access to electricity with the proportion of 
households with access increasing from 89.7 per cent in 2011 to 93 per cent in 2016. 
Kannaland municipality was able to provide an additional 64 households with access 
annually. Kannaland experienced significant progress, although from a low base, in 
household access to refuse removal with the proportion of households with access 
increasing from 66.1 per cent in 2011 to 79.2 per cent in 2016. The municipality was 
able to provide an additional 182 households with access annually. 
Whilst it is acknowledged that some progress has been made by the municipality in 
delivering basic services, they fall significantly short on the average service delivery 
standards and progress made over the same period within the Eden Region in all 
areas of services. From a governance perspective this municipality has experienced 
major governance breakdowns in almost all disciplines or dimensions of good 
governance over the nine-year period between 2009/10 and 2017/18. Major 
shortcomings have been highlighted by provincial oversight institutions, particularly in 
implementing the basics of being a functional municipality, particularly around the 
general level of compliance with the preparation, associated processes and 
submission of the IDP, annual budgets, SDBIPs and annual reports and lack of 
conformance to general financial management matters. 
Although the 2017-2022 IDP for Kannaland is supposed to provide the strategic 
direction for all activities of the municipality over the period covering current council’s 
term of office and should take into consideration the integration of social, economic 
and environmental concerns of the municipal area through an evidence-based 
approach, which includes “an analysis of environmental and socio-economic issues, 
the formulation of strategic development objectives, and the development of 
assessment and prioritisation criteria, the setting of indicators, targets and 
performance assessment”, major shortcomings have been identified in most areas of 





responsive budgets linked to the IDP, budgets and plans. Intergovernmental and 
cross-border partnering arrangements, particularly within the wider Garden Route 
District, are non-existent or sub-optimal at best. 
From a financial governance and performance perspective, most of the key financial 
indicators and ratios assessed by the national and provincial treasuries and other 
institutional performance measures (political and administrative) for Kannaland 
municipality have shown major shortcomings between 2009 and 2018. Kannaland, 
which was initially identified as a Project Consolidate34 municipality in 2009, has been 
the subject of no less than two provincial executive interventions in terms of Section 
139 of the Constitution and the MFMA, for, amongst others, failing to fulfil its executive 
responsibilities, financial failures and irregularities and many other institutional 
breakdowns. This has resulted in a failure to perform its basic constitutionally obligated 
services and functions. Over the period, the relevant provincial portfolio committee 
responsible for local government matters in the Province had to on many occasions 
summons Kannaland municipality (the mayor, council and administration) to account 
to provincial legislature on major financial and institutional governance lapses. 
From a financial perspective, the financial health of Kannaland municipality can be 
regarded as ‘being in crisis’. This has been the situation in Kannaland over most of the 
entire period. Key indicators of this crisis include tabling unfunded budgets, poor cash 
flow management, liquidity ratios well below the norm, overspending of budgets, 
under-collection of revenue, no proper internal controls and procedures relating to 
supply chain management (SCM), financial accountability and reporting is poor, 
financial irregularities being the order of the day, as well as growing concern/financial 
sustainability uncertainties. These lapses have been evident in most of the annual 
audit reports of the AGSA over the 2009/10-2017/18 period with Kannaland only been 
able to obtain three unqualified reports (for 2013/14, 2014/15 and 2017/18) over the 
nine-year period, with many matters of emphasis being raised in all three audit reports. 
                                            
34 A key aim of Project Consolidate was the deployment of Service Delivery Facilitators into the targeted 
municipalities to enhance and reinforce municipal performance and service delivery; promote a new 
culture of performance and accountability in municipalities; creating a disposition of collective 
responsibility and accountability for governance and performance across all spheres of government. 
Lastly to strengthen the capacity of government. Lastly to strengthen the capacity of government by 
gathering empirical information that can be analysed and used to refine existing policies and 





Kannaland received six qualification of audit outcomes during the period ranging 
between either qualified, adverse and, mostly, disclaimed. 
An attempt was made to obtain key reasons for the sustained poor performance of this 
municipality over the last decade. This was done by interviewing oversight institutions 
(the national and provincial treasuries, DCoGTA and provincial Department of Local 
Government), as well as both the implementation managers, the municipal manager, 
the mayor and the speaker of Kannaland municipality (the latter two have only been 
with the municipality post the 2016 elections and govern within a political coalition). 
Some critical factors contributing to the persistent failures include the following. 
 
Table 6.4: Kannaland Municipality: Interview summary and key points 
Governance 
Dimension 




Major political and administrative instability and risk of political take-over. 
Coalition government, with no majority political party rule. 
Fundamentally different political philosophy in the coalition government (limited 
coherence) – convenient government rule with the main aim ‘to keep joint 
opposition party’ out of rule. 
Historically governed by the same political party for a long time with ‘dodgy’ 
tactics. 
Limited sense of political transparency, accountability, integrity and will to govern 
given volatility in coalition. 
Political/administrative interface is far from optimal with blurred lines of 
accountability with some political interference and influence at times. 
Bad governance practices over a long time, which Kannaland is trying to change. 
Low levels of discipline and order amongst councillors. 
Limited local inter-party cooperation and consultation amongst political parties. 
Normative 
Dimension 
Limited to no respect for the rule of law (over a long time). 
High levels of non-compliance with relevant legislation, regulation and laws. 
Bill of Rights principles enshrined in all policy documents, IDP and budget, but 





Policy choices are not evidence-based, and in many cases not based on credible 
research, e.g. SEP-LGs and MEROs. 
No clear and distinct separation of powers between the executive, administration 
and communities – before 2016 – party political cadre deployment is rife. 
Transparency, responsiveness and accountability are not institutionalised and 
embedded in all activities of Kannaland as a way of doing business. 
Financial and institutional sustainability is questionable. 
Technical 
Dimension 
Leadership instability and continuity, with most senior staff serving for a very short 
time (more than ten municipal mangers over the period). 
Skills constraints, limited vision, ethical and values-driven leadership philosophy 
is debateable. 
Specialised skills and technical/administrative proficiency and effectiveness are 
absent or non-existent, with limited rules, processes and systems. 
Low levels of community trust, integrity and honesty. 
No urgency or sense of performance management throughout Kannaland, with 
poor quality and HR behaviour standards. 
General vacuum and shortage in leadership skills, with high vacancies throughout 
the institution. 
Weak institutional structures underpinned by poor levels of strategic and technical 
skills, competence and capacity throughout Kannaland. 
Limited to no focus on people, institutions, public services and the economy. 
Functions in survival mode (day-to-day). 
Weak financial position; grant dependent; high levels of inefficiencies and 
ineffectiveness; high levels of irregular, unauthorised and fruitless expenditure; 
limited revenue base and collections. 
Financial and institutional governance practices are poor, resulting in poor audit 
outcomes over time. 




Limited sense and acknowledgment of the role of civil society (communities, 
NGOs and business) in co-creating and co-implementation. 
Stakeholder participation and partnering is limited with no innovation – basic 
service delivery is a struggle. 
Compliance approach to public participation and stakeholder relations. 
Vision and mission statements are theoretical and not practically demonstrated 
or implemented. 
Very low levels of public trust, accountability and responsiveness by the 





Limited focus on the citizen as a ‘client’ in public service delivery. 
Strong support for effective IGR and applying the principles of ‘whole-of-
government’ and ‘whole-of-society’ approaches. 





Restore political administrative credibility. 
Focus on the citizen as the client and service user. 
Focus on getting the basics in place, e.g. tactical and technical capacity in key 
service delivery areas. 
Establish a leadership philosophy underpinned by strong ethical values, visionary 
and an environment in which staff flourish and deliver outstanding and 
sustainable public service. 
Build community trust and respect by engaging them and making them part of the 
solution. 
Strengthen internal and external communication. 
Restore financial credibility and sustainability. 
Party political coherence and cooperation – for the sake of Kannaland and the 
communities. 
A focus on basic service delivery: radical, urgency, absolute commitment and 
economic growth. 
Biggest Risks for 
Kannaland 
Changes in the current political and institutional landscape, creating instability, 
continuity and political and institutional succession. 
Vulnerable coalition government and a regress in efforts to turn things around. 
Further deterioration of the current negative economic environment and fiscal 
framework threatening financial sustainability. 
Increased demand for public services, particularly from indigents. 
Lack of continued government support and commitment. 
Further deterioration in institutional capacity, the cost of good governance, role of 
oversight institutions and support and failures in co-operative governance. 
Further deterioration of public trust, given the inability to be responsive to citizen 
demands and basic service needs. 
Risk of full Section 139 Constitutional intervention and further regression in 
governance and audit outcomes. 
 
In summary, Kannaland municipality has recently showed some willingness to change, 
and some marginal improvements in overall governance are noticeable, particularly in 





2015/16 and qualified in 2016/17 and further improved to being unqualified in 2016/17. 
It is also during this period of some political stability, although as a coalition 
government post the 2016 local government elections, there have been dedicated 
support interventions and initiatives from provincial government as part of the 
Constitutional intervention and a real effort by the senior management team and staff 
to ‘save Kannaland’. The municipality confirms this and, based on the recent marginal 
improvements in some governance dimensions, they conclude that there appears to 
be a direct link and (inter)relationship between good governance and performance. 
 
6.5.5.3 Oudtshoorn municipality (‘Oudtshoorn’) 
Based on the criteria applied by the researcher and as outlined earlier in the chapter, 
Oudtshoorn municipality is identified as having demonstrated ‘poor performance 
initially, but has recently been able to progressively turn things around 
(improved/getting on the right path)’, in this particular case for a period stretching over 
three political terms of office (2009 to 2018). Oudtshoorn municipality, as reflected in 
the SEP-LG 2017 for Oudtshoorn, is depicted in Annexure 7D of this dissertation and 
is classified as a category B235 local municipality. 
According to the 2017 SEP-LG (2017:15) for Oudtshoorn, the municipality 
“experienced a lower growth rate of 1.3 per cent in the number of households from 
2011 to 2016”, relative to the Eden District, with a total number of 21 910 households 
in 2011 and 23 362 in 2016, “which translates into approximately 383 additional formal 
dwellings per year over this period” and further that “[t]his increase in formal dwellings 
resulted in the proportion of formal households increasing from 88.5 per cent in 2011 
to 91.2 per cent in 2016”. The 2017 SEP-LG (2017:17) highlights that “[t]he proportion 
of households with access to water increased marginally over this period” from 97.1 
per cent in 2011 to 98.5 per cent in 2016, indicating that access to piped water has 
more or less kept “pace with the growth in the total number of households”, with the 
municipality achieving “significant progress in household access to sanitation services 
                                            
35 National Treasury (2011:193). LGBER. Large towns (B2): “All local municipalities with an urban core, there is 
huge variation in population sizes amongst these municipalities and they do have large urban dwelling population” 





with the proportion of households with access to acceptable standards of sanitation 
services” increasing from 82 per cent in 2011 to 90.2 per cent in 2016 and therefore 
“[t]he municipality was able to provide an additional 621 households with access 
annually; access growing at an average annual rate of 3.2 per cent”. 
According to the 2017 SEP-LG (2017:17), Oudtshoorn experienced significant 
progress in household access to electricity, with the proportion of households with 
access increasing from 85.3 per cent in 2011 to 92.0 per cent in 2016 and that “[t]he 
Municipality was able to provide an additional 563 households with access annually”. 
The municipality experienced significant progress in household access to refuse 
removal, with the proportion of households with access increasing from 78.0 per cent 
in 2011 to 87.4 per cent in 2016. The municipality was able to provide an additional 
182 households with access annually, at an average annual rate of 3.6 per cent. It is 
clear that progress has been made by the municipality in delivering the basic services, 
with some service areas either being aligned or even surpassing the average service 
delivery progress made over the same period within the Eden region. 
Pursuant to the 2016 local government elections, where the outcome resulted in a 
different political party and administration taking political and administrative control of 
Oudtshoorn, the municipality, as part of the transition and in order to deal with the 
many governance challenges, developed a new vision statement that provides 
direction for the municipality’s long-term development initiatives and is strategically 
aligned to the 2030 NDP and the 2014-2019 PSP. The 2017-2022 IDP for Oudtshoorn 
reflects a detailed situational analysis of the internal and external environment that 
indicates the municipality’s socio-economic profile, service delivery backlogs and 
development challenges, the landscape characteristics, as well as a financial and 
SWOT (strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats) analysis inclusive of a 
comprehensive spatial analysis that depicts a clear spatial development strategy 
aimed at ensuring inclusive growth. 
One of the major issues that has plagued the municipality since around mid-2014/15 
was decisively dealing with issues around fraud and corruption (perceived or real), 
lack of accountability and responsiveness, unlocking its economic potential as a prime 
tourism destination, the institutional and political leadership challenges at the time and 





sustainability in an organisation that faced major going concern issues. Oudtshoorn, 
also once a Project Consolidate municipality, particularly over the period of 2011 to 
2015, was not able to sustain its constitutionally obligated service delivery mandate 
on many fronts and provide clear, accountable and responsive services with high 
levels of good governance practices to its citizens. During this period, Oudtshoorn was 
placed under political and administrative oversight and administration in terms of 
Section 139 of the Constitution for failure to execute its executive function, which 
includes failure to approve an annual budget within the timelines and a temporary 
budget being crafted by the provincial administration. 
From a financial perspective, notwithstanding its economic potential, the financial 
health of Oudtshoorn municipality was in crisis, and this has been the case for most 
of the entire period (between 2009 and 2016). Since 2016, pursuant to a new 
government being elected, the turnaround required commitment from the new 
administration and management team to compile a sustainable medium- to long-term 
financial turnaround strategy and financial recovery plan addressing some of the key 
financial indicators that required a turnaround. This included the addressing of 
governance failures, such as timeous tabling of funded budgets, poor cash flow 
management, liquidity ratios well below the norm, overspending of budgets, under-
collection of revenue and poor revenue management practices, no proper internal 
controls and procedures relating to supply chain management (SCM), improving poor 
financial accountability and reporting, righting financial irregularities, as well as going 
concern/financial sustainability uncertainties. 
These concerns were evident in most annual audit reports of the AGSA between 
2009/10 and 2015/16, with Oudtshoorn obtaining three unqualified reports (for 
2011/12, 12/13 and 2013/14) and many matters of emphasis reflected in all of these. 
The major lapses in governance started to creep into the system from around 2013, 
resulting in Oudtshoorn consecutively receiving three qualification of audit opinions for 
the period 2014/15, 2015/16 and 2016/17, ranging from an initially adverse opinion in 
2014/15, improving to being qualified in 2015/16, 2016/17 and 2017/18. However, the 
focus was on progressive improvement in overall governance in Oudtshoorn and this 
achievement is reflected in the number of other matters raised by the AGSA in 2016/17 





progressive effort by the political and administrative leadership team was 
demonstrated in creating a culture of good governance and performance. 
Notwithstanding the latest 2017/18 audit outcome, it is clear that there is progressive 
implementation of the financial recovery plan by the administration, particularly from 
the new management, which demonstrates leadership in all areas of the business. As 
previously indicated, this effort by management has been acknowledged by the AGSA 
who awarded Oudtshoorn with the ‘best progress’ award in 2018 during the provincial 
audit awards ceremony for consistent performance and persistence in pushing the 
clean governance agenda. Given its progress, the provincial executive intervention in 
Oudtshoorn in terms of Section 139 of the Constitution has also been terminated, 
given the demonstrable evidence provided of political and administrative commitment 
and accountability to deal with the various challenges faced by the municipality. 
The research endeavoured to obtain the key reasons for the initial governance and 
performance lapses in Oudtshoorn municipality, as well as which factors contributed 
to the recent noticeable progressive improvement and energy to turn things around 
(improved/getting on the right path). Interviews were conducted with provincial 
oversight institutions, namely the national and provincial treasuries, DCoGTA and 
provincial department of local government, provincial standing committee on local 
government, current municipal manager and chief financial officer, mayor and/or 
speaker of Oudtshoorn. In capturing and documenting their responses, below are 
some key reasons advanced by interviewees for the previous lapses in governance 
and performance and, more importantly, the current initiatives and reasons that have 
contributed to this noticeable performance and governance improvements in 
Oudtshoorn. It is mentionable that the current leadership team has only been with the 







Table 6.5: Oudtshoorn Municipality: Interview summary and key points 
Governance 
Dimension 




Some form of political and administrative stability. 
A majority political party rule and government. 
Sense of political transparency, accountability, integrity and political will to clean 
up governance. 
Political/administrative interface is better, but not optimal. 
Clear lines of accountability with some political interference and influence at 
times. 
Levels of discipline and order amongst councillors can be improved. 
Limited local inter-party cooperation and consultation amongst political parties 
can be improved. 
Normative 
Dimension 
Respect for the rule of law (a major shift from the previous administration). 
Improved levels of compliance with relevant legislation, regulations and laws. 
Bill of Rights principles enshrined in all policy documents, IDP and budget, but 
scope for implementation can improve. 
Policy choices are in many cases evidence-based and based on credible 
research (e.g. SEP-LGs, MEROs and/or own research). 
Clear and distinct separation of powers between the executive, administration 
and communities – before 2016 party political cadre deployment was common. 
Transparency, responsiveness and accountability are embedded and 
institutionalised in all activities of Oudtshoorn as a way of doing business. 
Financial and institutional sustainability has progressively improved in 
comparison with the situation under the previous administration. 
Technical 
Dimension 
Strong and experienced leadership, particularly from the municipal manager and 
CFO, who have decades of experience in local government. 
Leadership was stable long term, with limited staff turnover and improved 
continuity. Lately this has been challenged by political/administrative differences, 
which impact on operations. 
Persistence by management in pushing the clean governance agenda. 






Institutional rules, processes and systems have been documented and 
implemented, particularly improving quality standards in human resources and 
finance. 
Levels of community trust, integrity and honesty have substantially improved 
since 2016. 
Strong sense and urgency to institutionalise performance management 
throughout Oudtshoorn. 
The pre-2016 vacuum and shortage in leadership skills have been reduced, as 
well as key vacancies throughout the institution across the service delivery 
platform. 
The pre-2016 weak institutional structures have been attended to, which were 
underpinned by poor levels of strategic and technical skills, competence and 
capacity throughout the municipality. 
There is a strong focus on people, institutions, public services and the economy 
– a progressive shift from the pre-2016 ‘day-to-day survival mode’ to proper 
integrated budget planning and implementation. 
Progressively improved the pre-2016 weak financial position, grant dependent, 
high levels of inefficiencies and ineffectiveness, high levels of irregular, 
unauthorised and fruitless expenditure, limited revenue base and collections. 
Financial and institutional governance practices have been strengthened, 
resulting in the progressive and sustained improvement in audit outcomes and 
service delivery. 
Processes and systems are in the process of being integrated and 




Full acknowledgment of the role of civil society (e.g. communities, NGOs and 
business) in co-creating and co-implementation of public services. 
Improved stakeholder participation and partnering resulting in progressive basic 
service delivery improvement. 
Exploring differentiated approaches to public participation and stakeholder 
relations. 
Strong support for effective IGR and applying the principles of ‘whole-of-
government’ and ‘whole-of-society’ approaches. 
Vision and mission statements are not just theoretical and are practically 
demonstrated or implemented, with the municipal manager leading from the front. 
Improved levels of public trust, accountability and responsiveness by politicians 
and administration. 
Specific focus on the citizen as a ‘client’ and user of public service delivery. 
What will it take 
to sustain the 
progress made 






to improve even 
further 
Reinforce inter- and intra-party political coherence and cooperation – ‘for the sake 
of Oudtshoorn and the communities’. 
Build on successes, trust and protection of the independent lines of accountability 
and strengthen the political interface. 
Improved focus on the citizen as the client and service user. 
Focus on moving beyond just ‘getting the basics in place’ to the next level of 
governance. 
Sustain and improve the tactical and technical capacity in key service delivery 
areas, particularly in HR, infrastructure and finance. 
Strengthen and further support the leadership philosophy, which should be 
underpinned by a sense of strong ethical values, be visionary and an environment 
in which staff flourish and deliver outstanding and sustainable public service. 
Build stakeholder, community and public trust and respect by engaging them and 
making them part of the solution, including improving both internal and external 
communication. 
Sustainably and progressively restore financial credibility and sustainability, 
maintain it and move to the next level of governance for results and not merely 
for compliance. 
Continue the focus on clean governance and the focus on basic service delivery: 
radical, urgency, absolute commitment and economic growth. 
Biggest Risks for 
Oudtshoorn 
Municipality 
Changes in the current political and institutional landscape, creating instability, 
continuity and political and institutional succession with the risk of potential 
regression in governance gains and audit outcomes. 
Further deterioration of the current negative economic environment and fiscal 
framework and the lack or reduction of continued provincial government support 
and commitment threatens financial and institutional sustainability. 
Increased urbanisation and demand for public services, particularly from 
indigents. 
Further deterioration in institutional capacity, the cost of good governance, role of 
oversight institutions and support and failures in co-operative governance. 
Further deterioration of public trust given inability to be responsive to citizen 
demands and basic service needs. 
Risk of a full Section 139 constitutional intervention and loss of governance gains. 
 
In summary, Oudtshoorn municipality can be regarded as a best practice case study 
to demonstrate, in particular, the impact and role played by the collective leadership 
to progressively improve governance. Oudtshoorn municipality has been able to 





particularly reflected in the audit outcome being improved from a disclaimer in 2014/15 
and then sustained by reception of a qualified audit opinion over the last three years, 
with a substantial downward adjustment in the number of issues raised by the AGSA. 
The municipality confirms that, based on the recent consistent year-on-year 
improvement in overall governance, which is underpinned by a medium-term recovery 
plan compiled in 2016, that there indeed appears to be a direct link and 
(inter)relationship between good governance and performance. The researcher, 
quoting the municipal manager, indicates that from his own experience in Oudtshoorn 
and many other municipalities where he served as municipal manager that there is a 
nexus between good governance and performance and that implementing good 
governance practices does not happen automatically, it takes time, it requires 
resilience, urgency and absolute commitment from the politicians, the ‘whole-of-
government’ and the broader communities operating as the whole-of-society. 
 
6.5.5.4 City of Cape Town (‘City’) Metropolitan municipality 
According to the City of Cape Town Integrated Annual Report 2016/17, “Cape Town 
has the second-largest population of all cities” in the Republic of South Africa, “and is 
one of the most visited tourist destinations on the African continent. It is a significant 
economic, political and business hub for South Africa, and a key driver of South African 
and African growth and development”. 
In terms of regional government, the Cape Metro is a vibrant metropolitan area that 
dominates the economy of the Western Cape. In 2016, the Cape Metro area 
contributed 71.8 per cent to the GDPR of the Western Cape and provided employment 
for 1 539 808 people (62.6 per cent of employment in the Western Cape). 
Based on the criteria applied by the researcher and outlined earlier in the chapter, the 
City of Cape Town metropolitan municipality has been identified as a municipality that 
has ‘consistently demonstrated good performance since 2009/10, but has recently 
shown some signs of regress’, for a period stretching over at least three political terms 
of office (2009 to 2018). The City of Cape Town is classified as a Category A 
metropolitan municipality and in 2018 had in excess of just over four million 





households growing in excess of three per cent on an annual basis. The City of Cape 
Town municipality, as reflected in the SEP-LG 2017 for the City, is depicted in 
Annexure 7E of this dissertation. 
According to the 2017 SEP-LG (2017:13a) for the City of Cape Town, the “GDPR per 
capita is highest in the City of Cape Town, more so than in any of the other districts of 
the Western Cape. The City’s per capita contribution to GDPR is also notably higher 
than the Western Cape average” and “[t]hese high levels of GDPR per capita is 
reflective of the City’s strong position in terms of economic output in relation to that of 
the other districts” in the province. The SEP-LG (2017:13b) makes the point that “[t]he 
National Development Plan has set a target of reducing income inequality in South 
Africa from a Gini coefficient of 0.7 in 2010 to 0.6 by 2030” and that the income 
inequality has concernedly “in general been on the increase throughout the various 
districts”, including in the City. The City’s Gini coefficient was 0.61 in 2016, the highest 
of all municipalities in the province. 
According to the SEP-LG (2017:16), the “percentage of households with access to a 
formal dwelling within the City of Cape Town increased from 78.4 per cent in 2011 to 
81.6 per cent in 2016”, marginally lower than the average for the province, “which 
indicates that housing delivery across the metro takes place at a rate” of 4.3 per cent 
per annum which is “a faster rate than the growth in the total number of households”. 
The SEP-LG (2017:17) highlights that “[t]he number of households in the City 
increased by 196 276 between 2011 and 2016, whilst an additional 200 521 
households were provided with access to piped water”, which is an indication “that the 
City’s service delivery efforts are keeping up with the demand for water services”. The 
access to potable water services increased from 99.3 per cent in 2011 to 99.8 per cent 
in 2016, reflecting that almost all citizens in the City have access to clean and safe 
water resources. Given the recent drought in the province, particularly within the 
Metro, the water-services function in the City has become stressed since 2017. 
In terms of extending sanitation services to the broader public, the City has made 
notable progress in the availability of decent sanitation services and provided it to all 
households above the minimum standard, namely “a total of 94.3 per cent of all 
households enjoy access to a flush or chemical toilet connected to a sewerage system, 





delivery rate in 2016 does however remain slightly below that of the Western Cape”. 
In relation to refuse removal services at least once a week within the City, “a net 
increase in access to refuse removal services across this period, household growth 
outpaced the provision of such services” (SEP-LG, 2017:17) and as a result there is a 
notable decrease in the provision of the service between 2011 and 2016. According 
to the SEP-LG (2017:18), the provision of electricity to households in the City improved 
from 94.0 per cent in 2011 to 97.7 per cent in 2016, providing an additional 231 672 
households “with access to electricity as primary lighting source between 2011 and 
2016 which equates to a 4.2 per cent averages annual growth”. 
The Financial and Fiscal Commission (FFC) presented a report to the Mayoral 
Committee on 18 September 2018 showing that, comparatively to other metros in the 
Country, the City consistently provides the best services. Amongst others, according 
to the FFC (2018), “the City of Cape Town is providing flush toilets and weekly refuse 
removal at a higher percentage rate than any other metro. A total of 93.8% of 
households in Cape Town have access to a flush toilet while”, comparatively with other 
metros, “93.2% of households in Nelson Mandela metropolitan; 88.6% of households 
in Johannesburg; and 85.4% of households in Ekurhuleni have access to flush toilets, 
respectively” (FFC, 2018). The FFC notes that improving capital spending would 
improve the responsiveness of the City to socio-economic and service delivery 
imperatives within the City and in order to improve municipal performance 
sustainability and citizen impact. 
Areas of concern in the City include increasing inequality in income distribution; 
significant proportion of low-income earners; decreasing matric pass rate; informal 
dwellers; high number of deaths caused by interpersonal violence and HIV/AIDS, as 
well as through injuries sustained from assault; and crimes including theft, drugs, 
robbery, assault and malicious damage to property. 
The City’s 2017-2022 IDP sets out the objectives of the City, which are closely aligned 
to the NDP goals and the 2014-2019 PSP. As highlighted in the LGMTEC Assessment 
Report 2016/17: City of Cape Town (2016:7), in the IDP, SDF and the budget, the City 
recognises that “sustainability and prosperity will be determined by the City’s ability to 
respond to change – rapid urbanisation, contrasting wealth and poverty, high 





reserves, energy and water supply constraints, and climate change”. Water resilience 
and dealing with the protracted drought disaster are major challenges that the City has 
had to deal with recently. 
According to the LGMTEC Assessment Report 2016/17: City of Cape Town (2016:7), 
there is a need for the spatial “reorganisation of Cape Town to be resilient and 
adaptable, and the City will constantly balance competing agendas for the provision 
of basic needs, social services and utilities against the stimulation of economic 
development and employment, the management of city growth, and the protection of 
environmental resources and systems” and further that any “new growth must be 
directed towards appropriate locations, and the spatial structure of the City must be 
flexible to adapt appropriately to market trends, such as shifts in the demand for 
industrial, commercial and residential property. Conversely, the market must be 
incentivised to respond to the spatial structuring elements and policy directives as set 
out in the IDP” and BEPP. 
The BEPP process that is implemented has been very successful in creating a 
platform for intergovernmental engagement on the plans and projects being 
implemented in the cities’ space by the different spheres of government, including 
state-owned companies. Social facilities such as health and education are critical to 
integrated development at a city level and greater alignment in planning and 
implementation between the City and the relevant provincial departments is 
encouraged. This is supported by a budget that is responsive and has a strong focus 
on economic growth and job creation, enabling infrastructure-led economic growth, 
promoting a sustainable environment, implementation of effective transport systems, 
leveraging assets for economic growth as well as training and skills development. 
However, according to DCoGTA (2019:9), service delivery protests, including those 
turning violent, increased over the two-year period between 2016/17 and 2017/18, 
particularly within the metropolitan municipalities, increasing from 967 in 2016/17 to 
999 in 2017/18. Municipalities with the highest number of protests in 2016/17 and 
2017/18 were the metros, particularly the City of Cape Town (325 in 16/17 and 328 in 
17/18), Ekurhuleni (120 and 315), City of Johannesburg (134 and 211) and Nelson 





More than one third of all the protests in metropolitan municipalities happened in the 
City of Cape Town. The number of violent protest with the City of Cape Town over the 
past two years is concerningly high, calling into question the effectiveness of the 
citizen participatory governance practices that are in place in the City. Although it is 
difficult to establish whether there is a direct link between the rate of public 
participatory processes that involve and provide feedback to communities and the 
prevalence of protests as the highest number of protests occurred in metros, one must 
ask the question of whether or not public participatory governance practices receive 
the required priority attention and, if not, whether this is possibly the reason for some 
violent protest spiralling out of control in the City of Cape Town. These protests very 
often result in the destruction of key service delivery public sector infrastructure, 
having major negative impacts on the delivery of basic services, the achievement of 
economic growth and development objectives of the country, and costing millions in 
public resources to manage these violent protests. 
In relation to service delivery and free basic services, when measuring access to 
water, the DCoGTA (2019:10) reports “[t]he City of Cape Town had the highest 
average of stoppages per month in each year (between 6 400 and 7 500 stoppages), 
followed by the City of Johannesburg (2 500 to 2 700 stoppages) and Ekurhuleni 
(around 1 800 stoppages)”. In relation to access to sanitation and the measurement 
of sanitation spillages, the DCoGTA (2019:11) reports that “[t]here is a significant 
number of average sanitation spillages per month in metros (between an average of 
3 803 in 2016/17 and 4 132 in 2017/18)”. Concerning is that the “City of Cape Town 
had the highest level of sewerage spillages in each of the years (between 10 300 per 
month in 2016/17 to 10 700 in 2017/18), followed by Ekurhuleni, the City of 
Johannesburg, eThekwini, Nelson Mandela Bay and City of Tshwane with averages 
of far more than a 1 000 spillages per month in each of the two years” DCoGTA 
2019:11). 
From a governance perspective, since around 2009 the City of Cape Town has been 
setting the national benchmark for driving and inculcating good governance in its 
internal systems and delivery processes. This has not gone unnoticed, as the City was 
the first metropolitan municipality in the country to receive a clean audit from the AGSA 
in 2011/12. Since 2012/13, for four consecutive years until 2015/16, the City was able 





faced a major challenge in dealing with the protracted drought in the region from a 
service delivery perspective. The drought has really tested the City’s resilience to 
effectively deal with the challenge and to remain on course to deliver on its stated 
objectives and delivering services to its communities. 
During the 2017/18 financial year, the City of Cape Town has undertaken an 
Organisational Development and Transformation Process (ODTP) in order to promote 
service delivery and spatial transformation in the Cape Metro area. As part of the 
ODTP, the City of Cape Town established an area-based service delivery directorate 
that ensures all service delivery departments are operational, functional and 
measurable within the strategic pillars identified by the City of Cape Town. 
Furthermore, as part of the ODTP, the Cape Metro area has been divided into four 
areas that will form the basis of the area-based service delivery model. The model 
aims to ensure service delivery coordination and management, as well as service 
standard monitoring at the level of the four delineated areas. It should be noted that 
whilst implementing the ODTP, the City also experienced the toughest parts of the 
worst drought on record, which impacted severely on municipal operations and service 
delivery, as well as staff morale and ability to implement strategies. 
Given the recent dynamics at the City, based on information obtained through publicly 
available resources and knowledge, both in the administration and on a political front, 
no single individual or group of individuals at the City was prepared to share their views 
on the reasons for recent governance lapses at the City and to what extent these have 
impacted on service delivery to the community of Cape Town. Similar findings have 
been made by Olver (2019) when he tried obtaining permission to do research in the 
City of Cape Town. Olver (2109) highlighted that in applying to do research, he “send 
them a letter, filled out an application form and had to submit a long list of stuff”. He 
compared it to being almost as bad as trying to obtain development rights. 
Notwithstanding completing the entire process, Olver (2019) indicates that “it took 
about a month, the answer came back: No! We decline your research request” 
Therefore, facing similar challenges as Olver (2019), in relation to the City, the 
researcher relied on public information to make certain deductions from a governance 





According to various newspapers articles, it would appear that the City was not 
politically and institutionally geared to deal with this major challenge from a resilience 
perspective. It is the view of the researcher that this inability to deal with the various 
challenges created panic in a system that has been running efficiently for a very long 
time. Politically, everyone wanted to manage or be seen to be managing the drought, 
which in the view of the researcher created major issues around political and 
administrative mandates, the role of the provincial government and the City, the role 
of the political party and the State and the role of national government, being a different 
political party and also responsible in terms of the Constitution, for water provision. 
This crisis created major internal party political fallout internally in the City and between 
the City and the province, with effects spilling over into the administration. The 
accountability lines became blurred and it is reported that politicians, in a panic to 
respond to the drought, apparently got involved in SCM processes and in the process 
flouted set governance policies and institutional arrangements. Some allegations 
suggest that the mayor became too powerful in the activities of the administration. The 
City managers, who served the City with distinction resigned after being implicated in 
apparent maladministration. Politically, the mayor and her mayoral committee were 
openly not on the same page, resulting in the ruling party tabling a vote of no-
confidence in their own mayor. The political instability made it very difficult for proper 
administrative-political interface, which is a key requirement under the political 
dimension of governance.  
Trust in the system and in each other, politically and administratively, started to erode 
with some reports citing that even the executive director team at the City of Cape Town 
were not all pushing in the same direction, given the political spill over into the 
administration. These governance challenges at the City of Cape Town dominated 
local newspapers headlines. Makinana (2018) in his newspaper article confirms that 
“for many years, Cape Town, the DA’s flagship government, has received clean audits, 
but a source told City Press that the downgrade was because the Auditor-General 
found that mayor Patricia de Lille’s leadership had led to governance and leadership 
failures” and because of these failures the City lost its clean audit status with the AGSA 





Gerber (2018) confirms that the failures in political governance negatively impacted 
on the brand and the service delivery ability of the City and underscores the point that 
the “priority is to bring stability and mature leadership in the City of Cape Town and to 
put the needs of the people first”. In order to achieve this, a serious intervention into 
the conduct of the mayor was required to get the City back on track (Gerber, 2018). 
During the last audit of the City, the AGSA found some serious governance lapses, 
particularly as these relate to the City not following SCM prescripts in certain matters 
and not adhering to the rule of law. In this regard, the City’s audit outcome regressed 
from being a clean administration for four consecutive years since 2012/13 to 2015/16, 
to receiving an unqualified report in 2016/17 and 2017/18, where certain matters were 
raised that require the urgent attention of the City. The findings highlighted by AGSA 
mainly relate to internal control deficiencies in respect of compliance to laws and 
regulations, whereby key risks have been noted which, amongst other, include the 
quality of the annual financial statements (material misstatements since the policy and 
accounting principles are not aligned), ICT and SCM – Contract Management (repeat 
findings in respect of contract management). The matter between the mayor and her 
political party is currently playing out in the judiciary, but it is clear that failures in the 
political governance arena at the City have impacted negatively on the administrative 
ability of the City to perform. 
Olver (2019), in his presentation on ‘Are governance and growth a contradiction?’, 
made an analysis of the governance challenges at the City of Cape Town and how 
these have contributed to the current state of governance at the City. In his 
presentation, he highlighted (citing Consulta, 2019; Statistics South Africa, 2018; and 
Good Governance Africa, 2019), that the City of Cape Town, almost by every index, 
measured the top in the country out of all the other seven metros and, from an external 
perspective, is regarded as “a well-functioning, happy, moving forward municipality”. 
However, he makes the point that on closer scrutiny, there appear to be may 
governance challenges, highlighting the following: 
• Governance and rules for compliance and to satisfy the AGSA in chasing 
clean audits, at times at the expense of service delivery. This was evident 
in the proliferation of internal audit, legal services and forensics, citing the 





Cape Town, staff were of the view that “compliance has become the be all 
and end all; you are so busy complying you forget to do any work, you 
don’t have time to do any work because you are complying yourself into a 
coma”;  
• Structural concerns and knowledge sharing and that, according to staff, 
cited by Olver (2019), “compliance and service delivery ended up at war 
with each other with there always be some rules and some piece of paper 
which someone will pull out as a reason why we can’t do anything and that 
resulted in us never going to get anywhere in the city”; 
• Restructuring at the City has just crippled the institution from effectively 
delivering on their service delivery obligations. Some officials, according to 
Olver (2019), indicated that this is the “sixth restructuring since the Metro 
was formed in 2000 and that they have been in permanent restructuring 
mode that is massively disruptive with others seeing the restructuring as a 
blatantly political exercise whereby the mayor was using the organisational 
development and transformation process to centralise power and create 
and executive structure within the administration for political reasons”; 
• Political and administrative interface not healthy nor constructive and this 
point is confirmed in the book co-authored between the mayor and a 
senior official, namely “View from City Hall: Reflections on Governing 
Cape Town” (de Lille & Kesson, 2017) in which, according to Olver (2019), 
he cites the authors describing the political interface as “in simple terms, 
the politician usually faces the senior civil servant as relatively lonely 
figure, whilst the civil servant is something like a general commanding an 
army”. This confirms the oppositional way of viewing the civil servant in 
that the politicians in the City feels threatened by the bureaucracy, when, 
according to Olver (2019), de Lille and Kesson (2017) wrote “the civil 
servant cannot initiate action without the politicians’ direction and sanction 
that is consistent with the mandate”.  
• Major delivery challenges in housing delivery, public transport, 
infrastructure delivery, basic services provision and efficiency in the 
administration / institution and a surge in irregular expenditure and 






Olver (2019) sums up the state of governance in the City of Cape Town in six points, 
namely: 
• Significant municipal decisions centralised in a cabal; 
• Appointments made according to political loyalist, not on merit; 
• Technical expertise not valued or retained and technical advice ignored or 
blocked; 
• Politicization of bureaucracy with ‘favourites’ who do ‘your’ bidding; 
• Intimidation of staff who don’t support politicians’ views; and 
• Key allocation processes controlled by factional interest. 
 
It was clear that the political infighting and the administrative instability in the City of 
Cape Town has impacted on the performance of the City in many areas. The City of 
Cape Town (2019) 2018/19 Mid-year performance assessment by the National 
Treasury highlighted the following concerns: 
• Persistent underspending on Infrastructure directly impacting on service 
delivery; 
• Under-achievement on ‘good governance’ key performance area with the 
City citing the failure on Good governance is a result of the target was set 
as high as a ‘Clean Audit Status’; 
• The City received an unqualified audit with findings for the past 2 financial 
years. For the 2015/16 financial year the City received an unqualified audit 
with no findings (“clean audit”); This is the City’s 15th consecutive 
unqualified audit opinion;  
• The material findings for the 2017/18 financial year on compliance were: 
o Expenditure Management - The findings were as a result of non-
compliance with Section 116(3) of the MFMA. 
o Procurement and Contract Management – A tender was drafted in a 
biased manner and a similar finding was reported in the prior year 
which is in contravention of the Municipal Supply Chain 





o Annual Financial Statements, Performance and Annual Reports – 
The financial statements submitted were not prepared in all material 
respect in accordance with the requirements of section 122(1) of 
the MFMA. 
o Increasing water loses (unaccounted revenue water losses) from 
18.83 to 24.42 percent between 2016 and 2018 respectively 
o Electricity losses in excess of 10% per annum over the past two 
years 
o Main reason for the under achievement relates to a lack of good 
governance according to the audit opinion of the AGSA  
o The City’s governance and financial management, however, 
remains sound and strong; and remedial measures have been 
taken in line with this administration’s emphasis of being an 
accountable and transparent government. 
o Underperformance on the SDBIP in the areas of Basic Service 
Delivery, Municipal Institutional Development and Transformation, 
Local Economic Development, Financial Viability with many 
reasons being cited by the City (City of Cape Town (2019: Slide 44) 
for this underperformance. 
It would be interesting to know some of the insider views on this matter and what they 
consider it would take to turn things around at the City, once seen and widely 
acknowledged as the model metro municipality in the country. 
 
6.6 CONCLUSION AND SUMMARY 
Municipal performance requires the application of good governance, which requires 
strong leadership, both political and administratively. It requires strengthening the 
institutional capacity of the organisation, through proper and clean political governance 
practices premised on respect for the separation of powers between the legislature, 
executive and judiciary, structured accountability arrangements and proper oversight. 
Institutionally, it requires initiatives to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the 
state in the implementation of policy and establishing the rule of law. Creating the 





requirements of a functional state, institutionalise practices that encourage open entry 
and competition from the private sector and effective mechanisms to deal with civil 
society, voice and participation, and creating appropriate partnering arrangements, all 
remain a foundation and non-negotiable to ensure organisational performance that is 
underpinned by good governance practices. 
This proposed municipal governance and performance model sets out the broad 
framework as a minimum requirement. If applied properly by politicians, administrators 
and those charged with oversight responsibilities, it will lay a good basis for ensuring 
local government performance and service delivery, in accordance with Section 152 
of the Constitution and underpinned by the application of good governance practices 
by all role-players, as set out in Chapter 2 and this chapter. 
The Malila model introduces renewed focus on participatory governance as a new, yet 
important dimension for municipal performance. Citing Governance International 
(2019c), “increasingly we are seeing greater involvement of citizens in service 
delivery”, but it is key to understand the role that citizens must and are prepared to 
“play in the design and delivery of those public services which matter most to them”. 
A new concept has emerged, namely co-production and community governance. 
Governance International (2019d) submits that it is about creating partnerships to 
institutionalise “co-commissioning, co-designing, co-delivering and co-assessing 
public services and outcomes with service users and local communities with the aim 
of improving high priority public outcomes through new forms of user and community 
co-production”. This must be institutionalised to ensure effective and responsive 
municipal service delivery. 
In validating the model, the chapter also provided some relevant case studies of 
municipalities, ranging from those that have consistently performed well to those that 
have consistently performed poorly. The desktop and case study analyses clearly 
demonstrate both the positive and negative relationship between applying and not 
applying the principles of good governance in running the business of a municipality 
and the associated implications on municipal performance. In conducting the case 
studies and focus group discussion, there is a clear sentiment on the nexus between 






CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSION, SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
7.1 INTRODUCTION 
The aim of this chapter is to provide the conclusions and recommendations flowing 
from the research. It provides linkages between the preceding chapters and aims to 
answer the initial research questions and sub-questions, as well as highlight 
opportunities for further research possibilities that will enhance the findings of this 
research. The chapter reflects on, and responds to, the ancillary research question on 
the nexus between good governance and organisational performance, particularly in 
the public sector. The proposals and recommendations are clustered in accordance 
with the proposed municipal governance and performance model presented in 
Chapter 6, focusing on the dimensions and elements of good governance and how the 
application of good governance principles enable municipal performance. 
Given the many performance challenges faced by municipalities, the goal of this 
dissertation is to understand underlying reasons for these challenges municipalities in 
delivering services to communities and, through delivery, give effect to the 
constitutional and policy requirements of developmental local government. In this 
regard, it was found that some of the main underlying reasons for levels of sub-optimal 
performance by municipalities over the last 20 years or so can largely be attributed to 
a lack of proper governance arrangements. In line with this, the researcher has 
developed two main research questions and one ancillary research question that form 
the basis of the dissertation, as set out in Chapter 1. 
In response to the two main research questions and sub-questions, this dissertation 
presents a conceptual municipal governance and performance model for 
municipalities in South Africa that will assist in identifying fundamental building blocks 
and a minimum set of good governance requirements that will lay the basis for 
sustainable municipal performance. 
This chapter also provides a response to the ancillary research question, followed by 
a presentation on the linkages of the good governance and performance model, 
connecting it to the various chapters in this dissertation. This is followed by a set of 
good governance recommendations aimed at improving municipal performance. The 





enabler for municipal performance, are also provided. The chapter concludes with the 
identification of some opportunities for further research aimed at enriching the findings 
and application of this dissertation. 
The outline of the entire dissertation is as follows: 
• The Introduction (Chapter 1) lays the basis and provides underlying 
reasons for engaging in this research, whilst the ‘Conclusion, Summary 
and Recommendations’ (Chapter 7) provides a connection between the 
various chapters, the key recommendations and findings, as well as offers 
a response to the initial research questions. 
• Chapters 2 and 3 provide the theoretical framework and literature review 
of the two main concepts, namely governance and performance. Chapter 
2 provides an in-depth analysis on ‘governance’ as a concept: how it has 
developed over time, its application in theory and practice, the respective 
dimensions of good governance and the various forms of governance and 
models, with a specific focus and application in the public sector. Good 
governance, as a form of governance, its characteristics and underlying 
elements, with application in the public sector, forms the basis of Chapter 
2. 
• Chapter 3 provides an in-depth analysis of the concept of ‘performance’, 
with a focus on the public sector. Chapter 3 includes a detailed analysis of 
the various organisational performance models and theories and provides 
an analysis of various factors that have an impact on organisational 
performance. Given that the focus of this study is on the public sector, 
which is not driven by profits per se, but by creating public value and 
customer satisfaction, the research recognises the various role-players, 
both internal and external to the municipal environment. Chapter 3 also 
touches on the characteristics of high performance organisations and 
concludes by highlighting some critical success factors for municipal and 
organisational performance. 
• With chapters 2 and 3 forming the theoretical base of this dissertation, 
chapters 4 and 5 set out the legislative, regulatory and policy frameworks 





government, including the roles and responsibilities of oversight 
institutions. Chapter 4 provides a history of the development of local 
government pre- and post-2000, the intergovernmental system of local 
government in South Africa (namely fiscal, institutional and political), an 
analysis of the many legislative and policy documents applicable to the 
local government environment, the key legislative statutes of the 
Constitution, the 1998 White Paper on Local Government, the Structures 
Act, the Systems Act, the MFMA and the various regulations and policy 
papers. Chapter 5 captures the legislative, regulatory and policy 
framework to improve financial governance and council oversight for 
enhanced local government organisational performance in South Africa. 
• Chapter 6 introduces the proposed municipal good governance and 
performance model, constructed taking into account key research findings 
as reflected in the theoretical chapters 2, 3, 4 and 5. The proposed model 
aims to assist various role-players in local government to understand the 
main concepts of governance and performance and particularly the 
dependencies and linkages between the two concepts. The proposed 
municipal governance and performance model also outlines the various 
key elements that must be considered in measuring municipal 
performance from a governance and legislative perspective. Chapter 6 
also provides an extensive analysis of the various institutions that have 
oversight responsibilities, inclusive of their respective measurement 
instruments and analysis of municipal performance. In addition, the model 
validation process, internal and externally, and an analysis of the findings 
from the case studies and focus group discussions are also provided in 
Chapter 5. 
 
7.2 KEY FINDINGS AND RESPONSE TO RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
7.2.1 Key Findings 
Chapter 1 sets out two main research questions, and one ancillary research question 
aimed at complementing the two main research questions. Chapter 1 also outlines 





chapters in this dissertation with the objectives of each chapter forming the basis for 
sub-dividing each chapter. 
 
Research Question 1: What are the inherent requirements for municipal 
performance in South Africa? 
The sub-questions, are as follows: 
• What is the all-embracing definition of performance? 
• What are the main strands, elements and constituent parts of 
organisational performance in the municipalities? 
• What are the main legislative and policy arrangements governing local 
government performance? 
 
Research question 1 and the sub-questions are responded to in chapters 3 and 5 of 
this dissertation. 
 
Research Question 2: What role does good governance play in municipal 
performance? 
The sub-questions, are as follows: 
• What is the all-embracing definition of governance? 
• What are the main strands, elements and constituent parts of good 
governance in the public sector? 
• What are the main legislative and policy arrangements governing local 
government governance? 








Ancillary Research Question 
The researcher also developed a third research or ancillary research question that is 
linked to the two main research questions, namely: what is the nexus between good 
governance and municipal performance. Developing a response to the ancillary 
research question presupposes a proper understanding of the two main concepts 
addressed in this dissertation, namely governance and performance, as outlined in 
chapters 2 and 3. It also presumes a thorough understanding of the legislative and 
policy environment and context relating to these two concepts, which is addressed in 
chapters 4 and 5. 
The response to the ancillary research question is provided in Chapter 7 and premised 
on the constituent parts of the proposed municipal governance and performance 
model presented in Chapter 6. The answer to the ancillary research question takes 
into account the research findings in chapters 2 to 5 and the good governance and 
performance model (Malila model) as presented in Chapter 6, all of which are 
underpinned by literature and policy documents, as well as key findings from the 
internal validation, focus group discussions, case study analysis and interviews with 
key stakeholders and specialists in the local government environment, as set out in 
Chapter 6 of this dissertation. 
 
7.2.2 Research Question 1 and Sub-Questions 
The answers to research question 1 and its sub-questions can be primarily found in 
chapters 3, 5 and 6 of this dissertation. Section 3.2 provides a range of definitions of 
performance, and distinguishes between individual and organisational performance in 
sections 3.2.3 and 3.2.4 respectively. The concept of organizational performance is 
very common in the academic literature, yet trying to construct a definition of the 
concept is very difficult because of its many meanings. For this reason, there is not a 
universally accepted definition of this concept. The researcher has relied on the work 
of Gavrea, et al. (2011:287); Georgopoulos and Tannenbaum (1957:535); Yuchtman 






Within the public sector, organisational performance is primarily expressed in terms of 
economy, effectiveness, efficiency and appropriateness (impact), measured in 
accordance with the triple bottom line, namely economic, social/ethical and 
environmental. Despite countless academic literature and documentation, universal 
agreement on the construct of organisational performance remains elusive. A 
multidimensional lens is therefore required to grasp the concept, particularly within the 
public sector. To define organisational performance in the public sector, the researcher 
primarily relied on the work of Pauw, et al. (2009:202); Lips (1998:329); Hazlett and 
Hill (2003:446); Cordella and Bonina, (2012:512, cited by Ndlovu, 2015:2); Combs, 
Crook and Shook (2005:261); Hamann, et al. (2013:7); Murphy, et al. (1996); Richard, 
et al. (2009); Fryxell and Barton (1990, cited by Hamann, et al., 2013); Fontannaz and 
Oosthuizen (2007:11); Kotter and Heskett (1992, cited by Kirby, 2005:30 - 39); Kolk, 
van der Veen, Pinkse and Fortanier (2005, cited by Fontannaz & Oosthuizen, 2007:11) 
and Kirby (2005:30-39) to shape and formulate an appropriate definition of 
organisational performance in the public sector. Based on the above resources, the 
researcher defines it as “meeting stated goals and objectives (effectiveness) within the 
constraints of limited resources (efficiency), shifting from an input- and resource-
focused administration to output- and result-based public service with the emphasis 
on outcomes or impact of the service delivery and being more responsive to citizen 
needs”. 
In Chapter 3 of this dissertation, organisational performance was explored at both a 
conceptual and operational level, covering various organisational performance 
theoretical frameworks and models, starting with a basic ‘input-output model’ and 
extending to very sophisticated ‘input-activities-outputs-outcomes’ organisational 
performance models. No less than 12 organisational performance models and 
theoretical frameworks were analysed, each providing a different approach to the 
concept, yet as a collective these provided the researcher with some key points and 
indicators that inform the local government governance and performance model as 
depicted in Chapter 6. 
The main strands, elements and constituent parts of organisational performance in 
municipalities are captured in Section 3.3 and gathered from the various theoretical 
models and frameworks governing the concept of organisational performance and 





oversight institutions expressing views on municipal performance and their respective 
roles are covered in sections 3.5.1.1 to 3.5.1.3. 
Performance failures in local government and the respective reasons for these failures 
are covered in Section 3.5.2 and could be attributed to, amongst others, a 
misalignment between individual employee goals and that of the organisation; no 
clearly defined managerial roles, which could lead to a lack of clear organisational 
outcomes; lack of service excellence or delivery culture; non-credible performance 
reward systems; and opposing interests of various stakeholders or customers. In 
relation to municipalities’ staff capacity and municipal performance failures, 
contributing factors are the inability to impose corrective action, as may be required 
when failures occur; political leadership and will; ill-directed funding; and lack of 
communication with and engagement of communities. 
The elements and constituent parts of performance are considered when highlighting 
the characteristics of high-performance organisations, as covered in Section 3.6 of the 
dissertation. The characteristics of a high performance organisation include having a 
clear vision, as well as good leadership that is willing to focus efforts on service, 
develop requisite human resource capacity and competence, deal with incompetence, 
reorganise and ensure appropriate organisational structures, improve listening skills, 
build trust and develop a two-way open communication system between key 
stakeholders and the municipality. 
The main legislative and policy arrangements governing municipal performance are 
covered extensively in Chapter 4, particularly sections 4.2, 4.3 and 4.4, which provide 
the history of local government in South Africa, particularly the concept of 
developmental local government, which is aimed at radically transforming the way 
local government delivers services. Section 4.3 of this dissertation provides an 
analysis of the intergovernmental relations system of local government in South Africa, 
particularly focusing on the constitutional requirements and the powers and functions 
of local government as a basis or key determinant for municipal performance. Sections 
4.4.2 to 4.4.10 of this dissertation provide the legal, regulatory and policy framework 






7.2.3 Research Question 2 and Sub-Questions 
The answers to research question 2 and the sub-questions can be primarily found in 
chapters 2 and 5 of this dissertation. Section 2.2.2 provides a range of definitions for 
the concept of ‘governance’, which is widely used in both the public and private sector. 
There are many authors and much literature that defines the concept, with some 
authors even suggesting that, given its wide usage, the term can be imprecise, 
although it has strong intuitive appeal, particularly in the public sector as it relates to 
achieving policy and organisational objectives. 
In defining the concept of governance and good governance, as set out in Section 2.2, 
the researcher relied mainly on the work of Lee (2003:2); Heinrich and Lynn, Jr. 
(2000:2); CIPFA (2014:V); the Business Dictionary (2018); and Ramachandran and 
Ang (2003:5). As governance relates to the public sector environment, the researcher 
relied on the work of the World Bank (1992); the United Nations and OECD, Osborne 
and Gaebler (1992); Landell-Mills and Serageldin (1992); Paderanga (1996) and Root 
(1995). Rhodes, (2006) provides details on various uses of governance, which 
includes “the minimal state; corporate governance; the new public management” 
(NPM); good governance; international interdependence; “socio-cybernetic systems; 
and self-organizing networks”, this is discussed in detail in Section 2.2.2 of this 
dissertation. 
The main strands, elements and constituent parts of good governance in the public 
sector are extensively covered in sections 2.4 and 2.5 of this dissertation. The 
dimensions of good governance are covered in sections 2.4.1 to 2.4.4 and include the 
technical, institutional and political governance dimensions and, whilst acknowledging 
the contribution of the World Bank (1998), introduces the elements of “open entry and 
competition in the private sector and dealing with civil society, voice and participation” 
as part of good governance dimensions. The constituent parts and characteristics of 
good governance, according to S4C Corporate Governance (2001:27), are covered in 
Section 2.5.3 of this dissertation and, particularly in the public sector: 
• “Good governance means focusing on the organisation’s purpose”, vision 





• “Good governance means performing effectively in clearly defined” and 
separate functions and roles, particularly between the administration and 
the executive; 
• “Good governance means promoting values for the whole organisation 
and demonstrating the values of good governance through behaviour”; 
• “Good governance means taking informed, transparent decisions and 
managing risk”; 
• “Good governance means developing the capacity and capability of the 
governing body” (council) to be effective, supported by visionary political 
and administrative leadership;  
• Good governance means building public trust, “engaging stakeholders and 
making accountability real”; and 
• Good governance means mainstreaming and institutionalising 
transparency, accountability, the “rule of law, participation, 
responsiveness, consensus oriented, equity, efficiency” and effectiveness. 
 
The main legislative and policy arrangements that guide the governance of local 
government are covered extensively in Chapter 4, particularly sections 4.2 and 4.3, 
which provide the history of local government in South Africa along with key definitions 
and concepts, an analysis of the intergovernmental relations “system of local 
government in South Africa” and various statutes, such as the Constitution, 1998 
White Paper on Local Government, Structures Act, Systems Act and MFMA. These 
provide the primary legal and regulatory basis for good governance within the 
municipal environment. 
 
7.2.4 Ancillary Research Question: Governance for Performance Nexus 
The ancillary question is aimed at clarifying whether or not there is a causal 
relationship or link between good governance and municipal performance. Kaufman, 
et al. (1999), in a “World Bank working paper concluded that there is new empirical 
evidence that governance matters, in the sense that there is a strong causal 





per capita incomes, lower infant mortality and higher literacy”. This view is supported 
by Kyereboah-Coleman (2017:1), citing Dharwardkar, et al. (2000) who “indicated that 
effective governance is critical to all economic transactions, especially in emerging 
and transition economies”. 
According to the IFAC (2001:1), “comments such as these, serve to highlight the 
importance of good governance. In virtually all jurisdictions, the public sector plays a 
major role in society, and effective governance in the public sector can encourage the 
efficient use of resources, strengthen accountability for the stewardship of those 
resources, improve management and service delivery, and thereby contribute to 
improving peoples’ lives. Effective governance is also essential for building confidence 
in public sector entities — which is in itself necessary if public sector entities are to be 
effective in meeting their objectives”. 
According to Kyereboah-Coleman (2007:6), “it is widely acclaimed that good corporate 
governance enhances a firm’s performance”, citing the work of “Brickley, et al., 1994; 
Brickley and James, 1987; Byrd and Hickman, 1992; Chung, et al, 2003; Hossain, et 
al, 2000; Lee, et al., 1992; Rosenstein and Wyatt, 1990; Weisbach, 1988”. There is a 
generally accepted notion that effective governance enhances performance; however, 
“other studies have reported [a] negative relationship between corporate governance 
and performance” (Bathala & Rao, 1995; Hutchinson, 2002) “or have not found any 
relationship” between good governance and organisational performance (Park & Shin, 
2003; Prevost, et al., 2002; Singh & Davidson, 2003; Young, 2003). There are several 
clarifications that have been provided to explain these inconsistencies in findings. 
According to the IFAC (2013:6), “effective governance in the public sector encourages 
better decision making and the efficient use of resources and strengthens 
accountability for the stewardship of those resources. Effective governance is 
characterized by robust scrutiny, which provides important pressures for improving 
public sector performance and tackling corruption. Effective governance can improve 
management, leading to more effective implementation of the chosen interventions, 
better service delivery, and, ultimately, better outcomes”. People’s lives are thereby 






However, there are mixed views on the subject of whether or not there is empirical 
evidence that the application of good governance principles will result in improved 
organisational performance. Heracleous (2001:165) summarises that his research 
outcomes on the relationship between good governance ‘best practices’ and 
organisational performance, find the relationship to be insignificant and provides four 
possible reasons for this: firstly, the possibility that these good governance “best 
practices in governance are indeed irrelevant to organisational performance, 
secondly, that the operationalisation of theoretical concepts has low face validity”; 
thirdly, that studies that have been conducted are generally too narrow, and may 
ignore “other systemic factors; and lastly, the possibility that different types of 
organisations require different practices in corporate governance”. 
Heracleous (2001) argues that the various ‘codes of good governance practice’ have 
been drawn up for companies with ineffective governance systems, and by implication 
will imply “that good governance means higher returns for shareholders and vice 
versa”. He makes the point “that research findings have generally failed to support the 
purported linkage between” the institution or application of such good governance 
practices and organisational performance and “that good governance, however, is no 
guarantee of superior performance and may even be irrelevant” (Heracleous, 
2001:166). He adds, however, that ‘bad governance’ practices may be “more strongly 
related to underperformance; in other words, good governance may be a qualifier 
rather than a differentiator” (Heracleous, 2001). 
Gillies and Morra (1997:77) opt to not question the underlying “principle that good 
governance leads to better organisational performance” purely on the basis of a lack 
of theoretical and empirical evidence They argue that “common sense tells us that 
there is a relationship between corporate governance and firm (organisational) 
performance” and “the fact that various empirical macro-studies in corporate 
governance have been unable to identify it does not mean that that this relationship 
does not exist” (Gillies & Morra, 1997). Rambajan (2011:iii), in her “study on the 
relationship between corporate governance and company performance”, concludes 
that, notwithstanding the absence of appropriate measurement instruments to 
measure the relationship between governance and performance, statistically, the 
overall results of her study indicate that the vast majority of the “variables relating to 





However, Heracleous (2008), in his article ‘What is the Impact of Corporate 
Governance on Organisational Performance?’, makes the point that “research on the 
importance of generally accepted ‘best practices’ in corporate governance has 
generally failed to find convincing connections between these practices and 
organisational performance” or found the “relationship to be insignificant”. In his 
research, he suggests four possible reasons for this unsubstantiated “relationship, that 
are not mutually exclusive: firstly, the possibility that ‘best practices’ in governance are 
indeed irrelevant to organisational performance; secondly, that the operationalisation 
of theoretical concepts has low face validity; thirdly, that studies are too narrow”, and 
at times ignore “other systemic factors; and … the possibility that different types of 
organisations require different practices in corporate governance” (Heracleous, 2008). 
In a study by Muhamad (2009) on ‘The Relationship Between Good Government 
Governance and Organization Performance: The Case of MARA Credit Control 
Department’, he applied descriptive, correlation, and regression analyses to test the 
relationship between “good public sector governance practices (as independent 
variables)”, such as “leadership, stakeholder relationship, risk management, 
accountability, planning and performance monitoring, information and decision 
support and review and evaluation” and public sector performance (as dependent 
variable), “represented by the efficiency and effectiveness, productivity and cost and 
customer satisfaction”. The results of the study support all hypotheses theorised for 
the study and the results of the “correlation analyses revealed that, good public sector 
governance and its dimensions are associated positively with the performance” of the 
department (Muhamad, 2009). Further, the results from the “regression analyses also 
revealed that good public sector governance, as a whole, has a significant effect on 
public sector performance” (Muhamad, 2009). 
Lynn Jr., et al. (2000:257) attempted a similar exercise using qualitative data to test 
the “relationship between governance and performance in the public sector”. They 
acknowledge the important role of qualitative data in governance research, but 
conclude that the challenge “is to explain government results, outcomes, impacts or 
performance in ways that (1) recognise the configurational, political and the 
administration; and (2) allow for the separate identification of governance 
arrangements and public management on outcomes of interest while controlling for 





context of the wider government system and the potential influences of other levels or 
components. In this work, they developed a ‘logic of governance’ model (Lynn, Jr., 
2000:244) to demonstrate the variables that impact on performance, but more 
importantly how variables and sub-components relate and inter-relate with each other, 
each scenario having the statistical potential of a different outcome. 
The analysis and research in this dissertation revealed some discrepancies between 
good governance variables proven to contribute to municipal performance, and the 
dissertation explicitly also provides evidence for the correlation between several 
governance variables and municipal performance. These are provided in chapters 2, 
3 and 6 and include variables such as political and administrative independence 
(separation of powers), oversight, accountability, transparency and openness, quality 
of leadership (political and administrative) and integrity, technical capacity and 
capabilities of the administration, role of civil society, stakeholders, public trust, and 
citizenry voice and involvement (co-create, co-produce and partnering). 
However, there is no conclusive evidence on the positive relationship between 
governance and organisational performance, except to make the point that ‘bad 
governance’ will over time progressively lead to poor organisational performance and 
poor public value creation. The underlying principle that good governance, as 
generally perceived, leads to better organisational performance is not questioned. 
It is the view of the researcher that good governance is a necessary means and can 
be highly influential on municipal performance. However, good governance on its own 
is an insufficient condition for municipal performance, given the various other factors 
influencing this performance. 
However, the researcher argues that without adhering to good governance principles, 
one cannot expect to have good municipal performance – a conclusion drawn from 
this study and underpinned or anchored in the four main dimensions of the municipal 
good governance and performance model (Malila model) depicted in Chapter 6. Such 
a finding is also aligned in the application of the model in the focus group discussions 
and gleaned from responses and findings from the cases studies at the four selected 





The findings from the four case studies confirm that in the context of South Africa 
where many municipal governance failures are directly attributable to lack of 
accountability, transparency and responsiveness and thus also to the rule of law, 
adherence to and application of good governance principles remains key, as 
discussed in Chapter 3 and depicted in the municipal good governance and 
performance model (Malila model) in Chapter 6. 
 
7.2.5 The Municipal Good Governance and Performance Model 
The proposed municipal governance and performance model, as set out in Chapter 6, 
aims to capture the link between good governance and municipal performance. The 
municipal governance and performance model (Malila model) is made up of the 
following key components. 
 
Table 7.1: Linking the chapters, the components and the key performance areas 
Component Key Performance Areas/Variables 







Section 152(1) of the Constitution: 
“Democratic and accountable government” 
“Provision of services in sustainable manner” 
“Social and economic development” 
“Safe and healthy environment” 
“Community involvement and participation” 
Chapters 4 and 6 
4.3.1 – 4.3.3 
4.4 
6.4.1.1 






Section 152(2) of the Constitution:  
Achieve outputs through activities of: 
The administration 
The community 
The political structure (council) 
Chapters 4 and 6 
4.2.2.4 and 4.3.2 
4.2.2.3 - 4.2.2.4 







Component Key Performance Areas/Variables 








Influenced by the: 
Internal Environment (culture, leadership, systems, 
work processes, structures, transparency, political 
interface, partnering) 
External Environment (political, performance of the 
economy, funding constraints, community behaviour, 
legal practice) 
Oversight Institutions (AGSA, NT, DCoGTA, council, 
parliament, executive councils) 
Chapters 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 
2.3.2.2 - 2.3.2.8 
3.2.4 
3.3.1 - 3.3.12 
4.3.1 - 4.3.2 
4.4 
4.4.2 - 4.4.7 
6.4.3.1 
6.4.3.2; 6.4.3 
 Normative Dimension: 
Rule of Law 
Human rights and constitutionalism 
Co-operative governance 
Separation of powers 
Transparency, accountability and responsiveness 
Efficiency, effectiveness and economy 
Chapters 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 
2.3.2.3; 2.4.4 
2.5.1 - 2.5.3 
3.3.1 - 3.3.12 
4.3.1 - 4.3.2 
4.4.1 - 4.4.7 
6.4.1.2.1 
6.4.3.1.3 
 Technical Dimension: 
Visionary managerial leadership/roles and action 
(practices, characteristics, integrity, attitudes and 
behaviour) 
Technical and administrative proficiency 
Organisational structures 
Financial rules and human resource systems, 
processes, culture, values and technology 
Integrated planning and execution 
Political interface and objectivity 
External reporting, accountability, transparency, 
openness, honesty, efficiency, effectiveness, 
economy and impact 
Chapters 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 
2.3.2.3 - 2.4.3 
2.5.1 - 2.5.3 
3.2.5 
3.3.1 - 3.3.12 
3.6 
4.3.1 - 4.3.3 







Component Key Performance Areas/Variables 
Link to dissertation 
(Section) 
 Political Dimension: 
Visionary political leadership/political roles and action 
(practices, characteristics, attitudes and behaviours) 
Political will, accountability, transparency, integrity, 
coherence and credibility 
Cooperative governance, political structures, capacity 
and code of conduct 
Administrative interface and separation of powers 
Chapters 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 
2.3.2.3 
2.4.1 
2.5.1 - 2.5.3 
3.3.1 - 3.3.12 
4.3.1 - 4.3.3 




 Participatory/Civil Society Dimension: 
Participation and voice of stakeholders 
Collaboration, co-creation, co-production, 
partnerships and partnering 
Whole of society approach 
Role of NGOs, civil society and private sector 
Public trust, responsiveness, accountability 
Chapter 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 
2.3.2.3 
2.5.1 - 2.5.3 
3.3.1 - 3.3.12 
4.3.1 - 4.3.3 




What is evident from the above is that there are many governance variables impacting 
on municipal performance, which include the association between these dependent 
and independent variables, resulting in a very complex causal structure or relationship 
that makes it extremely difficult to scientifically prove the causal relationship between 
good governance and performance. This gap allows for further research opportunities 
to study and possibly scientifically model the relationship between or within each of 
these main elements and variables and municipal performance. What the proposed 
governance and performance model presents is a complex causal structure that 
acknowledges relationships within and between respective key performance areas, 





the following equation: P=f (i, e), or Municipal Performance or Outcomes (P) = f (i, e) 
where (i) = internal and (e) = external environmental factors impacting on performance. 
The external environment factors mainly include the issues highlighted under political 
dimensions and the participatory, community, stakeholders and civil society dimension 
of good governance and other matters external to and not under the direct control of 
the municipality, such as the performance of the economy or policy decisions taken at 
another sphere of government. The internal environmental factors mainly consist of 
issues highlighted under the technical dimensions, which in turn include the respective 
managerial roles, leadership, structures, processes and adherence to the normative 
dimension of good governance. 
 
7.3 RECOMMENDATIONS 
The recommendations flowing from this research are divided into three categories. 
Firstly, a set of general recommendations that will assist municipalities to improve 
municipal performance, focusing on institutionalising the application of good 
governance principles; secondly, the universal use and application of the municipal 
good governance and performance model; and, thirdly, identifying opportunities for 
future research flowing from this dissertation and in so doing enriching the subject 
area of governance and performance. 
 
7.3.1 General Recommendations 
The dissertation serves as input for ongoing dialogue on enhancing good governance 
in the public sector as a basis for public sector performance, particularly within local 
government. Therefore, the set of general recommendations is not aimed at providing 
an exhaustive list, but rather at providing good governance pointers to improve 
municipal performance. The set of recommendations is assembled from the findings 
in chapters 2 to 5, with the key recommendations as follows. 
• From a normative governance dimension perspective: 
o Policy decisions and implementation of such polices must be 





the principles set out in the Constitution (1996), namely “adherence 
to the rule of law”, “Bill of Rights”, co-operative government, policy 
choices premised on evidence-based practices and adherence to 
the general normative governance principles, such as transparency, 
accountability and responsiveness. 
o Deliver services in accordance with the mandate of the municipality, 
ideally only those that the municipality is mandated to perform in 
terms of the Constitution or other legislation. 
o Changing the face of the rural and urban landscape to proper 
application of spatial development mandates, thereby ensuring 
complementarity between urban and rural development with a 
deliberate emphasis and focus on local economic development. 
o Promote developmental local government by ensuring sustainable 
development, whilst simultaneously accelerating initiatives to 
promote poverty eradication, employment and equality. 
 
• From a technical/institutional governance dimension perspective: 
o Administrative leadership that is visionary is honest, has integrity, is 
driven by a common set of values and sets a good example for the 
way that leadership should behave (standards of behaviour). 
o Institutional structures, systems and documented processes, 
particularly in finance, human resource management and technical 
services, provide the backbone for municipal performance from an 
institutional perspective. 
o Capacitated staff that are administratively and technically 
competent and proficient to do what is required, especially the 
municipal manager, chief financial officer and heads of technical 
and community services. 
o Delivery or execution of municipal services, applying the rule of law, 
in the most effective, efficient and economical way that provides 
value for money (public value) in service delivery. 
o Ensure compliance with rules and regulations (conformance), 





mismanagement, good intergovernmental relations and good 
community and stakeholder interface. 
o Institute a culture of performance management and accountability.  
o Solve the silo-approach to service delivery, particularly at a 
horizontal and vertical level, and work towards the attainment of a 
joint-up and whole-of-government approach. 
 
• From a participatory, community and stakeholder governance dimension 
perspective: 
o Narrow the distance between people and government by 
strengthening the coordination role and capacities at various levels 
of government and at ward level as the wards are closest to the 
people. Strengthen the role of ward committees as a community-
based legal and formal structure through which people can make 
their voices heard and hold council accountable. In addition, there is 
a need for broader, participatory and developmental models of 
public participation to deepen democracy through the establishment 
of alternative (other than ward committees), non-partisan and 
inclusive public participation and participatory governance 
processes. 
o Encourage initiatives that will enhance community, NGO, private 
sector and stakeholder involvement and participation, the co-
production and co-creation of public service delivery solutions, 
accountable and responsive government, institutionalise a ‘whole-
of-society’ approach, respect for the voice of the people and 
improving public trust. It calls for a shift away from traditional 
approaches to public participation and participatory democracy to a 
new approach of citizen-centric governance by recognising the 
changing role of the citizen and consumers as a client, and by 
making them part of design and delivery of services. This approach 
also strengthens accountability. Discover and explore, in alignment 
with recommendations from the OECD (2018), “how innovation and 





creation and co-production “in the framework of open government 
initiatives; how access to information laws can be effectively 
implemented in the region and how to improve institutional 
communication”. This is a key recommendation moving forward. 
o The constitutional provision for community and public participation 
requires more than mere compliance, as this constitutional objective 
does not have rule compliance in mind, but rather looks at quality of 
governance and the role that the community can play in it. Public 
participation must have an effect. Part of this is to create effective 
channels of communication, but at the next level it also includes, 
where applicable, co-production of services. This goal is also linked 
to the concept of citizen-centric governance and responsive 
governance, which are related issues that reflect on quality and 
impact. 
o Collaborate, build partnerships and relationships by shifting away 
from a ‘top-down authorising environment’ which is characterised by 
political mandates, electoral and budgetary cycles, planning, 
resource allocation, legislation and regulation, law enforcement and 
institutional arrangements to a ‘bottom-up mobilising environment’ 
that is characterised by entrepreneurs, worker-based movements, 
activists, NGOs, social movements, philanthropy, front-line 
government staff, active citizens and applied researchers. 
o Foster good relations with communities and stakeholders, be 
responsive to their needs (not only before or during elections), and 
do not make unrealistic or empty promises that create expectations 
within communities. 
o There is increasing involvement of citizens in service delivery, but it 
is key to the role that the citizens play and be prepared to play in 
the design and delivery of those public services that matter most to 
them. A new concept, introduced by Governance International 
(2019) and discussed in Chapter 6 has emerged, namely co-
production and community governance. This is about creating 
partnerships to institutionalise “co-commissioning, co-designing, co-





service users and local communities with the aim of improving high 
priority public outcomes through new forms of user and community 
co-production” (Governance International, 2019). This must be 
institutionalised to ensure effective and responsive municipal 
service delivery. 
o Acknowledge and give effect to the rights of citizens, but enforce 
citizen obligations, such as debt collection and, at minimum, ensure 
that citizens pay for the services consumed and honour their 
citizenry obligations. 
 
• From a political governance dimension perspective: 
o Political leadership, that is capacitated, visionary, competent, 
dedicated, is honest, has integrity, is driven by a common set of 
values and sets a good example in the way that it behaves (code of 
conduct and standards of behaviour). 
o Improved cooperative government and partnering arrangements 
across party political lines, in the interest of the citizen. 
o Encourage sound and clean political and administrative interfaces 
and institutionalise clear accountability lines, particularly as these 
relate to appointing staff. 
o Political accountability, transparency and responsiveness, including 
action by political parties against their own councillors when, for 
example, they do not adhere to the code of conduct for councillors. 
o Inculcate a zero tolerance stance against practices of corruption, 
fraud and maladministration in council and the administration. 
o Rethink the system of government, particularly the role of district 
municipalities as the penultimate sphere closest to the people after 
wards and local municipalities. The current system, with 257 
municipalities, is massive and unmanageable and a focus on the 
metros (eight municipalities) and districts (42 municipalities) as 
potential service delivery agents would improve the ability of 






• For oversight institutions, policy-makers and citizens 
o Municipal councils must ensure that the required internal oversight 
systems are, at minimum, in place and functional, and that council 
fully understands their role and the accountability cycle of local 
government. 
o Recommendations from the AGSA reports, given the recent 
amendments to the Public Audit Act, must be implemented and 
seen to be implemented. There must be appropriate consequence 
management, as set out in the MFMA, particularly if matters relate 
to fraud, corruption and constant mismanagement of public funds. 
The approach to regulatory audits by AGSA and municipalities must 
shift from mainly testing compliance to rules and regulations, to 
auditing and reporting on the performance of public sector 
institutions, which will improve administrative and political 
accountability and oversight. 
o The National Treasury and DCoGTA, supported by their provincial 
counterparts, should have an integrated response plan to monitor, 
support and intervene in municipalities. The oversight roles and 
functions between the two departments must be clarified and 
strengthened in an integrated manner. SALGA should also play a 
much more active role in supporting municipalities and councillors. 
o Resource alignment, as well as and following a much more 
focussed approach to oversight and accountability, will positively 
contribute to increasing the impact on local government. 
o Citizens as electorates, according to Mnguni (2016) and outlined in 
Chapter 3, “must more actively ensure that they elect capable 
individuals of moral standing to local government positions. The 
main aim, at all times, must be to ensure that the existing laws 
relating to local governance are understood by all stakeholders and 






7.3.2 Value of the Study: Use and Application of the Municipal Governance and 
Performance Model 
As indicated earlier in this dissertation, the municipal governance and performance 
model will have universal use and application for all three spheres of government: 
national, provincial and local. Municipalities can use the model as a normative basis 
during their strategic planning and execution phase. As oversight institutions, national 
and provincial governments can use and apply the model in conducting their oversight 
functions of local government. Other oversight institutions, such as the national 
parliament, provincial legislatures, national cabinet, provincial executive councils and 
the AGSA may also utilise this model in executing their oversight obligations. 
The model also finds application and use by communities, stakeholders and citizens, 
and is ultimately aimed at improving accountability, joint planning, co-creation of 
solutions and activities involving the ‘whole-of-society’. The model provides a solid 
base and aims to improve the system of local government, particularly overall 
municipal performance through instilling and institutionalising practices of good 
governance. The four dimensions of good governance (normative, technical, political 
and participatory governance), together with sub-elements, as depicted in Chapter 6 
of this dissertation, are fundamental to the municipal governance and performance 
model (Malila model). Good governance provides a solid foundation and departure 
point for municipalities to perform and institutionalise good governance practices. 
 
7.3.3 Future Research Work 
There are some areas that require further research which, given the focus of this 
dissertation on the subject of governance and municipal performance, were not fully 
explored in the scope of this dissertation. These include areas that require further 
theoretical and scientific research, as well as those that require more practical 
research. 
What is evident from the above is that there are many variables impacting on municipal 
performance, including the relationship between dependent and independent 





relationship, making it extremely difficult to scientifically prove the causal relationship 
or nexus between governance and performance. 
This lacuna stimulates and allows for further future research opportunities to identify 
the conditions on which the application of good governance principles/practices and 
municipal performance may be dependent. Therefore, this research study can be 
extended in the following forms: 
• A quantitative study that aims to scientifically model the relationship or 
association between good governance variables as set out in each of the 
main elements of the model, and their individual and collective impact on 
municipal performance. This may require the complex causal structure, as 
set out in the proposed model, to be broken down or delineated into 
smaller pieces to understand interdependencies that exist amongst the 
main components and within each of the main components. Based on 
existing literature, the researcher believes that a hypo-dissertation could 
be developed to determine and model the relationship with and between 
the various dependent and independent variables. 
• The municipal governance and performance model can also be extended 
by adding more variables with a special interest in possibly constructing an 
index for good governance in municipalities and then applying it in various 
municipalities, indicating the degree of conformity with the good 
governance principles as set out in this dissertation. This will require the 
development of multiple, systematic and multi-directional methodologies 
and good governance variables to measure the impact on municipal 
performance. In addition, this can include the employment of 
methodological triangulation through the use of fieldwork primary data as a 
rich resource for improving the understanding of good governance 
variables and their impact on municipal performance. 
• The study could be extended by combining the cross-sectoral municipal 
performance and good governance indicator data with time series data 
having a longer time horizon, as an example, a period covering more than 
two or three political terms of office, as this may be more appropriate to 





Alternatively, to increase the population size in terms of the number and 
type of municipalities and also their geographic location in South Africa. 
This will allow for a deeper understanding of issues of ‘territory’ through 
extended analysis over a longer time series and improved dialogue 
between the various stakeholders through the production of robust 
descriptions and consequently sound prescription and application.  It may 
also include extending the target population to include the use of less 
senior staff in the field study, interviews and analysis.  The potential is that 
this approach may produce some more diverse data. 
 
7.3.4 Concluding Remarks 
In conclusion, this research highlights the role that local government can play in search 
of progressively attaining developmental objectives set out in the South African 
Constitution. It also highlights their potential role in building positively engaged 
communities that are socially and economically inclusive and connected, where 
municipalities, together with the other two spheres of government, collectively work 
with communities to co-create and co-develop bespoke solutions that support 
municipal performance and joint delivery of the objectives of local government. 
Notwithstanding the many challenges facing local government that continue to 
undermine its capability to discharge its constitutional mandate, the recommendations 
in this dissertation call for a fundamental shift in the discourse of local government, 
particularly for increased teamwork, discipline, partnership, care, fairness, integrity, 
honesty, commitment, work ethic, pursuit of personal and technical excellence in the 
quest for perfection and respect for self and others, all aimed at fundamentally 
transforming the lives of community members and ensuring more effective service 
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Annexure 3A: Summary of Audit Findings per Municipality in the Western 




Audits Comment 2017-2018 2016-2017 2015-2016 2014-2015 2013-2014 2012-2013 2011-2012 2010-2011 2009-2010
West Coast District 8 Eight clean audit - 8 in a row Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Swartland 7 Seventh clean audit - 7 in a row Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
George 6 Sixth clean audit - 6 in a row Oualified Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Langeberg 6 Sixth clean audit - 6 in a row Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mossel Bay 6 Sixth clean audit - 6 in a row Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Theewaterskloof 5 Fifth clean audit - 5 in a row Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Breede Valley 6 Six clean audit - 6 in a row Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cape Town International Convention center6 Six clean audit - 6 in a row Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Witzenberg 6 Six clean audit - 6 in a row Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Overstrand 6 Six clean audit - 6 in a row Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cape Winelands District 6 Six clean audit - 6 in a row Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cape Agulhas 5 Five clean audit - 5 in a row Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Drakenstein 4 Fourth clean audit - 4 in a row Yes Yes Yes Yes
Matzikama 4 Four clean audit - 4 in a row Yes Yes Yes Yes
Overberg District 4 Four clean audit - 4 in a row Yes Yes Yes Yes
Saldanha Bay 3 Third clean audit - 3 in a row Yes Yes Yes
Stellenbosch 3 Third clean audit - 3 in a row Yes Yes Yes
Swellendam 4 Four clean audit - 3 in a row Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bergrivier 3 Third clean audit - 3 in a row Yes Yes Yes
Cederberg 2 Second clean audit Yes Yes
Prince Albert 1 First clean audit in CKD area Yes
City of Cape Town 5 Mixed Results (Regressed) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Central Karoo District 0
Laingsburg 0 Oualified Qualified Qualified Qualified
Hessequa 5 Fifth clean audit - 5 in a row Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Kannaland 0 Qualified Disclaimed Adverse Adverse Disclaimed Adverse
Central Karoo Economic 
Development Agency 0 Qualified NEW NEW NEW
Knysna 4 Yes Yes Yes Yes
Beaufort West 0 Oualified Disclaimed
Oudtshoorn Oualified Qualified Qualified Adverse Qualified Qualified
Eden District 3 Yes Yes Yes
Bitou 3 Yes Yes Yes
Legend
Yes Clean audit status
Unqualfied with findings
Qualified or Adverse or 
Disclaimed Audit qualified with findings or Adverse or Disclaimer of Opinion
Municipal Audit Outcomes 2009/10 - 2017/18
 
Source: Researcher’s own analysis and compilation from the respective AGSA Reports 





Annexure 1B: Local Government: Western Cape Audit Outcomes Over the Past 
Ten Years (2008/09 – 2017/18) for all Municipalities 
Source: Adapted from a presentation by AGSA on the Western Cape Local Government 


















Annexure 3: Division of Powers and Functions Local Category B and District 












Annexure 4: Individual and Community Fundamental Rights Reflected in the 





Annexure 5: List of Main Statutes Impacting on the Functioning of Local 



































































Annexure 7: Municipal Service Delivery Data and Profiles of Individual 
Municipalities Sampled in the Research 
Annexure 7A: Municipal Service Delivery Data and Profiles 
Kannaland Municipality
Population size
2001 23975 2001 96.9 2001 92.0 2001 64.0 2001 93.3 2001 58.0
2011 24767 2011 96.3 2011 94.0 2011 78.0 2011 98.1 2011 66.0




2001 72118 2001 93.4 2001 93.0 2001 85.7 2001 96.8 2001 70.0
2011 113762 2011 90.9 2011 99.0 2011 93.0 2011 99.5 2011 76.0
2018 141411 2016 94.6 2016 92.8 2016 98.4 2016 96.2 2016 83.5
2020e 152 846
Oudtshoorn Municipality
2001 84 691 2001 87.0 2001 93.0 2001 82.0 2001 87.6 2001 81.0
2011 95 933 2011 88.5 2011 95.0 2011 82.0 2011 96.9 2011 78.0
2018 98 026 2016 91.2 2016 98.5 2016 92.0 2016 90.2 2016 87.4
2020e 102 639
City of Cape Town 
2001 2 893 247 2001 83.0 2001 98.7 2001 87.3 2001 88.8 2001 93.0
2011 3 740 026 2011 78.4 2011 99.3 2011 91.4 2011 94.0 2011 94.3
2018 4 236 290 2016 81.6 2016 99.8 2016 94.3 2016 97.7 2016 87.8
2020e 4 400 004
Population size
housing water sanitation electricity
HOUSING AND BASIC SERVICES (%)
Housing Water Sanitation Electricity Refuse
Population size
HOUSING AND BASIC SERVICES (%)
HOUSING AND BASIC SERVICES (%)
HOUSING AND BASIC SERVICES (%)
Housing Water Sanitation Electricity Refuse
refuse
housing water sanitation electricity refuse
 
Source: Researcher’s own compilation; adapted from the Municipal Socio-economic Profile 





Annexure 7B: Swartland Municipal Service Delivery Data and Profile 





Annexure 7C: Kannaland Municipal Service Delivery Data and Profiles 





Annexure 7D: Oudtshoorn Municipal Service Delivery Data and Profiles 






Annexure 7E: City of Cape Town Service Delivery Data and Profiles  






Annexure 8: Focus Group Participants – Local Government Knowledge and 
Experience 
Dr. JC Stegmann Economist specialising in policy and planning and medical doctor. 
More than 40 years’ public sector experience, in policy and senior management. 
More than 25 years’ local government experience. 
More than 20 years as Head of Department Finance (Treasury). 
Instrumental in a crafting local government legislation such as the MFMA, 
Systems Act, Structure Act and White Paper on Local Government. 
Regarded as a specialist in the public sector, particularly in local government 
matters. 
Provincial and Local Government Pubic Entity Board experience. 
Prof. Andrew 
Boraine  
Current CEO of the Western Cape Economic Development Partnership. 
Economic expert in urban and economic development and partnering for 
systems change. 
Experience working in local government and development sector for more than 
40 years, most in senior management levels. 
First post-apartheid City Manager for City of Cape Town during transition. 
Instrumental in crafting the 1998 White Paper on Local Government. 
Founder of the SA Cities Network. 
Mr. Graham 
Paulse 
Acknowledged in the country and respected as a local government policy 
expert. 
Senior Treasury Official responsible for local government finance since 2000-
2015. 
Head of Department Local Government since 2015 to date, responsible for 30 
municipalities. 
Leading initiatives in the local government environment in the Western Cape 
and RSA. 
Masters degree in Public Administration with more than 30 years’ experience in 
local government matters, most of them at a senior management level. 
Key driver of integrated planning, budgeting and execution across the 
government spheres. 
Head of Disaster Management (linkage to municipalities) 







PhD in Economics and Policy Planning. 
Academic and public sector expert for about ten years in provincial and local 
government. 
Senior official at Provincial Treasury having oversight responsibilities for local 
government finance and fiscal policy matters relating to local government for 30 
municipalities. 
Has been employed in an economic policy environment at a metropolitan 
municipality and in provincial government. 
Published academically on local government policy and community matters. 
Dr. Hildergarde 
Fast 
PhD in Philosophy and Policy. 
Experienced leader in development and policy and implementation. 
Previous Head of Department for Local Government and Housing for more than 
ten years responsible for supporting 30 municipalities. 
Previously Head of Local Government Research at the Financial and Fiscal 
Commission, focusing on local government policy matters (six years). 
High level applied researcher with extensive experience inside and outside of 
government in the RSA. 
Acknowledged and respected as a seasoned local government policy expert. 
Mr Elton 
Johannes 
Senior official in the Provincial Treasury responsible for municipal oversight for 
more than 15 years. 
Diploma in Municipal Finance Management 
Experienced, particularly in implementing local government reforms at the major 
municipalities in the Western Cape province. 
Coordinates all local government activities. 
Recognised in the Province and at national level as a local government expert 
in policy and the practical implantation of reforms. 








Appendix 9: Focus Group: Interview Guide and Structure 
Introduction 
Dear members of the Focus Group 
Thank you for responding to my request and agreeing to part of this focus group 
discussion. 
The research project will focus on developing an integrated conceptual diagnostic 
governance framework to address performance sustainability challenges of 
Municipalities in South Africa. Given your specialised knowledge in the field of local 
government public policy, complemented by your experience and knowledge on the 
subject matter of local government governance and performance, you have been 
identified as a participant in this focus group. 
The research has focussed on the topical issue of municipal performance and the role 
of good governance as an enabler for municipal performance. Municipal performance 
in the context of the research refers to the ability of a municipality to give effect to the 
objects of local government as set out in Section 152 of the Constitution, within the 
administrative and financial means of the municipality whilst applying good 
governance practices in delivering on its key obligations in an effective, efficient, 
economically and impactful manner.  
In pursuit of the stated goals and focus, the aim will be to develop of a conceptual 
municipal good governance and performance model that would address the key local 
government governance challenges and its associated impact on local government 
performance. The conceptual municipal good governance and performance model or 
framework would identify the critical inherent requirements for municipal governance 
and performance sustainability in South Africa. It is envisaged that this municipal good 
governance and performance model would guide municipalities on the key 
requirements and conditions or minimum standards that should be in place as a good 
basis to ensure and improve municipal performance sustainability in South Africa. In 
this regard, key research questions have been developed which I will aim to answer 





Content Contribution from members of the focus group 
You will not be required to evaluate the thesis document. During the focus group 
sessions, discussions and interviews, I will present you with the background to the 
study, the problem statement and research questions and a high level overview of the 
research content which enabled me to develop the municipal and governance and 
performance model. Given your own experience in this field, what will be required from 
you as a member of the focus group will be following: 
• provide useful comments, insights and information that would enable me to 
compliment and answer some of the research questions relevant to the study, 
and 
• comment, engage and deliberate, by providing recommendations, on the 
content and the proposed theoretical governance and performance model 
aimed at addressing performance challenges of Municipalities in SA. 
 
Risks, confidentiality and ethical considerations 
I want to assure you that ethical principles will be strictly adhered to throughout the 
research process, in order to maintain a high standard of work and a high quality of 
the research project. The information obtained will only be used for purposes of this 
study and will ensure anonymity end confidentiality of potential research participants 
and respondents. If so required, a copy of the write-up of my findings on the focus 
group, once approved by the University, can be can be made available to yourself. 
 







Annexure A: Framework of Questions for Focus Group 
Taking into account the research questions, consider the following: 
 
Q1. Over the past few years, how would you characterise the performance of 
municipalities in SA and what, in your view, are the contributing factors (both 
externally and internally) that have impacted on the performance of municipalities. 
In your response, expand on your understanding of the measurement as it relates to 
measuring or expressing a view on performance in municipalities in SA. 
 
Q2. In your own experience, what are the risks in the SA IGR System in relation to 
the performance of municipalities and what can be done to deal with these risks? 
 
Q3. Provide your views on what you believe is the role played by and how the 
interface between the following has impacted on the performance of 
municipalities over the past years? 
 Council, the Mayor, the Mayoral Committee, and the Executive 
Management  
 Community organisations 
 Private sector / business partners, etc. 
 
Q4. There are some best practices out there with some municipalities doing 
consistently well and others really struggling. Why do you believe is this the case 
and in your view, what are the things that can change (risks) that will potentially 
negatively impact on the continued good performance of some municipalities? 
Distinguish between external and external factors that may impact on the 
performance of municipalities. 
 
Q5. In your own experience, what do you believe are the links (if any) between 
governance and performance; and how has this played out in most municipalities in 







Q6: I will now present you with my proposed municipal governance and performance 
model. Please review it and, given some of your responses above, answer the 
following: 
 
• Do you believe that the model proposed captures the key requirements for 
governance and performance? 
• What are your own views on how and where it could be enhanced? 
• Do you think it will be possible to apply the model universally and that it will 
assist municipalities (institution, councils and communities) and oversight 
institutions to improve overall governance and performance? 
 
Annexure B: The proposed governance and performance model – only to be 







Annexure C: Research Questions. 
Research Question 1: 
“What are the inherent requirements for municipal performance in South 
Africa?” 
The sub-questions are as follows: 
• What is the all-embracing definition of performance?  
• What are the main strands, elements and constituent parts of 
organisational performance in the Municipalities? 
• What are main legislative and policy arrangements governing local 
government performance? 
Research Question 2:  
“What role does good governance play in municipal performance?” 
The sub-questions are as follows: 
• What is the all-embracing definition of governance and good governance? 
• What are the main strands, elements and constituent parts of good 
governance in the public sector? 
• What are the main legislative and policy arrangements governing local 
government governance? 
 
Ancillary Research Question 
The ancillary research question is associated and interrelated with the two stated 
main research questions and is aimed at bringing together the two main research 
questions. The ancillary question is as follows: “what is the nexus between good 






Appendix 10: Municipality Interview Guide and Framework of Questions for 
Interviews at Each Municipality 
Q1. Over the past few years, how would you characterise the performance of 
xxxxxxxxx municipality and what, in your view, are the contributing factors (externally 
and internally) that have impacted on the performance of xxxxxxxxx municipality? In 
your response, expand on your understanding of the measurement as it relates to 
measuring or expressing a view on performance in municipalities. 
 
Q2. In your own experience, what are the risks in the SA IGR System in relation to the 
performance of municipalities and what can be done to deal with these risks? 
 
Q3. In xxxxxxxxx municipality, expand on the role played by and the interface between: 
 Council, the Mayco, the mayor and the executive management  
 Community organisations 
 Private sector / business partners, etc. 
In the performance of xxxxxxxxx municipality over the past years? 
Q4. Things can change in xxxxxxxxx municipality: In your view, what are the things 
that can change (risks) that will potentially negatively impact on the continued 
performance of xxxxxxxxx municipality? Distinguish between external and external 
factors. 
 
Q5. In your own experience, what do you believe are the links (if any) between 
governance and performance; and how has this played out in xxxxxxxxx municipality 






Appendix 11: Swartland Municipality info request and approval letter  
 
Mr J Scholtz 
Municipal Manager: Swartland Municipality 
Malmesbury 
Via email: JoggieScholtz@swartland.org.za 
 
Dear Municipal Manager 
 
REQUEST FOR PERMISSION BY STUDENT (HC MALILA) TO CONDUCT 
RESEARCH AT YOUR MUNICIPALITY (SWARTLAND MUNICIPALITY)  
 
The above matter and our earlier discussions in this regard has reference.  
I am currently, a student at the School of Public Leadership, Stellenbosch University 
and currently in the process of completing my PhD in Public Management and 
Development Planning. 
The proposed title of my research will focus on developing an “Integrated conceptual 
diagnostic governance framework to address performance sustainability challenges of 
Municipalities in South Africa” which could equally be applied to municipalities in the 
Western Cape Province. The study is being undertaken under the supervision of Dr 
DJ Brand and Prof APJ Burger. 
The research will focus on the topical issue of municipal performance and the role of 
good governance as an enabler for municipal performance. Municipal performance in 
the context of the research refers to “the ability of a municipality to give effect to the 
objects of local government as set out in Section 152 of the Constitution, within the 





governance practices in delivering on its key obligations in an effective, efficient, 
economically and impactful manner. 
In pursuit of the stated goals and focus, the aim will be to develop of a conceptual 
municipal good governance and performance model that would address the key local 
government governance challenges and its associated impact on local government 
performance. The conceptual municipal good governance and performance model or 
framework would identify the critical inherent requirements for municipal governance 
and performance sustainability in South Africa. It is envisaged that this municipal good 
governance and performance model would guide municipalities on the key 
requirements and conditions or minimum standards that should be in place as a good 
basis to ensure and improve municipal performance sustainability in South Africa. In 
this regard, key research questions have been developed which the researcher will 
aim to answer through this research.  
Your Municipality has been identified as one of 4 Municipalities that I would like to use 
in my sample in responding to some of the research questions and to provide useful 
insights and information that would enable the researcher to answer some of the 
research questions relevant to the study. In addition to the academic value that will be 
derived from this study, it is envisaged that your Municipality, the Western Cape 
Government and other Municipalities in the Province and in South Africa, will benefit 
from the outcomes of this research project. 
Please be assured that ethical principles will be strictly adhered to throughout the 
research process, in order to maintain a high standard of work and a high quality of 
the research project. The information obtained will only be used for purposes of this 
study and will ensure anonymity end confidentiality of potential research participants 
and respondents. If so required, a copy of the write-up on my findings at your 
Municipality, once approved by the University, can be handed to your Municipality for 
use and application in your environment. 
In this regard, I am herewith requesting your approval and permission to collect the 
necessary data and information from yourself and the relevant officials within your 
Municipality for the purposes of completing my thesis. Attached find a framework that 





findings and comments from you and your team. Your responsive would feed into the 
development of a good governance and performance model for Municipalities. 




Student Number: 13208993 
 Email: harry.malila@westerncape.gov.za 
Cell phone: 082 855 5553 
Date:  
Approved  Not Approved 







Annexure 11A: Framework of Questions for Interviews 
Q1. Over the past few years, how would you characterise the performance of 
Swartland Municipality and what in your view are the contributing factors (externally 
and internally) that impacted on the performance of Swartland Municipality? In your 
response, expand on your understanding of the measurement as it relates to 
measuring or expressing a view on performance in municipalities. 
 
Q2. In your own experience, what are the risks in the SA IGR System in relation to the 
performance of municipalities and what can be done to deal with these risks? 
 
Q3. In Swartland municipality, expand on the role played by and the interface between 
the following In the performance of Swartland Municipality over the past years 
 Council, the Mayco, the mayor and the Executive Management  
 Community organisations 
 Private sector / business partners, etc. 
 
Q4. Things can change in Swartland Municipality: In your view, what are the things 
that can change (risks) that will potentially negatively impact on the continued 
performance of Swartland Municipality? Distinguish between internal and external 
factors. 
 
Q5. In your own experience, what do you believe are the links (if any) between 
governance and performance; and how has this played out in Swartland Municipality 
(necessary requirement, but insufficient condition)? 
Stellenbosch University https://scholar.sun.ac.za
